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Technologies on the stand: Legal and ethical questions in neuroscience and robotics originates in a 
conference with the same title, which was held at Tilburg University on 11 and 12 April 2011. The editors 


















At present, neurotechnologies such as functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Deep Brain 
Stimulation are mainly used in the health sector for research, diagnosis and therapy. But neurotechnologies 
could also be used for human enhancement, for instance to improve cognitive functions or to morally 
enhance convicted offenders. Moreover, insights from neuroscience are increasingly used for legal 
purposes, for instance to determine a suspectʼs responsibility for his actions, or to distinguish truthful from 
deceptive statements. This raises the question whether neuroscience even has a contribution to make to 
(criminal) law at this point in time. Regardless of this concern, neuroscience has already entered the 
courtroom and influenced legal decisions. Using neurotechnologies for legal purposes obviously raises a 
number of important ethical and legal questions that require further discussion, most importantly regarding 
the admissibility of neurotechnologies in court. 
Similarly, the application of robotics and autonomous technologies in various (social) situations, 
including the home, hospital environments, traffic and in war, raises a number of ethical and legal issues. 
These include questions such as: what are the ethical implications of applying robots in the health sector 
with regard to our ideas about human dignity and autonomy? What are the consequences of using robotics 
in war? And can we hold robots liable if they play an ever more important role in our daily lives? The 
increasing autonomy and intelligence of robotics technologies, moreover, raises questions regarding the 
moral and legal standing of such machines: should we implement ethics into robotic soldiers or robotic 
nannies, is this feasible, and if so, how should we go about designing moral machines? 
Technologies on the stand: Legal and ethical questions in neuroscience and robotics is a textbook of 
papers that deal with diverse topics from the fields of law and neuroscience on the one hand and law, ethics 
and robotics on the other hand. The book is organised as follows: the first part deals with different topics 
from the field of law and neuroscience, ranging from criminal responsibility to the legal implications of using 
neuroscientific evidence, to human enhancement and its ethical and legal implications. The second part of 
the book deals with diverse topics from the field of law, ethics and robotics, and includes chapters on the 
morality of robots, the ethical and legal status of robots, and the regulation of behaviour through the design 
of robots. 
Each part of the book is divided into three sections. We will now discuss each of these sections and 
the individual chapters contained in them. Section A of part I deals with criminal responsibility and the 
question to what extent neuroscience can be used to assess the responsibility of a suspect in a criminal trial. 
In Chapter 1 Stephen Morse states that at present neuroscience does not have a large contribution to make 
to law generally, and that overclaims about the relevance of neuroscience to the law should be avoided. 
According to Stephen Morse, neuroscience is likely to make useful contributions to the law in the future by 
helping us to understand criminal behaviour better. Chapter 2, by Nicole Vincent, deals with restored mental 
capacities and the question whether direct brain interventions aimed at mental capacity restoration can help 
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us to assess the responsibility of someone who becomes mentally ill subsequent to committing their crime. 
In addition, the chapter addresses the question whether direct brain interventions aimed at mental capacity 
restoration help us to make a convicted offender more responsible. 
Section B of part I deals with the legal issues raised by using neurotechnologies in the courtroom. In 
Chapter 3, Stefan Seiterle discusses the use of fMRI for lie detection as one of the core goals of criminal 
procedure. The main focus of this chapter is on the question whether, and under what circumstances, 
neuroscience-based lie detection would be admissible in criminal courts in Germany. Chapter 4, by Jan 
Christoph Bublitz deals with the ethical and legal issues of using neurotechnologies to change the minds of 
other people outside of a therapeutic context. Bublitz explains how neuroscience may change legal thinking 
about the protection of the mind. Chapter 5, by Laura Klaming, addresses one specific challenge of using 
neuroscience in the courtroom, i.e. the potentially overly persuasive influence of neuroscientific evidence on 
legal decision-making. More specifically, the importance of presentation mode in the discussion about the 
admissibility of neuroscientific evidence in court is emphasised. In Chapter 6, Tommaso Bruni discusses 
cross-cultural variability at the neural level and its consequences for the use of fMRI for the purpose of lie 
detection stressing that fMRI lie-detection may hinder the ascertainment of truth, if research does not take 
cross-cultural variability into account. 
Section C of part one of Technologies on the stand deals with enhancement and the various ethical 
and legal questions that arise with regard to human enhancement. In Chapter 7 Anna Pacholczyk discusses 
the use of neurotechnologies for the purpose of moral and social enhancement. Besides examining what we 
mean by moral enhancement and what is currently possible, she discusses the potential problems with 
morally enhancing interventions. Chapter 8, by Elizabeth Shaw, focuses on the possibility of employing 
neurotechnologies in the penal system to morally enhance offenders. Elizabeth Shaw argues against 
attempting to alter offendersʼ goals and values using neurotechnologies that wholly or largely circumvent the 
offenderʼs rationality mainly for reasons of equality and moral dialogue. Chapter 9, by Bert-Jaap Koops and 
Ronald Leenes, deals with the possibility of using new technologies in order to improve our sight and vision 
and outlines a number of ethical and legal issues that may arise with this yet hypothetical form of human 
enhancement. In Chapter 10 Pieter Bonte answers the question why we should be natural by presenting five 
arguments against the supposed duty to ʻbe naturalʼ as grounds for outlawing human enhancement. 
Part II of this book deals with law, ethics and robotics. Section A of part II addresses the foundations of 
roboethics. Chapter 11, by Wendell Wallach, focuses on ethics, law, and public policy in the development of 
robotics and neurotechnologies. Wallach argues that robotic technologies in combination with 
neurotechnologies and other emerging technologies will contribute to a transformation of human culture, 
which will pose important challenges that need to be addressed. In Chapter 12, Samir Chopra answers the 
question whether robots can be considered moral agents, focusing on the ascription of an appropriate set of 
beliefs and desires to a putative intentional entity. Chapter 13, by Steve Torrance, deals with the ethical and 
legal status of artificial agents. Specifically, the moral status of robots is linked to their consciousness. In 
Chapter 14 David Jablonka addresses the problems that must be encountered and grappled with when 
discussing the moral responsibility of machines.  
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Section B of part II deals with ethics and the design of robots, and with the implementation of ethics or 
morality into robots. In Chapter 15 Andreas Matthias analyses the concept of an ethical governor, which is 
supposed to effectively control and enforce the ethical use of lethal force by robots on the battlefield and 
which has had a great influence on the design of war robots. He argues that the concept of an ethical 
governor as favoured and already implemented by the military research community is misleading and does 
not address the moral problems it is supposed to solve. Chapter 16, by Aimee van Wynsberghe, outlines a 
framework for the ethical evaluation of care robots. Specifically, Aimee van Wynsberghe emphasises the 
importance of understanding the complexity of care practices, and the consequences this may have for 
designing care robots. In Chapter 17 Joshua Lucas and Gary Comstock ask the question whether machines 
have prima facie duties by comparing two competing moral theories for the basis of algorithmic artificial 
ethical agents.  
The final section of part II focuses on legal issues in robotics. Chapter 18 deals with the legal 
responsibility of robots under Italian and European law. Chiara Boscarato discusses whether a robot should 
be considered an artefact or whether it should be compared to a person, for instance to a minor or a person 
with an unsound mind. In the final chapter, Bibi van den Berg argues that scholars in the field of Law & 
Technology ought to widen the scope of their research into techno-regulation, to include not only the 
intentional influencing of individuals through technological artefacts, but also more subtle, and implicit forms 
thereof. She discusses examples from various robotics domains to explain how this could work. 
 
The editors wish to thank the following persons: first and foremost, the authors of the book, whose 
work has turned editing this volume into a real pleasure. We also wish to thank the reviewers for their time 
and effort to provide feedback on all of the papers. We thank Han Somsen and Anton Vedder, who, in their 
role as head of the Tilburg Institute of Law, Technology and Society (TILT) made it possible to organise the 
conference that was at the heart of this book. Thanks also to the members of the organising team who 
supported us in realising the conference and the book, Leonie de Jong, Femke Abousalama and Vivian 
Carter. We thank Debbie Rovers and Ellen Knol for the great job they did in designing promotional materials 
for the conference and the cover of this book. And last but not least, we thank our publisher, Simone Fennell, 
for a job well done. 
 
Laura Klaming & Bibi van den Berg 
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NeuroLawExuberance: A plea for neuromodesty 
Stephen J. Morse* 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 smorse@law.upenn.edu 
 
Abstract This chapter suggests on conceptual and empirical grounds that at present neuroscience does 
not have a large contribution to make to criminal justice doctrine, adjudication and policy and to law 
generally despite the great advances in the science. Irrational exuberance and overclaims about the 
relevance should be avoided. It also explains why the new neuroscience does not present a radical 
challenge to current legal conceptions of agency and responsibility. Although present caution is warranted, 
the chapter concludes that in the near and intermediate term, as the science advances, neuroscience 
might well make helpful contributions to the law. 
Introduction 
In a 2002 editorial, the Economist warned, “Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make 
society homogeneous, and gut the concept of human nature. But neuroscience could do all those things 
first.” (2002, p. 77). The genome was fully sequenced in 2001 and there has not been one resulting major 
advance in therapeutic medicine since. Thus, even in its most natural domain, medicine, genetics has not 
had the far-reaching consequences that were envisioned. The same has been true for various other sciences 
that were predicted to revolutionize the law, including behavioural psychology, sociology, psychodynamic 
psychology, and others. I believe that this will also be true of neuroscience, which is simply the newest 
science on the block. Neuroscience is not going to do the terrible things the Economist fears, at least not for 
the foreseeable future. Neuroscience has many things to say, but not nearly as much as people would hope, 
 




 Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law & Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, University of 
Pennsylvania. This paper was first prepared for and presented at a conference on October 22, 2010 sponsored by the 
Mercer Law Review, ʻBrain Sciences in the Courtroomʼ. It will be published in 62 Mercer Law Review (2011). It is 
published here in altered form with the kind permission of the editors of the Mercer Law Review. Jakob Elster and 
Michael Moore provided invaluable insights. As always, I thank my personal attorney, Jean Avnet Morse, for her sound, 
sober counsel and moral support. 
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especially in relation to law. At most, in the near to intermediate term, neuroscience may make modest 
contributions to legal policy and case adjudication. Nonetheless, there has been irrational exuberance about 
the potential contribution, an issue I addressed previously in an article addressing ʻBrain Overclaim 
Syndromeʼ (Morse, 2006). I now wish to re-examine the case for caution. 
In this chapter, I shall first make some remarks about the lawʼs motivation and the motivation of some 
advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard normative problems that law addresses. Then I shall 
consider the lawʼs psychology and its concept of the person and responsibility. I then consider how 
neuroscience might be related to law, which I call the issue of ʻtranslationʼ. Next, I turn to various distractions 
that have bedeviled clear thinking about the relation of scientific, causal accounts of behaviour to 
responsibility. The chapter then examines the limits of neurolaw. The next section considers why neurolaw 
does not pose a genuinely radical challenge to the lawʼs concepts of the person and responsibility. 
Nonetheless, the next section makes a case for cautious optimism about the contribution neuroscience may 
make to law in the near and intermediate term. A brief conclusion follows. 
Science and law 
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative, addressing how we should regulate our lives in 
a complex society. How do we live together? What are the duties we owe each other? When, for violation of 
those duties, is the State justified in imposing the most afflictive but sometimes justified exercises of state 
power, criminal blame and punishment?
1
 When should we do this, to whom and how much? 
Virtually every legal issue is contested – consider criminal responsibility, for example – and there is 
always room for debate about policy, doctrine and adjudication. In a fine, recent book, Professor Robin 
Feldman (2009) has argued that law lacks the courage forthrightly to address the difficult normative issues 
that it faces. It therefore adopts what Feldman terms an internalizing and an externalizing strategy for using 
science to try to avoid the difficulties. In the former, the law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria. A 
futuristic example might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility. In the latter, the law turns to 
scientific or clinical experts to make the decision. An example would be using forensic clinicians to decide 
whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial and then simply rubberstamping the clinicianʼs 
opinion. Neither strategy is successful because each avoids facing the hard questions and they retard legal 
evolution and progress. Professor Feldman concludes, and I agree (Morse, 2011), that the law does not err 
by using science too little, as is commonly claimed. Rather, it errs by using it too much because the law is so 
insecure about its resources and capacities to do justice. 
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Here is my speculative interpretation of the motivation of enthusiasts for using neuroscience in criminal 
justice. Many hate the concept of retributive justice, thinking it is both prescientific and harsh. Their hope is 
that the new neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is true, that no offender is genuinely 
responsible, and that the only logical conclusion is that the law should adopt a consequentially-based 
prediction/prevention system of social control guided by the knowledge of the neuroscientist-kings who will 
finally have supplanted the Platonic philosopher-kings (Greene & Cohen, 2006, pp. 217-218). On a more 
modest level, many advocates think that neuroscience may not revolutionize criminal justice, but it will 
demonstrate that many more offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh punishments 
United States criminal justice imposes. Four decades ago, they would have been using psychodynamic 
psychology for the same purpose and more recently genetics has been employed similarly. The impulse is 
clear, however: jettison desert, or at least mitigate judgments of desert. As we shall see below, however, 
these advocates often adopt an untenable theory of mitigation or excuse that quickly collapses into the 
nihilistic conclusion that no one is really criminally responsible. 
The lawʼs psychology, concept of the person and responsibility 
Criminal law presupposes a ʻfolk psychologicalʼ view of the person and behaviour. This psychological 
theory explains behaviour in part by mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans. 
Biological, other psychological and sociological variables also play a causal role, but folk psychology 
considers mental states fundamental to a full causal explanation and understanding of human action. 
Lawyers, philosophers and scientists argue about the definitions of mental states and theories of action, but 
that does not undermine the general claim that mental states are fundamental. Indeed, the arguments and 
evidence disputants use to convince others presuppose the folk psychological view of the person. Brains 
donʼt convince each other; people do. Folk psychology presupposes only that human action will at least be 
rationalisable by mental state explanations or that it will be responsive to reasons, including incentives, 
under the right conditions. 
For example, the folk psychological explanation for why you are reading this chapter is, roughly, that 
you desire to understand the relation of neuroscience to criminal responsibility or to law generally, you 
believe that reading the chapter will help fulfil that desire, and thus you formed the intention to read it. This is 
a practical rather than a deductive syllogism. 
Brief reflection should indicate that the lawʼs psychology must be a folk psychological theory, a view of 
the person as a conscious (and potentially self-conscious) creature who forms and acts on intentions that are 
the product of the personʼs other mental states. We are the sort of creatures that can act for and respond to 
reasons. The law treats persons generally as intentional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces of 
nature. 
Law is primarily action-guiding and could not guide people directly and indirectly unless people could 
use rules as premises in their reasoning about how they should behave. Otherwise, law as an action-guiding 
system of rules would be useless, and perhaps incoherent. Legal rules are action-guiding primarily because 
they provide an agent with good moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or action. Human behaviour can 
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be modified by means other than influencing deliberation and human beings do not always deliberate before 
they act. Nonetheless, the law presupposes folk psychology, even when we most habitually follow the legal 
rules. Unless people are capable of understanding and then using legal rules to guide their conduct, law 
would be powerless to affect human behaviour. 
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must always reason or consistently behave 
rationally according to some pre-ordained, normative notion of rationality. Rather the lawʼs view is that 
people are capable of acting for reasons and are capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly 
conventional, socially-constructed standards. The type of rationality the law requires is the ordinary personʼs 
common sense view of rationality, not the technical notion that might be acceptable within the disciplines of 
economics, philosophy, psychology, computer science, and the like. 
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished is the 
product of mental causation and, in principle, responsive to reason, including incentives. Machines may 
cause harm, but they cannot do wrong and they cannot violate expectations about how people ought to live 
together. Machines do not deserve praise, blame, reward, punishment, concern or respect because they 
exist or because of the results they cause. Only people, intentional agents with the potential to act, can 
violate expectations of what they owe each other and only people can do wrong. 
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action consider folk psychology to be a primitive 
or pre-scientific view of human behaviour. For the foreseeable future, however, the law will be based on the 
folk psychological model of the person and behaviour described. Until and unless scientific discoveries 
convince us that our view of ourselves is radically wrong, the basic explanatory apparatus of folk psychology 
will remain central. It is vital that we not lose sight of this model lest we fall into confusion when various 
claims based on neuroscience are made. If any science is to have appropriate influence on current law and 
legal decision making, it must be relevant to and translated into the lawʼs folk psychological framework, as 
shall be discussed in more detail below.  
All of the lawʼs doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility are folk psychological. Begin with the 
definitional criteria, the ʻelementsʼ of crime. The ʻvoluntaryʼ act requirement is defined, roughly, as an 
intentional bodily movement (or omission in cases in which the person has a duty to act) done in a 
reasonably integrated state of consciousness. Other than crimes of strict liability, all crimes also require a 
culpable further mental state, such as purpose, knowledge or recklessness. All affirmative defences of 
justification and excuse involve an inquiry into the personʼs mental state, such as the belief that self-
defensive force was necessary or the lack of knowledge of right from wrong.  
Our folk psychological concepts of criminal responsibility follow logically from the action-guiding nature 
of law itself, from its folk psychological concept of the person and action, and from the aim of achieving 
retributive justice, which holds that no one should be punished unless they deserve it and no more than they 
deserve. The general capacity for rationality is the primary condition for responsibility and the lack of that 
capacity is the primary condition for excusing a person. If human beings were not rational creatures who 
could understand the good reasons for action and were not capable of conforming to legal requirements 
through intentional action or forbearance, the law could not adequately guide action and it would not be just. 
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Legally responsible agents are therefore people who have the general capacity to grasp and be guided by 
good reason in particular legal contexts.
2
 
In most cases of excuse, the agent who has done something wrong acts for a reason, but either is not 
capable of rationality generally or is incapable on the specific occasion in question. This explains, for 
example, why young children and some people with mental disorders are not held responsible. How much 
lack of rational capacity is necessary to find the agent not responsible is a moral, social, political, and 
ultimately legal issue. It is not a scientific, medical, psychological, or psychiatric issue. 
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition. Literal compulsion exists when the personʼs 
bodily movement is a pure mechanism that is not rationalisable by the agentʼs desires, beliefs and intentions. 
These cases defeat the requirement of a ʻvoluntary actʼ. For example, a tremor or spasm produced by a 
neurological disorder is not an action because it is not intentional and it therefore defeats the ascription of a 
voluntary act. Metaphorical compulsion exists when the agent acts intentionally, but in response to some 
hard choice imposed on the agent through no fault of his or her own. For example, if a miscreant holds a gun 
to an agentʼs head and threatens to kill her unless she kills another innocent person, it would be wrong to kill 
under these circumstances. Nevertheless, the law may decide as a normative matter to excuse the act of 
intentional killing because the agent was motivated by a threat so great that it would be supremely difficult for 
most citizens to resist. Cases involving internal compulsive states are more difficult to conceptualize because 
it is difficult to define ʻloss of controlʼ (Morse, 2002). The cases that most fit this category are ʻdisorders of 
desireʼ, such as addictions and sexual disorders. The question is why these acting agents lack control but 
other people with strong desires do not? In any case, if the person frequently yields to his or her apparently 
very strong desires at great social, occupational, or legal cost to herself, the agent will often say that she 
could not help herself, that she was not in control, and that an excuse or mitigation was therefore warranted. 
Lost in translation? Legal relevance and the need for translation 
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to law? We must begin with a distinction 
between internal relevance and external relevance. An internal contribution or critique accepts the general 
coherence and legitimacy of a set of legal doctrines, practices or institutions and attempts to explain or alter 
them. For example, an internal contribution of criminal responsibility may suggest the need for doctrinal 
reform, of, say, the insanity defence, but it would not suggest that the notion of criminal responsibility is itself 
incoherent or illegitimate. By contrast, an externally relevant critique suggests the doctrines, practices or 
institutions are incoherent, illegitimate or unjustified. Because a radical, external critique has little possibility 
 




 I borrow the felicitious phrase, “to grasp and be guided” by reason from Wallace (1994). 
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of success at present, as I explain below, here I will make the simplifying assumption that the contributions of 
neuroscience will be internal and thus will need to be translated into the lawʼs folk psychological concepts. 
The lawʼs criteria for responsibility and competence are essentially behavioural – acts and mental 
states. The criteria of neuroscience are mechanistic – neural structure and function. Is the apparent chasm 
between those two types of discourse bridgeable? This is a familiar question in the field of mental health law 
(Stone, 1984, pp. 95-96), but there is even greater dissonance in neurolaw. Psychiatry and psychology 
sometimes treat behaviour mechanistically, sometimes treat it folk psychologically, and sometimes blend the 
two. In many cases, the psychological sciences are quite close in approach to folk psychology. 
Neuroscience, in contrast, is purely mechanistic and eschews folk psychological concepts and discourse. 
Thus, the gap will be harder to bridge. 
The brain does enable the mind, even if we do not know how this occurs. Therefore, facts we learn 
about brains in general or about a specific brain in principle could provide useful information about mental 
states and human capacities in general and in specific cases. Some believe that this conclusion is a 
category error (Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Pardo & Patterson, 2010). This is a plausible view and perhaps it is 
correct. If it is, then the whole subject of neurolaw is empty and there was no point to writing this chapter in 
the first place. Let us therefore bracket this pessimistic view and determine what follows from the more 
optimistic position that what we learn about the brain and nervous system can be potentially helpful to 
resolving questions of criminal responsibility if the findings are properly translated into the lawʼs 
psychological framework.  
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally relevant because it makes a proposition 
about responsibility or competence more or less likely to be true. Any legal criterion must be established 
independently, and biological evidence must be translated into the criminal lawʼs folk psychological criteria. 
That is, the expert must be able to explain precisely how the neuroevidence bears on whether the agent 
acted, formed a required mens rea, or met the criteria for an excusing condition. If the evidence is not directly 
relevant, the expert should be able to explain the chain of inference from the indirect evidence to the lawʼs 
criteria. At present, as the part about the limits of neurolaw explains, few such data exist, but neuroscience is 
advancing so rapidly that such data may exist in the near or medium term. Moreover, the argument is 
conceptual and does not depend on any particular neuroscience findings. 
Dangerous distractions concerning neuroscience and criminal responsibility and 
competence 
This section of the article considers a number of related issues that are often thought to be relevant to 
criminal responsibility and competence but that are irrelevant or confusions and distractions: free will, 
causation as an excuse, causation as compulsion, prediction as an excuse, dualism, and the non-efficacy of 
mental states. Much of the legal exuberance about the contributions of neurolaw flow from these confusions 
and distractions, so it is important to correct them. But the legal exuberance also flows from unrealistic 
expectations about the scientific accomplishments of neuroscience. The next part of this article addresses 
the scientific exuberance. 
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Contrary to what many people believe and what judges and others sometimes say, free will is not a 
legal criterion that is part of any doctrine and it is not even foundational for criminal responsibility (Morse, 
2007). Criminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth of determinism or universal causation that 
allegedly undermines the foundations of responsibility. Even if determinism is true, some people act and 
some people do not. Some people form prohibited mental states and some do not. Some people are legally 
insane or act under duress when they commit crimes, but most defendants are not legally insane or acting 
under duress. Moreover, these distinctions matter to moral and legal theories of responsibility and fairness 
that we have reason to endorse. Thus, law addresses problems genuinely related to responsibility, including 
consciousness, the formation of mental states such as intention and knowledge, the capacity for rationality, 
and compulsion, but it never addresses the presence or absence of free will. 
When most people use the term free will or its lack in the context of legal responsibility, they are 
typically using this term loosely as a synonym for the conclusion that the defendant was or was not criminally 
responsible. They typically have reached this conclusion for reasons that do not involve free will, such as 
that the defendant was legally insane or acted under duress, but such usage of free will only perpetuates 
misunderstanding and confusion. Once the legal criteria for excuse have been met, for example—and none 
includes lack of free will as a criterion—the defendant will be excused without any reference whatsoever to 
free will as an independent ground for excuse. 
There is a genuine metaphysical problem about free will, which is whether human beings have the 
capacity to act uncaused by anything other than themselves and whether this capacity is a necessary 
foundation for holding anyone legally or morally accountable for criminal conduct. Philosophers and others 
have debated these issues in various forms for millennia and there is no resolution in sight. Indeed, some 
people think the problem is not resolvable. This is a real philosophical issue, but, it is not a problem for the 
law, and neuroscience raises no new challenge to this conclusion. Solving the free will problem would have 
profound implications for responsibility doctrines and practices, such as blame and punishment, but, at 
present, having or lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of any civil or criminal law doctrine.  
Neuroscience is simply the most recent mechanistic causal science that appears deterministically to 
explain behaviour. It thus joins social structural variables, behaviourism, genetics, and other scientific 
explanations that have also been deterministic explanations for behaviour. In principle, however, 
neuroscience adds nothing new, even if it is better, more persuasive science than some of its predecessors. 
No science, including neuroscience, can demonstrate that libertarian free will does or does not exist. As long 
as free will in the strong sense is not foundational for just blame and punishment and is not a criterion at the 
doctrinal level—which it is not—the truth of determinism or universal causation poses no threat to legal 
responsibility. Neuroscience may help shed light on folk psychological excusing conditions, such as 
automatism or insanity, for example, but the truth of determinism is not an excusing condition. The law will be 
fundamentally challenged only if neuroscience or any other science can conclusively demonstrate that the 
lawʼs psychology is wrong and that we are not the type of creatures for whom mental states are causally 
effective. This is a different question from whether determinism undermines responsibility, however, and this 
article returns to it below. 
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A related confusion is that behaviour is excused if it is caused, but causation per se is not a legal or 
moral mitigating or excusing condition. I have termed this confusion “the fundamental psycholegal error” 
(Morse, 1994, pp. 1592-1594). At most, causal explanations can only provide evidence concerning whether 
a genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was present. For example, suppose a life 
history marked by poverty and abuse played a predisposing causal role in a defendantʼs criminal behaviour. 
Or suppose that an alleged new mental syndrome played a causal role in explaining criminal conduct. The 
claim is often made that such causes, which are not within the actorʼs capacity to control rationally, should be 
an excusing or mitigating position per se, but this claim is false.  
All behaviour is the product of the necessary and sufficient causal conditions without which the 
behaviour would not have occurred, including brain causation, which is always part of the causal explanation 
for any behaviour. If causation were an excusing condition per se, then no one would be responsible for any 
behaviour. Some people welcome such a conclusion and believe that responsibility is impossible, but this is 
not the legal and moral world we inhabit. The law holds most adults responsible for most of their conduct and 
genuine excusing conditions are limited. Thus, unless the personʼs history or mental condition, for example, 
provides evidence of an existing excusing or mitigating condition, such as lack of rational capacity, there is 
no reason for excuse or mitigation. 
Even a genuinely abnormal cause is not an excusing condition. For example, imagine a person with 
paranoid suspiciousness who constantly and hypervigilantly scans his environment for cues of an impending 
threat. Suppose our person with paranoia now spots a genuine threat that no normal person would have 
recognized and responds with proportionate defensive force. The paranoia played a causal role in explaining 
the behaviour, but no excusing condition obtained. If the paranoia produced a delusional belief that an attack 
was imminent, then a genuine excuse, legal insanity – an irrationality-based defence – might be appropriate.  
In short, a neuroscientific causal explanation for criminal conduct, like any other type of causal 
explanation, does not per se mitigate or excuse. It provides only evidence that might help the law resolve 
whether a genuine excuse existed or it may in the future provide data that might be a guide to prophylactic or 
rehabilitative measures. 
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition, but causation, including brain causation, is 
not the equivalent of compulsion. As we have seen, compulsion may be either literal or metaphorical and 
normative. It is crucial to recognize that most human action is not plausibly the result of either type of 
compulsion, but all human behaviour is caused by its necessary and sufficient causes, including brain 
causation. Even abnormal causes are not compelling. Suppose, for example, that a person with paedophilic 
urges has them weakly and is weakly sexed in general. If the person molested a child there would be no 
ground for a compulsion excuse. If causation were per se the equivalent of compulsion, all behaviour would 
be compelled and no one would be responsible. Once again, this is not a plausible account of the lawʼs 
responsibility conditions. Causal information from neuroscience might help us resolve questions concerning 
whether legal compulsion existed or it might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures when 
dealing with plausible legal compulsion. But causation is not per se compulsion. 
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other science, can enhance the accuracy of 
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behavioural predictions, but predictability is also not per se an excusing or mitigating condition, even if the 
predictability of the behaviour is perfect. To understand this, just consider how many things each of us does 
that are perfectly predictable for which there is no plausible excusing or mitigating condition. Even if the 
explanatory variables that enhance prediction are abnormal, excuse or mitigation is warranted only if a 
genuine excusing or mitigating condition is present. For example, recent research demonstrates that a 
history of childhood abuse coupled with a specific, genetically-produced enzyme abnormality that affects 
neurotransmitter levels vastly increase the risk that a person will behave antisocially as an adolescent or 
young adult (Caspi et al., 2002). A person is nine times more at risk if he has the MAOA deficiency and a 
childhood abuse history. Does that mean an offender with this gene by environment interaction is not 
responsible, or less responsible? No. The offender may not be fully responsible or responsible at all, but not 
because there is a causal explanation. What is the intermediary excusing or mitigating principle? Are these 
people, for instance, more impulsive? Are they lacking rationality? What is the actual excusal or mitigating 
condition? Again, causation is not compulsion and predictability is not an excuse. Just because an offender 
is caused to do something or is predictable does not mean the offender is compelled to do the crime charged 
or is otherwise not responsible. Brain causation, or any other kind of causation, does not mean we are 
automatons and not really acting agents at all.  
Causal information may be of prophylactic or rehabilitative use for people affected, but no excuse or 
mitigation is applicable just because these variables make antisocial behaviour far more predictable. If the 
variables that enhance prediction also produce a genuine excusing or mitigating condition, then excuse or 
mitigation is justified for the latter reason and independent of the prediction.  
Most informed people are not ʻdualistsʼ about the relation between the mind and the brain. That is, 
they no longer think that our minds (or souls) are independent of our brains (and bodies more generally) and 
can somehow exert a causal influence over our bodies. It may seem, therefore, as if lawʼs emphasis on the 
importance of mental states as causing behaviour is based on a pre-scientific, outmoded form of dualism, but 
this is not the case. Although the brain enables the mind, we have no idea how this occurs and have no idea 
how action is possible (McHugh & Slavney, 1998, pp. 11-12). It is clear that, at the least, mental states are 
dependent upon or supervene on brain states, but neither neuroscience nor any other science has 
demonstrated that mental states play no independent and partial causal role. Indeed, the most likely 
explanation of complex human behaviour will be multi-field, multi-level, and will include mental states 
(Craver, 2007). 
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind–brain-action relation, some scientists and philosophers 
question whether mental states have any causal effect, treating mental states as psychic appendixes that 
evolution has created but that have no genuine function. These claims are not strawpersons. They are 
seriously made by serious, thoughtful people (Greene & Cohen, 2006, pp. 217-218). As discussed below. If 
accepted, they would create a complete and revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility 
and competence (and more widely). Thus, this claim is an external critique and must be understood as such. 




In conclusion, legal actors concerned with criminal law policy, doctrine and adjudication must always 
keep the folk psychological view present to their minds when considering claims or evidence from 
neuroscience and must always question how the science is legally relevant to the lawʼs action and mental 
states criteria. The truth of determinism, causation and predictability do not in themselves answer any 
doctrinal or policy issue. 
The limits of neurolaw 
Most generally, the relation between brain, mind and action is one of the hardest problems in all 
science. We have no idea how the brain enables the mind or how action is possible (McHugh & Slavney, 
1998). The brain-mind-action relation is a mystery. For example, we would like to know the difference 
between a neuromuscular spasm and intentionally moving oneʼs arm in exactly the same way. The former is 
a purely mechanical motion, whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot explain the difference between 
the two. We know that a functioning brain is a necessary condition for having mental states and for acting. 
After all, if your brain is dead, you have no mental states, are not acting, and indeed are not doing much of 
anything at all. Still, we do not know how mental states and action are caused.  
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other neuroscientific methods, we still do not 
have sophisticated causal knowledge of how the brain works generally and we have little information that is 
legally relevant. This is unsurprising. The scientific problems are fearsomely difficult and only in the last 
decade have researchers begun to accumulate much data from functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), which is the technology that has generated most of the legal interest. Moreover, virtually no studies 
have been performed to address specifically legal questions.  
Before turning to the specific reasons for neuromodesty, a few preliminary points of general 
applicability must be addressed. The first and most important is to repeat the message of the prior section of 
this article. Causation by biological variables, including abnormal biological variables, does not per se create 
an excusing or mitigating condition. Any excusing condition must be established independently. The goal is 
always to translate the biological evidence into the criminal lawʼs folk psychological criteria. 
Assessing criminal responsibility involves a retrospective evaluation of the defendantʼs mental states 
at the time of the crime. No criminal wears a portable scanner or other neurodetection device that provides a 
measurement at the time of the crime. At least, not yet. Further, neuroscience is insufficiently developed to 
detect specific, legally-relevant mental content or to provide a sufficiently accurate diagnostic marker for 
even severe mental disorder (Frances, 2009). Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural structure and function 
that bear on legally relevant capacities, such as the capacity for rationality and control, may be temporally 
stable in general or in individual cases. If they are, neuroevidence may permit a reasonably valid 
retrospective inference about the defendantʼs rational and control capacities and their impact on criminal 
behaviour. This will of course depend on the existence of adequate science to do this. We now lack such 
science, but future research may remedy this. 
Questions concerning competence or predictions of future behaviour are based on a subjectʼs present 
condition. Thus, the retrospective problems besetting retrospective responsibility analysis do not apply to 
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such questions. The criteria for competence are functional. They ask whether the subject can perform some 
task, such as understanding the nature of a criminal proceeding or understanding a treatment option that is 
being offered, at a level the law considers normatively acceptable to warrant respecting the subjectʼs choice 
and autonomy. 
Now, let us begin consideration of the specific grounds for neuromodesty. At present, most 
neuroscience studies on human beings involve very small numbers of subjects, which makes establishing 
statistical significance difficult. Most of the studies have been done on college and university students, who 
are hardly a random sample of the population generally and of criminal offenders specifically. There is also a 
serious question of whether findings based on subjectsʼ behaviour and brain activity in a scanner would 
apply to real world situations. Further, most studies average the neurodata over the subjects and the 
average finding may not accurately describe the brain structure or function of any actual subject in the study. 
Replications are few, which is especially important for law. Policy and adjudication should not be influenced 
by findings that are insufficiently established and replications of findings are crucial to our confidence in a 
result. Finally, the neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal behaviour is largely in its infancy and what is 
known is quite coarse-grained and correlational rather than fine-grained and causal (Miller, 2010).
3
 What is 
being investigated is an association between a task in the scanner and brain activity. These studies do not 
demonstrate that the brain activity is either a necessary, sufficient or predisposing causal condition for the 
behavioural task that is being done in the scanner. Any language that suggests otherwise, such as claiming 
that some brain region is the neural substrate for the behaviour, is simply not justifiable. Moreover, activity in 
the same region may be associated with diametrically opposed behavioural phenomena, such as love and 
hate. 
There are also technical and research design difficulties. It takes many mathematical transformations 
to get from the raw fMRI data to the images of the brain that are increasingly familiar. Explaining these 
transformations is beyond me, but I do understand that the likelihood that an investigator will find a 
statistically significant result depends on how the researcher sets the threshold for significance. There is 
dispute about this and the threshold levels are conventional. Change the threshold and the outcome will 
change. Now, I have been convinced by my neuroscience colleagues that many of such technical difficulties 
have been largely solved, but research design and potentially unjustified inferences from the studies are still 
an acute problem. It is extraordinarily difficult to control for all conceivable artifacts. Consequently, there are 
often problems of over-inference.  
A major, potential problem for present and future collection and use of imaging evidence is whether an 
 








uncooperative subject can invalidate a scan by the intentional use of countermeasures. This is not a problem 
if the subject either has a right not to be scanned, such as a 5th Amendment constitutional right in the United 
States not to be a witness against himself, or if the subject wishes to use neuroscience evidence. But if the 
subject can be scanned involuntarily or if the subjectʼs purposes are served by invalidating a consensual 
scan, this is a difficulty. The first experimental study of this question has now been published and it discloses 
that in a laboratory lie-detection study, subjects could substantially undermine the accuracy of lie-detection 
by employing countermeasures (Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit, & Schendan 2011). 
Over time, however, these problems may ease as imaging and other techniques become less 
expensive and more accurate, as research designs become more sophisticated, and as the sophistication of 
the science increases generally. It is also an open question whether accurate inferences or predictions about 
individuals are possible using group data for a group that include the individual. This is a very controversial 
topic, but even if it is difficult or impossible now, it may become easier in the future.  
Virtually all neuroscience studies of potential interest to the law involve some behaviour that has 
already been identified as of interest and the point of the study is to identify that behaviourʼs neural 
correlates. Neuroscientists do not go on general ʻfishingʼ expeditions. There is usually some bit of behaviour, 
such as addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity, that they would like to understand better by investigating its 
neural correlates. To do this properly presupposes that the researchers have already identified and validated 
the behaviour under neuroscientific investigation. I call this the ʻclear cutʼ problem. We typically get clear 
neuroscientific results only in cases in which the behavioural evidence was already clear. 
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behaviour is not well-characterized or is 
neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly different behaviour. In general, however, the existence of 
legally relevant behaviour will already be apparent. For example, some people are grossly out of touch with 
reality. If, as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them because they lack such 
knowledge. We might learn a great deal about the neural correlates of such psychological abnormalities, but 
we already knew without neuroscientic data that these abnormalities existed and we had a firm view of their 
normative significance. In the future, however, we may learn more about the causal link between the brain 
and behaviour and studies may be devised that are more directly legally relevant. I suspect that we are 
unlikely to make substantial progress with neural assessment of mental content, but we are likely to learn 
more about capacities that will bear on excuse or mitigation. 
The criteria for responsibility and competence criteria are behavioural; therefore, actions speak louder 
than images. This is a truism for all criminal responsibility and competence assessments. If the finding of any 
test or measurement of behaviour is contradicted by actual behavioural evidence, then we must believe the 
behavioural evidence because it is more direct and probative of the lawʼs behavioural criteria. For example, if 
the person behaves rationally in a wide variety of circumstances, the agent is rational even if the brain 
appears structurally or functionally abnormal. And we confidently knew that some people were behaviourally 
abnormal, such as being psychotic, long before there were any psychological or neurological tests for such 
abnormalities. An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive. Suppose someone complains about 
back pain, a subjective symptom, and the question is whether the subject actually does have back pain. We 
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know that many people with abnormal spines do not experience back pain, and many people who complain 
of back pain have normal spines. If the person is claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence 
that the person regularly exercises on a trampoline without difficulty indicates that there is no disability 
caused by back pain. If there is reason to suspect malingering, however, and there is not clear behavioural 
evidence of lack of pain, then a completely normal spine might be of use in deciding whether the claimant is 
malingering. Unless the correlation between the image and the legally relevant behaviour is very powerful, 
such evidence will be of limited help, however.  
If actions speak louder than images, however, what room is there for using neuroevidence? Let us 
begin with cases in which the behavioural evidence is clear and permits an equally clear inference about the 
defendantʼs mental state. For example, lay people may not know the technical term to apply to people who 
are manifestly out of touch with reality, but they will readily recognize this unfortunate condition. No further 
tests of any sort will be necessary to prove this. In such cases, neuroevidence will be at most convergent 
and increase our confidence in what we already had confidently concluded. Whether it is worth collecting the 
neuroevidence will depend on how cost-benefit justified obtaining convergent evidence will be.  
The most striking example of just such a case was the US Supreme Courtʼs decision, Roper v 
Simmons,
4
 which categorically excluded the death penalty for capital murders who killed when they were 
sixteen or seventeen years old because such killers did not deserve the death penalty. The amicus briefs 
were replete with neuroscience data showing that the brains of late adolescents are not fully biologically 
mature, and advocates used such data to suggest that the adolescent killers could not be fairly put to death. 
Now, we already knew from commonsense observation and rigorous behavioural studies that juveniles are 
on average less rational than adults. What did the neuroscientific evidence about the juvenile brain add? It 
was consistent with the undeniable behavioural data, and perhaps provided a partial causal explanation of 
the behavioural differences. The neuroscience data was therefore merely additive and only indirectly relevant 
and the Court did not cite it, except perhaps by implication.
5
  
Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average than adults to exclude them categorically 
from the death penalty is of course a normative legal question and not a scientific or psychological question. 
Advocates claimed, however, that the neuroscience confirmed that adolescents are insufficiently responsible 
 




 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005).  
5
 The Court did refer generally to other science, but it was not clear if the neuroscience played a role. The Supreme Court 
did cite neuroscientific findings in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. (2010), which categorically excluded juveniles from life 
without the possibility of parole in non-homicide cases. The citation was general and I believe it was dictum. It was 
responding to an argument that no party had seriously made, which was that the science of adolescent development had 
changed significantly since Roper was decided. 
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to be executed, thus confusing the positive and the normative. The neuroscience evidence in no way 
independently confirms that adolescents are less responsible. If the behavioural differences between 
adolescents and adults were slight, it would not matter if their brains are quite different. Similarly, if the 
behavioural differences were sufficient for moral and constitutional differential treatment, then it would not 
matter if the brains were essentially indistinguishable. 
If the behavioural data are not clear, then the potential contribution of neuroscience is large. 
Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that the neuroscience at present is not likely to be of much help. As 
noted, I term this the ʻclear cutʼ problem. Recall that neuroscientific studies usually start with clear cases of 
well-characterized behaviour. In such cases, the neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already 
clearly identified behaviours precisely because the behaviour is so clear. Less clear behaviour is simply not 
studied or for less clear behaviour the overlap is greater between experimental and control subjects. Thus 
the neural markers of clear cases will provide little guidance to resolve behaviourally ambiguous cases of 
legally relevant behaviour. For example, suppose in an insanity defence case the question is whether the 
defendant suffers from a major mental disorder such as schizophrenia. In extreme cases, the behaviour will 
be clear and no neurodata will be necessary. Investigators have discovered various small but statistically 
significant differences in neural structure or function between people who are clearly suffering from 
schizophrenia and those who are not. Nonetheless, in a behaviourally unclear case, the overlap between 
data on the brains of people with schizophrenia and people without the disorder is so great that a scan is 
insufficiently sensitive to be used for diagnostic purposes. 
Some people think that executive capacity, the congeries of cognitive and emotional capacities that 
help us plan and regulate our behaviour, is going to be the Holy Grail to help the law determine an offenderʼs 
true culpability. After all, there is an attractive moral case that people with substantial lack of these capacities 
are less culpable, even if their conduct satisfied the prima facie case for the crime charged. Perhaps 
neuroscience can provide specific data previously unavailable to identify executive capacity differences more 
precisely. There are two problems, however. First, significant problems with executive capacity are readily 
apparent without testing and the criminal law simply will not adopt fine-grained culpability criteria. Second, 
the correlation between neuropsychological tests of executive capacity and actual real world behaviour is not 
terribly high (see Barkley & Murphy, 2010). Only a small fraction of the variance is accounted for, and the 
scanning studies will use the types of tasks the behavioural tests use. Consequently, we are far from able to 
use neuroscience accurately to assess non-obvious executive capacity differences that are valid in real world 
contexts.  
Assessing the radical claim that we are not agents 
This part of the chapter addresses the claim and hope alluded to earlier that neuroscience will cause a 
paradigm shift in criminal responsibility by demonstrating that we are ʻmerely victims of neuronal 
circumstancesʼ or some similar claim that denies human agency, that holds that we are not the kinds of 
intentional creatures we think we are. 
If our mental states play no role in our behaviour and are simply epiphenomenal, then traditional 
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notions of responsibility based on mental states and actions guided by mental states would be imperilled. But 
is the rich explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply a post-hoc rationalization the brains of hapless 
homo sapiens construct to explain what their brains have already done? Will the criminal justice system as 
we know it wither away as an outmoded relic of a prescientific and cruel age? If so, not only criminal law is in 
peril. What will be the fate of contracts, for example, when a biological machine that was formerly called a 
person claims that it should not be bound because it did not make a contract? The contract is also simply the 
outcome of various ʻneuronal circumstancesʼ.  
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-action connections, to claim based on 
neuroscience that we should radically change our picture of ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices 
is a form of neuroarrogance. Although I predict that we will see far more numerous attempts to introduce 
neuroevidence in the future, I have elsewhere argued that for conceptual and scientific reasons there is no 
reason at present to believe that we are not agents (Morse, 2008). It is possible that we are not agents, but 
the current science does not remotely demonstrate that this is true. The burden of persuasion is firmly on the 
proponents of the radical view. 
What is more, the radical view entails no positive agenda. Suppose we were convinced by the 
mechanistic view that we are not intentional, rational agents after all. (Of course, the notion of being 
ʻconvincedʼ would be an illusion, too. Being convinced means that we are persuaded by evidence or 
argument, but a mechanism is not persuaded by anything. It is simply neurophysically transformed.) What 
should we do now? We know that it is an illusion to think that our deliberations and intentions have any 
causal efficacy in the world. We also know, however, that we experience sensations such as pleasure and 
pain and that we care about what happens to us and to the world. We cannot just sit quietly and wait for our 
brains to activate, for determinism to happen. We must, and will of course, deliberate and act. 
If we still thought that the radical view were correct and that standard notions of genuine moral 
responsibility and desert were therefore impossible, we might nevertheless continue to believe that the law 
would not necessarily have to give up the concept of incentives. Indeed, Greene and Cohen concede that we 
would have to keep punishing people for practical purposes. Such an account would be consistent with 
ʻblack boxʼ accounts of economic incentives that simply depend on the relation between inputs and outputs 
without considering the mind as a mediator between the two. For those who believe that a thoroughly 
naturalized account of human behaviour entails complete consequentialism, such a conclusion might not be 
unwelcome. 
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal contradiction just explored. What is the 
nature of the ʻagentʼ that is discovering the laws governing how incentives shape behaviour? Could 
understanding and providing incentives via social norms and legal rules simply be epiphenomenal 
interpretations of what the brain has already done? How do ʻweʼ ʻdecideʼ which behaviours to reward or 
punish? What role does ʻreasonʼ – a property of thoughts and agents, not a property of brains – play in this 
ʻdecisionʼ? 
If the truth of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do, this premise yields no particular 
moral, legal or political conclusions. It will provide no guide as to how one should live or how one should 
NeuroLawExuberance 
41 
respond to the truth of reductive mechanism. Normativity depends on reason and thus the radical view is 
normatively inert. Neurons and neural networks do not have reasons; agents do. If reasons do not matter, 
then we have no reason to adopt any morals or politics, any legal rule, or to do anything at all.  
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly disappearing person remains fully visible 
and necessarily continues to act for good reasons, including the reasons currently to reject the radical view. 
We are not Pinocchios and our brains are not Giapettos pulling the strings.  
The case for modest optimism 
Despite my claim that we should be exceptionally cautious about the current contributions 
neuroscience can make to criminal law policy, doctrine, and adjudication, I am modestly optimistic about the 
possibility of near and intermediate term, limited but important contributions neuroscience can make to our 
ordinary, traditional, folk-psychological legal system. In other words, I think neuroscience may make a 
positive contribution although there has been no paradigm shift in thinking about the nature of the person 
and the criteria for criminal responsibility. The legal regime to which neuroscience will contribute will continue 
to take people seriously as people, as autonomous agents who may fairly be blamed and punished based on 
their mental states and actions. 
In general, my hope is that over time there will be feedback between the folk psychological criteria and 
the neuroscientific data. Each might inform the other. Conceptual work on mental states might suggest new 
neuroscientific studies, for example, and the neuroscientific studies might help refine the folk psychological 
categories. The ultimate goal would be a reflective conceptual-empirical equilibrium. More specifically, there 
are four types of situations in which neuroscience may be of assistance that I will briefly address: data 
indicating that the folk wisdom underlying a legal rule is incorrect; data suggesting the need for new or 
reformed legal doctrine; evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case; and, data that help efficient 
adjudication or administration of criminal justice. 
Many criminal law doctrines are based on bits of folk wisdom that may prove to be incorrect. If so, the 
doctrine should change. For example, it is commonly assumed that agents intend the natural and probable 
consequences of their actions. In many or most cases it seems that they do, but neuroscience may help in 
the future to demonstrate that this assumption is true far less frequently than we think. In that case, the 
rebuttable presumption used to help the prosecution prove intent should be softened or used with more 
caution. 
Second, neuroscientific data may suggest the need for new or reformed legal doctrine. For example, 
control tests for legal insanity have been disfavoured for some decades because they are ill-understood and 
hard to assess. It is at present impossible to distinguish ʻcanʼtʼ from ʻwonʼtʼ. Perhaps neuroscientific 
information will help to demonstrate and to prove the existence of control difficulties that are independent of 
cognitive incapacities. If so, then perhaps control tests are justified and can be rationally assessed after all. 
More generally, perhaps a larger percentage of offenders than we currently believe have such grave control 
difficulties that they deserve a generic mitigation claim that is not available in criminal law today. 
Neuroscience might help us discover that. If that were true, justice would be served by adopting a generic 
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mitigating doctrine. On the other hand, if it turns out that such difficulties are not so common, we could be 
more confident of the justice of current doctrine.  
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate individual cases. Consider the insanity 
defence again. There is often dispute about whether a defendant claiming legal insanity suffered from a 
mental disorder, about which disorder the defendant suffered from, and about how severe it was. At present, 
these questions must be resolved entirely behaviourally and there is often room for considerable 
disagreement about inferences drawn from the defendantʼs actions, including utterances. In the future, 
neuroscience might help resolve such questions if the clear cut problem difficulty can be solved. As 
mentioned previously, however, I doubt that, in the foreseeable future, neuroscience will be able to help 
identify the presence or absence of specific mens reas 
Last, neuroscience might help us to implement current policy more efficiently. For example, the 
criminal justice system makes predictions about future dangerous behaviour for purposes of bail, sentencing, 
including capital sentencing, and parole. If we have already decided that it is justified to use dangerousness 
predictions to make such decisions, it is hard to imagine a rational argument for doing it less accurately if we 
were in fact able to do it more accurately. Behavioural prediction techniques already exist. The question is 
whether neuroscientific variables can provide value-added by increasing the accuracy of such predictions 
considering the cost of gathering such data. It is perfectly plausible that in the future they may and thus 
decisions will be more accurate and just.  
Conclusion  
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just and accurate criminal law decision-making 
about policy, doctrine, and individual case adjudication. This was the conclusion I reached when I tentatively 
identified brain overclaim syndrome five years ago and it remains true today. In the future, however, as the 
philosophy of mind and action and neuroscience mutually mature and inform each other, neuroscience will 
help us understand criminal behaviour. No radical transformation of criminal justice is likely to occur. But 
neuroscience can inform criminal justice as long as it is relevant to law and translated into the lawʼs folk 
psychological framework and criteria. 
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Abstract The capacitarian idea that responsibility tracks mental capacity underlies much of our thinking 
about responsibility. For instance, mental capacity assessments inform whether someone is a fully 
responsible person, what responsibilities they can be expected to observe, their degree of responsibility for 
what they did, and whether they can be expected to take responsibility and be held responsible in the 
sense of standing trial, being answerable, paying compensation and being punished. But what happens 
when mental capacity is restored through direct brain interventions? Specifically, can direct brain 
interventions aimed at mental capacity restoration help us to assess the responsibility of someone who 
becomes mentally ill subsequent to committing their crime or to hold them responsible, to expect them to 
take responsibility for what they did, to make them fully responsible and maybe even less irresponsible? I 
will argue that initially capacitarianism seems to strike difficulties in cases that involve direct brain 
interventions of this sort, or put another way, that responsibility does not seem to track restored mental 
capacities. However, I will also argue that most of these difficulties can be overcome once we take into 
account some of the other things that responsibility also hinges upon. In particular, I will argue that 
historical and normative considerations can explain why responsibility does not seem to track restored 
mental capacities, and thus why this is not something that undermines capacitarianism. 
Keywords capacitarianism, responsibility, direct brain interventions, therapy, justice	  
Capacitarianism underlies much of our thinking about responsibility 
The ʻcapacitarianʼ idea that responsibility co-varies with or ʻtracksʼ mental capacity underlies much lay, 
legal and philosophical thinking about responsibility. In lay contexts responsibility is often thought to require 
such things as the ability to perceive the world without delusion, to think clearly and rationally, to guide our 
actions by the light of our judgments, and to resist acting on mere impulse. This is, for instance, why 
children, the senile, and the mentally ill are thought to be less than fully responsible for what they do (i.e. 
because they lack the right kind and/or degree of mental capacity), why children can acquire more and/or 
greater responsibilities as they grow up (i.e. because their mental capacities develop as they mature), and 




Identical sentiments are expressed in the legal context by the idea that responsibility requires certain 
ʻcognitiveʼ and ʻvolitionalʼ mental capacities.6 For instance, Hart (1968) suggests that “[t]he capacities in 
question are those of understanding, reasoning, and control of conduct: the ability to understand what 
conduct legal rules or morality require, to deliberate and reach decisions concerning these requirements, and 
to conform to decisions when made” (Hart, 1968, p. 227). As I have argued elsewhere (Vincent, 2011b), the 
capacitarian approach provides an effective framework for understanding how legal defences such as 
insanity and automatism serve to diminish an accused personʼs responsibility for something that they did at 
the guilt determination stage of a trial. Namely, they do this by highlighting deficits in the mental capacities 
which are required for full responsibility, and thus by undermining either the claim that the defendant is 
causally responsible for what they did (by challenging the claim that their behaviour should even be viewed 
as an instance of their action and thus as something which can be attributed to them) or that they violated 
their role responsibilities in acting as they did (by challenging the claim that the defendant acted contrary to 
how they ought to have acted and is thus blameworthy for acting like that). Indeed, many recent attempts to 
introduce neuroscience into courtrooms are also best understood in precisely this way – i.e. neuroscientific 
techniques are used to help make assessments of mental capacity which in turn inform assessments of 
responsibility (Vincent, 2010, 2011). 
Mental capacity assessments also play a central role in the legal practice of holding defendants 
responsible (either in the sense of bringing them to trial where they must account for what they did or of 
punishing them for it) and of expecting them to take responsibility for what they did (in the sense of 
accounting for their actions during the trial, of acknowledging that they did it and are maybe even 
blameworthy, and perhaps that they might even need to do something like paying compensation or 
submitting themselves to punishment to make up for it). For instance, in Connecticut v. Kenneth Curtis 
(1999) a defendant who shot himself in the head after first shooting and killing his estranged girlfriend was 
initially found to be incompetent to stand trial, and thus he was initially neither tried nor punished for this 
crime. However, years later he made such an impressive recovery that he even enrolled in college, and upon 
subsequent re-assessment he was found competent to stand trial where he pled guilty to manslaughter and 
received a 20 year prison sentence. In Ford v. Wainright (1986), the court held that it was impermissible to 
punish defendants who are insane and thus whose responsibility-relevant mental capacities were 
compromised (though who were not insane at the time when they committed the crime) because this would 
serve no penological goals. And similar arguments were also cited in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) where the 
 




 The word ʻresponsibilityʼ refers to a range of different though related concepts and practices within the law. For a 
detailed discussion of the plural senses of ʻresponsibilityʼ used in legal contexts, and why these are genuine responsibility 
concepts, see Vincent (2010, 2011b). 
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court held that it was impermissible to punish mentally retarded defendants. The idea that responsibility 
tracks mental capacity clearly plays a key role in the legal practices of holding people responsible and of 
expecting them to take responsibility. 
Furthermore, consider the role that mental capacity assessments play in parole boardsʼ investigations. 
One question here is whether the person under assessment has reformed sufficiently such that it is now safe 
to release them back into society – i.e. whether we have sufficient evidence that they are now a responsible 
individual who can be trusted to stay out of trouble. And another question concerns whether the person in 
question has sufficient mental capacities to be a fully responsible person in the sense that if they were 
released from prison, they would be sufficiently mentally competent to fend for themselves and should the 
need arise to be held responsible for anything else that they might do. 
Finally, the idea that responsibility tracks mental capacity – and again, in particular, cognitive and 
volitional mental capacities – is also central to much philosophical thinking about this topic. For instance, 
Aristotle wrote that “feelings and actions…that are involuntary receive pardon” and that “[a]ctions are 
regarded as involuntary when they are performed under compulsion or through ignorance” (Aristotle, 1976, 
p. 111, emphasis added). Since Aristotle, this view has also been endorsed by numerous other philosophers 
(e.g. Dennett, 1984; Glannon, 2002; Sher, 2009; Wallace, 1994). 
Furthermore, capacitarianism is also at the centre of Fischerʼs and Ravizzaʼs (1998) compatibilist 
defence of responsibility from the alleged threat of determinism. Fischer and Ravizza (1998) contend that the 
reason why we retain the intuition that agents in Frankfurt style counter examples (Frankfurt, 1969, p. 835-
836) are still responsible for what they did even though they could not have done otherwise is because they 
possessed ʻguidance controlʼ (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). On their account, a person has guidance control 
over their actions when those actions issue from their own7 “moderately reasons-responsive mechanisms”, 
or when via “tracing” we establish that they are responsible for the fact that their mechanism was not 
moderately reasons-responsive” (Fischer & Ravizaa, 1998, p. 49-51). Mechanisms are moderately reasons-
responsive when they are “regularly receptive” and “weakly reactive” to reasons. And a mechanism is weakly 
reactive to reasons if it reacts to those reasons in at least a small set of possible worlds, even though it may 
not react to those reasons in this actual world (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). 
Put in simpler terms, on Fischer and Ravizzaʼs (1998) account a person has guidance control and is 
thus responsible for what they do when their actions issue from mechanisms in virtue of which they possess 
the cognitive and volitional mental capacities which are required for moral agency. Reasons-responsiveness 
is a feature of certain brain mechanisms in virtue of which one can comprehend what one ought to do/not do, 
and be moved appropriately to action on the basis of that comprehension. And the moderateness component 
 




 This refers to Fischer and Ravizzaʼs ownership condition (1998). 
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of moderate reasons responsiveness captures the idea of these brain mechanisms having varying degrees 
of capacity to do those things, rather than being infallible clockwork-like mechanisms that function in a 
suspiciously regular and thus worryingly unfree fashion. 
Capacitarianism and restored mental capacities 
The previous section demonstrated the pervasive role that capacitarianism plays in our thinking about 
responsibility. I take this pervasiveness to indicate the strength of our commitment to capacitarian thinking – 
i.e. the strength of our conviction that responsibility really does track mental capacity. 
In the examples cited above, what tracks mental capacity are assessments and impositions of 
responsibility. That is, mental capacity assessments inform assessments of whether someone should be 
considered a fully responsible person, assessments of the degree of their responsibility for something that 
they did, and assessments of whether they can be held responsible for what they have done in the sense of 
standing trial and being answerable. Similarly, mental capacity assessments also inform judgments about 
what sorts of responsibilities it is reasonable to impose onto people, and whether we can hold them 
responsible by imposing punishment and liability onto them. However, direct brain interventions are 
increasingly holding out the promise of making it possible to restore peopleʼs mental capacities, and when 
this is combined with the capacitarian idea that responsibility tracks mental capacity, two enticing legal 
prospects emerge – one for traditional justice-based aims, and another for the aim of therapeutic justice – 
which suggest that responsibility (in the various senses mentioned above) also tracks restored mental 
capacities. 
Firstly, consider the way in which mental capacity restoration is already being used to bring criminals 
to justice. Criminals who develop mental disorders after committing crimes may lack competence to stand 
trial or to be punished, and this prevents them from taking responsibility and us from trying them to assess 
their responsibility and subsequently from holding them responsible for what they did. However, such mental 
disorders can nowadays sometimes be treated with medications or other medical procedures (Lekovic, 
2008). For instance, defendants are sometimes involuntarily treated with antipsychotic drugs to restore their 
capacity to stand trial. In Riggins v. Nevada (1992), the court held that it was generally permissible to 
administer antipsychotic drugs that make defendants competent to stand trial as long as this is medically 
appropriate and the least intrusive means of making them competent.8 In Sell v. United States (2003) the 
United States Supreme Court clarified this position by ruling that it was permissible to forcibly medicate a 
 




 Notably, the court ruled that in this particular case Riggins had a legitimate reason to object to being medicated — 
namely, to support his insanity defense, Riggins wanted the jury to witness his condition first-hand without it being 
masked by the medications. 
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defendant for the sole purpose of making them competent to stand trial, as long as the treatment would most 
likely be effective, no medically better alternatives are available, and important state interests such as 
bringing criminals to justice are at stake. Similarly, defendants are sometimes also treated with antipsychotic 
drugs to restore their competence to be punished – for instance, in Singleton v. Norris (2003) antipsychotic 
medications were forcibly administered to a condemned defendant to make him competent for execution by 
lethal injection (Latzer, 2003). But even if we do not endorse capital punishment,9 we might still endorse the 
more moderate position that inmates who develop mental disorders while serving a prison sentence should 
be treated for those disorders, and not only because prisoners retain a right to receive adequate medical 
care while incarcerated, but also to ensure that the retributive function of incarceration (one of the 
aforementioned penological goals cited in Ford v. Wainright (1986) above) is performed. My point is that 
such direct brain interventions seem capable of restoring peopleʼs ability to take responsibility, and our ability 
to assess their degree of responsibility for what they did and to subsequently hold them responsible for it – 
i.e. that responsibility in these different senses also seems to track restored mental capacities. 
Secondly, consider some actual and proposed therapeutic uses of direct brain interventions. Some 
authors write that at least a portion of criminal behaviour may be caused by mental disease or disorder 
(Sapolsky, 2004; Tancredi, 2005), and so they suggest that such criminals should be provided with medical 
care and treatment rather than being punished. Dawkins (2006) argues that it makes just as little sense to 
punish criminals as it does for Basil Fawlty (the fictional character from the comedy ʻFawlty Towersʼ) to 
threaten and then to flog his broken car when it fails to start. On Dawkinsʼ account, instead of punishing 
criminals, we should figure out whatʼs wrong with them – i.e. what brain disorder makes them act like that, for 
instance drug addiction – and then fix it by administering the appropriate treatments. Put in terms of the 
language of responsibility, what Dawkins is suggesting is that rather than holding irresponsible and non-
responsible people responsible for what they did, we should instead treat their disorders and make them 
responsible.10 It is for precisely these sorts of reasons that repeat sex offenders are sometimes given drugs 
like cyproterone acetate, a powerful antiandrogen that helps them to regain self-control by reducing their sex 
drive (Bradford & Pawlak, 1993). And this is also the thinking behind trials currently under way in Australia in 
which convicted violent criminals at treated with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which have 
been observed to help people control their outbursts of anger – i.e. the aim is to restore their capacity for 
 




 For the record, I do not endorse capital punishment, and nothing that I say in this paper should be taken to imply 
otherwise. 
10
 Note however that Dawkins would probably not endorse putting his point into the language of responsibility since he 
explicitly argues that responsibility does not make sense in a fully mechanistic universe in which something like 
determinism is at work. 
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self-control (Macey, 2010).11 Finally, Chinese and Russian surgeons have, rather controversially, reported 
success in treating drug addiction through ablation of the nucleus accumbens and cingulate gyrus, also 
arguably restoring the addicted individualsʼ capacity for self-control (Lekovic, 2008) – a technique which, if 
not so controversial, could perhaps be used as a treatment for those who commit drug-related crimes. 
Proponents of this therapeutic approach view it as a more compassionate and effective response to crime 
than just punishing criminals, because it allegedly targets the causes of crime – i.e. it aims to restore 
peopleʼs status as responsible individuals in both of the relevant senses – and so these examples also 
suggest that responsibility tracks restored mental capacities. 
Problems with the idea that responsibility can be restored 
The previous section argued that direct brain interventions which restore mental capacities could at 
least hypothetically help the law to achieve justice in the traditional and therapeutic senses. Or, put another 
way, it argued that direct brain interventions might help us to assess the responsibility of people who develop 
certain mental illnesses after committing their crime or to hold them responsible, to put us in a position where 
we can justifiably expect them to take responsibility for what they did, and even to make them fully 
responsible or less irresponsible – i.e. that responsibility in its various senses tracks restored mental 
capacities. 
However, there are problems with these claims. Some of these are moral problems such as: practical 
ethics concerns about the risks and side-effects associated with any kind of treatments that involve direct 
brain interventions (Chatterjee, 2007); that it might be unethical, or at least violate codes of medical ethics, 
for members of the medical profession who are meant to save lives to treat people for the sole purpose of 
making them competent to be punished and maybe even executed (Eisenberg, 2004; Latzer, 2003); that 
people have a right to cognitive liberty (Tovino, 2007) – or, as Martha Farah puts it, “the freedom to think 
oneʼs own thoughts and have oneʼs own personality” (Farah, 2002, p. 1126) – which might be infringed even 
by voluntary let alone involuntary treatments of this sort (Bomann-Larsen, 2011); and that respect for human 
dignity is incompatible with modifying people to make them (in our view) better (Duff, 2005). However, rather 
than investigating these claims about what we ought and ought not to do, in what follows I wish to highlight 
difficulties with the underlying assumption that direct brain interventions are something that could even help 
us to achieve justice in traditional and therapeutic senses. 
 




 Note though that in this trial the restoration of these convicted violent criminalsʼ capacity for self-control, and thus of 
their responsibility, does not replace the traditional aims of justice since they are given no concession on their sentences. 
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Mental capacity restoration and justice 
In regards to bringing criminals to justice, it may be that the sorts of medications that are typically 
administered to defendants to make them competent to stand trial or to be punished simply cannot restore 
their mental capacities, but that they either only make it seem as if the treated people again possess those 
mental capacities, or that they implant in them artificial mental capacities which are poor substitutes for their 
own mental capacities. For instance, Horstman has argued that: 
Artificial sanity is not a substitute for true sanity. Drugs inherently have only a temporary effect on people, 
usually just as long as the drug is in the blood stream. Additionally, the temporary nature of chemical 
competence renders difficult a reliable assessment of the sufficiency of an inmateʼs competence for 
execution. Since an insane inmate cannot truly be made permanently sane, it follows that the inmate 
cannot be made competent to be executed. (Horstman, 2002, pp. 846-847). 
If what such treatments would do is more like either of these two things – i.e. forcing people to wear a 
mask of sanity or the creation of an artificial sanity – than genuine restoration of the treated personʼs original 
mental economy, then such techniques might be incapable of helping us to achieve the traditional aims of 
justice. In the former case, we would merely be making ourselves feel better about trying or punishing a 
person who in fact remains fundamentally mentally ill, and in the latter case the person who would be tried 
and/or punished would not even be the same as the person who committed the crime (Greely, 2008). 
In a paper devoted to the topic of the ʻmedicate to execute controversyʼ, Latzer (2003) considers the 
objection that “[m]edication cannot achieve true competency for execution” (2003, pp. 9-10). Although he 
ultimately argues that this objection is unconvincing, I believe that there are problems with his argument 
which help to highlight why we might doubt that direct brain interventions can achieve justice in the traditional 
sense, and since a portion of what Latzer (2003) says also applies to the use of other direct brain 
interventions (not just pharmaceuticals)12 and to the aim of restoring competence to stand trial (not just 
competence to be punished), it is therefore worthwhile to consider his position in detail. 
In regards to doubts about the effectiveness of such techniques (i.e. the ʻmask of sanityʼ objection), 
Latzer (2003) acknowledges that “[i]n a case in which the medication is ineffectual, the policy implications 
are clear: forcible (sic) medication would be pointless”, however he maintains that such people “are a distinct 
minority, they drive the exception, not the rule. For the majority, medication that controls (though it does not 
 




 I treat psychopharmaceuticals as an instance of direct brain interventions because their chemical method of action 
bypasses our conscious reasoning and control capacities and instead it targets the brain mechanisms that implement 
those capacities, albeit via our veins (in the case of injectable pharmaceuticals) or via our stomachs (in the case of pills). 
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cure) the disquieting effects of psychosis can produce competence for execution” (Latzer, 2003, p. 10). This 
leaves him with the ʻartificial sanityʼ objection, which he dispatches as follows: 
[I]f the effects of the disorder can be controlled, and for as long as they can be controlled, then the inmate 
is competent for execution. For the duration of the time that the inmate regains his cognitive faculties – 
there is no need to eradicate them permanently – he is sane enough for execution. Any potential for 
relapse due to non-treatment is beside the point. Nor does the ʻartificialityʼ of the sanity make any 
difference. If a psychotic were to commit a crime while on medication – medication that made him aware 
and in control of his conduct – the artificiality of his sanity would provide no defence. Just as culpability for 
the commission of a crime depends on the cognitive and volitional state of the actor at the time, and not 
the cause of the actorʼs condition, the competence of the death row inmate should not be affected by the 
basis for that competence (Latzer, 2003, p.9). 
In response to what Latzer says about reasons to doubt the effectiveness of such techniques above, I 
think that the question of whether medication is effective to render condemned inmates sufficiently 
competent for execution in the majority of cases is an empirically and conceptually open question. On the 
empirical side, it is at least conceivable that tests could be administered to treated inmates to ascertain 
whether most of them are in fact rendered sufficiently competent by such treatments. And on the conceptual 
side, it is debatable precisely which mental capacities a person must possess, and in what degrees they 
must possess them, to be sufficiently competent. For instance, precisely what mental capacities and in what 
degrees must a person have to be competent to stand trial, as opposed to being competent for incarceration, 
or execution, or even something else? These are difficult conceptual and moral questions which Latzer does 
not address, and which are still a subject of fierce disagreement (e.g. see the collection of papers in Schopp, 
Wiener, Bornstein, & Willborn, 2009). However, precisely because so much hinges on empirical facts and on 
contentious conceptual and moral issues, for the sake of argument I will put these matters aside and grant 
Latzerʼs assertion. 
Furthermore, with Latzer (2003), and against what Horstman (2002) says in the above-quoted 
passage, I agree that the impermanence of artificially-induced sanity should not matter to the question of 
whether someone is competent for execution. If we presuppose as Latzer and many others do that capital 
punishment is at least sometimes permissible, then what ought to matter is the persistence of sanity until the 
condemned inmateʼs life is extinguished. The fact that their sanity would have evaporated once the effects of 
the drugs wore off if they had not been executed is immaterial, or at least it is far from clear why this should 
matter. 
However, I reject Latzerʼs argument in the second paragraph quoted above for three reasons. Firstly, 
contrary to what Latzer asserts, there are compelling reasons to doubt that a person who commits a crime 
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while on mental capacity restoring medications necessarily ought to be viewed as responsible for that crime 
(Carter, Ambermoon, & Hall, 2010). One problem here is ʻmerelyʼ epistemic13 – i.e. we simply have no way of 
knowing whether the person who committed the crime while on the medications did so out of their own un-
tainted volition, or because the meds did not work, or due to the medicationsʼ side effects. In fact, the person 
themselves may not know whether they committed the crime out of their own un-tainted volition or because 
of the drugsʼ (side) effects simply because the true causes of our own actions can be just as inaccessible to 
us as they are to others (Davies, forthcoming). However, our worries may run much deeper – i.e. they may 
not be ʻmerelyʼ epistemic in the above sense. For instance, perhaps there simply is no fact of the matter – 
i.e. nothing even for the person concerned to know – about whether the crime should be attributed to them or 
to the drugs, since what we have post-treatment is not a person and their meds, but rather we just have a 
treated person and this person is not the same as the person with whom we were faced prior to treatment. 
Carter and colleagues (2010) provide some very evocative examples which support this claim: 
There are cases, however, in which DRT [dopamine replacement therapy] induces behaviour that 
individuals claim are authentic. For example, one male who became fascinated with anal sex following 
DRT claimed that he had these desires prior to DRT treatment but was too embarrassed to act on them. 
The medication allowed him to ʻrealise these desiresʼ. His interest in these sexual behaviours stopped 
following a change in his medication, and he later expressed regret at his behaviour. Similar experiences 
have been expressed by users of other drugs that affect the dopaminergic system. Singh interviewed 
adolescents treated for ADHD with Ritalin (a drug which also increases dopaminergic stimulation) and their 
parents, and found that the attribution of authenticity to various actions depended on whether the 
behaviour was seen as positive or negative. For example, a childʼs bad behaviour was often attributed to a 
failure to take their medication, whereas success on the sporting field was more likely to be attributed to 
the child. This reflects a common human characteristic documented by social psychologists to take 
personal credit for our successes and blame circumstances for our failures. There has been no attempt as 
yet to examine whether DRT patients believe that these changes in behaviour are authentic expressions of 
who they are or simple neurochemical reflexes (Carter et al., 2010, pp. 5-6). 
In the very least, these examples demonstrate the more acute form of the epistemic problem that I 
discussed above – i.e. that even subjects themselves may vacillate about whether to attribute behaviour to 
themselves or to the medications that they are on, and not merely because they try to cover up their own 
 




 I say ʻmerelyʼ in order to emphasize the point that although epistemic questions do not undermine the existence of 
facts about responsibility but only our knowledge of those facts – I am of course assuming here that a realist stance on 
responsibility is defensible, though I will not argue for this point – never the less we should not underestimate the serious 
problems that these epistemic problems pose for attempts to settle questions about responsibility. 
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guilt but rather because they themselves do not know this. However, it is also plausible to interpret the 
phenomenology and self-reports present in these examples as evidence that what we have prior and 
subsequent to treatment are two different selves, and that what one of these selves does may not 
necessarily be attributable to the other self. This is relevant to Latzerʼs (2003) argument for it shows that it is 
far from clear, in both a deep metaphysical sense as well as a ʻmereʼ epistemic sense, that a person who 
performs a crime while on such medications would necessarily be responsible for that crime. And to the 
extent that this undermines Latzerʼs claim that “[i]f a psychotic were to commit a crime while on 
medication…the artificiality of his sanity would provide no defense” (2003, p. 9), this also undermines his 
consequent claim that “[j]ust as culpability for the commission of a crime depends on the cognitive and 
volitional state of the actor at the time, and not the cause of the actorʼs condition, the competence of the 
death row inmate should not be affected by the basis for that competence” (2003, p. 9). 
Secondly, it could be argued that once one person meddles with another personʼs mind, the former 
(the ʻmanipulatorʼ) for ever remains at least partly entangled in what the latter one does and is thus at least 
partly responsible for it because their agency has become inextricably linked to their patientʼs agency. This is 
certainly why responsibility is allegedly undermined in so-called ʻmanipulation casesʼ discussed in the 
compatibilist literature (e.g. Fischer & Ravizza, 1998), and the leading intuitions there are the same as the 
ones that I draw upon above – namely, that the manipulator takes over at least some of the responsibility 
from the subject of their manipulation, and that the subject loses ownership of their mental capacities (i.e. 
they cease to be genuinely or authentically their mental capacities). Latzer (2003) is not entitled to suppose 
that it is irrelevant how (i.e. by what causes) a person came to possess their mental capacities, and so this is 
another reason to suppose that the fact that a personʼs sanity is artificial is significant after all. 
Thirdly, as I have already suggested above, it is far from clear that the mental capacities which a 
person must have to be competent to stand trial, are the same as the ones required in other contexts – e.g. 
to be competent for incarceration, or execution, or even to be a fully responsible person in the sense of being 
a legitimate target of attributions of praise and blame for what they do and of admiration and condemnation 
for who they are. The literature on competence in legal settings is filled with disagreement about which 
mental capacities are needed for responsibility and competence at different legal stages – i.e. when the 
crime is originally committed, when they subsequently stand trial for it, when they are eventually punished, 
and maybe even when they are assessed for early release by a parole board (e.g. Buchanan, 2006; Burrows 
& Herbert, 2005; Mossman et al., 2007; Rogers, Blackwood, Farnham, Pickup, & Watts, 2008; Otto, 2009; 
Winick, 2009). Nevertheless, the single message which comes through loud and clear is that the mental 
capacities which a person must possess for full responsibility or for competence at these difference stages 
vary greatly. Consequently, Latzer (2003) is simply not entitled to avail himself of the analogy between the 
person who commits a crime while on medications, and another who is treated to make them competent for 
execution, because qualitatively and quantitatively different mental capacities may be required in these two 
different contexts. Thus, even if it were possible to restore the mental capacities that are required for 
attributions of responsibility for what one does through direct brain interventions (and I have argued that this 
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is questionable), it would not necessarily follow that it must therefore also be possible to restore the mental 
capacities required to make people into legitimate candidates for retributive punishment. 
In summary, I discussed two objections to the claim that direct brain interventions could be used to 
help achieve justice in the traditional sense. Firstly, I looked at the ʻmask of sanityʼ objection which claims 
that such treatments only make it seem as if the treated person is once again a legitimate candidate to be 
put on trial or punished. My main point here was that Latzerʼs (2003) response to this objection assumes way 
too much – in particular, that the question of whether medications actually are effective to render most 
condemned inmates sufficiently competent is an empirically and conceptually open one – although I did not 
press this point any further. Secondly, I also looked at Latzerʼs (2003) response to the ʻartificial sanityʼ 
objection, which claims that sanity installed through such treatments cannot help us achieve traditional 
justice. Here I offered two reasons to reject Latzerʼs claim that artificial sanity can substitute for normal sanity 
– one drew on examples cited by Carter and colleagues (2010), and the other drew on the compatibilist 
literature about responsibility in manipulation cases – and I also argued that even if it were possible to 
restore the mental capacities needed for full responsibility, that would not entail that it is possible to restore 
the mental capacities required for competence to be punished or to stand trial. 
Mental capacity restoration and therapy 
There are at least three problems with the claim that direct brain interventions can help further the aim 
of therapeutic justice. 
Firstly, as I have already argued above, once we meddle with a personʼs mind to treat their 
irresponsibility or non-responsibility – i.e. to make them responsible (as opposed to non-responsible) – 
paradoxically they may never again be fully responsible for anything that they do. Although such treatments 
aim to restore peopleʼs status as moral agents – as individuals whom we can praise and blame for what they 
do – if we accept the leading intuitions in the previously cited compatibilist literature on responsibility in 
manipulation cases, then we may again be forced to conclude that once one person meddles with another 
personʼs mind, the latter person will never again be fully responsible for what they do since at least some of 
their responsibility will be transferred back to the former person (i.e. to the ʻmanipulatorʼ). 
Secondly, in the fiction novel ʻA Clockwork Orangeʼ, Anthony Burgess (2000) writes the following 
about Alex, the hyper-violent young protagonist who is sentenced to undergo a treatment intended to make 
him into a responsible individual in the sense of being a legitimate target for admiration and condemnation 
for who he is: “Does God want goodness or the choice of goodness? Is a man who chooses the bad perhaps 
in some way better than a man who has the good imposed upon him?” (Burgess, 2000, p. 71). 
Burgessʼ point, if I get him right, is that reform which is forced or inflicted upon one person by another 
has little if any value — i.e. that moral virtue of this sort is not something that can be implanted into people by 
brute force. If Burgess is right then the very aim of making people responsible in this sense of the word 
would be conceptually flawed at a very fundamental level, because unless one already is responsible or 
chooses of oneʼs own untainted volition to become responsible, then no amount of other-inflicted changes 
could ever make one into a responsible person. At best, one might become a well-behaved puppet or 
Nicole Vincent 
56 
automaton, or perhaps a prisoner of the ʻdo gooderʼ impulses that have been implanted in oneʼs psyche like 
ever-watchful and ever-knowing security guards, but puppets and automatons are simply not subjects of 
moral admiration or contempt. 
And thirdly, there is also the worry that such treatments would not restore mental capacities but rather 
alter character or personality. Consider for instance a person who is callous, uncaring and feels little if any 
empathy for others, as a consequence of which they are always flying off the handle and beating people up. 
Is it more accurate to view such a person as someone who has a capacity deficit (e.g. they have diminished 
capacity for self-control and diminished affective capacities), or as someone who has a set of nasty and 
maybe even condemnable character flaws (i.e. they are an unsavoury individual with a mean streak, a nasty 
temper and a short fuse)? Should such a person be treated for their capacity deficits, or despised for their 
character flaws? As I have argued elsewhere, the answer is far from clear, and it hinges not merely on 
empirical facts but at least to some extent also on irreducibly conceptual and moral issues (Vincent, 2011a). 
Furthermore, as some of the literature on psychopathy has noted, prima facie both of these descriptions 
seem apt — what looks like madness when it is viewed from one angle, can also be viewed as badness 
when it is from another angle (e.g. Maibom, 2008; Reimer, 2008; Sadler, 2008). But if the same state of 
affairs equally admits of two radically different interpretations – viewed one way it is a rabbit, but viewed 
another it is a duck – then how are we to decide whether to treat such peopleʼs illness/madness or to despise 
them for being evil/bad? 
There are two reasons why this question matters. Firstly, as Lewis (1963) has argued, without a way 
of distinguishing ducks from rabbits – or madness from badness in the case at hand – in the name of therapy 
and compassion such treatments might instead allow the state to inflict unspeakable brutality onto citizens 
whose character or values it disapproves of: 
[I]f crime and disease are to be regarded as the same thing, it follows that any state of mind which our 
masters choose to call ʻdiseaseʼ can be treated as crime; and compulsorily cured. [But] one school of 
psychology already regards religion as a neurosis[, and w]hen this particular neurosis becomes 
inconvenient to government, what is to hinder government from proceeding to ʻcureʼ it? [W]hen the 
command is given, every prominent Christian in the land may vanish overnight into Institutions for the 
Treatment of the Ideologically Unsound. [T]he Humanitarian theory of punishment ... carries on its front a 
semblance of mercy which is wholly false (Lewis, 1963, p. 229). 
Secondly, it also matters because if the ʻbad characterʼ interpretation is more appropriate in some 
cases than the ʻcapacity deficitʼ interpretation, then in those cases being sentenced to treatment would be a 
macabre death sentence in disguise — a death of personality (Greely, 2008). In some cases (those which 
involve mental capacity deficits) therapy might indeed be achieved, but in others (i.e. those which involve 
character flaws) brutality not therapy is all that would be achieved. And if it should turn out that there is not 
even a valid distinction here to be drawn between mental incapacities and character flaws – for instance, if it 
should turn out that the neurological correlates of our mental capacities are identical to the neurological 
correlates of our character – then all such treatments would effectively also modify peopleʼs character or 
personality. 
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Admittedly, nothing that I have said above has shown that what such treatments would do is alter 
character or personality rather than treat mental incapacities, and thus I cannot claim to have positively 
established that such treatments would fail to achieve their therapeutic aims. However, I need not show this 
for my argument to meet its target, because all I need to show is that we have ample grounds to worry that 
we currently have no way to distinguish character flaws from capacity deficits, and thus that to be on the safe 
side we should abstain from ʻtreatingʼ people with direct brain interventions until we have gathered more 
empirical data on this topic and analysed the conceptual basis of the distinction between capacity and 
character. 
In summary, I have argued that there are three problems with trying to further the aim of therapeutic 
justice by using direct brain intervention based techniques for mental capacity restoration. Firstly, by 
meddling with a personʼs mind we might (rather paradoxically) rob them forever of the opportunity to be fully 
responsible for what they do. Secondly, although direct brain interventions might succeed in making one into 
a well-behaved puppet or automaton, they cannot make one into a genuinely responsible person since 
puppets and automatons are not the subjects of moral admiration or contempt. Thirdly, far from being 
merciful and compassionate, such treatments may inflict the worst forms of brutality upon their victims by 
inflicting personality and character changes upon them — i.e. it might turn out that what such treatments do 
is to alter character rather than mental capacities. 
A problem with capacitarianism? 
The main point advanced by the previous sectionʼs arguments can be stated in two different though 
equivalent ways. Stated one way, these arguments show that direct brain interventions cannot help us to 
achieve justice in either the traditional or the therapeutic sense. Stated another way, they show that direct 
brain interventions cannot help us to assess the responsibility of someone who becomes mentally ill 
subsequent to committing their crime or to hold them responsible, to expect them to take responsibility for 
what they did, or to make them fully responsible and maybe even less irresponsible. 
The first way of stating the point advanced by the previous sectionʼs arguments is already interesting 
enough, for it challenges practices (and their rationale) which are already affecting peopleʼs lives today. For 
instance, it challenges the practices of medicating defendants and condemned inmates so that they can be 
tried and/or punished, and the administration of cyproterone acetate and SSRIs to convicted violent 
offenders to treat the causes of their criminality. 
However, what makes the second way of stating the previous sectionʼs point particularly interesting is 
that it raises the possibility that capacitarianism might be false, flawed or at least limited. By showing that 
responsibility does not track restored mental capacities, the previous section in the very least seems to rein 
in the scope of the central capacitarian thesis. But given the pervasive role that capacitarianism plays in our 
thinking about responsibility, this should be a ground for concern, for if responsibility does not track mental 




A brief defence of capacitarianism 
When a foundational assumption of this sort which informs how we reason about moral issues is 
challenged, one way to proceed is to conclude that this assumption must indeed be false — i.e. that the 
central hypothesis expressed by this assumption has been falsified. In the case of capacitarianism, this 
would involve concluding that the central capacitarian thesis that responsibility tracks mental capacity must 
after all be incorrect. 
However, a less drastic option might be available – namely, to check whether something else (an 
auxiliary assumption or set of assumptions) can explain why the central assumption seems to generate or 
support conclusions that clash with reflective moral intuitions – and that is indeed precisely what I will 
attempt to do below. Firstly, I will argue that capacities of all sorts, not just mental ones, affect our 
responsibility judgments. Secondly, I will explain why capacities seem to matter to responsibility. Thirdly, I 
will list some other things that also affect our responsibility judgments. And finally, I will end by explaining 
how all of this bears on the above threat to capacitarianism and on whether justice (in either the traditional or 
therapeutic sense) might be furthered along at least in some cases by using direct brain interventions. 
Not just mental capacities 
Imagine that a child drowns at the beach, and we ask whether a person who was on the shore looking 
out across the waves in the childʼs direction (the onlooker) is responsible for their drowning because they did 
nothing to save them. There are several ways in which a mental incapacity could absolve them of 
responsibility, even if only partially, for the childʼs drowning. For instance, suppose that we learn that the 
onlooker was actually looking out across the waves at the birds that had gathered above the water, but that 
they had no inkling of what was attracting the birdsʼ attention — i.e. a child struggling for life in the water. 
Alternatively, suppose that the onlooker had noticed the drowning child, but that they have a pathological and 
paralysing fear of water — a fear which they were in fact trying to overcome by taking a stroll to the beach, 
only to be traumatised even further by this awful turn of events. Or even suppose that the onlooker suffered 
from a mental illness due to which they could not think clearly.  
In each of these cases a mental incapacity is what would undermine the onlookerʼs responsibility – 
respectively, a lack of knowledge, a volitional impairment, and a cognitive impairment.14 
However, physical incapacities could also absolve the onlooker of responsibility. For instance, the 
onlooker might not know how to swim, in which case we may not be justified in claiming that they had a 
 




 A lack of knowledge is usually classified as a cognitive impairment, though see following note and the related text 
about (e.g.) knowing how to swim, which I classify as a physical incapacity rather than a mental incapacity. 
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responsibility to save the child in the first place which they subsequently breached by doing nothing to save 
them.15 Alternatively, maybe they knew how to swim but they lacked the physical strength or stamina 
required to swim out towards the child – perhaps they had only just swam back ashore themselves and were 
too worn out and exhausted, or maybe they were sitting there in a wheel chair paralysed from the neck 
down. The physical tools at our disposal can also affect our capacities – for instance, if the scenario had 
been such that in the vicinity was a life boat, a rope or a lifebuoy/ring which could have been thrown to the 
child, then that again might have extended the onlookerʼs capacities which in turn might have justified the 
supposition that they had a responsibility to save them. These are just a few examples of how non-mental 
capacities might be relevant to responsibility. 
My point here is simply that it is plausible that responsibility may co-vary with or track a wide range of 
different capacities, many of which are not necessarily mental.  
Why capacities matter 
Capacitarianismʼs normative appeal seems to derive from the maxim that ought implies can. The links 
here are between our responsibilities and what we ought to do on the one hand, and our capacities or what 
we can do on the other hand. However, there are at least two ways of explaining how our capacities (what 
we can do) might have a bearing on our responsibilities (what we ought to do). 
In the positive version of this explanation, capacities generate responsibilities. The idea here is that we 
ought to do what we have most reason to do, and what we can and cannot do (along with a range of many 
other things, as I explain below) generates the reasons that we have to do various things. An inference is 
thus first made from what capacities I have to what I have reason to do, and then another inference is made 
from what I have most reason to do to what I ought to do – i.e. we move from capacity claims via reasons 
claims to ought claims.  On this account, if I cannot save a child from drowning – perhaps because I do not 
know that they are drowning, or because I cannot swim, or because I do not have a rope to throw to them – 
then it is simply not true that I ought to save them (unless I am responsible for the fact that I cannot do this – 
see the discussion of the role of history below). The reason why I would not be blameworthy for not saving 
them is because I was not in the first place even subject to that saving duty. On the other hand, in the 
negative explanation capacity regulates duties. The idea here is that regardless of the source of our duties, 
 




 Two points should be noted. Firstly, I am treating the onlookerʼs lack of knowledge of how to swim as a physical 
incapacity because it is an instance of ʻknowing howʼ rather than ʻknowing thatʼ, and because it involves a physical 
activity. In a sense, imagine that the onlooker says “But I canʼt swim.” To me this seems natural to view this as a physical 
incapacity. Secondly, the onlooker may not be absolved of responsibility if they should have had the capacity to swim — I 
return to this point below. 
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on this second view our incapacities can excuse departures from those duties. On this latter account, the 
three cited considerations – i.e. I do not know that the child is drowning, I cannot swim, or I have no rope – 
do not extinguish the saving duty, but rather they provide an excuse for departing from it. The reason why I 
would not be blameworthy on this second account is because although I did have the saving duty, my 
incapacity provided an excuse for departing from it. 
Two advantages of the negative explanation are that only it has an explicit place for excuses and 
justifications which play a prominent role in much ordinary and legal thinking about responsibility, and 
arguably it also more adequately captures the rich structure of practical reasoning in which some 
considerations discount, undermine and invalidate (rather than just outweigh or extinguish) other 
considerations. Nevertheless, I suspect that both views of the relationship between capacity and 
responsibility will generate the same responsibility judgments, and since I find the positive explanation 
simpler, in what follows my discussion will be framed in terms of it rather than in terms of the negative 
explanation. Thus, the idea is not to read off a personʼs responsibilities simply from an assessment of their 
capacities (this would assume that can implies ought), but it is rather that in determining what responsibilities 
a person has we should, among other things, consider what capacities they (ought to)16 possesses – i.e. the 
idea is that can, taken together with a range of other considerations, implies ought. 
What else matters 
Although capacities play an important role in informing responsibility claims, they are not the only 
things that matter to responsibility. For instance, to determine what a person is responsible for and the 
degree of their responsibility for it, it surely also matters what that person did (e.g. killed another person, 
stole an item, offended someone, mildly bruised anotherʼs ego, etc) and the degree to which their actions 
causally contributed to the outcome (e.g. did they play a crucial sine qua non role in bringing it about, were 
their actions just one of a number of necessary contributions, or were their actions a dispensable ʻoverkillʼ 
contribution without which the outcomes would still have come about, etc). 
Historical factors also play an important role. For instance, in the above example we would assess the 
onlookerʼs responsibility differently if they were blameworthy for their own incapacity – perhaps because they 
should have learned how to swim, or because they should not have allowed their energy levels to drop like 
that. As Smith points out, when an agentʼs incapacity is caused by “an initial [benighting] act, in which the 
agent fails to improve (or positively impairs) his [own] position” (Smith, 1983, p. 547), the exculpatory value 
of that incapacity is itself diminished and maybe even extinguished. 
 




 I discuss the need for this qualification below. 
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A vast range of normative and policy considerations can also affect our responsibility judgments. For 
instance, suppose that the water at the beach was teaming with hungry sharks; under such circumstances it 
would surely be unreasonable to insist that the onlooker should have swam out in an attempt to save the 
child since this would be tantamount to expecting them to almost certainly commit suicide — that would be 
too much to expect of anyone. On the other hand, if the onlooker had previously undertaken to care for the 
child at any cost, it might be reasonable to blame them for not trying to save the child then if we deem this to 
have been a binding undertaking on their part. Similarly, we might have sound policy reasons to treat 
childrenʼs guardians as responsible for the childrenʼs actions and for what happens to those children. By 
clearly delineating peopleʼs responsibilities, and in this case by imposing them onto those who are in the best 
position to take care of the child, we are more likely to avoid a situation where everyone assumes that it is 
somebody elseʼs responsibility to look out for the childʼs welfare. 
Normative considerations might also play a role in determining how much of a given capacity a person 
needs in order to have a responsibility to do something – i.e. normative considerations might play a role in 
setting the threshold of capacity required for responsible agency in a given context or sphere – and precisely 
how a person should be treated in order to be appropriately held responsible for what they have done – e.g. 
whether the right punishment for theft is 5, 10, 15 or 20 lashes of the whip, amputation of the hand that stole 
the item, incarceration (and if so, for how long), execution, or something else entirely. 
And finally, personal identity considerations also seem pertinent to responsibility assessments, since 
at least prima facie a person who possesses all of the right mental capacities might still act while not being 
themselves, and then it would seem inappropriate to attribute the actions to them. As I already mentioned, 
this is the very point of Fischer and Ravizzaʼs (1998) ownership condition, which specifies that to be 
responsible for an action (or its outcome), that action must have issued from our own moderately reasons-
responsive mechanism. 
My point is that responsibility claims are affected by a wide range of considerations and not just by 
what capacities the person to whom the claim pertains possesses. Above I mentioned the personʼs actual 
behaviour, their causal contribution to the outcome, historical factors, their obligations, normative and policy 
considerations as well as personal identity considerations. Hence, the central capacitarian thesis that 





The above discussion helps explain why it is not yet time to start writing an eulogy for capacitarianism. 
Given the role that historical considerations play in informing responsibility judgments, it should come 
as no surprise that artificial sanity will not suffice for seeing to it that justice is done – i.e. to re-enable 
mentally ill defendants and condemned inmates to stand trial and to be punished, so that their responsibility 
can be assessed, so that they can be held responsible, and so that they can take responsibility for what they 
have done. After all, the particular historical trajectory that leads these parties to possess those particular 
mental capacities undermines the claim that those are genuinely their mental capacities. Put a different way, 
certain kinds of histories undermine the ownership condition, and that in turn undermines responsibility. 
Thus, the reason why responsibility would not track mental capacity in cases of forced mental capacity 
restoration is because the historical and ownership conditions discussed above would not be met – i.e. this is 
not a counter-example to capacitarianism because historical and ownership considerations are among the 
auxiliary assumptions which provide legitimate exceptions to the general capacitarian rule. The artificiality of 
the sanity is thus significant not qua it having been brought about through unnatural methods, but rather qua 
being inflicted and qua being inflicted in a manner which gives us no choice over whether and how we will be 
changed. This is from whence at least some of our reservations about medicating people so that they can 
stand trial and be punished come. 
The role that normative considerations play in informing responsibility judgments also helps to explain 
why we might feel reserved about whether a particular form of competence or responsibility is restored by a 
particular treatment. For instance, depending on what we think is the purpose of punishment – for instance, 
retribution, deterrence, reform, or expression of solidarity with victims and their families – defendants may 
need a different set of mental capacities (and in different degrees) to be competent for punishment because 
the mental capacities one might need to be reformed may differ radically to the mental capacities one might 
need to have in order for victims and their families to get a sense of closure from seeing one punished. And 
for identical reasons, just because we might be able to restore the mental capacities required for one context 
(e.g. standing trial where responsibility is assessed and taken (or not) by the defendants), that does not 
mean that we must also be able to restore the mental capacities required for another context (e.g. 
punishment where people are held responsible and take responsibility). 
What I said above about the role of history (that certain ways of acquiring mental capacities fail to 
satisfy the ownership condition) also explains why direct brain intervention techniques might face an up-hill 
battle in trying to help us achieve the therapeutic aim of making people into fully responsible moral agents – 
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i.e. into people who could be released back into society and be legitimate targets for attributions of praise 
and blame for anything that they do thenceforth. Part of the problem is that if people are treated involuntarily 
– i.e. against their will – then the resulting capacities that they might acquire will not be their own and thus 
their possession of those capacities will not confer ʻfully responsibleʼ status onto them. But even if the 
treatments are consented-to or asked-for,17 any direct brain interventions which implement large-scale 
changes in one fell swoop would most likely break sufficient continuity between the pre-treatment and the 
post-treatment person, which in turn would give us grounds for concern that the post-treatment person is not 
in an authoritative position to retroactively endorse those changes. After all, the person who would be 
conducting the re-assessment might be too different from the person who they were prior to the treatment, 
and so any endorsement that they give might be insufficiently partial to warrant the claim that they endorse 
those changes in retrospect.18 
The above reflections suggest that the celebrated effectiveness of direct brain interventions is also 
probably their down-side – i.e. because when too much is changed in one single step, this removes the 
treated personʼs authority to retroactively endorse what has been done to the pre-treatment person. The 
difference between direct brain interventions and more conventional techniques for changing people, such as 
cognitive behavioural therapy or even some of the positive effects that we hope to achieve when we 
incarcerate someone, would thus appear to be that with the latter methods the treated person always retains 
the ability to stick to their guns and resist being changed. On the other hand, direct brain interventions by-
pass the treated personʼs ability to veto the changes that are being made to them – i.e. they slide in 
undetected ʻunder the radarʼ, robbing them of the opportunity to resist but also to endorse those changes – 
and the greater the change that is involved, the less likely it is that the treated person will be in a sufficiently 
authoritative position to retroactively endorse those changes. However, this also leaves open the possibility 
of using direct brain interventions to make many small and preferably reversible changes, all along allowing 
the treated individual to say “Stop there, letʼs go back – I no longer endorse whatʼs being done to me!” 
Effectiveness in small doses might be acceptable, and so perhaps this might be taken to suggest that the 
 




 And even if we put aside worries about whether genuine consent can be given in 'Itʼs either prison or treatment for 
you!” style conditions. See Bomann-Larsen (2011) for a discussion of some problems with voluntary treatments. 
18
 In Chapter 8 of Responsibility and Control, Fischer and Ravizza (1998) outline their views about “the process by which 
a mechanism leading…to an action, becomes oneʼs own” (p. 207). They argue that there are certain processes through 
which a person can retroactively come to own the mental capacities which they have come to possess, and they call 
these processes ʻtaking responsibilityʼ (I use this expression to mean something different). However, although I find most 
of their compatibilist theory to be very compelling, for reasons outlined briefly in this paragraph I do not endorse what 
they say about this matter. 
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sorts of direct brain intervention techniques that we should be working on – if we should be working on any 
such techniques, that is – are ones that would only make small and reversible changes. 
Finally, nothing that I have said in this last section substantially affects my earlier claims about 
whether direct brain interventions could be used to make people more responsible in the sense of making 
them into legitimate candidates for admiration and condemnation for who they are. Whatever value there 
might be in being a responsible person in this sense is not something that can be inflicted upon us from the 
outside by others. Furthermore, I would still worry about changing peopleʼs character through direct brain 
interventions even if the changes made were small, gradual and reversible, and this highlights an interesting 
difference between making people more responsible in the ʻlegitimate candidates for praise and blame for 
what they doʼ sense and making them more responsible in the ʻlegitimate candidates for admiration and 
condemnation for who they areʼ sense. 
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Abstract Discussion about ʻlie detectionʼ has almost exclusively been linked with the polygraph. Its use 
has always been controversial. Yet undoubtedly there is a need for search of truth in trials, considering the 
unreliability of eyewitness testimony and the subjective standpoints of both judges and juries. In recent 
years, there have been immense efforts to develop new ways to detect deception, and one of them is 
using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). It is too early to tell if this method is more suitable 
than the polygraph (the denying of admittance of fMRI lie detection for reasons of unreliability by a 
Magistrate Judge in the Western District of Tennessee in May 2010 had a lot to do with the specific facts 
of that case and cannot be generalised). Its potential problems must be researched as soon as possible. In 
1998, the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice) held that the polygraph must not be used 
in German courtrooms, but for the first time, the Court explained the prohibition with something other than 
purely legal arguments. Instead, the polygraph was barred because of alleged “thorough unsuitability”. 
This leads to the question whether a more suitable method – such as, for example fMRI – would now find 
access to German criminal courts, or whether the (purely) legal arguments that formerly applied against 
the polygraph could gain relevance again. Even with the consent of the accused, one might still argue that 
the use of a lie detection method in criminal courts violates the personʼs human dignity or his or her 
personal rights. Under which conditions would the consent be valid, if at all? And would admitting 
deception detection in the courtrooms not violate the accused's right against self-incrimination? Does it 
make a difference that fMRI looks right into the brain of the examinee? Does this mean it looks into the 
ʻsoulʼ of the accused, as was claimed by the Bundesgerichtshof in its 1954 polygraph judgement? 
Keywords neuroscience, fMRI, lie detection, admissibility, German criminal law 
Introduction 
In May 2010, a Magistrate Judge in the Western District of Tennessee ruled that at least the fMRI 
(functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging)-based lie detection test at issue was inadmissible at trial as it was 
judged as an unreliable method of determining the defendant's truthfulness (US vs Semrau, 2010).19 In the 
 
                                                      
 
 
19 Especially in the German discussion the terms ʻlie detectionʼ and ʻdetection deceptionʼ are much critized for it is 
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same month, the Indian Supreme Court was of the same opinion regarding a ʻbrain mappingʼ test with which 
it was allegedly possible to find out whether the subject has “experiential knowledge” (Smt. Selvi & Ors. vs. 
State of Karnataka, 2010). Despite debate over the polygraph testʼs suitability, it is used by law enforcement 
in many countries in the world, either during preliminary proceedings or at trial or both (Vrij, 2008; Honts, 
2004). However, in most countries the use is prohibited. In Europe, only very few countries – like Poland20  – 
allow polygraph lie detection in criminal procedure. Courts might still perceive neuroscience-based lie 
detection as unsuited for the purpose of assessing the reliability of the accusedʼs statement. However, after 
more than a decade of intense research in this field
21
 and numerous attempts to introduce neural lie 
detection in court settings, there is no doubt that we are not dealing with science fiction any more. The day 
might come sooner than expected that judges will be satisfied with the scale of reliability and validity that a 
neuroscience-based test provides. Always bearing in mind that humans are more than poor at detecting lies, 
that witness testimony is among the most unreliable kinds of evidence and that there is yet a strong need for 
the ascertainment of truth in criminal trials, it is important to examine the (purely) legal admissibility of a 
suitable neuroscience-based lie detection test.  
This article will confine itself mainly to the situation in Germany – although a few comments on the 
discussion in the USA will be made – but many considerations are of general validity, as those about the 
voluntariness of the accused's consent, the legal ʻnatureʼ of brain activity and the self-incrimination clause. 
The other restriction concerns the area of use: the article will be about the admissibility of neural lie detection 
in criminal courts only. It will also almost exclusively deal with the issue of legal admissibility. The crucial and 
at least in some legal systems also fiddly question how the suitability of neuroscience-based lie detection 
could be ascertained will only be examined in passing, as the sole criterion for admissibility under this aspect 
in German law is that the evidence at issue is not “thoroughly unsuited” (§ 244 s. 3 ss. 2 var. 4 German 
Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung, StPO)) – which is a more generous standard than the Frye 
or the Daubert standard in US law. 
Lie detection applying the polygraph – questioning techniques  
A lot has been written about lie detection with the polygraph. Hence, I will not repeat its history again22 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
undisputable that none of the existing ʻlie detectionʼ techniques are actually measuring lies directly. What it does instead 
is attempt to interpret data that are gained by substracting the measured activation in one state from a baseline state. 
This baseline needs to be established for each tested individual (Langleben, Dattilio, & Guthei, 2006). In this article, for 
simplification, the term ʻlie detectionʼ will be used nonetheless. 
20 Art. 192a § 1 ss. 2, 199a Polish Criminal Procedure Code. 
21
 For an overview, see Spence (2008), Vrij (2008) and Bhatt, Mbwana, Adeyemo, Sawyer, Hailu, & VanMeter (2009). 
22 For an overview of the history oft he polygraph, see e.g. Ford (2006) and Steller (1987). 
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and the technique will be outlined only briefly. The polygraph measures physiological functions such as heart 
rate, breathing rate and skin conductance. But it is not the machine that makes the differences, it is the 
questioning techniques. There are two main approaches: One does indeed test whether the tested person 
answers truthfully or not when asked a specific question related to a ʻcrimeʼ. The most popular questioning 
technique in this field is the Control Question Test (or Comparison Question Test, CQT). This test is widely 
used in the USA and other countries. The CQT compares physiological responses to relevant questions 
(e. g. ʻDid you steal the bike?ʼ) with responses to irrelevant questions (e.g. ʻIs your name Cornelius?ʼ) and 
with responses to particular comparison questions (e.g. ʻDuring the first 18 years of your life, did you ever 
steal anything?ʼ) (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). The other method searches 
for knowledge. This paradigm is based on the assumption that an increased psychophysiological response 
to a question about a specific detail of a particular crime (e. g. the colour of a stolen bike) indicates ʻguilty 
knowledgeʼ and thus involvement in the crime in question (Guilty Knowledge Test, GKT) (Ganis et al., 2003). 
It is obvious that the logic of the latter test is based more on cognitive reactions of the examinee, whereas 
the former seems to measure in effect emotional states like guilt or fear. However, it is important to mark that 
there is still no justifying basic theory that could provide the reason for the enhanced reaction with the CQT. 
In other words: Even the supporters of the CQT are unable to explain what actually causes the stronger 
reaction to the relevant questions (Rill, 2001); it could be fear or stress, but also cognitive reactions like 
comprehension, memory recall, response inhibition, etc. According to Ganis et. al. (2003), there is at least 
one general problem with the CQT: This polygraph method detects increases in measures that reflect 
increased arousal, which is at least typically, as mentioned, interpreted as reflecting guilt and fear. These 
measures can confuse lie detection in two ways. First, guilt and fear can occur in many situations other than 
during deception, which is why the results do not necessarily indicate deception as such. Second, if the 
deceptive person does not feel guilty or is generally ʻcold-bloodedʼ, he or she may not show the physiological 
reaction (Ganis et al., 2003). 
New approach: fMRI-based lie detection 
The three neuroimaging technologies/modalities mostly used to measure brain activity are functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and positron emission tomography 
(PET). fMRI uses a MRI scanner to measure active brain blood flow, EEG uses electrodes attached to the 
scalp to measure electrical activity, and PET measures the absorption of small amounts of radioactive 
materials introduced into the subject's body (Moreno, 2009). As for the question of legal admissibility, there is 
no difference between whether fMRI or EEG is used. However, there is an important difference between 
those two and PET: PET requires an intravenous line to be placed into the subject. This method is, unlike the 
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others, invasive (Moreno, 2009). At least under German law, that makes it a prohibited interrogation method 
per se (given that brain activity is regarded as testimonial, which is the case, see below, § 136a s. 1 of the 
German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO)). Although there has been research on lie detection with PET
23
, its 
likelihood to find access to the courts is definitely smaller than is the case with EEG and fMRI. 
There are more than 20 peer-reviewed scientific articles that deal with experiments on lie detection 
with fMRI. Research on lie detection with EEG seems to be far poorer. This article will therefore not be about 
the (in)famous Farwell's ʻbrain fingerprintingʼ
24
 and other attempts with EEG – although it cannot be said that 
this technology does not have potential for lie detection purposes – but will concentrate on fMRI. As with 
polygraph lie detection, researches have not found a ʻspecific lie responseʼ when using fMRI for lie detection, 
and it is doubted that there is a brain pattern that is a singular sign for deception (Vrij, 2008). However, the 
studies indicate that the brains of deceptive subjects are active in other areas than when the subjects are 
being truthful. Although these brain areas are not the same in each study, there is some evidence that the 
lateral and medial prefrontal cortex play an important role in deception (Abe et al., 2006; Ganis et al., 2003; 
Langleben et al., 2005; Priori et al., 2008). Such activation has been associated with memory-related and 
executive control processes (Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009). According to Ganis 
et al. (2003), it seems that different types of lies are at least partly modulated by different neural substrates 
(see also Abe et al., 2006; Priori et al., 2008). There are just a few fMRI studies yet that aimed at detecting 
deception or concealed knowledge at the individual level (Davatzikos et al., 2005; Ganis, Rosenfeld, 
Meixner, Kievit & Schendan, 2011; Kozel, Johnson, Mu, Grenesko, Laken, & George, 2005; Kozel et al., 
2009; Langleben et al., 2005; Nose, Murai, & Taira, 2009). They have revealed accuracy rates of up to 90%. 
However, this article is not the place to go into a detailed description of the relevant studies or the 
methods and techniques applied, as its purpose is to look into the legal admissibility of a method that is at 
least not unsuited for lie detection (see below). Further discussion about more scientific issues can be found 
in the relevant literature (see above; see also e.g. Greely & Illes, 2007). 
Suitability of scientific evidence 
In particular in the USA, but also, for example, in India, there has been intense discussion about which 
requirements have to be met to determine a method as scientifically valid. As mentioned above, the studies 
about fMRI lie detection have shown up to 90% correct classifications of truthful/deceptive answers. 
However, many authors mention issues that raise concern in terms of a lack of reliability (the consistency of 
the measurement), construct validity (do studies test what they purport to test?) and external validity (do 
 




 Mainly in Japan, see Abe et al. (2009), Abe, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh, & Fujii (2007) and Abe et al. (2006). 
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 See e.g. Stoller & Wolpe (2007). 
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laboratory results predict real-world outcomes?) (Schauer, 2010). These issues include the small number of 
studies with individual effects, the lack of replication, the small and non-diverse groups of subjects, the 
inconsistency of reported regions of activity, the artificiality of the deceptive tasks, the lack of attempted 
countermeasures (in a first study in which participants were trained to use countermeasures, deception 
detection accuracy in single participants was 100% without countermeasures, but only 33% with 
countermeasures (Ganis et al., 2011)), the variability of individual brains and in particular the transferability of 
the results into real-world situations (Greely & Illes, 2007; Moriarty, 2009). 
These concerns are indeed all worth considering, yet one should always bear in mind that other 
evidence such as witness testimony has not proven to display a high level of accuracy, in particular because 
the statement itself is already flawed with false memory effects (Eisenberg, 2011) and because ordinary 
peopleʼs ability to distinguish truth from lies rarely rises above chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) – which is 
also true for policemen, prosecutors and judges (Kassin, 2004). Hence, opinions such as Schauer's (2010) 
should also find consideration:  
...the admissibility of neural lie-detection evidence must be based on an evaluation of the realistic 
alternatives within the legal system and not on a non comparative assessment of whether neural lie 
detection meets the standards that scientists use for scientific purposes (Schauer, 2010, p. 102). 
To be perfectly clear, this cannot mean that unsuited lie detection methods should be admissible 
because other unsuited evidence is also admissible. But it cannot be either, that fMRI-based lie detection 
must meet stricter criteria than other types of evidence. As mentioned, this article is not about the criteria for 
scientific reliability and validity under the Frye or Daubert standard
25
 but about the legal admissibility of an 
allegedly just good enough neuroscience-based lie detection test. However, the situation in Germany 
concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence shall be shortly examined. 
In German criminal law, the court is allowed to reject a motion to take evidence by the defence only 
under the regulations of §§ 244, 245 German Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung, StPO). The 
only criteria for admissibility of a certain scientific method is whether the method is not “thoroughly unsuited” 
(“völlig ungeeignet”, § 244 s. 3 ss. 2 var. 4 German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO)). 
But when is a scientific method considered not thoroughly unsuited? In contrast to the discussion in 
the USA, where there are quite a few judgements concerning this issue and where the Supreme Court in its 
1993 Daubert decision suggested several non-exclusive factors26 to consider to aid the trial court in its 
 




 For a discussion on the criteria for scientific reliability under the Frye or Daubert standard, see e.g. Greely & Illes 
(2007) and Moreno (2009). 
26 Such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be tested and has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the method used and the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the techniqueʼs operation; and (4) whether the theory or method has 
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determination of whether an expertʼs testimony is suitable, the German judiciary is rather unhelpful and even 
contradictory in parts. Interestingly, among the few verdicts that concern the question of when a method is 
not “thoroughly unsuited”, are the 1954 and the 1998 Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice) 
rulings about the admissibility of polygraph lie detection. In the earlier verdict, the court said that the 
suggestion that an untruthful answer leads to an increased reaction of the vegetative system would have to 
be an “established well-known fact”, this would be “essential” for the use of scientific methods in court 
(Bundesgerichtshof, 1954, p. 333). Further explanations were not given. The 1998 opinion is much more 
detailed. However, the court sets quite a high standard: A scientific method (such as the CQT applied with 
the polygraph) is reliable only if it was a method that was “generally and free of doubt to be considered as 
correct and reliable by the relevant experts” (Bundesgerichtshof, 1998, p. 319). This formula now shows 
great similarity with the ʻgeneral acceptanceʼ rule of the Frye test from 1923 (the criterion survived as one of 
the factors that should be considered in the Daubert standard). The bad news though was that the court 
neither wasted a single syllable on deducing, explaining or underpinning this standard nor on the question of 
which criteria would apply for establishing the relevance of the experts at issue. In addition, no references 
can be found as to different court decisions or relevant literature. It seems as if the standard had appeared 
from nowhere. Taking into account the wording of § 244 s. 3 ss. 2 var. 4 of the German Criminal Procedure 
Code (StPO), according to which the evidence must be “thoroughly unsuited” for the court to be allowed to 
reject the respective motion, establishing such a high standard is rather surprising. In addition, considering 
that the question of the polygraph's reliability was crucial for the judging of its admissibility, the court's silence 
here is even more surprising. 
If the wording of § 244 s. 3 ss. 2 var. 4 of the German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) is taken 
seriously though, one has to come to a different conclusion. Although it could surely be asked whether the 
phrasing was well chosen, as ʻunsuitedʼ is not capable of forming a comparative, it can be said however, that 
the legislature wanted to make a point by putting ʻthoroughʼ in front of ʻunsuitedʼ. Another decision of the 
Bundesgerichtshof points in the same direction of interpretation. Only if a certain method was “not thought 
through” it could be regarded as “thoroughly unsuited”, the court said. But as soon as “just the slightest 
inferences” could be drawn from an expert opinion, the scientific method applied by the expert could no 
longer be considered “thoroughly unsuited” (Bundesgerichtshof, 1997, p. 339). 
An interpretation of this kind does justice to the wording of § 244 s. 3 ss. 2 var. 4 of the German 
Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) much more than the strict standard of the ʻrelevant expertsʼ. The few voices 
of the literature support this view. For Engels (1981), the unsuitability of the method must be established on 
the basis of a “non falsifiable well-known fact” (Engels, 1981, p. 36). According to Grünwald (1993), it must 
be “impossible” (p. 98) that the method has something to say about the fact in question. For Zwiehoff (2000), 
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the fact that there is a controversy in the scientific community over the suitability of a method is insufficient 
for it to be considered “thoroughly unsuited”. 
By accepting this much lower standard, it seems that the Bundesgerichtshof was wrong when it ruled 
the CQT inadmissible.27 Even when considering the many submitted studies that have all, with a few 
exceptions, shown rates of at least 70% accuracy for the CQT (for an overview, see Honts, 2004), it might 
well be justified to say that the method's suitability is not very good, because of the many possible objections 
such as for example the ones expressed by Greely and Illes (2007) mentioned above. But it is unlikely that 
such neuroscience-based lie detection tests are not at least a bit better than chance in determining the 
tested person's truthfulness (see Seiterle, 2010). It has to be emphasised once more that – at least for the 
use of neuroscience-based lie detection as a means of exculpation – it is not at all necessary for the method 
to have a very high validity or to even be perfect – this aspect seems to have a tendency of being neglected 
in the discussion. In particular under German law, it suffices for the method not to be “thoroughly unsuited”, 
that it was only one percent better than chance in assessing the accused's truthfulness. 
There are not that many fMRI studies yet that aim at determining veracity on an individual level, so 
that it might still be too early to call any fMRI lie detector better than completely unsuited. It is not unlikely 
that the moment will come sooner than expected though, that it must be regarded as better than flipping a 
coin when an accused's (or witnessʼ) veracity is to be judged, as is already the case with polygraph lie 
detection (see also Schauer, 2010). 
Legal admissibility of a suitable non-invasive fMRI-based lie detection method  
Coerced use prohibited – procedural ʻnatureʼ of the neural ʻstatementʼ 
§ 136a of the German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) prohibits the use of certain interrogation 
methods such as torture, other physical harm, deception, etc. and is the statutory expression of the 
fundamentally guaranteed right not to incriminate oneself – the self-incrimination clause (in the US 
constitution protected under the 5th Amendment).  
It is already doubtful whether a coerced use of fMRI lie detection is feasible at all. For a coerced use, it 
would be necessary to fix the subject on the table and force him to listen to or watch the examiner's 
commands and make sure that he actually understands their meaning. 
But given that coerced use was possible for the purpose of argumentation, at first sight it seems that 
treating an accused this way would certainly fall under § 136a of the German Criminal Procedure Code 
 
                                                      
 
 
27 This view is shared by legal scholars (see Putzke, Scheinfeld, Klein, & Undeutsch (2009) and Scheffler (2008)) as well 
as by psychophysiologists (Offe & Offe, 2004; Fabian & Stadler, 2000). 
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(StPO). However, this conclusion might be rash, for what the accused does actually ʻutterʼ during the lie 
detection test differs from what is traditionally protected by the self-incrimination clause (§ 136a of the 
German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO)): his verbal testimony. On the other hand, the self-incrimination 
clause does not prevent the accused from being the source of physical evidence: § 81a of the German 
Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) permits the examination of the accused even against his expressed will. 
Physical tests like blood tests, fingerprints, etc. are permitted to be carried out according to §§ 81f of the 
German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO). fMRI lie detection has at least elements of a physical examination, 
too. It is evident that the traditional distinction between physical evidence that can be retrieved without the 
suspects's consent on the one hand and testimonial evidence that is protected by the right not to incriminate 
oneself on the other hand, does not provide clear guidance in this matter. It has already been proposed to 
think of something like a third way to solve this problem (Thompson, 2007). However, as long as legislature 
remains silent, it is the jurists who have to decide whether the ʻstatementsʼ made during a forced neural lie 
detection test fall within the scope of § 136a or § 81a of the German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO); at 
least for German law that means: tertium non datur.  
As there are no precedents that deal with this issue, one can only try to find arguments. In German 
criminal procedure law, the classic distinction is as follows: The state must not compel the accused into 
doing something actively. As long as this is not the case, the accused might be ʻusedʼ as physical evidence. 
Obviously, this line of distinction becomes difficult when deciding about the lawfulness of a (if ever feasible) 
coerced neural lie detection test: The accused may be fixed and forced into an fMRI scanner, but he would 
not be forced to do anything active, for his brain activity ʻhappensʼ involuntarily (Thompson, 2007). Stoller 
and Wolpe (2007) sum up the problem as follows: “For the first time in human history, the state may be able 
to obtain information directly from the brain against a suspect's will” (Stoller & Wolpe, 2007, p. 367; see also 
Fox, 2009). 
In the German discussion, it has been suggested to use the question whether there is communication 
as crucial criterion for the distinction between physical and testimonial evidence (Groth, 2003). Whenever 
there is communication between the accused and the criminal prosecution authorities – or the examiner as 
their representative – it would concern testimonial evidence. However, this criterion turns out not to be the 
most useful tool. Firstly, it is disputable what exactly is understood by the concept of ʻcommunicationʼ. 
Secondly, it is not always possible to achieve precise results. How for instance would the case be judged 
that – one day – a computer programme developed the questions for our neural lie detection test, a 
computer-generated voice read them out automatically to the accused and the measures would be analysed 
by special software? It does not seem easy to subsume this course of events to ʻcommunicationʼ between 
two parties. Or the other way round: Groth (2003), who suggests the communication criterion, goes with 
Watzlawick and colleagues (1985), who state that two people “cannot not communicate” (Watzlawick, 
Beavin, & Jackson, 1985, p. 51). Why would taking a blood sample from an accused then not fall under 
ʻcommunicationʼ, as the accused sends information (incorporated in his blood) to the doctor/nurse, which 
influences her and causes her reaction? No communication? 
Beyond this criticism, it is not made clear why the formal fact that there is communication going on 
should be relevant to our problem. Unless – something not done by Groth (2003) – it is explained why this 
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criterion should be more than a mere phenomenological observation, it cannot be used as an argument in a 
satisfactory way. What is needed instead is a material criterion. Here, the most convincing approach lies in 
asking whether the suspect is to reveal knowledge related to the criminal act.28 If this is the case, the use of 
force to retrieve information is prohibited. This is also the main reason the privilege against self-incrimination 
was installed in the first place: Other than in the infamous inquisition process, the self-incrimination clause 
attempted to guarantee the accused's right of disposal over his knowledge. The accused has the right to 
decide if and to what extent he is willing to reveal his knowledge related to the criminal act to the 
investigators. This said, it is not important how the statement is being made, whether verbal or non-verbal, 
consciously or unconsciously. Physical evidence like blood samples, on the contrary, do not concern the 
accusedʼs knowledge related to the criminal act, which is why it is allowed to retrieve it against the subject's 
will.29 
Accepting the knowledge criterion does not only produce rather clear results, it also provides a reason 
for the different legal treatment of physical evidence on the one hand and testimonial evidence on the other 
hand. It lies in the fact that traditionally the mind of man is regarded as more valuable than his mere physical 
being – which is not surprising given that the mind is what makes man unique and distinguishes him from 
animals. Human dignity, autonomy and the subjectivity of man are not determined by his biological existence 
but by his special ability to mentally and emotionally make and exercise his will (Verrel, 2001). 
When applying the knowledge criterion to any kind of lie detection, the outcome is evident: It is the 
principle of lie detection in the setting of criminal procedure that the suspect – at least indirectly via 
interpretation by the examiner – reveals knowledge (or the opposite) related to the criminal act. In the case of 
the CQT, the suspect is asked whether he took part in the crime and in the case of the GKT, the aim of the 
examination is already been mentioned in the name of the questioning technique. As a result, the accused 
must not be compelled to reveal his knowledge about the criminal act in a neural lie detection test, because 
he is protected by the self-incrimination clause. 
Use without the accused's consent – use in secret 
By accepting knowledge related to the crime as being the decisive criterion for distinguishing between 
testimonial and physical evidence, another problem can be addressed that has not yet been much 
 
                                                      
 
 
28 See the discussion in the USA, where also a distinction is made between the act of communicating (disclosure of the 
contents of one's mind) and the product of this communication (the contents of one's mind), described in some detail by 
Stoller & Wolpe (2007); see also Thompson (2006). For Germany, see Frister (1994) and Verrel (2001). 
29 See Schmerber vs. California (1966), where the Supreme Court ruled that the police could compel a suspect to provide 
a blood sample for analysis in order to determine whether he was intoxicated, because this process was in no way 
testimonial (Stoller & Wolpe, 2007). 
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discussed. There are attempts to develop mind-reading devices that work remotely, by using Near-Infrared 
Spectroscopy (see Greely & Illes, 2007), Infrared Photography (Pavlidis, Eberhardt, & Levine, 2002) or 
similar technologies. Under the further prerequisite that no questioning technique would be necessary for 
that kind of lie detector, the following scenario could become reality one day: The accused would be filmed 
while making his statement or even if he chooses to remain silent. An expert witness would then analyse the 
data and give a report on the ʻcontentʼ of the subject's mind and/or on the veracity of his statement. No 
coercion whatsoever would be needed to retrieve knowledge linked to the criminal act. However, as has 
been shown, the self-incrimination clause (§ 136a of the German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO)) would 
prohibit the use of such a device as it gives the accused the right to dismiss statements of whatever kind that 
concern his knowledge about the criminal act in question. 
Use with the accusedʼs consent 
It is much more difficult to determine whether the use of a fMRI-based lie-detection technique should 
be admissible if the accused consents to it or even demands it for the purpose of exoneration. 
Would the accused's consent be voluntary? 
Even if a neuroscience-based lie detection test was generally admissible in criminal courts with the 
accused's consent, it is yet to ask whether that consent could be acknowledged as voluntary at all. The 
German Supreme Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held in 1981 that a polygraph test would infringe the 
accused's personality rights because his consent would per se be involuntary (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
1982, p. 375). Protection against state acts was only unnecessary if the individual made a real choice, the 
court stated. But according to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, this freedom of choice was not given to an 
accused for who – depending on the evidence at hand against her – conviction was the more or less secure 
outcome when rejecting the polygraph test. In this situation, consenting to a lie detection test was an option 
that the accused could not reasonably refuse. Although the Supreme Court's view was barely agreed with, it 
cannot be completely ignored30, for it may be agreed with the court that this is not the classic situation of a 
free choice. It must be considered that the accused here offers his basic rights, like his human dignity or his 
common personal right, to be at least touched by the government-ordered neuroscience-based lie detection 
test solely because he wants to prevent the state to interfere with other rights like his right to freedom (in 
case of a prison sentence) or his right to property (in case of a fine). This indeed can be called a dilemma as 
it seems impossible for the accused to protect all his rights at the same time and he is forced to sacrifice at 
least one of them. The accused finds himself in an emergency, in which at least if innocent, he must decide 
 
                                                      
 
 
30 It is important to note here that this verdict does not create a precedent. 
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in favour of the lie detection test if he wants to keep the possibility to achieve acquittal – in this respect one 
might follow the Supreme Court's argumentation. 
What the court does not see however, is that a lack of freedom of choice must not necessarily lead to 
the consent becoming invalid. In many parallel cases (such as §§ 56c s. 3 § 183 s. 3 German Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch, StGB): consent to medical treatment, although the convict only consents in order to avoid 
enforcement of the prison sentence) consent to the infringement of her rights is acknowledged as valid, 
although it is no more than “semi-voluntary” (Amelung, 1999, p. 384). According to Amelung (1999), the 
consent in these situations might be called “encroachment-relaxing consent” (Amelung, 1981, p. 105). The 
basic idea behind the aforementioned regulations is the principle of proportionality: State organs have to 
choose the most lenient way when interfering with the individual's sphere. If the individual faced such 
interference it could be the most lenient way to let him participate. It has to be left to the person affected, 
which of two (at least formally) legal detriments to his rights he wants to accept, because he is the only one 
who can judge which of the potential losses affects him less. To summarise, the consent in these cases is 
acknowledged as valid despite the predicament, (only) because with his consent the accused is able to 
mitigate detriments that otherwise would be disproportionate. Lie detection aiming at exoneration is not about 
the accused reducing the extent of a legal detriment by his consent altogether. The accused rather wants to 
prevent that he has to take – in case of his innocence – an illegitimate detriment of his basic rights. That is 
why it is not about the ʻclassicʼ case of an “encroachment-relaxing consent” which could be explained 
through the principle of proportionality. Hence, a different justification is required if this “encroachment-
preventing consent” should be acknowledged as autonomous despite the obvious crises the accused is in. 
The true reason why the accused's consent in a lie detection test cannot be declared insignificant is as 
follows: A main goal of the criminal procedure is realising the ʻguilt principleʼ: in the inquisitorial system, the 
court always has to endeavour to “do everything so that the guilty will be punished according to his guilt and 
that the innocent will be released from the procedure or acquitted” (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1987, p. 
2663). The court is therefore obliged to investigate the facts, the material truth, so that it is able to make a 
just decision. But the accused also has to be protected from unjustified burden; if he consents to the state-
caused violation of his rights, because he wants to convince the court of his innocence, this wish has to be 
respected. 
From what has been said, it is possible to deduce the further requirements for a consent to be 
voluntary in this sense: The state is only permitted to intrude in the accused's sphere because of his consent 
if the aforementioned goals are really served in this way. Therefore, the tool that is used for the exoneration 
purpose must be a suitable and (otherwise legally) admissible means for the search for the truth. If, for 
example, the Bundesgerichtshof's opinion concerning the reliability of the CQT was correct in that it could not 
contribute in the slightest to establish the truth, this test would already be inadmissible because the 
accused's consent could not count as voluntary. The same conclusion would result, if there were 
infringements that would not serve the search for the truth but that the accused would offer in exchange for 
acquittal (if he for example offered to go to a mental hospital for a certain amount of time). If in contrast, the 
consent's validity was derived solely from the idea of the accused's autonomy, like it has been done (Brandis 
2001), one would be forced to acknowledge also senseless ʻsacrificesʼ. This argumentation overlooks that it 
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is about state encroachments, which without a statutory authority can only be justified by the accused's 
consent. State organs are not, however, entitled to harm citizens just upon their wish as soon as they are in 
any kind of crisis, although this would be the consequence of a justification that was arguing with the idea of 
the individual's autonomy. 
In the case of fMRI lie detection, the just described requirements for ʻvoluntaryʼ consent are met: It is 
assumed here that our lie detector is reliable at least to a certain extent and it would therefore be a suitable 
means for the search for truth. The accused therefore would be able to avoid being convicted because of 
wrong assumptions to a – in case of his innocence – illegitimate punishment just through partially sacrificing 
his personality rights. As long as there was no additional pressure, the consent would be ʻvoluntaryʼ or at 
least valid. 
Would the use of neural lie detection violate the subject's personal rights/human dignity – despite her valid 
consent? 
Having acknowledged the consent of the accused who wishes to exonerate himself as voluntary, it has 
to be clarified whether law permits him to consent to a state measure that potentially affects his personality 
rights or even his human dignity. The Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice) ruled in 1954 
that an accused must not consent to a polygraph test. The court argued – although it has to be pointed out 
that there is not much of a detailed argumentation to be found in the reasons for the judgement – that a 
polygraph test ordered by the court does violate the accused's human dignity, even if he consented to it. It 
seems obvious that this decision was influenced by the post-”Third Reich”-atmosphere, where there was a 
general scepticism towards any method that had to do with – alleged – interference with a subject's psyche. 
Despite the fundamental lack of argumentative depth, German criminal law literature supported this verdict 
almost unanimously for at least 20 years. And yet it is not an absurd question to ask whether the 
Bundesgerichtshof's judgement could be reasonably justified. It has to be scrutinised whether basic rights 
might be turned against the bearer of the rights. In general, it is about the right to disposal of the subject's 
basic rights. Under German law, it is acknowledged that the common personality right (art. 2 s. 1 in 
conjunction with art. 1 s. 1 German Constitution) is a disposable right. Hence, the infringement of this right by 
the state use of an fMRI lie detector would be justified by the subject's informed consent.  
This result is not as clear with the case of human dignity (art. 1 s. 1 German Constitution). As 
mentioned, the Bundesgerichtshof did not accept the consent as justificatory in its 1954 decision. However, 
after a 20-year-discussion that started off in the late 1970's and that focused on the innocent accused whose 
last chance of producing evidence would be to take part in a suitable method of lie detection (see Schwabe, 
1979), in a second verdict in 1998, the Bundesgerichtshof changed its mind. If the accused voluntarily 
consents to the lie detection test, there would not be any violation of his human dignity, the court said 
(Bundesgerichtshof, 1998, p. 317). 
Case closed? Rather not. There is another passage in the opinion for the judgement that reads 
differently: In order to establish a lie detection test with the consent of the accused as non-dignity-violating, 
according to the court it was “crucial” that it was impossible that the method in question could not provide a 
“specific lie reaction” (which was not the case with the CQT/polygraph, the court said) (Bundesgerichtshof 
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1998, p. 315). The court ties in the 1954 verdict here, according to which it was possible with a polygraph 
test to look into the “soul” of the accused (Bundesgerichtshof, 1954, p. 335). If with a test one could indicate 
a “specific lie reaction”, according to the 1998 verdict, this would be equivalent to looking “into the soul” 
(Bundesgerichtshof, 1998, p. 315). So, for existing methods, the Bundesgerichtshof ruled that the consent is 
sufficient to justify the implicit infringement of the accused's human dignity. But as soon as there was a 
“specific lie response”, the lie detection test would be inadmissible due to a violation of dignity. At least it 
seems that this is what the court is saying, although it did not make its point totally clear and there is some 
debate amongst the criminal law experts as to whether this was really what the court wanted to say (if it tried 
to say something here, not even that seems certain). So the crucial question is still, whether the accused's 
will is of such importance that it could justify a state order (like ordering and performing a lie detection test) 
that would violate his human dignity if it were done without or even against his will. This issue concerns the 
disposability of the guarantee of the constitution to protect every humanʼs dignity. 
In the outcome, the Bundesgerichtshof was right in its 1998 verdict. In a ʻfree democratic basic orderʼ 
as Germany has, the guarantee for human dignity has to be understood first and foremost as recognition of 
the individual's right to self-determination. Religious beliefs like they might have underlain the 1954 decision 
about a lie detection test looking “into the soul” of the accused cannot – in a secular and pluralistic society – 
be used against personal autonomy. Against this background, any attempts to justify ʻhard paternalisticʼ 
approaches to compel someone into behaviour that at least in a way was for his own good, is destined for 
failure. 
There are other verdicts amongst German judiciary that come to a different conclusion. According to 
these, human dignity is an “objective, indispensable” value, “of which recognition the individual must not 
renounce”, because its importance goes “beyond the individual” (Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Supreme 
Administrative Court), 1981, p. 279). However, in no case, the respective court gave the slightest reasons for 
its decision, which is why it is impossible to further comment on these singular verdicts, even though they 
were pronounced by federal courts. 
Others try to justify the prohibition of a certain – voluntary – conduct in a different way: The respective 
conduct was to be prohibited because permitting this kind of conduct would have the potential to severely 
change the idea of humankind. Schmitt Glaeser (2000), for instance, has attempted to give reasons for the 
prohibition of TV shows like “Big Brother”. According to him, if a certain conduct undermined “the 
infrastructure of human dignity, understood as legal and factual substructure of its recognition, respect, its 
protection and its development” (Schmitt Glaeser, 2000, p. 400) and therefore endangered or destroyed the 
condition for a dignified life of many or all human beings, this conduct should be prohibited, even and 
particularly if it were with the actor's valid consent. As it is evident that voluntary lie detection, even if done 
with neuroimaging techniques, does however probably not have such strong impacts, it does not seem 
necessary to elaborate on this issue. But even if one assumed that lie detection – perhaps some futuristic 
kind of lie detection we are unable to even imagine yet – had that potential, the argument of the idea of 
humankind was wrongly placed within the scope of human dignity. The reason for this is that when talking 
about a change in the idea of humankind, one inquires about the consequences of the admission of a certain 
conduct. This has nothing to do with the specific subject of human dignity, but belongs to the general aspect 
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of the possibly overriding interests of the general public or third persons (see below). 
As a consequence, there is no voluntary conduct that could be prohibited under the aspect of the 
allegedly violated individual's human dignity, whether it is taking part as a dancer in a “peep show” 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 1981, p. 274) or in an ʻeventʼ that has become famous under the term ʻdwarf 
throwingʼ (Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Neustadt, 1993, p. 99). Not even ʻvoluntaryʼ torture, if 
there was a logically satisfying concept of it, would violate the suspect's human dignity. This does not mean, 
however, that conduct like the aforementioned would necessarily be permitted. In some cases, especially for 
voluntary torture with the aim of strengthening one's credibility in court, it seems quite facile to find different 
reasons for it to be prohibited – but the consenterʼs human dignity does not seem to be a valid one. 
Coming back to the Bundesgerichtshof's 1998 judgement, it turns out that it would not be practicable 
to justify the inadmissibility of a lie detection method used with the accused's informed consent, that provided 
a “specific lie response” or worse, with which it was possible to “look into the soul of the accused”, with the 
argument that it violated the accused's human dignity (Spranger, 2009). If it was the court's intention to keep 
the door open for falling back on the metaphysical view of the 1954 judgement – which cannot be decided 
from the wording of the opinion (see above) – and thus to prepare for the prohibition of a suitable 
neuroscience-based lie detector once it is there, this attempt has to be rejected. (Naturally, the same applies 
to those opinions that follow from the 1998 decision – and approve of – the ʻfinal endʼ of any kind of lie 
detection in German criminal courts (Kühne, 2010)). 
Prevailing interests of the general public/third persons 
Interests of the general public 
As mentioned above, a possible objection could be that the concept of the idea of man could be 
affected by the widespread use of fMRI methods in criminal courts. But in this case one would have to show 
that the admission could have such severe consequences, that these would have to be avoided even at the 
expense of the – sometimes vital – interests of the accused in question. Quite rightly nobody has ever tried 
to use this kind of argumentation against lie detection yet, considering that lie detection methods are used in 
many – also western – countries. The fact that it was not the polygraph but a brain imaging method makes 
no difference as fMRI, EEG and the like are also generally accepted and widely used for the most diverse 
purposes. The public charge argument does not become valid unless a perfect brain-reading machine is 
developed that could be purchased and used by almost everybody. 
 
Interests of third persons/indirect pressure upon the future accused 
Much weightier appear the concerns about the interests of people who may be accused of a crime in 
the future. What if a suspect does not utter the wish to be tested in order to prove his innocence? Would 
such conduct not be interpreted as an admission of his guilt by the judge(s)/the jury? And would this not 
impose an (indirect) pressure upon the accused to consent to the use of the lie detection method against his 
original intention? In the German discussion about the admissibility of lie detection in criminal court, for some 
authors only this argument of ʻindirect pressureʼ remains (Frister, 1993). Some reject the admissibility solely 
on the basis of the consequences of ʻindirect pressureʼ which they call “almost impossible to calculate” 
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(Rogall, 2010, para. 95). 
Often neglected in this context is the fact that it is not about the alleged fact of implicit pressure on the 
accused. This pressure can only be relevant for the question of admissibility of lie detection if it (also) had 
legal consequences. But before these legal consequences are considered, the right not to incriminate 
oneself might be at issue. This would have to be scrutinised as by definition it has to be ascertained whether 
lie detection in court would lead to a significant pressure on the accused at all. In order to show this, several 
assumptions have to be made. Some of these assumptions are no more than speculations about mental 
processes within judges/jurors, whereas others can be supported by empirical research. 
Firstly, judges/jurors would have to interpret a failure to undertake the test by the subject as 
circumstantial evidence for his involvement. For this purpose, it is useful to compare this to the discussion 
about the right to silence and the question if and to which extent it is permitted to draw negative inferences 
from the fact that the accused does not reply to the accusations. For a long time, there was not much doubt 
that silence meant the accused had something to hide, which usually meant: his guilt (Bentham, 1962). Only 
later it became accepted that silence might have many others reasons – general fear or intimidation, 
protecting others, political attitude, etc. – and that at least solely from the accused's silence the court/jury 
must not deduce his guilt.31 When taking a closer look at the situation in which the accused refuses to 
undertake a lie detection test though, you will find important differences to the case of the accused remaining 
silent. On the one hand, it has to be considered that we are dealing with a method that classifies ʻnon-guiltyʼ 
subjects as ʻguiltyʼ with a significant probability, which means that over every truly innocent accused hangs 
the sword of Damocles of receiving a wrong incriminating test result – a ʻfalse positiveʼ. This is a good 
reason for every subject not to ask for the test! This reasoning would also be taken into consideration by the 
court/the jury and consequently a lack of desire to be tested would not be interpreted as a sign of guilt. 
However, this conclusion would be premature, for one has to distinguish between different situations in 
a criminal trial. If basically all the evidence pointed to the accused and if a subject was just about to be 
convicted, a false positive neuroscience-based lie detection test result would not deter most of them from 
consenting to be tested. In this case, judges/juries would probably be even more tempted to draw negative 
inferences from a suspect who would not take his last opportunity to prove his innocence in this situation. But 
it gets even more complicated: When conviction is almost inevitable, the court/jury is not in need of an 
additional piece of evidence, so that the ʻevidenceʼ of a lack of a consent to undergo a lie detection test plays 
no role in the first place. This leads to the assumption that in this situation an accused would feel no 
(additional) pressure to consent to a lie detection test against his true intention, because he does not have to 
 
                                                      
 
 
31 In England and Wales (and also Northern Ireland, Criminal Evidence Order 1988), it is at least under certain 
circumstances allowed for the judge/jury to draw inferences that appear ʻproperʼ (sections 34f. Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act; 1994). 
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fear that this decision would be regarded as suspicious. 
But what about a case in which there is some evidence against the subject, but just not enough to 
convict him, in which in other words, one final piece of the puzzle might still be missing? This lacking piece of 
evidence could now be delivered by exactly the negative inference a jury/judges might draw from the fact 
that the accused refuses to ʻproveʼ his innocence by means of a suitable neuroscience-based lie detection 
test. But this consideration is not yet sufficient: Subjects would only feel pressured to offer this kind of 
evidence, if it was about a lie detection method that had a very high specificity, i. e. a test that has a very low 
rate of classifying non-guilty suspects as ʻguiltyʼ (a low false positive rate). If a testʼs false positive rate was 
high, every accused, and especially an innocent suspect, would have very good reason to refrain from taking 
part in a neural lie detection test. As already mentioned above, this reason would apply to every subject and 
it is evident that – we are still speculating about complex inter-psychological processes – the judge(s)/jury 
would not conclude that this the lacking piece of evidence. As there would be no inferences, the accused 
would feel no pressure to do what he did not originally intend to do. 
Here is a first result: The problem of the ʻindirect pressureʼ on subjects that might be caused by 
admitting lie detection in court is very complex, but turns out not to be as incalculable as it is widely feared. A 
possible violation of the right not to incriminate oneself might only occur if there is some evidence against the 
accused but perhaps not enough to convict him without further pieces of evidence, and if it concerns an 
almost perfect neuroscience-based lie detection test, a test that has a very high specificity. In any other 
case, the problem of ʻindirect pressureʼ/the self-incrimination clause would not emerge at all. 
And even for the remaining cases the discussion is not yet over. At least one further requirement must 
be met: In accordance with the right to remain silent, inferring guilt from the fact that the subject refrains from 
requesting a lie detection test would be subject to the prohibition of exploitation: Even if it might appear just 
reasonable to interpret such a conduct as admission of guilt, the judges/jurors are legally prohibited to use it 
as evidence against the accused, because they would thereby violate the accusedʼs right not to incriminate 
himself (Bundesgerichtshof, 1998; Beck, 2006). 
The interesting question now is whether in the real world the decision-makers would be capable of 
complying with that prohibition. One can easily find pros and cons on a once again mere speculative level, 
but there are also a few recent studies that investigate this question empirically (Wistrich, Guthrie, & 
Rachlinski, 2005; Kassin & Sommers, 1997). The results are inconsistent, but there are some intriguing 
findings. It seems that it is harder for judges to ignore information like previous convictions, conversations 
between the accused and his counsel, or details from confidential amicable agreements than information that 
was gained by violating the accused's guaranteed right to counsel. When considering that an accused, who 
claims to be innocent and faces a certain danger to be convicted, shows no interest in a – sometimes even 
literally life-saving (USA) – very promising way of exonerating himself from the accusations, might have 
something to hide, namely his guilt, it seems likely that judges/jurors do not always have the capacity to fully 
ignore this ʻevidenceʼ. 
If this is accepted it is only now that the question arises which rights of an accused might be affected 
in the above-mentioned case, in which the conviction is yet unsure and the available ʻevidenceʼ of the lack of 
a desire to be tested might be the last piece of the puzzle. Here one is forced to differentiate once again: The 
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right to testify is violated if the suspect has not made the decision whether he would like to go for the test yet, 
because due to the indirect pressure the choice whether or not to undergo the lie detection test is not free 
anymore. Those subjects who actually decide in favour of the test, although this decision contradicts their 
original attitude, suffer an infringement of their personality rights, because the consent to a method that has 
the potential to affect this right cannot be regarded as voluntary anymore, so that the consent loses its 
justificatory power. Finally, admitting fMRI-based lie detection would infringe the right not to incriminate 
oneself of those who do resist the pressure and refrain from consenting to a lie detection test even in this 
precarious case, because this – permitted! – conduct would (probably) be interpreted as admission of guilt 
and the accused would at least indirectly be “compelled…to be a witness against himself" (US constitution, 
5th Amendment). Only for this – obviously very limited – case the doubts expressed by quite a few authors 
are justified. But of course the concerns are only justified if it is made sure that no additional pressure is put 
upon the subject, neither by the police or the court nor by the prosecution. 
But even if it was established that – at least in certain cases – admitting fMRI lie detection would lead 
to an inevitable violation of the self-incrimination clause for some accused, this does not necessarily mean 
that their rights would come first. It has to be clarified whether the interests of an accused to have his 
procedural rights protected and preserved as thoroughly as possible take priority, or whether the interests of 
an accused to have access to a means that gives him a promising chance of proving his innocence take 
priority. Once again, the consequence is not consistent. For instance, if we are dealing with a situation where 
the case against the accused is weak, so that conviction is more or less out of the question, the interests of 
the accused to gain just an additional possibility to undermine his innocence have to take second place to 
the interest of an individual who may be accused of a crime in the future to complete protection of his rights. 
However, in the case that sparked off the ʻmodernʼ discussion about the admissibility of polygraph lie 
detection in Germany in the late 1970's, the outcome is different: When a person who is accused of a crime, 
in particular those who are innocent, according to the body of evidence has to seriously fear conviction – and 
there is no other evidence for the defence – he has a vital interest in being given the promising opportunity to 
produce evidence of his innocence. There cannot be much doubt that the interest in not to be – in the case of 
innocence unlawfully – given a prison sentence or, worst case (USA) to be sentenced to death, overrides the 
interests of people who may be accused of a crime in the future.32 
To summarise: The motion to take evidence by way of consenting to a neural lie detection test, which 
would at least indirectly allow conclusions to be drawn about the veracity of the accused's statements, is 
admissible without further problem in most cases. In particular, this is the case when it concerns a lie 
detection technique that is not perfect in the sense that the probability for false positives is significantly high. 
It has to be emphasised that as long as fMRI or any other form of lie detection does not show a very good 
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specificity, rights and interests of the accused will (probably) not be affected and the test is admissible in 
total. This means, that even if the testimonial nature of the physiological ʻexpressionsʼ is accepted, the 
voluntary use of fMRI-based lie detection is admissible under German law if the method is suitable (see 
above). Only a method with a very high specificity could cause problems under certain aspects, mainly a 
possible impairment of the right not to incriminate oneself, because only then a suspect is likely to feel an 
indirect pressure to go for the neural lie detection against his initial intention. But even in this case this 
conclusion is only valid if one accepts that judges/jurors are not (always) capable of ignoring the prohibition 
not to exploit the ʻevidenceʼ that a truly innocent accused would certainly apply for a lie detection test and 
that therefore the fact that a subject refrains from doing so must be an implicit admittance of his guilt. In 
addition, this conclusion is only valid if there is most likely not enough evidence against the accused, as 
otherwise the interest of an accused to take advantage of a reliable way to exonerate himself from the 
accusation and thus prevent unlawful conviction would override the interest of an individual who may be 
accused of a crime in the future not to accept violation of his rights, in particular his right not to incriminate 
himself33. 
However, all these considerations can only claim to be correct if the subject's voluntariness is secured. 
As soon as there was the slightest pressure on the subject to consent to a lie detection test against his 
original intention beyond the mentioned implicit pressure, there would be a different case and many concerns 
would gain importance again. In order to avoid this, it would be important to prohibit the police or the 
prosecution from even talking about the possibility of a lie detection test, let alone suggest it, even for the 
purpose of exoneration. The test should only be admissible if the accused takes the initiative without having 
been influenced in any way by state authorities. Only if this requirement is met, the admissibility of fMRI-
based lie detection seems rather unproblematic. 
Conclusion 
In comparison to the US legal system, the standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence are 
lower under the rules of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO). Accordingly, a scientific method 
must be “thoroughly unsuited” for it to be regarded as inadmissible by the court. Hence, a neuroscience-
based lie detection method like fMRI could in theory be considered admissible in Germany sooner than in the 
US, although in reality this seems rather unlikely, as the Bundesgerichtshofʼs (German Federal Court of 
Justice) attitude toward the accuracy of physiological lie detection methods (like the polygraph) is very 
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exculpation and the – potentially conflicting – interests of different accused not to be violated in their fundamental 




Given the suitability of neural lie detection, purely legal issues have to be raised. Firstly, the question 
whether a compelled (or secret) use would be legal depends on how you assess the nature of the subjectʼs 
brain activity that is measured during the test. There are good reasons for regarding brain activity as 
testimonial, for which reason the use of neuroscience-based lie detection would fall under the self-
incrimination clause (5th Amendment in US law). As a result, the secret or forced use would be prohibited 
and only lie detection with the accusedʼs consent is worth further examination. Despite the crisis a suspect 
finds himself in when facing conviction, his consent would have to be acknowledged as at least “semi-
voluntary” and therefore be valid. 
In contrast to the Bundesgerichtshofʼs 1954 ruling and several legal scholars, the accusedʼs human 
dignity cannot be turned against him: There is no – at least no legal – duty to behave with dignity. As long as 
consent is valid, the actual testing will therefore not infringe upon the accusedʼs human dignity or interfere 
with any other of his rights. 
It is prohibited for the judge/jury to draw negative inferences from the fact that an accused does not 
consent to undergo a potentially exculpating lie detection test. Hence, the rights of the accused could only 
count as argument against the admissibility of lie detection in criminal court, if one assumed that judges/jury 
are not fully capable of complying with this prohibition. In this case, the rights of the accused against self-
incrimination would potentially be threatened. But only within limits: In the case where the accused is 
expecting acquittal, the interests of individuals who may be accused of a crime in the future prevail over the 
interest of the accused at issue to exonerate himself by means of a suitable lie detection test. In every other 
case suitable lie detection for the purpose of exculpation is legally admissible in German criminal courts. 
Finally, the analysis leads to the assumption that for the (purely) legal issues, the fact that not the 
polygraph but fMRI or another neuroscience-based lie detection method is used, is not crucial (Spranger, 
2009; Schneider, 2010), neither for the question whether the use of the lie detector with the consent of the 
accused violates her human dignity, nor for the discussion about the legal ʻnatureʼ of the measured physical 
ʻstatementsʼ (vegetative symptoms/brain activity), nor for the assessment of the possibly infringed rights of 
the general public. The most important difference, as far as technical issues are concerned, is that with 
neuroscience it seems possible that lie detection might be used without the subject even being aware of it. 
But this only means that another situation has to be legally considered, it does not mean a fundamental 
difference in the assessment itself. 
References 
Abe, N., Suzuki, M., Tsukiura T., Mori, E., Yamaguchi, K., Itoh, M., & Fujii, T. (2006). Dissociable roles of 
prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices in deception. Cerebral Cortex, 16, 192-199. 
Abe, N., Suzuki, M., Mori, E., Itoh, M., & Fujii, T. (2007). Deceiving others: Distinct neural responses of the 
prefrontal cortex and amygdala in simple fabrication and deception with social interactions. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 287-295. 
Legal admissibility of suitable fMRI based lie detection evidence in German criminal courts 
89 
Abe, N., Fujii, T., Hirayama, K., Takeda, A., Hosokai, Y., Ishioka, I., Nishio, Y., Suzuki, K., Itoyama, Y., 
Takahashi, S., Fukuda, H., & Mori, E. (2009). Do parkinsonian patients have trouble telling lies? The 
neurobiological basis of deceptive behaviour. Brain, 132, 1386-1395. 
Amelung, K. (1999). Anmerkung zu BGH, Urteil v. 17.12.1998 – 1 StR 156/98 (BGHSt. 44, 308). Juristische 
Rundschau, 382-385. 
Amelung, K. (1982). Anmerkung zu BVerfG, Beschl. v. 18.8.1981 – 2 BvR 166/81. Neue Zeitschrift für 
Strafrecht, 38-40. 
Amelung, K. (1981). Die Einwilligung in die Beeinträchtigung eines Grundrechtsgutes: Eine Untersuchung im 
Grenzbereich von Grundrechts- und Strafrechtsdogmatik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Beck, S. (2006). Unterstützung der Strafermittlung in den Neurowissenschaften? – Einsatz von Verfahren 
funktioneller Bildgebung als „Lügendetektoren“ im Strafprozess. Juristische Rundschau, 146-150. 
Bhatt, S., Mbwana, J., Adeyemo, A., Sawyer, A., Hailu, A., & VanMeter, J. (2009). Lying about facial 
recognition: An fMRI study. Brain and Cognition, 69, 382-390. 
Bond, C., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 10, 214-234. 
Brandis, T. (2001). Beweisverbote als Belastungsverbote aus Sicht des Beschuldigten? Frankfurt/Main: 
Peter Lang. 
Bundesgerichtshof (1997). Strafverteidiger, 339. 
Bundesgerichtshof (1954). BGHSt, 5, 333-335. 
Bundesgerichtshof (1998). BGHSt, 44, 308-328. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (1982). Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 375. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (1987). Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 2663. 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (1981). BVerwGE, 64, 279. 
Christ, S.E., Van Essen, D.C., Watson, J.M., Brubaker, L.E., & McDermott, K.B. (2009). The contributions of 
prefrontal cortex and executive control to deception: evidence from activation likelihood estimate meta-
analyses. Cerebral Cortex, 19, 1557-1566.  
Davatzikos, C., Ruparel, K., Fan, Y., Shen, D.G., Acharyya, M., Loughead, J.W., Gur, R. C., & Langleben, 
D.D. (2005). Classifying spatial patterns of brain activity with machine learning methods: Application to 
lie detection. NeuroImage, 28 (3), 663-668. 
Stefan Seiterle 
90 
Eisenberg, U. (2011). Beweisrecht der StPO. Spezialkommentar (7th ed.). München: C.H. Beck. 
Engels, D. (1981). Beweisantizipationsverbot und Beweiserhebungsumfang im Strafprozeß. Goltdammerʼs 
Archiv, 21-36. 
Fabian, T., & Stadler, M. (2000). Polygraphietest im Ermittlungsverfahren. Möglichkeiten der 
physiopsychologischen Verdachtsabklärung im Ermittlungsverfahren. Kriminalistik, 54, 607-612. 
Ford, E. B. (2006). Lie detection: historical, neuropsychiatric and legal dimensions. International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry, 29, 159-177. 
Fox, D. (2009). The right to silence as protecting mental control. Akron Law Review, 42 (3), 763-801. 
Frister, H. (1994). Der Lügendetektor – Zulässiger Sachbeweis oder unzulässige Vernehmungsmethode?. 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 106 , 303-331. 
Ganis, G., Kosslyn, S. M., Stose, S. Thompson, W.L., & Yurgelun-Todd, D.A. (2003). Neural correlates of 
different types of deception: an fMRI investigation, Cerebral Cortex, 13, 830-836. 
Ganis, G., Rosenfeld, J.P., Meixner, J., Kievit, R.A., & Schendan, H.E. (2011). Lying in the scanner: Covert 
countermeasures disrupt deception detection, NeuroImage, 55, 312-319. 
Greely, H. T., & Illes, J. (2007). Neuroscience-based lie detection: The urgent need for regulation. American 
Journal of Law & Medicine, 33, 377-431. 
Groth, K. (2003). Unbewusste Äußerungen und das Verbot des Selbstbelastungszwangs. Frankfurt/Main: 
Peter Lang. 
Grünwald, G. (1966). Beweisverbote und Verwertungsverbote im Strafverfahren. Juristenzeitung, 489-501. 
Honts, C. R. (2004). The psychophysiological detection of deception. In P. A. Granhag & L. A. Strömwall 
(Eds.), The detection of deception in forensic contexts (103-123). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kassin, S. M. (2004). True or false: “Iʼd know a false confession if I saw one”. In P. A. Granhag & L. A. 
Strömwall (Eds.), The detection of deception in forensic contexts (172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Kassin, S. M., & Sommers, S. R. (1997). Inadmissible testimony, instructions to disregard, and the jury: 
Substantive versus procedural considerations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 893-
898.  
Kozel, F. A., Johnson, K.A., Mu, Q., Grenesko, E.L., Laken, S.J., & George, M.S. (2005): Detecting 
Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Biological psychiatry, 58, 605-613. 
Legal admissibility of suitable fMRI based lie detection evidence in German criminal courts 
91 
Kozel, F.A., Johnson, K. A., Grenesko, E.L., Laken, S.J., Kose, S., Lu, X., Pollina, D., Ryan, A., & George, 
M.S. (2009). Functional MRI detection of deception after committing a mock sabotage crime. Journal 
of Forensic Sciences, 54 (1), 220-231. 
Kühne, H. H. (2010). Strafprozessrecht (8th ed.). Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag. 
Langleben, D. D., Loughead, J. W., Bilker, W.B., Ruparel, K., Childress, A.R., Busch, S.I., & Gur, R.C. 
(2005). Telling truth from lie in individual subjects with fast event-related fMRI. Human Brain Mapping, 
26, 262-272. 
Langleben, D. D., Dattilio, F. M., & Guthei, T. G. (2006). True lies: delusions and lie-detection technology. 
The Journal of Psychiatry and the Law, 34, 351-370. 
Moreno, J.A. (2009). The future of neuroimaged lie detection and the law. Akron Law Review, 42(3), 717-
737. 
Moriarty, J. C. (2009). Visions of deception: Neuroimages and the search for truth, Akron Law Review, 42 
(3), 739-761. 
National Research Council. (2003). The polygraph and lie detection. Washington D.C.: The National 
Academies Press. 
Nose, I., Murai, M., & Taira, M. (2009). Disclosing concealed information on the basis of cortical activations. 
NeuroImage, 44, 1380-1386. 
Offe, H., & Offe, S. (2004). Experimentelle Untersuchung zur Theorie der Vergleichsfragen in der 
physiopsychologischen Täterschaftsdiagnostik. Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform, 
87, 86-102. 
Pavlidis, I., Eberhardt, N. L., & Levine, J. (2002). Seeing through the face of deception. Nature, 415, (6867), 
35.  
Priori, A., Mameli, F., Cogiamanian, F., Marceglia, S., Tiriticco, M., Mrakic-Sposta S., Ferrucci, R., Zago, S., 
Polezzi, D., & Sartori, G. (2008). Lie-specific involvement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in deception. 
Cerebral Cortex, 18, 451-455. 
Putzke, H., Scheinfeld, J., Klein, G., & Undeutsch, U. (2009). Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft, 121, 607-644. 
Rill, H.-G. (2001). Forensische Psychophysiologie: Ein Beitrag zu den psychologischen und physiologischen 
Grundlagen neuerer Ansätze der „Lügendetektion“.            
Retrieved from http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=962727717.  
Rogall, K. (2010). In J. Wolter (Ed.), Systematischer Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung. Mit GVG und 
Stefan Seiterle 
92 
EMRK (§ 136a). Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 
Schauer, F. (2010). Neuroscience, lie-detection, and the law. Contrary to the prevailing view, the suitability of 
brain-based lie-detection for courtroom or forensic use should be determined according to legal and 
not scientific standards, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14 (3), 101-103. 
Scheffler, U. (2008). In M. Heghmanns & U. Scheffler (Eds.), Handbuch zum Strafverfahren (593-874). 
München: C.H. Beck. 
Schmerber vs. California 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
Schmitt Glaeser, W. (2000). Big Brother is watching you – Menschenwürde bei RTL2. Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik, 395-402. 
Schneider K. (2010). Der Einsatz bildgebender Verfahren im Strafprozess. Lohmar-Köln: Josef Eul Verlag. 
Schwabe, J. (1979). Rechtsprobleme des „Lügendetektors“, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 576-582. 
Seiterle, S. (2010). Hirnbild und Lügendetektion. Zur Zulässigkeit der Glaubwürdigkeitsbegutachtung im 
Strafverfahren mittels hirnbildgebender Verfahren. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Smt. Selvi & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004, Supreme Court of India 
05.05.2010. Retrieved from http://www.scribd.com/doc/30969546/Narco-Analysis-Test-Guidelines-by-
Supreme-Court-Selvi-v-State-of-Karnataka-2010. 
Spence, S. A. (2008). Playing devilʼs advocate: The case against fMRI lie detection. Legal and Criminological 
Psychology 13, 11-25. 
Spranger, T. M. (2009). Der Einsatz neurowissenschaftlicher Instrumente im Lichte der Grundrechtsordnung. 
JuristenZeitung, 1033-1040. 
Steller, M. (1987). Psychophysiologische Aussagebeurteilung: Wissenschaftliche Grundlagen und 
Anwendungsmöglichkeiten der „Lügendetektion“. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Stoller, S. E., & Wolpe, P. R. (2007). Emerging neurotechnologies for lie detection and the fifth Amendment. 
American Journal of Law & Medicine, 33, 359-375. 
Thompson, S. K. (2007). A brave new world of interrogation jurisprudence? American Journal of Law & 
Medicine, 33, 341-357. 
US vs. Semrau, No. 07-10074 Ml/P. Retrieved from http://lawyersusaonline.com/wp-files/pdfs-2/us-v-
semrau.pdf. 
Verrel, T. (2001). Die Selbstbelastungsfreiheit im Strafverfahren: Ein Beitrag zur Konturierung eines 
Legal admissibility of suitable fMRI based lie detection evidence in German criminal courts 
93 
überdehnten Verfahrensgrundsatzes. München: C.H. Beck. 
Verwaltungsgericht Neustadt (1993), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 99. 
Vrij, A. (2008). Detecting lies and deceit. Pitfalls and Opportunities (2nd ed.). Chichester: Wiley-Interscience. 
Watzlawick, P. G., Beavin, J. H., & Jackson, D. D. (1985). Menschliche Kommunikation: Formen, Störungen, 
Paradoxien (7th ed.). Bern: Huber. 
Wistrich, A. J., Guthrie, C., & Rachlinski, J. J. (2005). Can judges ignore inadmissable information? The 
difficulty of deliberately disregarding. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 153, 1251-1345. 








If manʼs true palace is his mind, what is its adequate 
protection? On a right to mental self-determination  
and limits of interventions into other minds 
Jan Christoph Bublitz 
University of Hamburg 
Faculty of Law 
 christoph.bublitz@uni-hamburg.de 
 
Abstract While the ethical and legal issues of using neurotechnologies to change oneʼs own mind have 
been widely discussed, the legitimate ways of changing minds of other persons outside of therapeutic 
contexts remain vague. Interestingly, the protection of the mind is a rather blind spot in legal thinking. 
Neuroscience may change this as it provides means to both intervene into minds and measure changes. 
In this paper, I shall outline why current legal provisions cannot adequately capture interventions into other 
minds and suggest the recognition of a mind-protecting right, a right of mental self-determination. 
Furthermore, I propose some elements of a framework of illegitimate interventions into other peopleʼs 
minds based on a normative dualism between direct and indirect interventions, contrasting parity principles 
between interventions recently put forward in neuroethics. 
 
Keywords neurolaw, brain interventions, freedom of mind, parity principle, normative dualism 
Introduction 
Increasing knowledge about brain processes and technological advances facilitate new means for 
interventions into the brain targeting mental phenomena. From deep brain stimulation (DBS), transcranial 
magnet stimulation (TMS) to pharmaceuticals, tools for changing the inner world of persons are already at 
hand, and may become more effective and widely available in the near future. These neurotechnologies 
pose various challenges for society and the law. One of the central issues for neurolaw is to find principles 
framing the regulation of their use. The ongoing debate over neuroenhancement to improve cognitive 
capacities relates to one side of the question: What are the legitimate ways of changing oneʼs own mind? In 
this paper, I want to address the other side: What are the legitimate ways of changing the minds of others? 
More precisely, the minds of mentally healthy adults who have neither requested to nor approved of having 
their minds changed. Therefore, I shall not be concerned with consented interventions (e.g. for therapeutic 
purposes) but with the broader and very general, yet somehow neglected question over the legal limits of 
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The issues of transforming oneʼs own and changing othersʼ minds share common ground in the 
question of whether neurotechnological means differ from traditional ways. In an abstract perspective, 
changing minds is anything but a novel phenomenon. People have always sought to alter their mind states, 
from ingesting alcohol, chewing coca leaves to education and books. For some, neurotechnologies are the 
continuation of humankindʼs quest for optimising cognitive capacities (Galert et al., 2009; Greely et al., 2008), 
while others point to categorical differences between means (Sandel, 2007), which raises the normative 
question about their ethical or legal ramifications. But even the first step, describing the differences 
accurately, is a task harder as it may initially appear. While often taken for granted, Levy (2007) tries to 
capture them in some detail: 
There are two basic ways to go about changing someoneʼs mind. What we might call the traditional way 
involves the presentation of evidence and argument…Of course, there is a sense in which presenting 
evidence is a kind of (indirect) manipulation of the brain – it alters connections between neurons, and 
might contribute, in a very small way, to changing the morphology of the brain…But direct manipulation of 
the brain differs from indirect in an extremely significant way: whereas the presentation of evidence and 
argument manipulates the brain via the rational capacities of the mind, direct manipulation bypasses the 
agentʼs rational capacities altogether. It works directly on the neurons or on the larger structures of the 
brain (Levy, 2007, p. 69). 
Having said that, Levy goes on to argue for an ethical parity principle: “our new ways of altering the 
mind…ought not to be regarded, as a class, as qualitatively different in kind from the old” (Levy, 2007, p. xii) 
In its weak version, the parity principle claims “unless we can identify ethically relevant differences between 
internal and external interventions and alterations, we ought to treat them on a par… [T]he mere fact that 
one kind of intervention is internal is not a ground for objection” (Levy, 2007, p. 62). Levy does not claim we 
should not worry about new means of mind interventions but that we should not be especially worried about 
“internal means of manipulating the mind, not until far more powerful techniques come into existence” (Levy, 
2007, p. 144) since traditional means might be equally effective: “[T]he kinds of powers that neuroscience 
promises in the near future pale in comparison to the mind…control techniques already in existence, in 
power and in precision” (Levy, 2007, p. 144). 
Levyʼs remarks are very helpful for distinguishing interventions. Regarding the normative claim, 
 




 Evaluating the legitimacy of interventions in special relations such as doctor-patient or state-citizen requires a model of 
legitimacy in standard cases. Furthermore, between changing one's own or another person's mind lies the third category 
of changing another's mind by request in which different normative criteria obtain (Merkel, 2007). 
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however, I shall argue to the contrary. Concerning interventions into other minds, a legal parity principle 
between interventions cannot obtain, not even prima facie. Rather, I propose a normative dualism of 
interventions: Without consent, the law should prima facie consider indirect interventions permissible, direct 
interventions prohibited. Nonetheless, I concur with Levy that worries over new technologies may prompt us 
to reconsider some traditional means of changing minds too. Let us take a look at some ways we change 
other personsʼ minds, how the law deals with these interventions de lege lata (in its current state) and why it 
has problems to adequately capture mind interventions. As a solution, I propose to recognise a right to 
mental self-determination de lege ferenda, outline its contours and a framework of illegitimate mind 
interventions. 
Changing the minds of others 
As said, it is a truism that we change each otherʼs minds all the time. Every act of communication 
changes the minds of speaker and listener, and, as we may reasonably assume, changes brain processes 
as well. While I am writing these words, I expect to change the mind and the brain of you, the reader. I even 
intentionally strive to change it. Obviously, these kinds of intervention into anotherʼs mind are beyond any 
ethical or legal concern. 
In contrast, other interventions are clearly impermissible. Last year, scientists voiced worries over 
security weakness of neuro-devices like DBS, which may enable hackers to change their functioning (Kohno, 
Denning, & Matsuoka, 2007). Is there anything closer to mind-control than remotely controlled DBS-ʻmind 
hacksʼ, in quite a literal way? But even without hacking, taking over control of neuro-devices by force in 
traditional ways allows interveners to change minds of others quite invasively. Imagine scientists turn a 
patientʼs DBS on and off modulating his moods from moment to moment as they please to observe his 
reactions for a scientific experiment. Surely, without consent this is illegitimate, and, by the way, not because 
of the illicit use of machine and property, but because of the mental effects. Likewise, changing moral 
reasoning through TMS as recently demonstrated in a study (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & 
Saxe, 2010) appears illegitimate.  
Other interventions are harder to assess. Consider oxytocin, a neuropeptide recently gaining 
popularity in the press and neuroethical thought experiments. Its name derives from Greek (roughly: sudden 
birth) since it is released during labour. Oxytocin seems to impact various interesting mental and behavioural 
properties from bonding, maternal behaviour and sympathy to trust and risk-taking (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005; Fehr, Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, & Fischbacher, 2008). Some have 
exaggeratedly called it the “molecule of love”. So, if I, seeking to win your sympathy, spray some odourless 
oxytocin in the room before a talk, or a business partner before negotiating a risky deal – is it illegal? Do I 
commit a crime? Parts of the answer surely rely on its efficacy. However, I will set aside empirical aspects 
and concentrate on normative issues assuming interventions to contribute to mind-change.  
Also, take an example Dennett put forward: “Consider the case of the eloquent philosopher who 
indirectly manipulates a person's brain by bombarding his ears with words of ravishing clarity and a host of 
persuasively presented reasons, thereby inducing all his desires, beliefs, and decisions” (Dennett, 1984, p. 
64). Intending to ridicule frequent worries over manipulation and free will (an issue I will touch upon) Dennett 
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(1984) asks whether there is anything dubious in the philosopherʼs way of changing minds. 
And finally, consider a phenomenon more common than desire-inducing philosophers: marketing. 
Boasting claims over the efficiency of marketing methods developed with the help of functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data can be found throughout the rapidly expanding neuromarketing literature. 
Although these claims tend to be examples of good self-marketing rather than good science and their 
explanations, e.g. the reverse inference from brain states to mental states, are often overly simplistic (Ariely 
& Berns, 2010; Pauen, 2007), it is important to keep in mind that the neuromaketerʼs explanandum is not so 
much decision-making but ways of influencing it. As medicine aptly proves, changing phenomena does not 
require detailed understanding of its underlying mechanisms. On a larger scale, psychological surveys 
indicate that marketing works, but no one knows exactly how and why. In light of new findings over its 
efficacy and involved mechanisms the limits of legitimately changing othersʼ preferences through marketing 
may need to be reconsidered. 
Surveying the normative landscape 
What does the law de lege lata have to say about the legitimacy of these interventions, from DBS to 
neuroscientifically optimised ads (hereforth: example interventions)? Let us take a closer look at the existing 
landscape of norms relating to mind interventions. I hasten to add that there is, of course, not the law, but 
rather various different legal systems on different levels, from civil to criminal, from local to international law 
(the latter I call jurisdictions). Norms and doctrines may vary from one jurisdiction to the next, sometimes 
legal cultures are more divergent than ethical schools of thought. Even a systematic analysis of all norms 
relating to the mind in one jurisdiction is a Herculean task no one has, as far as I see, ever pursued. 
Therefore, the following remarks have to remain on a rather abstract level and resort to some basic 
principles of the law without commitment to a particular system. Apparently, cognitive liberty and its relation 
to the 1st amendment have been debated for the US legal system (Boire, 2003) with which I am not familiar 
enough to comment on. However, even there no legal theory of protection of the mind seems to exist. Thus, I 
hope my claims might apply to many jurisdictions.  
In their abstract formulations, legal provisions regularly do not refer to particular types of actions, e.g. 
spraying oxytocin, but to certain states of affairs (the protection of bodily integrity prohibits any action which 
causes bodily harm). Therefore, it is helpful to distinguish mind interventions by their outcomes. Two types 
appear morally and legally problematic: interventions causing psychological harm and those altering will-
formation and preference structures.  
Protection of bodily integrity 
Every jurisdiction provides some kind of protection to bodily integrity; inflicting bodily harm constitutes 
a criminal offence throughout the world. Do the example interventions cause bodily harm? Being exposed to 
an electromagnetic field via TMS surely produces changes in the brain, pharmaceuticals modify levels of 
neurotransmitters and watching ads changes brain activity. But do these changes constitute harm to the 
body? Criminal provisions often define infliction of bodily harm as actions having a detrimental effect on 
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bodily tissue, substance or the functioning of organs. Mere changes of the particles comprising the body are 
insufficient, since, on a closer look, at the microscopic level bodily changes occur all the time, yet it is hard to 
conceive of the body as being in a permanent state of injury.  
Thus, the negative effects on the material side of the body have to exceed a threshold. Some of the 
old forms of mind interventions like psychosurgery or electroconvulsive therapy certainly constitute bodily  
 
harm due to their negative bodily effects. Therefore, without prior informed consent, they violate the right to 
bodily integrity. With TMS and DBS (once the device has been surgically implanted) it depends on facts of 
the concrete case, especially what kind of, if any, damage has been caused to nearby brain tissue. 
Psychopharmaceuticals may constitute bodily harm if they have negative bodily side-effects. Their main 
mind-altering feature, however, the change of levels of neurotransmitters in synaptic clefts, does not 
constitute bodily harm. If it was, at least within a normal range, every act of communication with similar 
effects may constitute infliction of bodily harm - an absurd consequence. Hence, mind interventions cannot 
be adequately captured on the bodily level. The law has to recognise the mental side, and in fact, some 
jurisdictions have considered extending the protection of bodily integrity to mental phenomena. 
German courts hold that mental harm can constitute a violation of bodily integrity if they “manifest 
somatically”. This may sound progressive, but an analysis of judgments reveals that the protection of the 
mind is restricted to cases involving harm to the body (Bublitz, 2011). Furthermore, one should be aware of 
the fact that legal reasoning is deeply permeated with mind-brain dualisms, to be witnessed in a widespread 
distinction between physical and emotional harm. ʻPureʼ psychological harms, those not accompanied by 
damage to the bodyʼs tissue, are not considered as bodily harms. Obviously, such interpretations rely on 
mind-brain dualisms of a stronger sort presupposing the existence of purely psychological harms and purely 
mental states. In light of current debates in philosophy of mind such a position is hard to maintain. More than 
likely, all mental states are caused, realised by or at least supervene on bodily states.  
In the UK, the House of Lords held:  
The phrase ʻactual bodily harmʼ is capable of including psychiatric injury. But, it does not include 
mere emotions such as fear or distress or panic nor does it include, as such, states of mind that are not in 
themselves evidence of some identifiable clinical condition.35  
Thus, the protection of bodily integrity covers, at best, the infliction of mental disorders. None of our 
example interventions would meet this threshold.  
In tort law, the psyche is afforded broader protection. In their seminal paper on privacy the US 
scholars Warren and Brandeis (1890) noted:  
 




 Reg. v. Chan-Fook [1994] 1 W.L.R. 689; Reg.v.Ireland/Burstow [1998] AC 147. 
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[O]ur law recognises no principle upon which compensation can be granted for mere injury to the 
feelings. However painful the mental effects upon another of an act, though purely wanton or eyen 
malicious, yet if the' act itself is otherwise lawful, the suffering inflicted is damnum absque injuria [a loss 
without injury, a damage without a violation of someoneʼs rights]. Injury of feelings may indeed be taken 
account of in ascertaining the amount of damages when attending what is recognised as a legal injury, but 
our system, unlike the Roman law, does not afford a remedy even for mental suffering (Warren & 
Brandeis, 1890, p. 197). 
Today, I suppose, most jurisdictions do recognise tort claims over psychiatric injury to some extent. 
However, requirements are quite high. In the US, claims for “intentional infliction of emotional distress” 
require conduct to be outrageous and mental distress incurred to be severe. Several European jurisdictions 
stipulate mental injuries have to be caused by “nervous” or “sudden shocks”. Therewith, courts try to curb the 
virtually limitless claims over psychological harms (McInerney, 2009). Also, harms have to be quite severe, 
so severe, in fact, that posttraumatic stress disorder is contested in various jurisdictions. It is one of the 
hopes expressed by some legal scholars that neuroimaging may be employed to estimate the amount of 
pain or suffering inflicted in order to grant appropriate compensation. For epistemological reasons, I suspect 
this hope is farfetched since it tends to ignore the central point in the reductionism debate. If qualia, the 
subjective experience, the ʻwhat-itʼs-likenessʼ, cannot be reduced to brain states, then the intensity of 
discomfort cannot be read off their images.36 But this leads us astray.  
We can observe that courts only reluctantly grant remedies for mental injuries without somatic harms, 
but on the bodily level alone, negative mental changes are hard to be identified. Evaluating mind 
interventions reasonably requires taking the mind seriously – which implies recognising the mind in ʻits own 
rightʼ and discussing to which mental phenomena protection should be afforded. Before the procedural 
aspects of neuroimaging in the courtroom can be assessed, the role of mental states in substantive law has 
to be reconsidered. 
Privacy/personality rights 
A different set of rights found in most constitutions and human rights treaties protects privacy or 
personality.37 The central idea of privacy rights is that individuals are entitled to private spaces free from 
 




 At least, when it comes to inter-subjective comparisons between pain-intensity, epistemological obstacles seem 
irresolvable, Kolber (2007) is more optimistic.  
37
 Note that rights enshrined in constitutions or international human right treaties are primarily designed to apply in the 
vertical relationship between state and citizen, not horizontally, in private-private relations. They give rights against the 
state, e.g. to protect and not to violate privacy, but not against other citizens. For horizontal, third-party applicability they 
have to be transformed by further regulations, e.g. by recognising a tort of privacy. I will leave out such details and 
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unwanted intrusion. Traditionally, the protected sphere is the home in contrast to public places. In a classic 
understanding, privacy provisions only guarantee a right to be let alone, protecting a Thoreauean like 
seclusion in solitude. From the prohibition of surveillance measures based on privacy analogies can be 
drawn to mental privacy, barring neuroimaging or mindreading. However, in this sense privacy seems to lack 
the resources to deal with mind interventions in public social interactions. Yet this is what we may be most 
interested in. But as the notion of privacy has been steadily extended covering areas as anonymity, 
reputation, false press statements and Internet data, this line can be further expanded to the mind. After all, 
in the words attributed to the artist Joseph Beuys: The true palace of man is his mind. 
Personality rights protect the integrity and expression of oneʼs personality, classic examples include 
the right to sexual identity or self-definition of personality elements disclosed to the public. The scope of 
personality rights often overlaps with privacy rights. Interestingly, the notion of personality seems to remain 
largely unexplored in legal thinking. Although the German Constitutional Court held that Art. 2 of the German 
Basic Law confers absolute protection to the “core elements of the personality”, which means that 
interferences may not be justified by appeal to opposing rights, it has never defined what a personality or its 
core elements consist of. In a narrow understanding, personality traits are somewhat constant and consistent 
properties closely connected to that ʻwhat binds the personʼs inner core togetherʼ. So it remains unclear 
whether mind interventions altering preferences, behavioural dispositions or emotional propensities of rather 
trivial sorts qualify as changes in the personality. Presumably, a broader meaning of personality needs to be 
construed to capture transient changes in mood or preferences caused by oxytocin, TMS or reading these 
words.  
Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (EC) guarantees a “right to respect for private 
and family life…” which the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted quite extensively 
covering not only privacy but also the development of oneʼs personality in interaction with others and 
conferring a right to “psychological integrity” which has recently joined the rank of fundamental rights in the 
EU. 
Mental integrity 
Almost ten years after its proclamation, the Treaty of Lisboa set in effect the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EUCh) in December 2009. The Charter is the EUʼs first codified ʻbill of 
rightsʼ
38
 Art. 3.1 reads: “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity”. Art. 3.1 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
assume horizontal applicability.  
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 This may sound confusing to non-lawyers (and non-Europeans): The European Convention on Human Rights is an 
ordinary international treaty adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. Violating the 
 
 
Jan Christoph Bublitz 
102 
is one of the few norms explicitly protecting the mind. As it is neither contained in the EC nor in most national 
constitutions, the term caused some controversy during final debates. To various delegates “mental integrity” 
appeared unfamiliar and its scope unclear. A Swedish representative declared: “The concept of mental 
integrity remains a mystery to Swedish experts who cannot find it in either the Convention on Biomedicine 
and Human Rights or any other international instrument” (Borowsky, 2006, p. 120). The term was adopted, 
nevertheless, since Art. 3 was designed to afford protection against all conceivable biotechnological 
interventions.  
Art. 3 does not indicate what mental integrity means and leaves its interpretation to the courts. For 
some commentators it is synonymous with mental health. Others suggest that Art. 3 should also afford 
protection against coerced psychiatric treatments which may improve health but interfere with integrity. Even 
others consider it more broadly conferring protection against indoctrination or brainwashing (Rengeling & 
Szczekalla, 2004). Conceptually, it is hard to conceive what the “integrity” of a particular mental state is 
supposed to mean. Either a person is in or has a particular mind state – e.g. a thought or an emotion – or 
not. The same is true for ʻthe mindʼ – what is a disintegrated mind? Some forms of mental illness might be 
called ʻdisintegrated mind statesʼ, but the purpose of Art. 3 is to cover more than those exceptional states. 
Alternatively, it could protect the mind in its current state, the mental status quo. But this is quite 
unconvincing in light of the fact that the mind is in an ever-changing ʻstream of consciousnessʼ. Thus, the 
concept of “integrity” cannot be easily transferred from the rather static body to the dynamic mind. Mental 
integrity is a metaphor in need of further explication. Whether any of our example interventions interfere with 
it remains an open question. Ambiguities notwithstanding, the drafters of the Charter send a clear message 
for stronger protection of the mind, which will reverberate in the member statesʼ legal systems.  
Freedom of thought/freedom of speech 
Another important provision for mind interventions is the right to freedom of thought, enshrined in 
every human right treaty (Art. 18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – UDHR, Art. 18 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – ICCRP, Art. 9 EC, Art. 10 EUCh). Freedom of thought is one of the 
strongest, most fundamental rights, demonstrated by the fact that it is protected unconditionally. Neither the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Convention is a violation of an international treaty. The ECHR has no direct powers to enforce compliance with the 
Convention, however, parties to the treaty usually incorporate rulings into domestic law. The European Union is, 
arguably, a state on its own to which the member states have conceded some of their sovereign powers. The EU has a 
parliament, executive and judicative branches, but limited areas of competency. The highest Court of the EU is the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Charter of Fundamental Freedoms only applies to acts of the EU, not of member 
states. Nevertheless, due to the process of legal harmonisation throughout Europe, the Charter will influence court 
rulings in member states. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nor the EC provide limitation clauses. Art. 18 ICCPR & UDHR do 
“not permit any violation whatsoever on the freedom of thought” (UN General Comment No. 22, 1993). 
Freedom of thought is closely related to freedom of speech and expression and in philosophy, 
literature and even the law, they are often used interchangeably. For legal purposes they should be kept 
apart. Freedom of thought refers to personsʼ inner sphere (called ʻforum internumʼ) while freedom of speech 
and expression entail actions in the outside world, the manifestation of beliefs (forum externum). The forum 
internum also covers religious beliefs and personal moral conscience and is often regarded as inviolable. So 
even if thought was nothing more than inner speech it is protected unconditionally, only its external 
expressions are restrictable. Sometimes, the right to freedom of speech is deemed to include processes prior 
to speaking, e.g. forming and having opinions. In this spirit, Art. 19 UDHR & CCPR guarantee a right “to hold 
opinions without interference” which overlaps with freedom of thought. 
So, high-ranking rights cover mental phenomena as thought or belief-formation. In sharp contrast to 
their omnipresence, visibility and declared indispensability for democratic societies stands their lack of 
practical importance. For instance, in his over 50 years of existence the ECHR has only decided a handful of 
cases regarding freedom of thought, none of them bearing any relation to our present concern. Compared 
with the freedoms of religion and conscience protected by the same article, freedom of thought is an almost 
empty declaration.39 There are no definitions over its meaning, scope or possible violations. Even 
commentators rarely attempt to define what this fundamental liberty might encompass. Some provide 
examples of violations: again, brainwashing or indoctrination (Vermeulen, 2006). To others it prohibits “any 
conduct intended to change a thinking process, change an opinion or force divulgence of conviction” 
(Clayton & Thomlinson 2000, p. 976). Plainly, this must be wrong – otherwise, every university has to be 
shut down immediately. Given this ambiguity, one wonders why the ECHR never took a chance to formulate 
an idea of what freedom of thought may mean. Perhaps there was no necessity as all cases presented to the 
court were resolvable by other articles. However, as other articles, are limited (Art. 10 II ECHR), the logic of 
the law would demand testing complaints against the strongest right possible. 
Thus, we can only speculate over the scope of freedom of thought. Narrowly construed it might 
encompass only the capacity to think, i.e. the cognitive processes bringing about conscious mental 
phenomena which classify as thoughts. But does it cover the act of thinking or merely having a thought? And 
what is a thought, a subclass of conscious mental phenomena? Do thoughts include phantasies and 
emotions, do they need semantic content? And what is the act of thinking – consciously processing 
information? What about being in pain, loving, associating pictures with music or dreaming? And, after all, 
how can mental phenomena of whatever kind be unfree? Have we always thought freely?  
 




 Interestingly, the constitutions of EU member states do not protect freedom of thought, hence, there are no national 
court cases from which interpretations could be drawn (Bernsdorff, 2006). 
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I suspect legal scholars and courts are not too ambitious to get into these questions and rather cling to 
the belief that freedom of thought is not only legally, but factually inviolable as thoughts and the mind are 
ʻintangibleʼ and beyond the reach of interventions. During the drafting of the German Constitution after the 
2nd World War, delegates remarked: 
Thoughts, thank god, are shielded by the corpse and can neither be accessed nor restricted by anyone. It 
is unnecessary to protect freedom of belief – who could ever touch upon them? A norm: ʻthoughts are freeʼ 
is meaningless, its content self-evident, since no one could ever interfere with them. Therefore, such a 
norm would be without application and merely an empty phrase (Kahl & Thoma as cited in Faber, 1977, p. 
48). 
In some opposition to the presumption of the inviolability of thought stands the fact that practices as 
brainwashing – whatever it is – or psychoactive substances altering contents of thoughts, generating 
associative thinking, accelerating or slowing down thinking or modifying patterns of thought, etc. have a long 
history. Likewise, psychological findings have for at least a century indicated that mental phenomena can be 
changed in various and dubious ways. Somehow the law has not caught up with these insights and remains 
committed to a rather naïve, first-person perspective impression that thought is as a matter of fact free. Do 
our example interventions violate freedom of thought? By current (ill-defined) standards I suppose not as 
long as affected persons maintain capacities for thinking, making up their minds and weighing arguments. 
Other provisions 
Finally, it should be noted that some types of mind interventions fall under special regulations, e.g. 
oxytocin is included in drug-regulations prohibiting their unlicensed distribution and application. Presumably, 
among the many goals these regulations pursue is a rather broad understanding of the potential harmful 
effects of these substances. So, in a weak sense these regulations afford protection of the mind, even 
though they are not founded on a principled recognition of mental self-determination (at times, drug 
regulations even interfere with it). Furthermore, severe mind interventions can amount to torture or inhuman 
and degrading treatment (Art. 3 EC). Arousing “feelings of fear, anguish, inferiority and humiliation” can 
violate Art. 3 if mental suffering is intense (Keenan v. UK, ECHR 272229/95). Famously, the ECHR held that 
extraditing criminals facing the death penalty to the US may amount to torture – not because of the 
punishment, but because of the time waiting in death row (Soering v. UK, ECHR 14038/88; Lillich, 1991). 
While there has been some success in the prevention of physical ill-treatment, the non-physical forms of 
torture have been somewhat neglected (Neziroglu, 2007). It remains unclear which methods aiming at 
mental distress constitute torture as recently and infamously demonstrated by the war-on-terror practices 
endorsed by the former US president. Without any doubts, mock executions are torture. However, 
psychological torture is not our concern here.  
Preliminary conclusion 
In criminal law, the protection of the person is focused on injury to the body. From unlawful touching to 
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medical treatments contra legem artis, jurisdictions have developed detailed rules over (im)permissible 
conduct with other personsʼ bodies. Concerning the mind, things are different. With the exception of severe 
mental injuries, the law remains largely silent about normative principles on altering another personʼs state of 
mind. To put it bluntly: Legally, you can mess up another personʼs mind quite intensively, but you are not 
allowed to touch her body inappropriately. 
Although freedom of thought and opinion or personality rights are central constitutional guarantees, 
their scope and likewise their violations remain unclear. The usually adduced examples such as 
brainwashing or mind-control are themselves vague, lacking definitions or case applicability and presumably 
refer only to extraordinary severe interventions. But are any less invasive interventions per se legitimate? 
Legal provisions and their interpretations oscillate between being too narrow (mind-control) or too broad 
(changing opinions). What is missing is a coherent theory of illegitimate mind interventions providing 
guidelines for concrete cases. 
I have elaborated on rights and their interpretation so extensively in order for lawyers to recognise 
that, contrary to widespread belief, there are gaps in current doctrines and for ethicists to see how the law 
argues hoping to connect disciplines. Albeit intuitively it may seem feasible to discern morally permissible 
and impermissible mind interventions without a general theory of mind protection, the law deals with rights, 
their scopes and limits. Neurolaw is not just an (codified) extension of neuroethics. Norms pertaining to the 
mind have to be coherently aligned with the overall system of rights and duties, and legal theory should 
attempt to define principled criteria under which cases can be subsumed. Simply outlawing manipulations or 
causing mental harm stipulating a neminem leadere principle for the mind is not a feasible option given the 
fact that persons seek to influence, hurt and cause each other sadness and sorrow all the time. Unless one 
seeks to turn society into a community of superficial, false and faked kindness, the law has to acknowledge 
that social life consists of clashing opinions and at times it hurts. 
There are manifold additional reasons why the mind is a rather blind spot in the law. Historically, 
classic concepts of law such as Kantʼs (1797) restrict its purview to the regulation of behaviour in the 
external world because only there spheres of freedom can collide (and acting from good will is only a moral, 
not a legal obligation). Practically, the law has problems with proving mental states. Philosophically, the law 
and courts rely on some intuitive mind-brain dualism and further, applying notions as causation to the mind is 
problematic. Politically, one could indeed ask whether the law is the proper tool for regulating inevitable 
conflicts of interpersonal relationships. Presumably, there is more than a grain of truth in all these 
observations. Yet, in light of the example interventions it is anything but self-evident why the law should 
exercise a ʻjudicial restraintʼ on almost all ʻmatters of the mindʼ. After all, the lawʼs mission is to protect 
interests of individuals, and there certainly is an interest not to be exposed to stimuli even when they fall 
short of brainwashing. Therefore, the challenge for the law in the age of neuroscience is to formulate a 
modern notion of free thought or freedom of mind affording reasonable legal protection to neuronal and 
psychological processes underlying and shaping thinking and feeling. Informed by neuroscience, psychology 
and philosophy of mind, the law has to formulate a framework into which empirical findings can be 
incorporated. Nonetheless, this framework is essentially normative and has to be derived from legal 
considerations of which I will outline some in the following. 
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A right to mental self-determination 
When the natural boundaries of the mind, the skull, can be surmounted by neurotechnologies, 
normative boundaries have to be established. Thus, the law should recognise a mind-protecting right. In 
codified-law jurisdictions this means ultimately drafting and passing a bill; alternatively, existing statutes 
might be modified within the permissible margins of interpretation. But what is its scope? To begin, it may be 
useful to detach oneʼs perspective from given categories, notions of mind-control and the like and ponder 
over the question which mind interventions appear illegitimate. For the law, this is already a paradigm shift, 
and it may reveal that large shares of mental occurrences are responses to the world enabling interaction 
with the (social) environment. Unless one strives to attain nirvana and Buddhist detachment from the world, 
the mind and mental changes are conditions sine-quibus-non for living, and not surprisingly in many 
jurisdictions the criterion for death is the irreversible ending of brain and mental activity. But what should the 
law protect given the mindʼs peculiarities? Mental autonomy, it seems, is a rather misleading idea – we do 
not give ourselves the laws on which our minds work. Also, protecting mental integrity seems dubious if it 
implies comparing one mental state to another and finding out whether it worsened as the mind is a highly 
dynamic system. I think the best abstract formulation of the protected interest is mental sovereignty or mental 
self-determination, to be understood in opposition to heteronomous influences on mental functions. Let us 
take a closer look what this may mean in a legal context. 
The scope of the right 
The right to mental self-determination (SD) should encompass all mental states, i.e. not only thoughts 
or opinions, but also emotions, behavioural dispositions, even subconscious processes. Drawing meaningful 
distinctions between types of mental states is impossible, even the term mental ʻstateʼ cannot be taken 
literally. As said, the mind is an ever-changing dynamic system, and presumably all mental states are 
functionally interdependent. Here, some words about emotions are in order. I presume (negative) feelings 
are actually part of the mindʼs working and serve functions. They alert us and guide behaviour, according to 
Damasioʼs (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, they are even necessary for rational decision-making and 
hence inducing negative feelings per se is not a sign of a violation but of a well-working system. Only in 
extraordinary cases inducing such feelings can be considered a ʻdamageʼ or harm in a legal sense. 
Particularly, a distinction has to be drawn between appropriate and somehow inappropriate emotional 
responses to the world elicited by mind interventions (e.g. in the DBS case). However, since humans are 
particularly weak in controlling emotions, sometimes controlling other peopleʼs emotions or mood via evoking 
appropriate responses may be the most efficient way to control their thinking and decision-making.  
Furthermore, as we have seen, the law protects the personality of individuals. But what is a 
personality? I suspect it can be broken down into a web of desires, beliefs, emotional propensities, etc. and 
hence, a personality is a conglomerate of interwoven mental states seen from an abstract perspective. 
Therefore, it should be possible to combine the protection of thoughts, opinions and personality into one 
unified right, rendering further distinctions obsolete. Prima vista, all mental states should be protected 
equally.  
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The right to mental SD has several dimensions: It is a liberty right, permitting right-holders (every 
person) to freely exercise their mental capacities and change their mental states placing obligations onto 
others not to interfere therewith. Regarding neuroenhancement, the legal question arises whether the right 
also entitles to transform mental states with the help of neurotechnologies. Prima facie, I suggest it does – 
however, employing neurotechnologies may be restricted to a larger extent than exerting mental capacities 
or mental actions. The latter, I claim, cannot be legally restricted at all as long as they exclusively concern 
the forum internum. For present purposes, however, we are only interested in the negative dimension of the 
right, i.e. which kinds of obligations it places on others. Which conduct interferes with and possibly violates 
mental SD?40 Put simply, interventions severely undermining mental self-determination are illegitimate. 
Defining which interventions severely undermine mental SD requires a firmer understanding of what it is – or 
at least, what it is not. Self-determination is an ambiguous notion and may raise some objections.   
At the outset, an objection which is metaphysical in nature and supposedly supported by findings in 
neuroscience and psychology should be addressed: There is no ʻselfʼ and therefore no self-determination, so 
the question whether it has been undermined is meaningless. Speaking of self-determination implies dubious 
metaphysical assumptions of an ʻIʼ, a ʻselfʼ or controlling-entities which are based on the homunculus fallacy, 
a “fatal theoretical error” (Wegner, 2005, p. 19). 
Before the law joins in discarding notions as self-determination altogether, it is important to see in 
which ways they might be fallacious and in which not. Perhaps there is no transcendental ego, no immaterial 
ʻIʼ hovering above the empirical world. Yet, for present purposes, we do not need to rely on homunculi. 
Mental self-determination is not a descriptive, but an ascriptive notion. It is a normative judgment based on 
observations from both first- and third-person perspectives relating not so much to freedom from natural or 
neuronal processes, but from interference by others. 
Without appealing to dubious entities, it is possible to ascribe to individuals mental capacities such as 
remembering, concentrating, calculating, language skills, logical reasoning, shifting attention or pulling 
oneself together, etc. Notwithstanding contested issues as mental causation, persons can be described as 
having some sort of conscious control over their mental life. Interventions can undermine these control 
capacities and thereby interfere with the right to mental SD. This is the more active component of self-
determination. 
Nonetheless, it is easy to forget how limited capacities for self-control are. It is a striking fact that not 
even our beliefs are under the free disposition of our wills (Pettit & Smith, 1996; Noordhof, 2003). For 
instance, I always found reincarnation a comforting vision, yet, as much as I want, I simply cannot bring 
myself to believe in it – try for yourself. From what enters our stream of consciousness or how we feel, which 
 




 A terminological note: I speak of interference when actions fall within the ambit of mental SD. Therefore, they are 
prima facie illegitimate and in need of justification. If they cannot be justified, they violate mental SD.  
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moments we remember and what we forget to limits of introspection and motivation, we are to a large degree 
more passive bystanders to inextricable psychological forces. Even trying not to think about something and 
halting the wandering of the mind takes years of practice. It is a fact of the mental conditio humana that 
conscious mental powers are quite limited.  
What does this mean for a right to mental SD? The law can only protect capacities of self-control to 
the extent they really exist. If there is no control over certain mental elements, it cannot blame others with 
having undermined it. Take as a vivid example sexual orientation. If neuroscientists identify its neuronal 
correlates and means of modification (surely, this is a thought experiment) and change someoneʼs sexual 
orientation, it is hard to speak of them having undermined control – there was no control to begin with. 
Nonetheless, their intervention appears impermissible. The reason for this is that self-determination is to be 
understood broader than conscious self-control. Consciously uncontrollable mental elements still ʻbelongʼ to 
the individual; in fact, they constitute large part of his character. Normatively, mental sovereignty implies that 
others are not allowed to interfere with these states – this follows straightforward from the postulate of 
personality protection. The real problem is that in light of such a broad understanding of self-determination, it 
may seem as if any intervention leaves self-determination intact. Unless persons are ʻbrains in a vatʼ, hooked 
up to supercomputers like in famous thought experiments, persons bring about, in a sense, all their mental 
states themselves. Again, the criterion seems to be either all-encompassing or too-exclusive. Here is the 
place to draw normative distinctions. 
Take the famous example of a person P who decides to raise her arm and then raises her arm.41  P 
may feel fully self-controlled. Nevertheless, if we know that X has sent magnetic stimuli to her brain 
producing both decision and arm movement, it is fair to contend Pʼs self-determination has been 
undermined, although, strictly speaking, her very own neuronal processes have been involved. A normative 
judgment allows ascribing the decision to the stimulus. Note how the meaning of self-determination differs 
here from other current debates, especially in the free will context. There, self-determination is questioned 
when mental states are determined by neuronal processes. Here, we are interested in a right to mental SD, 
and rights concern interpersonal relations: Does X respect Pʼs self-determination? I guess not. So, roughly 
mental SD protects against interventions that undermine control capacities or change elements of the 
personality. 
Mental self-determination and free will 
Recognising a right to mental self-determination poses some interesting theoretical challenges for the 
 




 The classic experiment by Brasil-Neto and colleagues (1992) concerned fingers. Schleim (2010) reports he could not 
find any scientific account of induced arm-raising cases in which subjects experienced the decisions as willed by their 
own.  
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law. The prime objection against mental SD I often encounter when speaking to legal scholars can be 
formulated like this: Persons have free will, or at least, the law presumes so. As long as the law maintains 
this premise it cannot declare an intervention as having undermined self-determination. Inner coherence of 
the law demands to consider agents as either free (and responsible) or unfree (not responsible). Declaring 
simultaneously that someone acts freely yet his mental sphere has been interfered with illegitimately appears 
to be an utter contradiction. Beyond the rare accepted cases in which the law considers agents unfree, the 
premise of free will leaves (almost) no room for undermined self-determination. 
Indeed, mental self-determination stands in an intricate relationship with the free will premise. Due to 
space constraints, here is my argument in a nutshell: The premise of free will is not inconsistent with a right 
to mental SD, but on the contrary, presupposes it. A right to mental SD is, in a sense a right to free will. 
Roughly, the law places on individuals an obligation to arrange their mental sphere in a way that only law-
complying conduct arises. Only in exceptional cases the law is willing to acknowledge that persons could – in 
whatever sense – not have acted otherwise. For this, the law makes numerous metaphysical and empirical 
assumptions, which have been assailed from many directions for ages. Nevertheless, if the law maintains 
the free will premise claiming you could have acted, and for that matter wanted otherwise, and leaves to the 
individuals the internal configuration of their minds but expects them to do so in a certain way and treats 
them as capable of doing so, then it has to confer to them the legal powers to achieve this, i.e. a right to keep 
others from interfering with mental SD. Considering persons as self-determined entails granting them the 
legal powers of self-determination. Therefore, a right to mental SD is a prerequisite, a conditio-sine-qua-non 
for the free will premise. 
From this, we can even infer a first criterion for illegitimate interventions into the minds of others: Mind 
interventions rendering agents non-responsible are illegitimate. Why? Respecting other persons mental SD 
implies respecting the other as a subject in the legal sense. Being a legal subject means to be a free, fully 
right-bearing and responsible agent. As soon as agents are not considered autonomous and not held 
responsible for their deeds any longer, they lose their status as legal subjects (in this strict sense). The law 
does not need to recognise their actions as free anymore and if persons remain in a state of legal incapacity 
for a longer time, the law may even have to assign legal guardians or representatives taking care and 
making legally binding decisions on their behalf. Often overlooked, responsibility has two inseparably 
connected sides. The first side is sometimes portrayed in a negative light, i.e. being an apt target for negative 
sanctions as punishment. It correlates with the other side, i.e. being considered and respected as an 
autonomous person, which means being allowed to act without legal constraints or interferences.  
Why should this status be respected by others?  Because, I suppose, it is the basic assumption of any 
legal community of free and equal persons. In the hypothetical moment in which persons left the stature of 
nature to enter into a state of rule of law, one of the founding elements of their social contract must have 
been to accept everyone else as an equal member of the community. This is inherent to the idea of a social 
contract – actually, it is its central idea, reappearing in Rawlsʼ (1971) two principles of justice: “Each person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others” 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 60). Respecting each other as entitled to equal rights means refraining from expelling each 
other from this status as this is a denial of their right to have equal rights, freedoms and responsibilities. One 
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cannot simply kick others out of the game without violating the rule establishing it: recognising each other as 
partners of equal rights. Therefore, as a minimum, we owe each other respect for the mental capacities 
required for responsibility.  Notwithstanding objections levelled against social contract theories, I think this is 
a fairly sound starting point in a world of moral uncertainty.  
Manipulation cases in the free will debate 
Speaking of free will and mind interventions, it is inevitable to take notice of a close-by philosophical 
debate revolving around manipulation cases, which play a pivotal role in the contemporary free will debate. 
As there is something to be learned from it, here is an admittedly rough excursion into the heart of the 
controversy. This is a manipulation case borrowed (and slightly modified) from Pereboom (2003): 
Agent A was created by nefarious neuroscientists, who can manipulate him directly through the use of 
neurotechnologies, but he is as much like an ordinary human being as is possible, given this history. 
Suppose these neuroscientists manipulate his process of reasoning by which his desires are brought 
about and modified. The neuroscientists manipulate him by pushing a series of buttons just before he 
begins to reason about his situation, thereby causing his reasoning process to be rationally egoistic. Due 
to this, he develops the desire to kill V, which he does (Pereboom, 2003, pp. 112). 
The question is whether A is responsible for killing V and the intuitive answer is that he is not. There is 
something unfair about holding A responsible although he acts in accordance with his desires which he 
might modify in light of convincing counter arguments (he may even, in Frankfurtʼs words, wholeheartedly 
affirm them) and there are no other internal conflicts. Traditional conceptions of (non)responsibility do not 
capture the problems posed by manipulation cases since agents set ends for themselves and are neither 
controlled nor constrained or coerced. And here, the debate starts. Further cases are introduced in which the 
power of the manipulator gradually diminishes. In the end, the neuroscientists vanish and leave behind a 
world governed by (deterministic) natural laws and persons shaped by social and cultural forces ultimately 
beyond their control. The challenge is to pinpoint at which stage the judgment shifts and A is considered fully 
responsible. Some claim there is no relevant difference between cases and thus if A is (not) responsible in 
the first, he is (not) in the last while others try to make out relevant differences. To cut a long story short, both 
compatibilists and libertarians (the positions contending that humans sometimes act freely) have difficulties 
in accounting for the relevant differences as long as they only regard the internal structure of the agentʼs (A) 
psyche.42 Whatever a theoryʼs sufficient conditions for responsibility, one can always come up with a 
scenario in which they have been installed by nefarious neuroscientists. Therefore several authors introduce 
 




 Originally, manipulation cases were designed as an attack on compatibilism (Kane, 1998). However, it seems that 
libertarian views are susceptible to the same arguments, e.g. Mele (2006).  
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further conditions of responsibility which pertain to the history of an agentʼs preferences. Agents have to act 
on their ʻownʼ or ʻauthenticʼ preferences. Unfortunately, most authors do not flesh out this intuitive notion in 
more detail. Mele (1995) is a noteworthy exception. To him: 
…there is also a negative historical constraint on autonomy which I have called authenticity...A necessary 
condition of an agent authentically possessing a pro-attitude P...is that it be false that having P...is, as I will 
say, compelled* – where compulsion* is compulsion not arranged by S...[Sometimes] agents come to 
possess pro-attitudes in ways that bypass their control capacities over their mental lives...Bypassing is 
sufficient for compulsion...provided that the bypassing was not itself arranged or performed by the 
manipulated person (Mele, 1995, p. 166). 
So for Mele (1995), certain ways of acquiring preferences rule out responsibility. If his view is correct, 
control-bypassing interventions would be illegitimate for the same reason as other responsibility-thwarting 
interventions are. However, we shall remain uncommitted on the responsibility question43 and instead 
analyze their relevance for our present concern. The debate over differences between acquiring preferences 
via natural and societal forces or manipulations by nefarious neuroscientists pertains directly to Levyʼs 
(2007) parity claim. Recall his parallel distinction: Some interventions “bypass the agentʼs (rational) 
capacities altogether”. Unlike Mele (in regard to responsibility), Levy denies the normative relevant difference 
of control bypassing interventions. Let us try to get a firmer understanding of what bypassing interventions 
are and whether they are normatively different. 
Direct vs. indirect interventions 
The thousand ways to change anotherʼs mind fall on a popular view into two camps: direct and indirect 
interventions. Direct interventions are those that work ʻdirectly on the brainʼ such as DBS, TMS and 
psychoactive substances, and might bypass control whereas indirect interventions are somehow more 
remote. Sometimes the difference is cast in terms of interventions into the internal or external world. Strictly 
speaking, all these distinctions collapse: Any change in the external world must, in order to effectively 
change minds, cause internal (neuronal) changes; every indirect intervention affects brain activity. And most 
internal interventions which supposedly work directly on the brain (e.g. TMS stimuli) also pass through 
external space and the body. However, although these distinctions are not strictly mutually exclusive, I think 
they can be reconstructed for normative purposes under the guiding idea of self-determination. 
I suggest considering as indirect interventions those stimuli which have to be perceived sensually 
 




 It should be noted that existing legal systems are quite reluctant to accept manipulation or ʻbrainwashingʼ defences. 
This may change in light of neurotechnological mind interventions. Nevertheless, manipulated agents cannot be granted 
a carte blanche to violate norms as they please and should not be exonerated automatically (Bublitz & Merkel, 2009). 
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(hear, smell, see, feel) and processed psychologically including communication through word and sound, but 
also images or smells. In contrast, direct interventions are stimuli that reach the brain on other routes than 
perception, ʻworking directly on the brainʼ, although from stimulus to brain change various metabolic 
processes might be involved. Pharmaceutically induced changes in the level of neurotransmitters in synaptic 
clefts or changes in electromagnetic fields in brain areas are primarily not psychological but brain processes, 
i.e. chemical or physical reactions. They follow the laws of nature whereas changes induced by perceptions 
of the world somehow relate to what is being perceived, to the psychological setup of the perceiver and 
follow ʻpsychological lawsʼ, even though they are realised by brain activity.
44
 Again, these are not strict 
dichotomies: Indirect interventions involve light rays or sound waves carrying information and hence work, in 
a sense, also directly on the brain. Psychological processes are not only involved in processing information 
of what is being perceived, but also in processing direct interventions. Attaining new states of mind through 
pharmaceuticals surely involves some psychological processes at same stage – where and how, we do not 
know. This is the unsolved mind-brain mystery, but I assume that a personʼs psychological constitution 
significantly affects the outcome of an intervention and accounts for their interpersonal differences. 
These objections notwithstanding, in terms of control the rough distinction between direct and indirect 
is tenable for most interventions. Individuals have most control over interventions they perceive especially 
when they rise to the level of conscious awareness. A further distinction can be drawn between consciously 
und subconsciously processed interventions. According to functional accounts of consciousness such as the 
global workspace model, contents in consciousness are broadcasted and received by specialised 
submodules. Consciousness is understood as a global information exchange enabling ʻcommunicationʼ 
between different parts of the brain and facilitating higher cognitive functions as working memory (Baars, 
1997). If this is correct, conscious phenomena are better controllable than subconsciously processed 
interventions, control over the latter is much more limited. But even subconsciously processed information 
involves psychological processes. Before preferences or moods are transformed, stimuli are presumably 
ʻcheckedʼ against or aligned with existing moods, preferences, etc. So, stimuli working their way through 
conscious awareness are more controllable, whereas subconsciously processed stimuli are less controllable. 
Direct interventions are qualitatively different, presumably bypassing these psychological (not 
necessarily rational) processes altogether. Roughly one could say that indirect interventions are inputs into 
 




 Speaking of psychological processes is, admittedly, vague. Tentatively, I suggest that psychological processes are 
those which can be best described by reference to psychological properties or mental states of persons such as fear or 
excitement instead of neuronal or physical occurrences. The distinction between indirect and direct interventions does 
not rely on commitment to a particular mind-brain theory. Presumably, the differences between causal pathways into the 
mind could be reformulated in reductionist terms without losing their peculiarities on which the normative differences are 
based, even if ʻpsychological lawsʼ can be fully reduced to physical laws.  
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the cognitive machinery our minds are somehow adapted to process, whereas direct interventions change 
the cognitive machinery itself. Direct interventions somehow strain the connection between the individual and 
the world, be it appropriate or not. Admittedly, at some point this distinction might become unsustainable 
since indirect interventions could also change the machinery or the personality supervening on it. Yet, these 
changes are somehow more in line or accordance with the existing personality structure and preserve the 
individualʼs authenticity.
45
 However, it should be noted that some indirect interventions, especially olfactory 
stimuli, are much less controllable than others, demonstrated by the special way smells sometimes evoke 
memories and feelings.46 Fortunately, the normative dualism of intervention that I would like to propose does 
not primarily rely on the direct/indirect distinction. It only provides a first orientation for normative 
assessments based on the notion of control over ones mental sphere. And in this regard, even if 
interventions differ only gradually, they may differ significantly. 
Awareness & evasion 
Interventions may also differ in other control-related aspects. For instance, persons have greater 
powers to counteract interventions they are aware of. Communication seems effective only if the receiver 
gives the speaker a chance, an inner willingness to be persuaded. At least, one can revise arguments and 
use techniques as inner counterspeech, so that persons can at least drastically reduce, say, the impact of 
TV ads by reminding themselves of the manipulative business marketing is. In contrast, mental powers to 
counteract direct interventions are limited. Even if one is aware of being exposed to TMS or psychoactive 
substances, it is hard to withstand their effects through inner willing. Since means of resistance are limited, 
direct interventions can be considered more powerful.  
Moreover, sometimes persons can evade exposure to stimuli. The sense organs are the gates to our 
minds, at least the eyes we can shut. So interventions carried out covertly are especially worrisome (e.g. 
odourless oxytocin) leaving no chance for escape or counteraction. Being unaware of stimuli, another 
control-undermining effect may set in, i.e. misattribution. When persons experience changes in emotional 
states they seek explanatory causes. Only those stimuli a person is aware of are candidates for attributing 
 




 Of course, authenticity is one of the most cited and likewise challenged notions in the enhancement debate. But here it 
has a different normative function. In the enhancement debate it is often understood as an interest to be observed by 
oneself in self-transformations, here, much less problematic, it designates an interest to be protected against others. The 
contested issue of what an authentic personality consists of can be left to the individual.   
46
 The olfactory system seems to be closely connected to emotional areas of the brain (Stockhorst & Pietrowsky, 2004). 
Olfactory stimuli illustrate the hairsplitting character of the direct/indirect distinction. The smell (and look) of fresh flowers 
creating sympathy in another is an indirect intervention whereas nasally administered cocaine is direct, although causal 
routes into the body might be identical. 
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causality. In empirical studies, arousal was induced in test persons through covert administration of drugs 
and, not surprisingly, subjects misattributed changes to other cues (Schachter & Singer, 1962). This is in a 
way facilitating self-deception and hence undermining self-control. Hence, sub specie control distinctions 
between interventions can be drawn by taking into account several control-related aspects – but are they 
normatively relevant? 
Normative considerations 
The right to mental SD commands respect by others. As we have seen, in terms of control some 
interventions are more worrisome than others, yet a normative standard is needed to evaluate which ones 
are illegitimate. For instance, one may claim that respect for mental SD obliges others to always use the 
least invasive means to achieve a given goal. This seems to be implied by Meleʼs (1995) bypass criterion. 
Strictly speaking, no control is bypassed in e.g. spraying oxytocin as we simply do not have control 
capacities over that causal route. Bypassing only makes sense in comparison: Route 2 bypasses an 
obstacle to be encountered on route 1. And so, there is a hidden normative assumption in Meleʼs (1995) 
criterion: If there is a causal route over which agents have more control, taking another route over which they 
have less control amounts to bypassing. This implies that using the route best controllable by affected 
persons is the default option for changing other peopleʼs minds. Tentatively, I would suggest this is a 
reasonable approach. At least, one could say that taking the less-controllable route is in need of strong 
justification. And this leads us to my main argument for normative dualism: the different normative status of 
interventions. 
Normative status of interventions 
Indirect interventions are often protected by other rights, whereas direct ones are usually not. As we 
have seen, indirect interventions are perceptible changes in the external environment. Oftentimes persons 
have legally protected interests to change the outside world. Property rights allow proprietors to change the 
appearance of objects and places, e.g. setting up a supermarket or painting their house as they wish even 
though this changes minds of perceivers. Most importantly, freedom of speech protects communication 
including audiovisual stimuli. Special rules apply to restricting speech (e.g. defamatory or deceptive speech) 
beyond which every act of communication is legally privileged. If communication was to be regulated only 
because it changes minds, social life would suddenly become mute and expressionless. 
In contrast, direct interventions are in most cases not covered by special rights.47 There simply is no 
 




 Note that direct interventions may be justified by other reasons, e.g. (coerced) medication of mentally ill. This relates to 
the question whether interferences with the right to mental SD may be justified on other grounds. Here, we are 
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legally protected interest in spraying oxytocin or changing magnetic fields (of course, changing minds of 
others as such is not a legally protected interest). Therefore, no reasonably understood freedom is restricted 
if direct interventions were prohibited, but social life as we know it would collapse if indirect interventions 
were prohibited. 
Still, it should be analyzed whether and which limitations might be placed on freedom of speech in 
virtue of their mental effects on others. Perhaps neuroscientific insights into decision-making and persuasion 
may shed new light on the cognitive capacities and susceptibility of listeners. However, in the end it is a 
normative decision and the ethics of rhetoric have been discussed since the days of the Sophists. Therefore, 
I would contend that every change in the minds of others caused by communication, and with that I mean the 
semantic content of a message, is legitimised by free speech. This demonstrates the difference between 
direct and indirect interventions. Curbing the latter immediately raises free speech issues and balancing 
rights, restricting the former does not. Dennettʼs (1984) incessantly preaching philosopher may therefore 
transform all beliefs and desires of another without raising legal suspicion. Note, however, that free speech 
does not place obligations on others to listen. If you happen to sit next to Dennettʼs philosopher on a flight to 
Australia, your right to mental SD (not to listen) must be balanced against the philosopherʼs freedom of 
speech. But these are special cases (called ʻcaptioned audiencesʼ). Generally, as a consequence of the 
normative difference between interventions, changing mental states – even harming – others through indirect 
interventions is permissible to a great extent while comparably less harmful outcomes via direct interventions 
interfere with mental SD. 
Volenti non fit iniuria – consent 
Finally, persons can consent to having their minds changed. We have only discussed cases without 
consent. Usually we do not wander through the world consenting to mind interventions. In a world full of 
utmost respect for mental SD, we would constantly ask each other kindly whether we are allowed to change 
their minds. Of course, this is ridiculous as they answer is often clearly affirmative. For instance, if a 
restaurant waiter declares that the paint on the walls and the flowers on the table have been carefully chosen 
to create a nice atmosphere and may together with the smells of fresh food emitting from the kitchen 
increase appetite, no one would bother. If he tells you that substances are used in cooking that do not do 
much for the taste but suppress feelings of overeating to sell more desserts, we would care. So there is a 
kind of seduction we want for which consent can be assumed without expression, and there is a kind of 
influence we despise. Only the latter is worrisome. But even if we do not want to be influenced by some 
interventions, everyone must be deemed as having consented to them because of his participating in an 
urban society in the informational age. The legal doctrine capturing this is called venire contra factum 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
establishing what may count as an interference with mental SD in the first place.   
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proprium (ʻestoppelʼ may be the English-law counterpart), which roughly states that the law does not need to 
recognise self-contradictory behaviour. Walking over Times Square watching billboards one cannot deny 
consenting to mind-change. This again relates to the normative differences in changing the external world. 
One cannot expect the world to be free from stimuli affecting our minds. Oftentimes, particular persons are 
entitled to design the world and we want the world to be designed, and this entails affecting perceivers. The 
outside world is something society must and wants to create meaningfully, and hence, one must be deemed 
as having consented to unavoidable exposure if one lives in a culturally rich society. More generally, one 
might say that as long as persons are aware of external, indirect stimuli, they consent to exposure unless 
they withdraw. Problems arise only when persons are not aware of or cannot escape stimuli.  
Framework of illegitimate interventions 
After all, we can weave the ends together to formulate some elements of a legal framework of 
illegitimate mind interventions: The law should recognise a right to mental SD that has to be respected by 
other persons. However, as social life is constant interaction between minds, not any stimuli changing other 
peopleʼs minds can be considered illegitimate or in need of justification. Instead, several factors have to be 
taken into account. 
First, the intervention must be considered as having undermined mental SD in a legally relevant 
sense. The new mental states produced by the intervention have to have some relevance for thought 
processes, will-formation, opinions, preferences or other elements of oneʼs personality, emotional well-being 
or mental health (these categories overlap). Regarding emotions, their appropriateness is an important issue. 
The more intense the interference, the more likely its illegitimacy, particularly worrisome are interventions 
undermining capacities of conscious self-control, strength of will (inducing weakness of will)48 or diminishing 
capacities on which legal autonomy of subjects is grounded. Most of the millions of visual or auditory stimuli 
entering our mind day by day are either trivial as they lack significance or easily sheddable and shall not be 
of further interest. The example interventions changing moods (e.g. DBS), moral preferences or appraisal of 
other persons and therewith thought-processes, will-formation (e.g. oxytocin and TMS) or opinions 
(philosopher) are strong enough to warrant further scrutiny. 
Secondly, when interventions cause potentially worrisome new mental states, the way they have been 
brought about needs to be evaluated. The guiding idea is that over some interventions persons have more 
control than over others. Especially worrisome are covertly administered or direct interventions bypassing 
 




 Philosophy has grappled with weakness of will for ages. Recently, psychological theories compared strength of will to 
strength of muscles. Willpower may be depleted (and strengthened) by repeated exercise. Then, manipulating strength 
of will seems to be a realistic possibility (Levy, 2007). 
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psychological control capacities. 
Thirdly, the normative status of the interventions has to be taken into consideration. Some 
interventions, especially communicative, are themselves protected by strong rights whereas others, 
especially direct interventions, are not. Therefore, the permissibility of an intervention depends on its 
outcome, means and normative status. From this we can deduce a normative dualism of interventions: Prima 
facie, indirect interventions are permissible, indirect ones illegitimate. Of course, every intervention needs 
careful analysis of its own.  
This normative dualism stands in some opposition to Levyʼs (2007) parity principle, even though the 
former only applies to the law, the latter to ethics. Nonetheless, it may be worth to recapitulate the normative 
differences opposing it: Why should it matter to someone who has been influenced without consent to, say, 
purchase something he does not really want, whether he has been exposed to a buying-increasing 
substance or the charms, in words and person, of a saleslady? Because he cannot expect the environment 
to be free from any elements affecting him. Even if the salesladyʼs charms are as ʻirresistibleʼ as the 
substance, she has a (personality) right to be as charming as she wishes which prevails over his mental SD. 
He can, however, expect respect for his mental SD when it comes to substances as there is no legally 
protected interest in emitting them. If unconvinced consider it from the intervenerʼs perspective: Should we 
tell the saleslady not to be charming? There is a clear normative difference between ways of changing 
minds.   
This framework has to be expanded to incorporate other factors. Up to now, only single interventions 
were considered. In real-life there is no single stimulus, but sets of stimuli (e.g. 1000 ads plastered on 
billboards and broadcasted on TV) and for them to be combined in a legal evaluation rules of imputation 
have to be applied. Special criteria have to be worked out for emotional injuries, causality and foreseeability. 
Moreover, at this stage the model is insufficient to cover group processes in which manipulation or 
ʻbrainwashingʼ might most likely occur. Furthermore, it does not apply to parent-child or other special 
relationships since guardians have legal duties to interfere with their childrenʼs minds (education). Still, I think 
that even there indirect/direct distinction has some relevancy. Last but not least, thresholds for seriousness 
have to be defined, requiring close collaboration with empirical sciences. And above all, even if interventions 
interfere with mental SD, the question arises whether they may be justified by prevailing interests: Is mental 
SD an absolute right? Can interests of others or the state or the common good (Vedder & Klaming, 2010) 
outweigh mental SD? These are open questions for the law to address and any answer has to be grounded 
on a framework of illegitimate interventions. 
Case applications 
What does the proposed framework have to say about the example interventions? DBS, TMS and 
pharmaceuticals altering mental states to a severe degree are direct interventions, hard to counteract and 
hence undermine individualsʼ mental SD. Unless there are other prevailing interests, they are illegitimate. 
Thus, covertly spraying oxytocin (if effective) violates mental SD. Note that this does not imply that 
interveners commit a criminal offence as not every unlawful action constitutes one. Rather, at least in 
codified-law jurisdictions, criminal statutes indicating the prohibited behaviour are necessary, and currently, 
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there are to my knowledge no criminal offences against the mind. For German Law, I have proposed to 
introduce such an offence (Bublitz, 2011; Merkel, 2009). 
Dennettʼs preaching philosopher is not acting unlawfully, as his means of changing minds, i.e. through 
speech, is indirect, does not bypass control capacities and enjoys special legal protection. With the 
exception of special situations (captioned audiences), changing minds through speech does not infringe 
upon mental SD. Marketing is surely the hardest case as it requires balancing freedom of speech and mental 
SD. Roughly, as long as the persuasiveness of ads relies on the content of the message it is legitimate. 
Special marketing forms targeting subconscious mechanisms, however, are problematic. Perhaps the irony 
of neuromarketing lies in the fact that the more scientific valid data demonstrate that its effectiveness is due 
to other factors than the persuasiveness of the message, the more reasons there are for curbing it. 
Obviously, marketing and other indirect means of changing minds require very different normative 
considerations than direct interventions. Yet, finding appropriate ways of dealing with new neurotechnologies 
gives reason to reconsider traditional means of changing minds too.  
To conclude, the normative principles for changing other peopleʼs minds are vague. Even in the age of 
neuroscience, neither persons nor their legal protection can and should be reduced to their bodies. Thus, 
recognising and refining a mind protecting right and delineating its limits is one of the main challenges for 
neurolaw. 
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Abstract Findings from neuroscience research are increasingly advancing our understandings of the 
neural correlates of human behaviour, cognition and emotion. These findings are beginning to gain 
visibility in the legal system, including the courtroom. To an increasing extent, judges are being confronted 
with neuroscientific evidence concerning the degree to which the suspect should be held criminally 
responsible, the likelihood of future offending and the presence of emotional pain. By directly measuring 
brain activity, neurotechnologies hold the promise of increasing the quality of evidence in legal 
proceedings, and could therefore be of great value to the legal system. However, such practice has 
important implications including the possibility that neuroscientific evidence is overly persuasive, thereby 
unduly affecting legal decision-making. The presentation of visual information, i.e. brain images, may even 
increase this effect. In fact, several researchers have recently raised the concern that neuroscientific 
evidence, especially brain images, may be perceived in court without sufficient critical appraisal and should 
therefore be inadmissible in court. However, there is currently limited empirical support for this claim, which 
raises the risk of drawing premature and invalid conclusions regarding the responsible use of 
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom. So far, the difference between the effect that verbal and visual 
neuroscientific evidence may have on legal decision-making has not been sufficiently taken into account. 
Additionally, the possibility that visual neuroscientific evidence, i.e. brain images, increases the 
comprehensibility of the information rather than contributes to the potentially overly persuasive effect of 
neuroscientific evidence has not yet been considered. The present paper deals with the effect that 
neuroscientific evidence may have on legal decision-making taking presentation mode into account. 
 
Keywords neuroscientific evidence, legal decision-making, brain images, presentation mode 
Introduction 
In 2007, a 63-year-old man stabbed a friend nine times, as a result of which she deceased. The 
suspect declared that he was annoyed by the victimʼs behaviour. He furthermore declared that he saw that 
the victim had lost a lot of blood as a result of the stabbing and lost her consciousness several times. When 
she regained consciousness and tried to get up he stabbed her again. At the time of the incident, the suspect 
was intoxicated with alcohol and cocaine. According to one of the expert witnesses, a behavioural 
neurologist, the suspectʼs behaviour during the incident was affected by damage to his frontal lobes. More 
specifically, the brain damage had rendered the suspect unable to control his impulses and reflect on his 
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actions in difficult situations. The alcohol and cocaine were believed to have aggravated his impulsive 
behaviour. Additionally, the expert witness stated that the suspectʼs brain damage had interfered with his 
free will. On the basis of inter alia the neurologistʼs testimony, the presiding judge decided that the suspect 
had acted intentionally. More specifically, he stated that although the suspectʼs behaviour was affected by 
the frontal lobe damage, he did not lack complete insight into the consequences of his actions. According to 
the judge, the suspect was aware of the possibility that the victim would die as a result of the harm that he 
was inflicting on her. Consequently, the court decided that the suspect had committed the act of intentionally 
killing someone (manslaughter). The judge also considered the neurologistʼs testimony along with the 
testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist when deciding about the suspectʼs responsibility. According to 
the neurologist, the suspect was severely diminished responsible due to his frontal lobe damage, which as 
stated above had interfered with his free will. The presiding judge accepted this explanation and adopted the 
expert witnessʼ diagnosis of severely diminished responsibility, which eventually resulted in reduced 
sentencing of 18 months imprisonment, plus detention during Her Majestyʼs pleasure (District Court 
Amsterdam, 2008)49. 
This case clearly demonstrates the potential of using neurotechnologies in a legal context. Besides the 
determination of intentionality and the assessment of responsibility (Aharoni, Funk, Sinnott-Armstrong, & 
Gazzaniga, 2008; Gazzaniga, 2008; Greene, & Cohen, 2004; Vincent, 2008), neurotechnologies have 
numerous other legitimate legal applications, both in criminal and civil law. These include determining the 
likelihood of future offending and the treatment of criminal behaviour (Gazzaniga, 2008; Greely, 2008). 
According to Greely (2008), neuroscience may provide us with more effective rehabilitation through 
treatment aiming at directly changing our brains. Chemical castration for sex offenders, i.e. a 
pharmacological treatment aimed at a decrease in testosterone levels and resulting decrease in sexual 
thoughts and behaviour, is an example of a neuroscience-based treatment of criminal behaviour. 
Additionally, it has been suggested that neurotechnologies might play a role as a method to detect deception 
(Kozel, Johnson, Mu, Grenesko, Laken, & George, 2005; Langleben et al., 2002; Spence, Farrow, Herford, 
Wilkinson, Zheng, & Woodruff, 2001) or to enhance eyewitness memory (Klaming & Vedder; 2009; Vedder & 
Klaming, 2010). Research has for instance indicated that certain brain areas that are associated with high-
level executive functions including areas in the frontal cortex are more active during deception, which has 
been argued to be due to the increased cognitive effort involved in lying (Langleben et al. 2002; Spence et al. 
 




 Information about this case was extracted from www.rechtspraak.nl, the website of the Dutch Judiciary and the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands. Since only summaries of court cases can be found on the website, it is unclear how 
the neurologist examined the suspect and exactly what kind of evidence he presented to the court besides the written 
report of his examination of the suspect. 
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2004). As truth-finding is the core goal of criminal proceedings, accurate and reliable lie-detection would be 
of great value to the criminal justice system. Besides their potential applications in criminal law, 
neurotechnologies also have potentially valuable applications in the civil justice system. In civil law, 
neurotechnologies might be used for pain detection or to determine mental competence (Bremner, 2007; 
Grey, 2007; Jones, Buckholtz, Schall, & Marois, 2009; Kolber, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2006; Peyron, Laurent, 
& Garcia-Larrea, 2000; Tovino, 2007). Several studies have used neuroimaging technologies to explore the 
neural correlates of physical and emotional pain (Bremner, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2006; Peyron et al., 2000). 
Studies on the neural correlates of posttraumatic stress disorder have for instance shown that dysfunction of 
the medial prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala may underlie symptoms of the disorder (Bremner, 
1999, 2007). More objective methods of pain proof in tort cases would certainly be of great value to the civil 
justice system. 
Since neurotechnologies allow researchers to directly measure brain activity, they hold the promise of 
being more objective and accurate methods for the ascertainment of cognitive or affective states. Despite its 
potential value, it is however important to note that the probative value of neuroscientific evidence is yet 
limited as a result of insufficient scientific proof that at this point in time neurotechnologies can be employed 
to accurately and reliably determine criminal responsibility, predict the likelihood of future criminal behaviour, 
detect deception or detect physical and emotional pain. Although there are some studies that have shown 
that neurotechnologies could be used for these purposes, more scientific research is necessary before any 
valid conclusions about the accuracy and reliability of using neurotechnologies for the detection of deception, 
the assessment of criminal responsibility, or pain detection can be drawn. Nevertheless, as the summary of 
the case described above demonstrates, neuroscientific evidence has already entered the courtroom in the 
Netherlands. Consequently, neuroscientific evidence has already influenced legal decisions and will most 
probably be cited in courts more frequently in the coming years as technologies advance. 
Putting aside the fact that the use of neurotechnologies for legal purposes is currently questionable 
due to the limited scientific research, another important challenge of applying neurotechnologies in a legal 
context refers to the possibility that neuroscientific evidence is inappropriately persuasive and may therefore 
unduly affect legal decision-making. Given that neuroscientific evidence has already influenced legal 
decisions, this may in fact be one of the most important challenges at this point in time. In fact, several 
researchers have already claimed that neuroscientific evidence may be perceived without sufficient critical 
appraisal by legal decision-makers and should therefore be inadmissible in court50 (Dumit, 2004; Jelicic & 
Merckelbach, 2007; Reeves, Mills, Billick, & Brodie, 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong, Roskies, Brown, & Murphy, 
 




 It is important to note that the debate about the responsible use of neuroscientific evidence in court has mainly focused 
on the use of neurotechnologies for the assessment of responsibility. 
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2008; Garland & Glimcher, 2006). Since empirical research supporting this claim is yet very scarce – as 
some researchers acknowledge (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2008) – it is impossible to draw a valid 
conclusion about the responsible use of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom at this point in time. 
Moreover, it is crucial to differentiate between the verbal and visual presentation of neuroscientific evidence 
when discussing the effect of neuroscientific evidence on legal decision-making. This differentiation is 
important because verbal neuroscientific evidence, i.e. a written and/or oral explanation of the expert 
witnessʼ assessment, may have a different effect on legal decision-making than including brain images with 
the expert testimony. More specifically, three distinct scenarios are possible. Firstly, it is possible that both 
verbal and visual presentations of neuroscientific evidence are overly influential and unduly affect legal 
decision-making. Secondly, it is possible that neither verbal nor visual presentations of neuroscientific 
evidence are overly persuasive, at least not more persuasive than other types of expert testimony. And 
thirdly, it is possible that one of the two, but not the other induces a bias on legal decision-making. Obviously, 
knowing how both verbal and visual neuroscientific evidence affect legal decision-making is necessary in 
order to make an informed and valid decision about the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence in court. So 
far, discussions on the admissibility of evidence based on neuroscience has not considered the possibility 
that the verbal presentation of neuroscientific evidence may have a different effect on legal decision-making 
than the additional presentation of visual neuroscientific evidence, i.e. brain images that support the verbal 
explanations of the expert witness. The aim of the present paper is to explain how neuroscientific evidence 
may affect legal decision-making taking presentation mode into account. 
The perils of using neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom 
The implications of using neurotechnologies for legal purposes continue to be discussed (e.g. Farah, 
2002; Feigenson, 2006; Gazzaniga, 2005; Glannon, 2005; Greely, & Illes, 2007; Jelicic & Merckelbach, 
2007; Morse, 2006; Reeves et al., 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2008; Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben, 2005). 
One of the major concerns already briefly mentioned above refers to the fact that research on the use of 
neurotechnologies for legal purposes such as the assessment of intentionality or responsibility or the 
detection of deception is still in its infancy. As a consequence, we cannot yet draw reliable and valid 
conclusions about a suspectʼs intentionality or responsibility or about the truthfulness of his statements 
based on his brain activity (Jelicic & Merckelbach, 2007; Morse, 2006). Another concern of using 
neurotechnologies both more generally and for legal purposes refers to privacy (Farah, 2002; Wolpe et al., 
2005). Neuroimaging data can reveal a great deal of information about an individual, such as aspects of 
personality, mental illness or predisposition to drug addiction (Canli & Amin, 2002; Childress et al., 1999). 
When using fMRI for legal purposes, this kind of information could also be revealed which raises the 
question who should have access to the data obtained by neurotechnologies. Obviously, privacy of the mind 
in relation to the appropriate use of information gained by exploring an individualʼs brain processes in 
criminal (and civil) settings needs to be discussed – and potentially be regulated – before neurotechnologies 
can be used for legal purposes. 
In addition to these and other concerns, one of the most important challenges of applying 
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neurotechnologies for legal purposes refers to the possibility that evidence derived from neuroscience might 
be accepted without much critical appraisal and may therefore unduly affect legal decision-making (Dumit, 
2004; Jelicic & Merckelbach, 2007; Reeves et al., 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2008; Garland & Glimcher, 
2006). This assumption is supported by recent research demonstrating that people view explanations of 
psychological phenomena as more believable if these explanations contain a neuropsychological component 
(Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008). Weisberg and her colleagues (2008) demonstrated in a 
series of experiments that including neuroscience information in explanations of psychological phenomena 
had an influence on participantsʼ satisfaction with these explanations. Subjects were asked to read short 
descriptions of psychological phenomena and short explanations for these phenomena, and were then 
instructed to rate how satisfying they found the explanations. The results indicated that participants who had 
received explanations that contained neuroscience information were more satisfied with the explanations of 
the psychological phenomena as compared to participants who had received explanations that did not 
include neuroscience information. The effect was found to be particularly strong for judgments of bad 
explanations of these phenomena, i.e. explanations that were circular restatements of the explained 
phenomenon. The effect of the “seductive allure of neuroscience explanations” (Weisberg et al., 2008, p. 
470) was limited to non-experts, which suggests that training has a benefit on judgments of explanations 
(Weisberg et al., 2008). A similar effect with regard to the influence of neuroscience information was found in 
another study that explored the effect of brain images on judgements of scientific reasoning (McCabe & 
Castel, 2007). In this study, participants read short articles, for instance about the finding that watching TV is 
related to math ability. Depending on the experimental condition they were assigned to, participants were 
then presented with brain images, for instance brain images that showed that watching TV activated similar 
brain areas as completing arithmetic problems. Including visual information, i.e. brain images, with 
summaries of cognitive neuroscience data significantly increased peopleʼs ratings of scientific reasoning for 
those summaries as compared to no additional visual information and bar graphs. The visual information that 
was added to the explanations was completely redundant with the text that participants received. The finding 
that including brain images in the explanations of scientific findings increased peopleʼs ratings of scientific 
reasoning for those explanations suggests that visual neuroscience information, such as brain images, may 
have a particularly strong effect on evaluations of explanations, at least within the context of perceptions of 
cognitive neuroscience research. According to McCabe and Castel (2007) this effect is due to the fact that 
brain images are physical and therefore less abstract representations of cognitive processes, appealing to 
“peopleʼs natural affinity for reductionist explanations” (McCabe & Castel, 2007, p. 344). 
Although these two studies analyzed the influence of neuroscience explanations on the publicʼs 
perception of scientific research and not within a legal context, a similar effect might occur if neuroscience 
information is presented in court. It is important to note that the first study (Weisberg et al., 2008) explored 
the influence of verbal neuroscience information, i.e. a written description of a phenomenon, while the 
second study (McCabe & Castel, 2007) explored the influence of visual neuroscience information, i.e. a 
brainscan. It is important to make this distinction since both types of presentation are likely to have a 
different effect on peopleʼs judgments. Nevertheless, both studies found that neuroscience information has 
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an overly persuasive effect on judgments of scientific reasoning and there is therefore reason to assume that 
a similar effect may occur if neuroscience enters the courtroom. One recent study empirically supports the 
concern that neuroscientific evidence unduly affects legal decision-making by showing that students were 
more likely to find a hypothetical offender not guilty by reason of insanity if he had some kind of brain 
damage as presented in a brain image (Gurley & Marcus, 2008). In this experimental study, participants 
were presented with a summary of a criminal case and expert testimony regarding the suspectʼs mental 
condition and then had to render a verdict of either guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendants 
diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, defendants who had a brain lesion as demonstrated in a brainscan, and 
defendants who had a history of brain injury were more likely to be found not guilty by reason of insanity than 
those defendants who did not present any psychological or neurological testimony. A combination of a 
psychotic disorder, brain damage that had caused the disorder and neuroimaging evidence depicting the 
damage increased the likelihood of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict as compared to either of these 
types of testimony alone. Although these findings are very interesting and clearly demonstrate that 
psychological and neurological evidence affect legal decisions, there is an important concern that warrants 
closer examination and that limits the possibility of drawing valid conclusions about the influence of 
neuroscientific evidence on legal decision-making more generally. This concern has to do with the fact that it 
is currently unclear what exactly the effect of presentation mode is, which complicates discussions about the 
admissibility of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom51. 
Presentation mode 
The concerns of researchers who have argued that neuroscientific evidence should be inadmissible in 
court because it is perceived as overly persuasive almost exclusively focus on the use of brain images, i.e. 
 




 Besides the potential effect of presentation mode, there are additional issues that need closer examination before it will 
be possible to draw valid conclusions about the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence more generally. It is difficult to 
draw more general conclusions on the basis of Gurley and Marcus (2008) study, because the application of 
neurotechnologies to questions of responsibility is just one of the numerous legal applications of neurotechnologies. 
Consequently, knowing that neuroimages increase the likelihood of accepting an insanity defense does not tell us 
anything about the impact of neuroscientific evidence in general on other types of legal decisions. Additionally, 
responsibility is conceptualised differently in distinct jurisdictions, which is likely to affect judgments of responsibility. In 
the Netherlands for instance, a 5-point scale ranging from complete responsibility, slightly diminished responsibility, 
diminished responsibility, severely diminished responsibility to complete absence of responsibility is used in forensic 
practice (Barendregt, Muller, Nijman, & de Beurs, 2008), whereas in other countries determination of a suspectʼs 
responsibility is often a binary decision. 
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the visual presentation of information. It has been argued that judges and juries might get distracted by the 
ʻpretty lightsʼ in brain images resulting in reduced attention to an expertʼs explanation of the brain image, 
which has been referred to as “Christmas tree phenomenon” (Mobbs et al., 2007, p. 0699). If evidence 
concerning the intentionality, responsibility or truthfulness of a suspect is presented together with images of 
the suspectʼs brain, the vividness and the technological sophistication of these images may be very 
compelling and may even distract the judgeʼs or jurorsʼ attention away from the expertʼs explanation. Seeing 
a brain image of the suspect may easily push aside any concerns about the reliability or validity of 
neurotechnologies for the purpose of determining the suspectʼs intentionality, responsibility or truthfulness 
(Dumit, 2004; Henson, 2005; Mobbs et al., 2007; Reeves et al., 2003).  
An additional problem with brain images besides their potential effect on attention has been outlined 
by Henson (2005), who argues that non-experts are likely to believe that it is possible to “directly observe 
psychological constructs” (Henson, 2005, p. 228) when they are presented with brain images. Judges and 
jurors might not be aware that brain scans present interpretative rather than ʻphotographicalʼ images of what 
is occurring in the brain (Feigenson, 2006; Jones et al., 2009; Henson, 2005; Roskies, 2007). Hence, if they 
are presented with a brainscan that depicts some kind of dysfunction or damage they may easily believe that 
this malfunction caused the criminal behaviour without realizing that there may not be a causal link between 
the abnormality and the suspectʼs behaviour. Laypeople may have difficulty differentiating between the brain 
abnormality being proof of the dysfunctional behaviour and it being merely consistent with the dysfunctional 
behaviour. 
Besides reduced attention and naïve realism, neuroimages may increase peopleʼs propensity to 
commit the fundamental attribution error, the tendency to overvalue dispositional and undervalue situational 
explanations (Ross, 1977). Being presented with a brainscan of a suspect may therefore prompt people to 
believe that the behaviour was caused by the brain damage and not by other factors when in fact behaviour 
is generally brought about by a multitude of factors including dispositional and situational factors.  
Besides these arguments, some support for the concern that brain images are overly persuasive 
comes from research on legal decision-making. Studies have found that the visual presentation of 
information, including photographs and videotapes, is more persuasive than verbal descriptions of the same 
evidence (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Kassin & Garfield, 1991).  For instance, in one study, 
participants were presented with either only verbal or verbal and photographic evidence of a crime scene 
and the victimʼs wounds and were asked to indicate whether they found the suspect guilty. The results of the 
study revealed that participants who had received photographs of the crime scene and the victimʼs wounds 
were more likely to find the suspect guilty than suspects who had not received photographic evidence (Bright 
& Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). This explanation is supported by the ʻvividness effectʼ, the idea that 
information has a greater impact on social judgment when it is emotionally interesting, detailed, and highly 
imaginable (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980). According to Bell 
and Loftus (1989), vivid information may carry more weight in judgments because it may attract more 
attention, recruit more additional information from memory, be more available in memory, have a greater 
affective impact and be perceived as having a more credible source. 
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On the basis of these arguments, it seems obvious that neuroscientific evidence should be 
inadmissible in court. However, this conclusion would be premature for two reasons. Firstly, it is possible that 
only the visual presentation, but not the verbal presentation of neuroscientific evidence is overly influential. 
As previously mentioned, the debate on the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence has almost exclusively 
focused on brain images. Since no empirical research directly comparing the effect of verbal and visual 
neuroscientific evidence on legal decision-making is yet available, we do not know how persuasive verbal 
neuroscientific evidence is and we can therefore not draw valid conclusions about the responsible use of 
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom at this point in time. In this regard, it is moreover important to note 
that verbal neuroscientific evidence may be as persuasive as other types of expert testimony, such as for 
instance DNA evidence, because neuroscientific evidence may be more tangible proof of a disorder or 
specific cognitive or affective state as compared to the testimony of a psychologist or a psychiatrist. Hence, 
we need empirical research that compares the influence of distinct types of expert evidence in order to make 
an informed and justified decision about the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence. Secondly, while the 
visual presentation of neuroscientific evidence may have a negative effect on legal decision-making, 
because it draws away attention from the expert explanation, is easily misinterpreted or is simply perceived 
as more credible, it is equally possible that the visual presentation of neuroscientific evidence has a positive 
effect on legal decision-making. Instead of confusing the decision-maker, presenting evidence visually may 
increase the comprehensibility of the information. The potentially positive effect of visual neuroscientific 
evidence – which has not yet been considered in debates on the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence in 
the courtroom – will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
The potentially positive effect of brain images 
It is possible that instead of having a negative effect on legal decision-making, the visual presentation 
of neuroscientific evidence has a positive effect on legal decision-making, because it increases the 
comprehensibility of the expert witnessʼ explanations. This is why regardless of the relevance of the findings 
of Gurley and Marcus (2008), it is important to consider alternative explanations for the finding that 
defendants who presented visual evidence for their brain damage were more likely to be found not guilty by 
reason of insanity, before drawing any conclusions about the responsible use of neuroscientific evidence in 
the courtroom. Although the findings of Gurley and Marcus (2008) suggest that jurors endow brain images 
with greater credibility, it is possible that the distorting effect of neuroimages was the result of complex 
information being presented visually rather than the brainscans per se. In contrast to what several 
researchers claim – i.e. that brain images confuse the decision-maker – brain images may in fact increase 
the decision-makerʼs ability to comprehend the information presented. This explanation is supported by dual 
coding theories. According to dual coding theories, people use two separate channels for the processing of 
information, one for auditory and one for visual information. Each channel is limited in the amount of 
information it can process (Clark & Paivio, 1991; Paivio, 1971). Presenting information both verbally and 
visually will therefore reduce the cognitive load on each of the channels and contribute to better processing 
of the information. Interesting research in this regard has been conducted by Hewson and Goodman-
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Delahunty (2008), who found that mock jurors were more likely to comprehend DNA evidence when it was 
accompanied by multimedia instructions consisting of a narrated video sequence using both animation and 
textual content to explain DNA evidence. As they state “these results are encouraging for criminal justice 
practitioners and courts that have been cautious in adopting innovative technologies or concerned that 
multimedia will tend to persuade and possibly mislead jurors rather than facilitate their understanding of 
complex expert evidence” (Hewson & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008, p. 62). Other research supports this 
assumption (Brewer, Harvey, & Semmler, 2004; Kassin & Dunn, 1997; Morell, 1998). For instance, Morell 
(1998) found that people who received expert testimony in combination with a computer animation recalled 
information more accurately and in more detail than participants who received expert testimony without 
visual aids. 
Presenting evidence visually may decrease the cognitive efforts required to comprehend the 
information, which may contribute to a better understanding of the evidence. Combining verbal and visual 
presentations of evidence may be the most effective means of communicating complex information to a 
layperson who subsequently has to make a decision on the basis of this information. Consequently, the 
visual presentation of neuroscientific evidence may have a positive rather than a negative effect on legal 
decision-making. If this assumption turns out to be true, visual neuroscientific evidence, i.e. brain images, 
should be admissible in court. Nevertheless, more empirical research on the influence of both verbal and 
visual neuroscientific evidence is beneficial. This research should explore whether, consistent with dual-
coding theory, the visual presentation of neuroscientific evidence improves the comprehensibility of the 
information. Additionally, as mentioned above, it is essential that the influence of neuroscientific evidence is 
compared to the influence of other types of expert evidence such as for instance DNA evidence before any 
conclusions about the persuasiveness of neuroscientific evidence can be drawn. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The use of neurotechnologies in a legal context is promising; especially since directly measuring brain 
activity may yield more accurate and reliable evidence. Rapid developments and advances require 
discussing the possible persuasiveness of neuroscientific evidence. As soon as neuroscientific evidence is 
used in court more frequently, it will be necessary to know whether and to what degree it is overly influential 
and unduly affects legal decision-making. The debate concerning the admissibility of neuroscientific evidence 
in court has already begun with the vast majority of researchers claiming that neuroscientific evidence should 
be inadmissible because it is accepted without sufficient critical appraisal. These concerns have however 
exclusively focused on the visual presentation of neuroscientific evidence, i.e. brain images. Not knowing 
whether the verbal presentation of neuroscientific evidence has the same effect on legal decision-making as 
the visual presentation of the same evidence complicates the discussion about the responsible use of 
neuroscientific evidence. 
Moreover, there is generally a risk of drawing premature and invalid conclusions without sufficient 
empirical support for the claim that neuroscientific evidence should be inadmissible in court because it is 
overly persuasive. An example of how opinions rather than empirical data have shaped the public discussion 
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in the past is the ʻCSI effectʼ – the claim that jury members who are avid watchers of the television series 
Crime Scene Investigations have an unrealistic belief in the infallibility of forensic science (Cole & Dioso-
Villa, 2007; Tyler, 2006). The CSI effect has received an enormous amount of media attention, which not 
only unsettled the public, but moreover resulted in calls for changes in the legal system. These calls were 
unsubstantiated because they lacked empirical support. Without empirical data, it is possible to plausibly 
argue for the opposite effect. With regard to the CSI effect, it is equally plausible that CSI watchers are more 
critical of scientific evidence because they have greater expectations about scientific evidence than can 
actually be delivered. In fact, recent empirical research supports this hypothesis (Schweitzer & Saks, 2007; 
Shelton, Kim, & Barak, 2006). 
A similar effect may occur if the discussion on the responsible use of neuroscientific evidence is based 
on opinions rather than empirical data. The risk for unsubstantiated conclusions seems to be particularly high 
for visual neuroscientific evidence since the vast majority of the debate has focused on neuroimaging 
technologies. As outlined above, arguing that brain images should be inadmissible in court because they are 
overly influential is risky, because it is possible to plausibly argue that brain images reduce cognitive 
demands because they are less abstract representations of cognitive processes. Consequently, 
neuroimages may increase the comprehensibility of expert testimony rather than confuse the decision-
maker. As described above, research on the visual presentation of expert testimony suggests that this 
assumption may be true (Brewer, Harvey, & Semmler, 2004; Hewson & Goodman-Delahunty, 2008; Kassin 
& Dunn, 1997; Morell, 1998). Hence, more research on the effect of presentation mode within the specific 
context of neuroscientific evidence is beneficial and would contribute to a more substantiated discussion 
about the responsible use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal (and civil) proceedings 
If neuroscientific evidence turns out to be accompanied by an exaggerated belief in its infallibility and 
induces a bias on legal decision-making, regulatory efforts to mitigate this effect might be necessary. As 
mentioned above, studies on the influence of neuroscience information on judgments of scientific reasoning 
(Weisberg et al., 2008) have shown that the persuasive effect was limited to non-experts, which suggests 
that training has a benefit on judgments of explanations. Hence, training for laypeople, including judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers, about what can and what cannot be inferred from results derived by 
neurotechnologies may prove useful in order to prevent misinterpretation. Since neuroscientific evidence has 
already influenced legal decisions, as the brief description of the case in the introduction demonstrates, it is 
important to further discuss the use of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom. It seems important to 
realise that some of the problems encountered with the use of neurotechnologies in the courtroom may turn 
out to be very similar to the problems encountered with other clinical methods and technologies. 
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Abstract As decidedly underscored by a recent editorial in Nature Neuroscience (2010), many 
experiments in cognitive neuroscience have been carried out with a sample that is not representative of 
the general human population, as the subjects are usually university students in psychology. The 
underlying assumption of this practice is that the workings of the brain do not vary much even when 
subjects come from different cultural groups. Recent research by Henrich et al. (2010) shows that this 
assumption is unwarranted. On several basic features of perception and cognition, Western university 
students turn out to be outliers relative to the general human population, so that data based on them 
should be interpreted with caution. In particular, this situation seems to provide an argument for 
questioning the conformity of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) lie-detection to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702 and Daubert. Deception is a social phenomenon and it is related to mental functions, such 
as theory of mind, for which cross-cultural variability at the neural level has been detected. Furthermore, 
culture is a multi-dimensional variable whose effects are diverse. Thus, the use of fMRI lie-detection in 
legal contexts may hinder the ascertainment of truth if the experimental results are not shown to be 
conserved in different cultures. Cross-cultural variability in neural activation patterns is just a facet of the 
broader issue of external and ecological validity for neuroscientific experiments on the detection of 
deception; nonetheless, fMRI lie-detection is unlikely to meet the Daubert standards if cross-cultural 
variation is not controlled by appropriate experiments. 
Keywords fMRI, lie-detection, culture, cross-culturality, Daubert standard 
Introduction 
In this paper I discuss functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) lie-detection and claim that this 
technique should be used in courts only if its experimental basis includes checks for cross-cultural variation.  
The concept of ʻcultureʼ refers to features of human groups that typically vary according to geographic 
areas and which depend on social learning; it includes shared attitudes, practices, and beliefs, together with 
languages and religions.  
Cross-cultural variation in human psychology is pervasive (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Nisbett & 
Masuda, 2003) but it is rarely addressed in the behavioural sciences (Sears, 1986; Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). Cross-cultural variability in psychology corresponds, in some cases at least, to cross-
cultural neural variability (for a review about cross-cultural neural variation, see Han & Northoff, 2008).  
Lying is a social activity. As society and culture are closely related, deception is unlikely to be free of 
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cultural variation on both the psychological and the neural level. Moreover, culture possesses several 
dimensions (Hofstede, 2001), which are notoriously difficult to measure, so that it is much more complex to 
take this source of variation into account than others, such as for instance a mono-dimensional factor like 
age. For these reasons, the neuroscientists who are developing fMRI lie-detection should be aware of the 
problem and include cross-cultural experiments into their experimental strategies, in order to check if the 
Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) activations that correlate with lying are conserved in different 
cultures. If this is not done, the experiments about fMRI lie-detection run the risk of having both a reduced 
ecological validity, i.e. the experimental settings are too heterogeneous relative to the parts of the real world 
they want to model, and a low external validity, i.e. the experiments are based on an idiosyncratic sample 
which is not representative of the general population. In this case the results would tell little about what 
happens outside the lab. If the experiments do not possess a sufficient degree of external and ecological 
validity, they are unlikely to provide error rates that are applicable to the real world and to gain general 
acceptance in the scientific community. But if the real-life error rates and general acceptance are absent, 
fMRI lie-detection will probably not be accepted as a valid expert testimony either in the jurisdictions that 
follow the Daubert ruling (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993) or in those that adopt the 
older Frye (Frye v. United States, 1923) test. This is because both tests take general acceptance into 
account and because one of the Daubert standards is the “known or potential error rate” in real life 
applications. 
The concept of ʻcultureʼ 
First of all, some words are due on the way I avail myself of the concept of ʻcultureʼ which is central to 
my overall argument. According to my working definition, ʻcultureʼ refers to some properties of human groups 
that depend on social learning. Languages, religions, shared attitudes and beliefs, family structures and 
hierarchies are all parts of culture. Culture varies not only moving from one social group to another, but also 
from an individual to another in the same group.
52
 Both the geographical variability and the individual 
variability have behavioural consequences. For instance, Chua, Boland and Nisbett (2005) have 
demonstrated that Americans and Chinese feature different saccades
53
 patterns when they are shown a 
picture composed by a salient object and a background: Chinese tend to focus more on the background than 
 




 See for instance Haidt & Graham (2007) about the different moral principles used by liberals and conservatives. 
53
 Saccades are quick and simultaneous movements of both eyes in the same direction. Human beings are usually not 
aware of performing saccades. 
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Americans. As to individual variation, priming for individualism or collectivism
54
 performed on bicultural 
individuals, such as Japanese-Americans, modulates both their ways of self-description (general, context-
free descriptions vs. contextual descriptions) and the corresponding BOLD signals in areas related to self-
representation (Chiao et al., 2009). One of the major problems in dealing with culture as a factor of 
behavioural and neural variation is that culture is not easy to measure. One framework that I find helpful is 
Hofstede's (2001) five dimensional model, which collocates every culture along these dimensions: 
1. Individualism – collectivism; 
2. Small – large power distance: It measures the difference in power between the most and the 
least powerful members of the group. If power distance is large, the leaders of the group are 
much more powerful than the subordinates. If power distance is small, the leaders of the group 
are almost on the same level as subordinates; 
3. Short – long term orientation: to what degree a group considers the remote future when making 
decisions;  
4. Weak – strong uncertainty avoidance: how much a group is willing to take up risks;  
5. Masculinity – femininity: here Hofstede uses the Western stereotypes as metaphors, without 
any commitment about the actual psychology of men and women. Masculinity symbolises an 
assertive and competitive stance, whereas femininity indicates a caring and modest attitude. 
According to this model, every society is characterised by a set of five values that describe its position 
along the dimensions, but any individual in the society might depart from the group's values. For instance, 
the United States (US) are considered as one of the most individualistic societies in the world (Henrich et al., 
2010), but a single US citizen can endorse collectivist values for a variety of reasons, such as religious 
tenets or family education. 
Lastly, it must be understood that ethnicity is not a synonym of culture, since immigrants retain their 
ethnicity for some generations (as long as they have children with other immigrants coming from the same 
ethnic group), whereas they rapidly lose their original cultural traits (Heine & Lehman, 2004). Individual and 
intra-national variation also prevents us from identifying culture with nationality, even though nationality has a 
great influence on culture.  
 




 Individualists think that people are independent from each other and that they are characterized by a context-
independent set of personality traits. Collectivists see persons as interconnected and describe them as embedded in 
specific social situations, which constitute a part of their personality. 
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The sampling bias in the behavioural sciences 
This being said, I can continue with the sampling bias. Most experiments in the ʻbehavioural sciencesʼ 
(cognitive science, economics and psychology) are carried out on culturally homogeneous samples. Arnett 
(2008) has surveyed the articles of the main peer-reviewed journals in psychology in the 2003-2007 period 
and has found that 68% of the subjects come from the US. Furthermore, 67% of this US population is 
composed of university students who take psychology courses. Therefore, the bulk of experimental subjects 
in the behavioural sciences is composed by a very specific human group: undergrads in psychology.  
On the one hand, this is an advantage, because very homogeneous samples allow the attribution of 
differences in the subjects' behavioural responses to the differences in the experimental conditions (e.g. 
distinct stimuli), which are manipulated by the researchers. Moreover, university students are easily 
available, cheap and permit a fast replication of the experiments.  
On the other hand, this poses serious questions of generalisability of the experimental findings. How 
can a researcher be sure that the experimental results are valid under different cultural conditions? This risk 
is particularly serious if we take into account that university students are a very specific sample relative not 
only to the global human population, but also to the US population. As Rozin (in Henrich et al., 2010) has 
pointed out, the university student experiences a unique life transition from family life to a peer-centered life. 
Moreover, they usually earn little or no income, live in a very liberal, educated, and open-minded 
environment (the campus), and have not built their own family yet. Therefore, their behaviour on several 
accounts, such as economic decisions, is likely to be different even from that of the average US 30-year old 
person. This is evidenced by cross-cultural studies (Henrich et al., 2005) which show that the behaviour of 
university students coming from Western, industrialised countries on some economic games like the 
ultimatum game and the dictator game is very different from the behaviour found in many small-scale 
societies around the globe. A further consideration is that cultural variability does not only involve social 
behaviours like theory of mind
55
 and its neural correlates (Kobayashi Frank & Temple, 2009) or economic 
behaviour, but has a much broader scope. For instance, on the behavioural level culture influences general 
strategies of reasoning (Nisbett, Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), the performance on the visual 
ʻrod-and-frameʼ task (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003), and the effectiveness of visual illusions 
(Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits, 1963).  
Since one may understand the aim of the behavioural sciences as describing universal features of 
human behaviour and accounting for those features by means of appropriate theories, experiments that are 
 




 Theory of Mind (ToM), or mentalising, is the ability to attribute mental states (both cognitive and affective) to other 
human beings. 
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carried out on a very specific sample are of little utility to the pursuit of such a purpose, at least as long as 
they are not repeated in different human groups that diverge culturally. It should be noted that universality 
must not be intended as a digital variable: there are discrete degrees of universality that can empirically be 
tested. For instance, a cognitive phenomenon can be present in almost all human groups, but perform 
different functions in different contexts, or it can be consistently present and robustly perform the same 
function in all contexts. Universality can be tested by means of three kinds of experiments: the two-cultures 
experiment, the triangulation study, and the cross-cultural survey (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).  
In a two-cultures experiment a determined response to an experimental setting is taken into account. 
Two cultures that differ on many cultural dimensions are examined and the experimenters check whether the 
effect is conserved. If it is, the experiment provides some evidence for some degree of universality; if it is not, 
the difference in the behavioural effects of the setting must be traced back to a cultural dimension. But since 
the two cultures that have been examined differ on many dimensions, identifying the dimension that is 
responsible for the variation is not straightforward. In order to do so, a triangular study is needed. Such a 
study must start from a theory that allegedly explains the previously tested effect and that allows researchers 
to make hypotheses as to which cultural dimension is responsible for the variation. Then the experimenters 
take into account three cultures that differ from each other along two theoretically relevant cultural 
dimensions. For instance, if the theory leads to the prediction that dimensions D1 and D2 may be relevant, the 
cultures will be selected in such a way that cultures C1 and C2 differ on D1, and C1 and C3 differ on D2. If the 
difference is spotted between C1 and C2, D1 will be the relevant dimension; if the difference is found between 
C1 and C3, D2 will be chosen as explanatory instead. Of course, it must be assured that in the different 
cultures, the experimental conditions are interpreted by the subjects in the same way and that the 
experimental protocol does not change.  
A cross-cultural survey entails examining many human groups around the world, both in small-scale 
societies and in urban societies. If no differences are detected, it provides a strong evidence for some 
degree of universality. Nonetheless, it is costly and difficult to carry out, as experimental rigor cannot be 
maintained without considerable efforts when different research teams have to work in diverse environments. 
These cross-cultural investigations can be carried out by means of meta-analyses too, if sufficient data have 
already been gathered.  
Furthermore, there are some types of behavioural research in which universality is not an issue, so 
that idiosyncratic samples can be used without any problems in these cases. As Gächter (in Henrich et al., 
2010) correctly points out, US freshmen and sophomores can be very useful to falsify theories in behavioural 
economics. Falsification is about the research of counterexamples, not about generalisability, so that using 
undergrads as participants in an experimental study is appropriate when a study aims at falsification. 
Furthermore, students are bright enough to participate in these kinds of studies. 
This being said about the sampling bias and how to address it, let us look at the part of the 
behavioural sciences that concerns me most in this paper: cognitive neuroscience. Here, the situation is 
probably even worse than in experimental psychology. According to Chiao (2009), 90% of the peer-reviewed 
neuroimaging studies come from Western industrialised countries. But the sampling bias would be a problem 
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only if significant evidence for cultural variability at the neural level has been gathered. Cultural neuroscience 
provides substantial evidence to this effect. I briefly review part of this evidence (for a more comprehensive 
review, see Han & Northoff, 2008). Gutchess, Welsh, Boduroğlu and Park (2006) have used fMRI to identify 
the neural correlates of a cross-cultural difference between Caucasian Americans and East Asians in image 
processing: Americans fixate a salient object more than East Asians. This proves that culture modifies neural 
function when non-verbal stimuli are processed.  
Zhu and colleagues (2007) have found a differential activation of the Medial PreFrontal Cortex 
(MPFC), which explains the distinct construal of the self in American and Chinese subjects. In Americans, 
whose concept of self does not include intimate relatives, the MPFC is activated only in response to 
judgments concerning the subject himself, whereas in East Asian the same area of the brain also responds 
to stimuli concerning close relatives, such as the subject's mother. 
Hedden and colleagues (2008) uncovered the neural correlates of another cross-cultural bias: East 
Asians are better than Americans at performing tasks that have contextual demands. Conversely, Americans 
are better than East Asians at ignoring the context if this is required.  
By means of an fMRI study on Japanese bilinguals, Kobayashi, Glover and Temple (2006) have found 
differences in BOLD activation in Japanese and American cultures when subjects perform false belief tasks. 
False belief tasks are one of the main tests for theory of mind. 
Wong and colleagues (2004) have shown in a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) study that the 
processing of auditory pitch patterns engages the left or right insular cortex when the pitch has a linguistic 
function, as in Chinese, or as not in English, respectively. This demonstrates that linguistic variation across 
cultures correlates with distinct neural correlates.  
One can conclude that cross-cultural variation at the neural level concerns both basic brain functions, 
such as visual processing, and ʻhigherʼ functions such as self-construal. How can this problem be tackled? 
MRI scanners are expensive and it is difficult to find them in developing countries or to bring them to the 
homelands of small-scale societies. Conducting cross-cultural experiments in cognitive neuroimaging is 
therefore difficult. Nevertheless, East Asia provides a rich and industrialised area in which cultural variability 
relative to the West is still sufficiently high to make two-cultures neuroimaging experiments meaningful. One 
possible agenda for cultural neuroscience is to look for the neural correlates of the behavioural variation that 
has been found between East Asia and the US in cultural psychology.  
The precise mechanisms by which culture can sculpt the human brain have not been elucidated yet, 
but the existence of brain plasticity is now an established fact. It has been studied both in the context of 
functional recovery after lesions (Wall, Xu, & Wang, 2002; Frost, Barbary, Friel, Plautz, & Nudo, 2003; 
Winship & Murphy, 2009) and in the context of learning (for instance Maguire et al., 2000). Brain plasticity 
yields a good theoretical framework to create detailed neural explanations of cross-cultural variability in 
behaviour, but cultural neuroscience still has a lot of work to do in order to reach the neurophysiological level 
on which small neural populations are taken into account. In addition, there are well-known and warranted 
ethical limitations to neurophysiological experimentation in humans. 
In the next section I will examine fMRI lie-detection.  
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fMRI lie detection 
Deception has been defined as “a social behavior in which an individual attempts to persuade another 
to accept as true what the deceiver believes to be untrue” (Ganis & Keenan, 2009, p. 465). Deception is a 
natural phenomenon that spontaneously develops in human beings (Spence et al., 2004). Deception as a 
mental task requires the suppression of a prepotent response, namely telling the truth; moreover, a new 
cognitive item, i.e. the lie, must be built up starting from the beliefs of the person to be deceived. Then the 
reactions of the deceived must be constantly monitored, so that consistency between the lie and their beliefs 
can be maintained. The lie can be very simple, as in cases in which one answers ʻnoʼ instead of ʻyesʼ to a 
question, or quite complex when a whole piece of narrative must be devised to disguise the truth (Ganis, 
Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). All this requires response inhibition, working memory, 
theory of mind, and other mental functions. Briefly, many high-order capacities of the human brain are 
engaged when one lies. Moreover, voluntary deception is essentially social: It is a way in which an individual 
manipulates her relationships with other human beings. Furthermore, there are many kinds of deception. In 
addition to the aforementioned distinction between structurally simple and complex lies, there are also the 
following differences:  
1. self-related lies vs. other-related lies; 
2. lies in which the subject says she did perform an action she has not carried out vs. lies in which 
the subject says she did not perform an action she has actually carried out (suggested by Kozel 
et al., 2009); 
3. verbally expressed lies vs. non-verbally expressed lies; 
4. well-rehearsed lies vs. improvised lies;
56
 
5. lies in which a lot is at stake, in terms of rewards and risks, vs lies in which little is at stake. 
Since the phenomenon is inherently social and there are many kinds of lies, the existence of a simple 
biological marker for all kinds of deception is unlikely (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008). 
fMRI lie-detection has been tested in the lab using a variety of paradigms: a version of the polygraph 
Guilty Knowledge Test featuring playing cards (Langleben et al., 2002), a mock crime scenario (Kozel et al., 
2005, 2009), autobiographical memories (Lee et al., 2002), and others. Nonetheless, all of these methods 
have common shortcomings.  
Firstly, even if in some cases additional monetary rewards are promised to the subject if her lies are 
not detected by the experimenters (e.g. Kozel et al., 2005), the motivation to lie in the lab is very low relative 
 




 For this last dichotomy Ganis & Keenan (2009) found different BOLD activations relative to a baseline constituted by 
telling the truth. 
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to some real life circumstances, in which the risks and gains of deceiving can be tremendous. 
Secondly, in the lab, subjects are instructed to perform deception, so that the intention of lying is not 
spontaneous. Sip et al. (2008) claim that the lack of a voluntary intention to deceive prevents these 
experiments from studying deception. Instead, these experiments study “some of the complex executive 
functions that are associated with the phenomenon [i.e. deception]” (Sip et al., 2008, p. 48). This major 
shortcoming might be avoided by adopting an experimental setting in which subjects are put into a situation 
that indirectly induces them to be mendacious, on the lines of the experimental paradigm used by Greene 
and Paxton (2009). Nonetheless, to my knowledge no such study on deception has yet been conducted. 
Thirdly, in all of these experiments the presence of lies is guaranteed by the experimental design, 
whereas in a real life setting the relevant issue is whether someone is lying or not. The findings of an 
experiment in which the presence of lies is secured cannot be extended to situations in which lies may or 
may not be there (Langleben & Dattilio, 2008). 
Fourthly, the time between the fact that the subjects are questioned about and the scanning is usually 
short in lab settings (minutes or hours), whereas in real life it can be very long (months or years) (Spence et 
al., 2004).  
Fifthly, the current paradigms compare two mutually exclusive conditions: Telling the truth vs. lying. In 
real life lies can be more nuanced: an account in which deception and what has actually happened are 
merged can be given (Spence et al., 2004). All of these factors contribute to creating a problem of external 
and ecological validity of fMRI lie-detection studies. 
These experiments have identified a series of brain regions that correlate with lying in the 
experimental setting, i.e. that show an increased BOLD signal on a Lie minus Truth (henceforth written as 
Lie>Truth) contrast.
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 Many distinct brain regions have been indicated and researchers do not agree on 
which the most relevant regions are (Spence, 2008; Kozel et al., 2009), but some consistencies have been 
found (Monteleone et al., 2009). Firstly, there is no activation for Truth>Lie, showing that telling the truth is a 
baseline response. The regions that are regularly activated in Lie>Truth are associated with the cognitive 
functions that have been predicted to be involved in lying: response inhibition, working memory, theory of 
mind and others. The main areas that have been implicated are the MPFC (especially the ventromedial part 
known to be related to emotion processing, see Damasio, 1994), the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior 
cingulate cortex, and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex seems to show 
an increased activation when lies are structurally complex, so that it may be related to the creation of a new 
 




 fMRI investigation is normally based on the subtraction of the BOLD signal in the task condition from the BOLD signal 
in the control condition. In this case lying is the task and telling the truth is the control. 
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cognitive item (Spence et al., 2004). If only one area is examined, the best detection in terms of sensitivity at 
p < 0.01 is achieved by using the MPFC as in this way an accuracy of 71% is reached (Ganis & Keenan, 
2009). Increasing accuracy above this level entails a rise in the number of false positives. If the number of 
liars in a population is very low, the number of false positives can be higher than the amount of the true 
positives, making the test useless. Therefore, false positives must be minimised if the technique is to be 
used in real life. The relatively low specificity of the test is due to the scarce specificity of the correlation 
between brain regions and deception. Those regions carry out many other functions and therefore their 
activation does not necessarily indicate deception. At the state of the art, fMRI lie-detection is only slightly 
more accurate than the traditional polygraphy (Simpson, 2008). Nonetheless, fMRI presents two advantages 
in comparison to polygraphy. Firstly, it measures a Central Nervous System (CNS) signal and not a 
Peripheral Nervous System (PNS) signal, therefore a closer correlate of behaviour and secondly, it is 
independent from arousal. In the next section, I will discuss some issues that arise from the potential 
application of this technique in criminal and civil proceedings. 
fMRI lie-detection in judicial settings 
I exclusively deal here with the US legal system. Firstly, I examine the legal standards that regulate 
the acceptance of scientific evidence and some recent decisions. Secondly, I argue that both external and 
ecological validity are central when the admission of fMRI lie-detection in court is discussed. 
The admission of scientific evidence in US federal courts is regulated by Rule of Evidence 702, which 
concerns the testimony of scientific or technical experts. For the admission of the witness three conditions 
must be satisfied: 
1. The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; 
2. The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
3. The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case (Rule of 
Evidence 702). 
These conditions are applied together with other standards that were fixed by two decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the US, the aforementioned Frye v. United States (1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993). The Daubert standards are valid in federal courts and in most state jurisdictions 
in the US. The Frye standard applies to the remaining state jurisdictions (among which are California and 
New York).  
The Frye standard simply states that expert witnesses can be admitted in courts if “the thing from 
which the deduction is made” has “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”. 
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Therefore, general acceptance on the part of the relevant scientific community is required. This general 
acceptance has not been reached in the case of fMRI lie-detection, as a 2008 editorial on Nature 
Neuroscience demonstrates. Moreover, a recent New York State decision in a civil case rejected the 
admission of fMRI lie-detection under Frye58.  
The Daubert standard attributes to the judge the role of gatekeeper with regard to expert witnesses. 
The Daubert standard must ensure that the testimony is relevant to the case and has been obtained by 
means of reliable methods. To ascertain this, a test with five non-exclusive and flexible prongs is proposed. 
The points are the following: 
1. Empirical testing: the grounding theory must be falsifiable through experimentation; 
2. Peer-reviewed publication of the scientific bases of the testimony; 
3. Potential or known error rate of the procedure in real cases; 
4. Existence of technical standards for the procedure; 
5. General acceptance in the scientific community. 
The admission of fMRI lie-detection under Daubert has been recently denied in the federal criminal 
case USA v. Semrau. The decision of Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham59 excludes fMRI lie-detection on two 
grounds:  
1. Under Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, because “there are no known error rates for fMRI-
based lie detection outside the laboratory setting”, because “standards controlling the real-life 
application have not yet been established”, because Dr. S. J. Laken, who performed the scans, 
violated his own protocols when he rescanned Dr. Semrau on a positive result for deception, 
and because “fMRI-based lie-detection has not yet been accepted by the scientific community”; 
2. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, because the evidence was more prejudicial than 
probative, since the scans were taken by Dr. Laken without notifying the government. In this 
way, Dr. Semrau risked nothing in undergoing the tests, because positive results for deception 
would not have been released. 
As Magistrate Judge Pham himself notices, the rejection of expert testimony is the exception, rather 
than the rule. This makes his decision particularly relevant.  
 
                                                      
 
 
58 Wilson v. Corestaff Services, decided May 14th 2010, Justice Robert J. Miller, 32996/07. Available at 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/files/2010/06/CorestaffOpin1.pdf (accessed December 25th 2010). I 
thank Prof. Henry T. Greely for having pointed this case out to me. 
59 USA v. Semrau, May 31st 2010, Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham, No. 07-10074 Ml/P. Available at 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/files/2010/06/fMRI-Report-and-Recommendation1.pdf  
(accessed December 26th 2010). 
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The second point is not against fMRI lie-detection per se, but it concerns the contingent circumstances 
of the USA v. Semrau scans, so that it is not relevant for our discourse. The first point in contrast is 
paramount: fMRI lie-detection is not admitted inter alia because there are no reliable error rates. This is due 
to the fact that most of the current experimental work tells us little about real life application of this technique. 
Concerns about external and ecological validity are particularly relevant in legal contexts. In fact, judicial 
applications of fMRI lie-detection might be conducted on people who are medicated, who may have a 
psychiatric history, who are unwilling to cooperate, and who may try to use countermeasures to the test. 
However, the technique has been tested so far on subjects without any psychiatric condition, present or 
antecedent, who are unmedicated, and who are willing to follow the instructions of the experimenters. 
Another factor, which is specific to legal settings, must be taken into account. As Simpson (2008) 
correctly points out, the current paradigm of fMRI lie-detection focuses on functions such as response 
inhibition and correlated regions in the brain. But response inhibition is likely to be very often engaged by a 
defendant in a criminal trial, since defendants must be circumspect about what they say in courts and 
repress feelings of outrage at accusations, if they are not guilty. Therefore, if lie-detection is carried out in the 
context of a criminal trial, response inhibition seems to be an unreliable marker for deception. This shows 
again that the experimental paradigms used so far might have little bearing on how deception outside the 
lab, and specifically in a court, is detected. 
This allows us to conclude that fMRI lie-detection is unlikely to be accepted under the Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 and Daubert unless problems relative to external and ecological validity are solved. 
In addition to this, I argue that cross-cultural validity is an important issue in this set of problems and 
that it needs to be addressed if fMRI lie-detection is to enter courts under the laws currently in force. For this 
claim I present four arguments. First, as briefly mentioned above, Kobayashi and her co-workers (2006, 
2007) have shown that different areas of the brain are activated in East Asians and Caucasian Americans 
when they perform the false belief task. In particular, the TPJ activation would be culture-dependent and 
specific to English-speaking cultures (Kobayashi Frank & Temple, 2009). Nonetheless, Adams et al. (2009) 
have found a consistent activation of the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), which 
partially overlaps with the TPJ, in both American and Japanese subjects. But Adams and co-workers (2009) 
used a different task than the one that Kobayashi Frank and Temple (2009) availed themselves of. The task 
used by Adams et al. (2009) is non-verbal and based on eye stimuli, whereas the false belief task is normally 
verbal. The different results of the two groups might be due to the distinct stimuli that were used. Despite 
this, researchers agree that the brain areas activated during ToM tasks depend on cultural background. 
Furthermore, culture impacts on ToM in other ways. For instance, people are better at detecting mental 
states in targets belonging to their in-group relative to out-group members and different areas of the MPFC 
are activated when subjects are asked to use ToM on targets that are respectively similar or dissimilar to 
themselves (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). From this I can conclude that the neural underpinnings of 
ToM show a high degree of cross-cultural variation. If ToM is a necessary cognitive component of deliberate 
deception (and it is difficult to think it is not, as deception requires a manipulation of another's beliefs), this 
cultural variation is likely to be shared by deliberate deception too, even though experiments are needed to 
Tommaso Bruni 
148 
confirm this theoretical prediction. And if BOLD patterns varied significantly across cultures in deception, 
fMRI lie-detection would risk being unreliable when a single experimental paradigm is used on subjects 
belonging to different cultures. 
Secondly, the sheer number of immigrants in the US constitutes a good argument for cross-cultural 
checks. There were 38 million first-generation immigrants in the US in 2007 (Segal, Elliott, & Mayadas, 
2010), amounting to about 12% of the US population. If fMRI lie-detection was used in court, more than one 
out of ten suspects could potentially show cultural variability in the neural correlates of lying, assuming 
arguendo that immigrants end up under trial or in civil litigation with the same frequency as the general US 
population. Therefore, if cross-cultural validity of fMRI lie-detection is not checked by means of appropriate 
experiments, errors could be widespread, leading to sub-optimal outcomes of judiciary procedures. Of 
course, the real amount of cultural variation in the neural correlates of deliberate deception cannot be 
estimated without actual cross-cultural experiments. 
Thirdly, culture is different from other forms of variation in that it has many dimensions and 
components, together with a degree of individual variation. Unlike age, which is mono-dimensional, culture is 
manifold and therefore difficult to handle. Each cultural dimension could have a different effect on the neural 
correlates of voluntary deception, so that adapting the experimental setting of the technique to the culture of 
the individual to be tested might prove a daunting task. A careful measurement of the different cultural 
dimensions of the individual might be required. If the BOLD signals found during deception varied with 
culture, it could be extremely complex to devise an fMRI lie-detection technique suitable to use in courts 
under Daubert, since the error rate would be high. On the contrary, assuming arguendo that the neural 
correlates of deception vary with age, it might be easier to modify the experimental paradigm to factor this 
source of variability in, since the age of every person can be easily assessed.  
Fourthly, the social nature of deception makes it theoretically likely that culture plays a big role in 
shaping this phenomenon, as culture, unlike for instance age, is a source of variation that results from 
human sociality. Deception requires a continuous surveillance on the beliefs of the deceived, an estimation 
of the long-term consequences of deception, and a maintenance of trust by means of pseudo-cooperation 
(Sip et al., 2008). Variations in belief systems and in what is considered to be advantageous or 
disadvantageous could thus make substantial changes in the psychological nature of deception. Since 
psychological differences are often coupled with underlying neural differences, this variability would affect 
BOLD signalling as well. 
I am not claiming that the neural correlates of deception vary with culture, but that from the theoretical 
point of view this is likely to be the case. This hypothesis must be addressed by means of cross-cultural 
experiments. 
There are of course many other legal and ethical issues that are raised by fMRI lie-detection in a legal 
setting. Firstly, there is the concern that lie-detection might illegitimately reduce the prerogatives of the finder 
of fact, who has inter alia the role of assessing the credibility of witnesses. Then, we find the so-called ʻCSI 
effectʼ, as Simpson (2008) states it:  
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The aura of big science and high technology surrounding complex and expensive tests may lead to an 
overestimation of the reliability and utility of fMRI lie detection among lay people, including law 
enforcement personnel and other investigators, judges, and jurors (Simpson, 2008, p. 496).  
A third issue is related to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Concerning the 
Fourth Amendment, fMRI lie-detection could be seen as an unreasonable search and seizure and as a 
violation of the individual's cognitive freedom (Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben, 2005) if it is performed without an 
appropriate warrant. Concerning the Fifth Amendment, forcing the defendant to undergo lie-detection might 
be interpreted as an instance of self-incrimination. These problems are very important and must be carefully 
considered when discussing the ethical and legal acceptability of fMRI lie-detection in court. Nonetheless, 
dealing with them in depth would lead me astray as they are not connected with cross-culturality and 
because they play a minor role in the USA v. Semrau landmark decision. In the next section I will address 
some possible objections that can be made against my arguments. 
Discussion of objections 
Kozel and colleagues (2005, 2009) have done much to tackle the external and ecological validity 
problem, of which the cross-culturality issue constitutes a part. In particular, Kozel et al. (2005, 2009) used 
quite diverse samples, which cover a broad age interval, different ethnicities, professions and levels of 
education. None of these factors is significantly correlated with the results of the experiments. This 
strengthens the external validity of the study. Moreover, the more recent study makes use of a mock 
sabotage scenario which is much closer to a real life situation than the previous scenarios (subjects are 
asked to go to a separate building, find a CD containing evidence of a crime, devise a way to destroy it, and 
go back to the experimenter; a phone rings in the room where the CD is kept in order to enhance emotional 
stress). This increases ecological validity. Finally, Kozel et al. (2009) addressed the aforementioned problem 
of the time interval between the relevant action (in this case the sabotage) and the scanning. They have 
brought the time-lapse to 105 hours, but it is not clear whether this time interval is sufficient to solve the 
issue, as in real legal applications the time would probably be much longer. Nevertheless, this is another 
step towards a greater ecological validity. 
Does the work of Kozel and colleagues (2005, 2009) undermine the legitimacy of requesting cross-
cultural checks? I argue it does not, because experiments were carried out in a US university, using a 
sample of general US residents, and because ethnicity cannot be identified with culture. For instance, African 
Americans and Western Africans may be very similar from the ethnic point of view, but they undoubtedly 
differ a lot along many cultural dimensions. Even though the populations used by Kozel et al. (2005, 2009) 
are diverse, they are likely to be relatively homogeneous from the cultural point of view, as they are mostly 
composed of people born and raised in the US. If a significant proportion of first-generation immigrants had 
been included, more precise conclusions about the need of cross-cultural checks could have been drawn. 
This does not detract from the value of the studies conducted by Kozel and colleagues (2005, 2009), which 
according to my view is the only research on fMRI lie-detection that takes the important problem of external 
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and ecological validity into account. 
A second important objection refers to the current practices of lie-detection and the role cross-
culturality plays in them. Juries currently evaluate the truthfulness of witnesses not only by the plausibility of 
their statements and by the consistency of their account, but also through a gamut of behavioural cues 
(fidgeting, speed of speech, keeping eye contact with the jury, and so on) whose reliability is not above 
chance (Rand, 2000; Ganis & Keenan, 2009; Schauer, 2009). Nevertheless, jurors may consider these cues 
to be quite reliable. It is likely that these clues undergo cultural variation60: What is considered to be a sign of 
reliability can obviously change across cultures. Specific evidence to this effect is available: e.g. Bond and 
colleagues (1990) have shown that American and Jordanian observers rely on partially different sets of cues 
to detect deception. Therefore, it may be the case that for instance immigrant defendants are already 
disadvantaged in trials because they do not know what kind of demeanour they are supposed to keep in front 
of the jury in order to look truthful. They might abide the unwritten rules of their home culture and use a body 
language that does not match the expectations of the jurors. As Rand (2000) points out, truthful African-
American witnesses could be seen as liars by Caucasian American jurors because of this 'Demeanor Gap'. 
Therefore, so the objection goes61, we already have a cross-culturality problem in lie-detection. This renders 
a cross-culturality problem in fMRI less important, as we would simply not solve a problem we already have 
in the current situation. Continuing on the same lines, as fMRI is much more accurate than behavioural cues 
as a tool of lie-detection, it would be a good idea to adopt it, since it simply keeps the cross-culturality issue 
unsolved, but provides a much higher detection rate. According to Bold (1990), both American and Jordanian 
observers have detected lies with an accuracy rate of slightly more than chance (about 54%). FMRI lie-
detection reaches more or less 70% (Ganis & Keenan, 2009) without false positives. 
To this argument I respond that the CSI effectʼ generates a big difference between lie-detection by 
bodily cues and fMRI lie-detection. The jurors would consider the latter as 100% accurate. Jurors would 
probably have some doubts about truthfulness assessment via body language and voice pitch, whereas fMRI 
lie-detection seems to eliminate all uncertainty. Therefore, cultural biases in current trials produce milder 
harms than those that would result from alleged cultural biases in fMRI lie-detection. Given the CSI effect, 
false positives in fMRI lie-detection might cause severe trouble. Then, if we move from this level to the legal 
standards for admission, we notice that this argument is irrelevant for the conformity of fMRI lie-detection to 
the Daubert requirements. Already having a problem in our current practices does not make the case for 
fMRI lie-detection relative to Daubert easier.  
 
                                                      
 
 
60 I thank one anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
61 It should be noted that this objection is not proposed by Rand (2000), but is rather a theoretical reconstruction of a 
possible line of argument. 
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A third objection claims that we should not wait to use fMRI lie-detection, since: 
1. The current practices of lie-detection are really bad (see the behavioural cues above);  
2. There is a huge societal demand of lie-detection (Langleben, 2008), such that the US 
government continues to use polygraphy even though its accuracy is far from being perfect;  
3. Because current methods of extracting information, such as waterboarding, are cruel and violate 
human rights (Spence et al., 2004); 
4. Cross-cultural checks would take a long time, a time that we cannot allegedly afford to lose.  
My response to this is threefold. Firstly, lie-detection is not mind-reading, which is at present a totally 
futuristic technology, so that fMRI lie-detection cannot be considered an information extraction technique. 
Therefore it is improbable that fMRI will replace forms of torture in the near future. Secondly, using fMRI lie-
detection without checking for generalisability might entail sub-optimal outcomes of the judicial processes, 
such as punishment of the non-guilty, acquittal of the guilty, and payment of undue compensations. It is not 
clear if an early use of fMRI lie-detection would make criminal or civil trials better in the present situation. 
Given the possibility of a ʻCSI effectʼ with regard to fMRI lie-detection, the risk that it would not improve trials 
is significant. Thirdly, the societal demand for lie-detection can be questioned from two perspectives. On the 
one hand, it might be argued that the demand for lie-detection is an American peculiarity, maybe even an 
obsession, as historian Ken Alder (2007) has claimed. On the other hand, this demand can be cast into 
doubt from the ethical point of view. Is this demand warranted? What kind of balancing between security and 
individual liberties do we want to adopt? How are we to interpret the citizens' cognitive freedom? This is an 
issue I cannot discuss here, but of course the legitimacy of this societal demand cannot be taken for granted. 
As a matter of fact, neuroethics experts like Levy (2007) have argued that early adoption is the main risk 
when neuroscientific lie-detection is discussed. 
The fourth objection comes from Schauer (2009): he denies the relevance of any kind of scientific 
considerations concerning external and ecological validity. Schauer argues:  
If the ease of telling an instructed lie in the laboratory correlates with the ease of telling a real lie outside 
the laboratory, research on instructed lies is no longer irrelevant to detecting real lies. With any positive 
correlation between instructed and real lies, experiments on the former will tell us something about the 
latter, and whether that 'something' is enough depends on the uses for which the research is employed. 
That which is inadequate for scientific publication or criminal prosecution might be sufficient for a 
defendant seeking to suggest reasonable doubt (Schauer, 2009, p. 102).  
The overall point Schauer (2009) is making is that legal and not scientific standards matter in 
assessing evidence in courts. Both external and ecological validity are scientific standards and therefore are 
allegedly not relevant in a legal context. It is sufficient to have 'something' that binds the lab setting and real 
life to permit some use of the experimental results. Therefore, even though fMRI lie-detection has some 
problem of external validity on the scientific level, it could be used in legal settings, such as civil litigation, 
where the standards of evidence are not “beyond a reasonable doubt”, but “a preponderance of evidence” or 
“a reasonable suspicion”.  
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What surprises in this account is that Schauerʼs (2009) arguments ignore the Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 and Daubert altogether. These norms state that the legal standards for expert witness are at 
least in part scientific standards. If these scientific standards are not met, the evidence cannot be legally 
admitted. This also applies to all arguments for differential application of fMRI lie-detection (admissible in civil 
cases but not in criminal cases; admissible for the defence but not for the prosecution inside criminal cases) 
at the federal level. The Federal Rule of Evidence governs proceedings in the federal courts of the US 
whatever the case at issue (civil or criminal), so that there seems to be no room for differential application. 
Judges, as gatekeepers, must decide on admissibility on a case per case base: every use must be 
separately evaluated in its specific context. Nevertheless, the federal judge must abide the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and Daubert in doing so. Therefore, external validity cannot be dismissed as being merely scientific 
and not legally relevant. 
The fifth and last objection underlines that no cross-cultural variation was found by using behavioural 
tests for deception such as the polygraph62 and that no cross-cultural neural variation has been reported so 
far for deception paradigms. The two points seem to show that the worry I am expressing I implausible. If 
there is no behavioural cross-cultural variation for earlier lie-detection techniques and neural cross-cultural 
variation has never been detected in deception, maybe there is no good reason to presume that the latter 
can be a problem for fMRI lie-detection. To this I reply that it is difficult to find cross-cultural variation in a test 
if this is not explicitly searched for, especially if there is no way to double-check for the correctness of the 
result. If a polygraph is used in a real-life setting and signals a suspect or witness as a liar, it is not so easy 
to check whether the machine is right or not, because the reliability of the subject was doubtful in the first 
place. Furthermore, behavioural researchers often start from the implicit assumption that cross-cultural 
variation is negligible, so that they do not notice this phenomenon unless it is macroscopic. To the best of my 
knowledge, neural cross-cultural variation in deception is yet to be tested. I would welcome any experimental 
attempt either to show its presence or to demonstrate its nonexistence. 
Conclusion 
The long and the short of this paper is that cross-cultural experiments on fMRI lie-detection should be 
performed before this technique enters courts, because the lab experiments with US citizens risk having an 
unacceptably low external validity. As a matter of fact, I suggest the technique cannot live up to the Daubert 
standards without such checks, because no error rate calculated in the lab can be projected onto real life 
without them. I do not take any position about the ethical acceptability of fMRI lie-detection, but argue that 
 
                                                      
 
 
62 To the best of my knowledge no cross-cultural variation is explicitly reported in the polygraph literature.  
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more neuroscientific research is needed (not only in the cross-cultural field) in order to assess its full 
potential both legally and morally. I therefore encourage and endorse more funding for fMRI lie-detection 
research. Only sound and carefully conducted empirical research can lead to new forensic technologies that 
can be useful to ascertain the truth and to justly determine legal proceedings. 
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Abstract Building on the achievements of disease-oriented research, the coming decades will witness an 
explosion of biomedical enhancements to make people faster, stronger, smarter, less easily distracted and 
forgetful, happier, prettier, and live even longer. Recently, there has been a new arrival on the 
enhancement scene – moral and social enhancement. In one of the most significant works on moral 
enhancement to date, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson (2008) suggest that “the core moral 
dispositions...have biological basis and, thus, in principle should be within the reach of biomedical and 
genetic treatment” (Savulescu & Persson, 2008, p. 172) although they question to what extent these 
interventions can be done in practice. I explore what we mean by moral enhancement and draw some 
distinctions that will help us avoid confusion when talking about the matter. Next, I suggest that the 
pessimistic view of the plausibility of moral enhancement stems from having much higher expectations 
about the effectiveness of morally modifying interventions. However, if we make our expectations 
comparable to those we have of cognitive enhancement or pharmacological treatment, then current 
research in the field of neuroscience of morality suggests that relatively efficient interventions are already 
here or will be possible in the near future. Next, I draw our attention to the plethora of potential targets of 
enhancement and discuss oxytocin as a potential moral enhancer. Finally, I highlight and explore possible 
problems with morally enhancing interventions, such as the threat to freedom and problems of application 
stemming from the lack of consensus about what is morally permissible and obligatory. I suggest that even 
if we accept that there are cases of fundamental moral disagreement, the problem may be much less 
serious then it first appears. 
Keywords enhancement, pharmacological enhancement, moral enhancement, morality, ethics 
Introduction  
Moral enhancement is, at least prima facie, not susceptible to some of the objections to cognitive 
enhancement. Making people more moral seems to be beneficial to society, and thus the typical concerns 
raised in connection to cognitive enhancement – that enhancement is beneficial for the subject of 
enhancement but harmful to others – appears not to apply. Tom Douglas (2008) used the example of moral 
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enhancement to refute what he called the bioconservative thesis63. Douglas (2008) argues that the 
bioconservative thesis is false, given that there is at least one enhancement that would be morally 
permissible, namely enhancement of moral motives. In the second significant work that considered moral 
enhancement, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson (2008) suggest that although “the core moral 
dispositions...have a biological basis and, thus, in principle should be within the reach of biomedical and 
genetic treatment” (Savulescu & Persson, 2008, p. 172), sufficiently effective interventions are not within our 
reach in the near future. The purpose of this paper is to extend the scope of the debate and address some of 
the objections raised as to plausibility and desirability of moral enhancement.  
In the first part of this paper, I will examine what ʻmoralʼ in moral enhancement can mean, and suggest 
that there are three main ideas that moral enhancement can refer to: a morally permissible or even obligatory 
enhancement of any kind, an enhancement that would make people more moral in some way and a 
beneficial intervention that affects moral functioning. Secondly, I discuss the plausibility of moral 
enhancement. I look at Savulescu and Perssonʼs (2008) paper on moral enhancement and examine what 
moral enhancement is expected to do. I suggest that the pessimistic view of the plausibility of moral 
enhancement expressed by these authors stems from having overly high expectations about the 
effectiveness of morally modifying interventions. However, if we make our expectations comparable to those 
we have of cognitive enhancement, then current research in the field of neuroscience of morality and pro-
social behaviour suggests that relatively efficient interventions are already here or will be possible in the near 
future. I then discuss some of the possible ways in which moral functioning could be influenced and discuss 
whether moral enhancement is something we may want given the existence of moral disagreement and an 
alleged threat to freedom posed by moral enhancement. 
What is moral enhancement?  
What does the term ʻmoralʼ in ʻmoral enhancementʼ mean?   
In this section I explore what we mean by moral enhancement. I suggest some distinctions that might 
help us avoid confusion when talking about the matter and propose that ʻmoralʼ can have three meanings in 
this context. As such, moral enhancement can be understood as an ethically desirable enhancement of any 
capacity, an ethically desirable enhancement of a moral sphere, or an enhancing intervention affecting the 
moral sphere that brings an overall benefit to the subject of enhancement.  
 




 “Even if it were technically possible and legally permissible for people to engage in biomedical enhancement, it would 
not be morally permissible for them to do so” (Douglas, 2008, p. 228). 
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ʻMoralʼ enhancement as enhancement that is morally desirable 
When we say ʻmoral enhancementʼ what we could mean is that it is an enhancement of any kind that 
is morally desirable. We may here think about enhancement that would result – other things being equal – in 
a better world. Vaccinations for smallpox resulted in the eradication of this disease (Eyler, 2003), and most 
would agree that the world without suffering and deaths brought by smallpox is better than an otherwise 
identical world with this disease. We often think that the increase in average life expectancy that took place 
in the past century was a good thing and it is, at the very least, an ethically permissible goal of the state to 
promote longevity, especially if it is accompanied by a good quality of life (Harris, 2007). Some have 
proposed that cognitive enhancement is not only permissible but that there can be a duty to enhance (Chan 
& Harris, 2007). Enhancements can therefore be said to be moral in the sense of being morally permissible 
or even morally obligatory. Thus, ʻmoralʼ in the first sense refers solely to our ethical appraisal of a given 
enhancement. However, when we say ʻmoral enhancementʼ we might mean something very different.  
Moral enhancement as a change in some aspect of morality that results in a morally better person 
Moral enhancement can also refer to making people more ethical, thus making them morally better in 
some sense. This is what Savulescu and Persson (2008) had in mind when they proposed that moral 
enhancement could, theoretically, be an answer to an alleged increased risk posed by the cognitively 
enhanced and morally corrupt minority.  
 Being moral is a complex ability and there is a wide range of potentially enhancing interventions. 
Thus, making morally better people could include making people more likely to act on their moral beliefs, 
improving their reflective and reasoning abilities as applied to moral issues, increasing their ability to be 
compassionate and so on. We could also focus on a number of aspects of being moral - acting in a moral 
way, being more virtuous, having better moral motivations and so on. Some of those possibilities will be 
explored in section 2.  
There are two parts to the idea of moral enhancement understood as making people morally better: 
the factual claim that the enhancement in question in some way affects the moral sphere, and a normative 
claim about whether that intervention makes for a morally better person. Those two components may at first 
seem necessarily coexisting. But the distinction between the factual and a normative claim about moral 
enhancement is important, as our discussion may be constructed differently depending on whether we take 
the factual and normative or only factual claim as a basis for our discussion. The first reason for that is 
pragmatic – making sure that we keep this distinction in mind can make the discussion clearer. Secondly, 
considerations of moral enhancement based solely on the factual claim are interesting in their own right, and 
we would be missing an important part of the enquiry if we focused only on enhancement understood as 
making people more moral. 
Moral enhancement as a beneficial change in the sphere of morality 
As mentioned before, ʻmoralʼ in the phrase ʻmoral enhancementʼ can have a descriptive function and 
refer to, for example, a certain aspect of our cognition. A cognitive approach to moral enhancement would 
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therefore be based on the assessment of cognitive functions and regions implicated in moral reasoning, 
decision-making, acting and so forth, and on the assessment of how these functions can be modulated. On 
that view, whether an intervention is a moral enhancement depends on whether it affects relevant cognitive 
processes and behaviours. We may construct the moral sphere narrowly or widely but in this paper I will not 
consider this issue in great depth. Secondly, it depends on whether the modification of function counts as an 
enhancement. In the next section I propose and discuss the understanding of enhancement as improvement.   
Enhancement as improvement  
Elsewhere John Harris and I have proposed understanding enhancement as an improvement brought 
about by a change in a characteristic or function and an intervention that is overall beneficial (Pacholczyk & 
Harris, forthcoming). Does understanding enhancement as improvement include a normative statement 
about what is morally good? Not necessarily; it only includes the claim that an intervention is beneficial to the 
agent. When talking about moral enhancement it may be worth asking whether it is supposed to be beneficial 
for the personʼs moral aptitude or for their welfare more generally. The ambiguity of the phrase ʻmoral 
enhancementʼ can be partly explained by the presence of those two ways in which an intervention can be 
beneficial – beneficial to the ʻmoral profileʼ of the person or prudentially beneficial.  
A similar question may arise for cognitive enhancement – we may be wondering whether an 
intervention is beneficial for a personʼs intellectual capacity or in the personʼs interest more generally 
speaking. There may be cases when cognitive enhancement is in a personʼs narrowly constructed interests, 
those related to their cognitive abilities and knowledge, but not necessarily in a widely constructed interest.  
 Let us consider two scenarios of cognitive enhancement. There may be cases when an improvement 
in certain cognitive abilities may not be in the overall interest of a person, for example, if there are substantial 
side effects that affect their physical or mental wellbeing. Take the example of Esperanza, a girl with 
borderline learning difficulties. Although after taking a new smart pill Esperanza becomes much better at 
mathematics and physics, yet the pill also happens to act directly on the neural circuitry involved in mood 
and emotion – causing Esperanza to feel depressed most of the time. Contrast this with the imagined story 
of Ernesto with a similar level of learning difficulty, who does not experience any obvious side-effects. 
However, after being able to learn so much more effectively, he becomes lonely – his old friends will not play 
with him anymore because now ʻhe is too smartʼ, and neither will other pupils. Despite various efforts by 
teachers and parents over a long period of time, Ernesto becomes increasingly isolated. In Ernestoʼs case, 
although there are no straightforward adverse effects, an improvement in an aspect of cognitive function 
causes a behavioral change that brings net loss in wellbeing.  
Consider another example, somewhat akin to that explored in Keyesʼ short story Flowers for Algernon. 
Esther has severe learning difficulties. She does not realize that she lacks certain capacities. She is a 
cheerful person and a pleasure to be around, and she enjoys her life. She does not display challenging 
behaviour and so does not require any additional medication. There is a new drug that was shown to 
improve cognitive function in people with less severe mental disability. Estherʼs mother decides to try this 
drug and there is a marked improvement of Estherʼs cognitive abilities. Unfortunately, the improvement is not 
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significant enough to allow her to be more independent, etc. – although she understands her environment 
better there is no great change in her well-being. However, for the first time, she starts to notice jokes that 
people make at her expense, and she has the acute awareness of her limitations. Although, as Mill famously 
wrote, it may be “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill, 1861/1991, p. 140), there will 
be some cases when the cost of knowledge or intelligent awareness is too high. 
As Estherʼs example demonstrates, there may be some cases when intervention in cognitive 
capacities is beneficial in the narrow, but not in the wide sense. In this situation we could say that the 
intervention is an enhancement in the narrow sense, but is not an enhancement all-things-considered. The 
example of Esperanza and Ernesto demonstrates the importance of prediction and the estimation of cost and 
benefits. Despite the fact that cognitive enhancement could have such negative effects on Esperanzaʼs and 
Ernestoʼs life, it can be argued that enhancement in such cases, (cognitive enhancement narrowly 
understood) usually brings more benefits than harms (in the wide sense) and is therefore worth pursuing. 
Education is important in our societies; high academic performance often translates into better career 
prospects and brings a number of other benefits. Thus, our experience with a number of instances of 
enhancement may lead us to say that cognitive enhancement (narrowly understood) is most likely to be in 
the personʼs interest.  
A separate issue arises when considering enhancement as a beneficial intervention in the context of 
interventions in the moral sphere. If a similar logic is applied, intervention in the sphere of morality would only 
be an enhancement if it was beneficial for the subject of that intervention. Consequently, if we understand 
moral enhancement analogically to cognitive enhancement, there is nothing prima facie inconsistent in 
saying that moral enhancement can be going contrary to what is morally good. Moral enhancement thus 
understood may, for example, make people be less prone to act on moral reasons, give those reasons moral 
weight or act in a moral way. This is because moral enhancement will refer to intervention in the sphere of 
morality that brings an overall prudential benefit to an agent. Imagine Eric, who is deeply moved by moral 
considerations, strives for moral integrity and often acts on the basis of his moral beliefs. He spends a 
substantial amount of time on thinking about what is good and what is right, gives most of his disposable 
income to charities and spends many hours per week volunteering. However, his preoccupation with moral 
obligations has led to problems in family life. His wife threatens to leave him if he does not stop taking 
homeless people to their house and does not find at least some time to spend with her. In this case, acting 
as one think one ought to has negative consequences for Ericʼs overall wellbeing. Eric decides to strive to 
care less about othersʼ misfortune.  
Secondly, the ʻmoralʼ can refer to the overall ethical permissibility or obligatoriness of moral 
enhancement, and so be a more general reflection on the context of moral enhancement and the general 
consequences of it, and the judgment be all-things-considered. It can be argued that the second and first 
meaning of moral enhancement (making people better) and the all-things-considered moral assessment of 
this intervention could reasonably be collapsed into one. For example, one might argue that moral 
enhancement is an intervention that will result in people acting more morally, and the moral action will be the 
one that will maximize overall utility. At the same time, if the moral assessment of interventions is based also 
on maximizing utility, the two will likely coincide. The same is the case if one takes making people more 
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moral to mean being more virtuous and the ethical value of the enhancing intervention is judged on the basis 
of the extent to which it promotes virtue. 
However, there are at least two situations when the two do not have to coincide. Firstly, the moral 
enhancement in the second sense could be achieved using morally reprehensible means, which in turn 
would influence our moral assessment of the intervention in question. If the moral enhancement of a given 
person could only be achieved at the price of a side-effect of inflicting strong pain on another person for a 
long time, we could reasonably argue that overall it was not worth it, even if enhancing the person would lead 
to them acting in a significantly more moral way after the intervention. Secondly, it is possible that making a 
person more concerned with morality may not have a positive overall effect under certain circumstances, for 
example that the subjective and the objective right64 do not coincide and more consistent following what is 
subjectively right leads to morally worse outcomes. Another case can also happen – when an enhancing 
intervention would result in a less moral individual, but have overall good effects. 
Some may object to the use of ʻmoral enhancementʼ as a phrase referring only to certain capacities 
and not carrying a clear normative message as well. Although it may be true that when we think about moral 
enhancement we automatically think about people being, morally speaking, better, this approach introduces 
confusion due to the ʻmoralʼ doing double, and sometimes triple, work: as a description of the target abilities 
that are improved, as a normatively loaded reference to whether that intervention results in people being 
morally better in some way, and as a reference to whether this enhancement is overall desirable from a 
moral point of view. This may introduce confusion when examining moral enhancement - we can be asking 
three questions to which we could give, at least in principle, diverging answers.     
Moreover, if we find cognitive enhancement to be interesting, we are likely to find moral enhancement 
in the third sense (an enhancement of moral sphere beneficial to the agent) also interesting. It raises 
interesting questions about authenticity, free will and the moral nature of humans, the role of rational choice 
and of the motivation to be moral in choosing what moral stances one adopts. As a result, although most of 
the current discussion focuses on the second understanding of moral enhancement, the ʻcognitiveʼ 
understanding is interesting in its own right.  
Hype or hope? - On the plausibility of moral enhancement  
Against plausibility of moral enhancement  
Persson and Savulescu (2008) in their paper The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent 
Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity argue that non-traditional means of enhancement 
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could contribute to the rising risk of considerable harm to a large number of people and, therefore, are 
ethically problematic (for criticisms of this claim see: Fenton, 2010; Harris, 2010). They suggest that this 
threat could be theoretically offset by moral enhancement. Accordingly, in their paper moral enhancement is 
seen as a potential tool for eliminating this alleged risk of large scale harm. Since small groups or even 
individuals could inflict serious harm, the aim of moral enhancement is to prevent the ʻmorally corrupt 
minorityʼ from doing so (Persson & Savulescu, 2008).   
Let us consider increasing empathy to illustrate some difficulties with this approach to moral 
enhancement. Increasing empathy comes to mind when thinking about what kind of intervention could carry 
out the task that Persson and Savulescu (2008) want moral enhancement to do. Lack of empathy is 
sometimes said to be correlated with criminal behaviour (Miller, 1988; Bush, Mullis, & Mullis, 2000; Kiehl, 
2006) and it seems common-sense that an increased appreciation (be it cognitive, affective or both) of 
othersʼ suffering would decrease the likelihood of behaviour that is likely to result in harm. For the purpose of 
this argument let us assume that there is an intervention that substantially increases empathy across 
different measures.    
But increasing general empathy will most likely not be enough for several reasons, even when we 
assume that increased empathy is going to make a substantial difference in the motivation to act in a certain 
way. Firstly, we know that moral reasons are not the only basis for action and that prudential reasons can 
override moral ones. Thus, even if increased empathy would indeed give rise to reasons not to harm others 
that are stronger than before, those may not be enough to refrain from a fatally harmful action. As a result, it 
is reasonable to expect that even a highly efficient intervention will not be sufficient to abolish the possibility 
of harm completely.  
Secondly, there may be cases when an increase in empathy would increase the risk of large scale 
harm. It is not clear that the allegedly morally corrupt minority that may pose a threat acts solely on the basis 
of non-moral reasons. This claim could be based on a conflation of two uses of ʻmoralʼ – one to describe a 
kind of reason for action and ethical assessment of actions. Thus, when we refer to ʻmorally corrupt minorityʼ 
we mean ʻthose whose acts we judge as immoralʼ. But let us not forget the second meaning of ʻmoralʼ - it is 
possible for a terrorist to have her actions at least appearing to be based on moral reasons, that is, reasons 
of a moral kind. There is a long tradition of those claiming to be fighting for what they consider to be a better 
world and seeing inflicting harm as a necessary evil; sometimes we may support this struggle and 
sometimes we may denounce it (Merkl, 1986). We may disagree with the moral assessment that the terrorist 
has made, rejecting some or all of her reasons for action, disagree about which ends are desirable or simply 
disagree in our predictions of likely consequences – chances of success and the cost of bringing about the 
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desired end. On the other hand, there is also a long tradition of arguing against change despite the harms of 
the status quo.65 
If we accept that empathy may provide a basis for some of those subjective moral reasons, it is also 
possible that there will be cases when empathizing with the suffering of the in-group will underlie the reasons 
for inflicting large-scale harm on the members of the out-group. Research suggests that although we are 
likely to empathize with the distress of any individual, empathy is vulnerable to the familiarity bias and here-
and-now bias: people tend to favour family members, in-group members, close friends, people similar to 
themselves and those in physical proximity (Hoffman, 2000; Jones, 1991). If the increase in empathy for 
suffering of the in-group members is not offset by the increased empathy for the out-group, the increase in 
general empathy (other things being equal) could, in some circumstances, make the reasons for harming 
others stronger – for example, by adding poignancy to the observed suffering of those close to us.  
An answer to this problem would be to selectively induce increased empathy towards those 
considered to be foes, and increase it to such an extent that other reasons are overridden in every situation 
that includes a large-scale harm. Combining such selectivity and force of an enhancing intervention seems 
indeed wildly implausible.      
There are other reasons why moral enhancement may be unsuitable to serve the purpose Persson 
and Savulescu (2008) want it to serve. Persson and Savulescu (2008)  seem to be focusing on wickedness 
as a cause of large-scale harm but, as Harris (2010) points out in his response in Moral enhancement and 
freedom, large-scale harm can be inflicted not only by ʻthe badʼ but also by ʻthe madʼ. Moreover, it can result 
from incompetence, stupidity, negligence and miscalculation (Rees in Harris, 2010). Thus, moral 
enhancement, even if possible and effective, is likely to be unable to offset the dangers allegedly brought by 
cognitive enhancement and the development of science in general.  
Reconsidering our expectations  
Moral enhancement for all? 
I have outlined some of the reasons why moral enhancement may indeed not be able to eliminate the 
risk of large-scale harm, as Persson and Savulescu (2008) seem to require. But the expectation that moral 
enhancement eliminate the risk of large-scale harm seems to be not only potentially impossible (Harris 2010) 
but also unreasonably demanding. 
One of the reasons why it is unreasonably demanding was pointed out by Harris (2010): the 
expectation that moral enhancement ensure safety by eliminating risk (Persson & Savulescu, 2008) seems 
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to be impossible to fulfill. Even if moral enhancement was fantastically efficient and cost-effective, it would be 
unlikely to eliminate the risk of large scale disaster because one malevolent person, who slipped through the 
net of enhancement or for whom the intervention did not work, is enough for the risk not to be eliminated. 
Even assuming that all disasters are caused only by malevolent individuals, the standard for the 
effectiveness of moral enhancing interventions is set very high. Although we may have such hope, we do not 
normally expect cognitively enhancing technologies to work for every single person, nor do we expect most 
very effective treatments to work in every single case.  
Both cognitive and moral enhancement can be achieved by a variety of means. One of the possibilities 
is to use pharmacology. Pharmacological interventions often vary in effectiveness from individual to 
individual, and the influence of individual differences on outcomes is very well known, especially when the 
goal of intervention is to modify behaviour, mood or thinking processes. Predictions for outcomes (and side 
effects) for a single patient can be so unreliable that suitable medication is prescribed after a period of a trial-
and-error search (Huskamp, 2003). Often, there is a group of patients that are unresponsive to any of the 
pharmacological remedies, and sometimes both to different types of medication and different types of 
therapies, as well as to combined approaches. The use of pharmacology that seems to be sensitive to 
individual differences and pharmacological interventions, at least as our experience so far suggests, is likely 
to work for some but not for others. The number of subjects who could experience a desired effect is likely to 
increase with the growing variety of available interventions, as new drugs and other technologies (such as 
deep brain stimulation (DBS)) are designed and tested to address the needs of those for whom nothing has 
yet worked (Mayberg et al., 2005; Berton and Nestler, 2006).  
It is important to admit that pharmacological interventions have their limitations, but it is equally 
important not to forget about the cases when those interventions are effective. It may be regrettable that a 
drug is not effective for all (or even many), but denying the plausibility of moral enhancement because it does 
not work for all seems to be unjustifiably demanding. 
Moreover, whether a potentially enhancing intervention is indeed enhancement depends on the 
context and on a particular personʼs needs. While weight gain may be an enhancement for an underweight 
individual, it would not be so for an obese person. Although we may think of a change as a typical cognitive 
enhancement, for example an increase in the ability to focus on a particular task while ignoring distractors 
(focusing attention), the same intervention may be neutral or even counterproductive in some tasks that 
require creativity (Pacholczyk & Harris, forthcoming).      
Effectiveness 
Another issue is the expected magnitude of change. The plausibility of moral enhancement could also 
be put in doubt if the interventions available seem to be insufficiently effective. If we adopted the goal of 
moral enhancement that Persson and Savulescu (2008) adopt, we would expect morally enhancing 
intervention to result in the overriding of any inclination or reason for inflicting large scale harm. Among ʻthe 
wickedʼ who would be willing to inflict large-scale harm, there are likely to be both those whose vector sum of 
reasons would be largely pointing towards causing a disaster, and others riddled with doubt but who in the 
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end decide to carry on. There will be opportunists who would change their minds with a little nudge, and 
those for whom bringing large-scale harm is a purpose of life and is consistent with at least some their 
strongly held beliefs. The impact of morally enhancing intervention would indeed have to be great to override 
all the subjective reasons for inflicting large-scale harm, strong attitudes and the impact of deeply engrained 
beliefs. With expectations about the effectiveness set so high, Persson and Savulescu (2008) are right to 
doubt that sufficiently effective moral enhancement will be possible. However, there is no reason why we 
should understand ʻsufficientʼ as Persson and Savulescu (2008) do for the purpose of their paper. 
I would like to briefly discuss another potential reservation. One could argue that since any moral 
enhancement possible in the near future will not be able to make any of the wicked people good, moral 
enhancement is implausible. This objection seems to be especially illustrative because of how it is 
misguided; it remains so even if we would agree with the factual premise. This is because, firstly, it 
misunderstands enhancement as necessarily bringing people from one extreme of the spectrum to another, 
and, secondly, it grossly oversimplifies the issue. We do not necessarily expect cognitive enhancers to turn 
stupid people into smart ones but rather to improve certain aspects of cognition, improve the ability to deal 
with certain kinds of tasks and so on. Although we may think about prototypically ʻsmartʼ and prototypically 
ʻstupidʼ people, ʻbeing smartʼ can mean many different things, and requires a whole range of cognitive 
processes. Secondly, ʻsmart drugsʼ do not make people smart or even smarter. They modify a narrow aspect 
of functioning that partly underlies abilities and behaviours that we then see as signs of being smart. 
Whether any particular case of modifying an aspect of cognitive functioning amounts to an enhancement can 
very well be context-specific. If cognitive enhancement does not make stupid people smart, why should we 
expect moral enhancement to turn wicked people into virtuous ones?  
This is not to say that we could not want cognitive enhancers and moral enhancers to have this 
magnificent effect. We may hope for, imagine, and talk about the possibilities of radical human enhancement 
of a cognitive and moral realm, but even if radical enhancement is impossible, there is no reason why we 
should come to the conclusion that any enhancement is implausible. Naturally, we could point out that the 
effectiveness of enhancers is disappointing. It may indeed be the case that some of enhancing interventions 
will have such a small influence on functioning that, for most of us, they may not be worth the hassle. 
However, as some have pointed out, the cumulative and long-term impact of small changes can be 
substantial, yet are easily underestimated or altogether overlooked (Turner & Sahakian, 2006). 
Another issue is that of comparative effectiveness as well as comparative cost-effectiveness. It may 
be the case that any pharmacologically induced change in moral functioning will be much less effective then 
more traditional means such as moral education. Even if that is the case, it may still be worth pursuing. It 
may be worth pursuing if pharmacological methods will be significantly cheaper or more accessible, and so 
ultimately cost-effective. Moreover, it may be the case that application of pharmacology and other novel 
means of enhancement may be more effective or cost-effective in certain specific circumstances, for specific 
groups or as a method that complements traditional means. 
If we are going to consider pharmacological interventions that affect morality or cognition, there is no 
reason to be automatically discouraged if they have limited effectiveness (i.e., they do not turn maths idiots 
into maths geniuses or morally corrupt people into walking examples of virtue). We would likely find an 
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analogical threshold for efficiency impossible to reach for many pharmacological interventions. What we 
should rather look at is whether the effect of a single intervention or/and its repeated use is great enough, 
including the cumulative benefits of small beneficial changes to the extent possible, and look at comparative 
cost-effectiveness. It seems to be grossly premature to make strong judgments about those issues, given 
that neuroscientists only turned their interest to the cognitive science of morality a short time ago and that the 
empirical research on the effects of different interventions on the moral sphere of individuals is far from 
extensive. If we set our expectations to be comparable to those we have of cognitive enhancement and 
treatments for mental health disorders, the prospects of finding pharmacological or other moral enhancers 
seem to be much better. 
I have argued that if we revisit our expectations about the effects of moral enhancement, it is 
premature to conclude that moral enhancement is implausible. I have addressed doubts about the plausibility 
of moral enhancements based on claims of its low effectiveness. Let us discuss the criticisms that suggest 
that moral enhancement is impossible even if it was possible to significantly modify relevant cognitive 
processes, motivations or emotions. In the next section I will briefly draw our attention to possible ways of 
approaching moral enhancement and discuss empirical research that can lead us to believe that using 
pharmacology to modify our moral sphere is not so far off. 
What can we enhance? A multitude of potential targets 
The ability to be moral is complex, so there are many substrates that can potentially be modulated. 
Our moral sphere involves the ability to make moral judgments, to be motivated by moral reasons, acting 
according to our moral beliefs, the ability to reflect on and critically analyze moral beliefs, and so on (consider 
the model presented by Rest, 1984; also reviewed in Bergman, 2004). Those tasks rest on a number of 
cognitive and affective capacities, which also can be modulated. However, knowing what is good is certainly 
not enough. The research on moral hypocrisy has demonstrated that although people often declare that a 
certain behavior is right, they often do not act on this belief – especially if it is against their interest to do so 
(Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999; Batson, 2008).  
Moral behaviour encompasses a range of behaviours and includes refraining from doing what is 
wrong, doing what one ought to and doing good things beyond oneʼs obligations. One of the ways in which 
behaviours could be modified is by influencing states that have a strong motivational component, such as 
emotions. Firstly, one could try to modulate other-oriented emotions which influence moral behaviour. Those 
include gratitude, awe, elevation (Silvers & Haidt, 2008), righteous anger (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 
1999), disgust and contempt. Until now, researchers have tended to concentrate on investigations of anger 
and disgust, and there is a significant (and growing) amount of research into the physiological underpinnings 
of those emotions and their neural correlates (e.g. Moll et al., 2005). Positively-valenced emotions such as 
gratitude have enjoyed less attention until recently (Watkins, Scheer, Ovnicek, & Kolts, 2006; Immordino-
Yang, McColl, Damasio, & Damasio, 2009). 
A number of self-conscious emotions (shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride) play an important role 
in regulating behaviour, including moral behaviour. Emotions provide motivation to do good and to avoid 
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doing bad (Kroll & Egan, 2004).  People can anticipate their likely emotional reactions to predicted behaviour 
based on previous experience and this prediction can influence moral choices (Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007). Moreover, as is the case with a feeling of shame that is less central to morality, it can 
change the post factum behaviour. Research indicates that embarrassed people are inclined to behave in 
conciliatory ways in order to win approval from others (Cupach & Metts, 1990, 1992; Miller, 1996; Sharkey & 
Stafford, 1990). Some of those emotions may prove to be difficult to modify with novel means, but it is too 
early to make any strong conclusions on the issue. To show the possibilities that may emerge with more 
research, I will examine the effects on behaviour of one particular neurochemical – oxytocin. 
A case study: Oxytocin 
Oxytocin, a hormone and neurotransmitter originally known for its involvement in childbirth and 
lactation, has recently been shown to be involved in social behaviour. Studies in mice suggest that low levels 
of oxytocin correlate with impaired ability to recognise (Ferguson, Yung, Hearn, Matzuk, Insel, & Winslow, 
2000; Ferguson, Aldag, Insel, & Young, 2001) and bond to oneʼs peers (Winslow & Insel, 2002). These 
observations came in part from experiments with mice with a mutated oxytocin gene. Ferguson et al. (2001) 
showed that mouse knock-outs show a profound social recognition deficit despite normal olfactory and 
spatial learning abilities and that the social recognition ability can be fully restored by an injection of oxytocin 
in the medial amygdala. In contrast, a high level of this hormone seems to correlate with caring behaviour in 
rodents (Pedersen, Ascher, Monroe, & Prange, 1982).  
In humans, oxytocin has also been shown to influence social behaviour and cognition. In humans 
oxytocin plays an important role in creating the mother-infant bond. Feldman and colleagues (2007) showed 
that a motherʼs level of oxytocin in the first trimester predicts the strength of the motherʼs attachment to the 
infant. Also, a boost to oxytocin levels in experimental settings commonly achieved by administration of a 
nasal spray, seems to promote trust (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005; Baumgartner, 
Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008) and generous behaviours (Barraza & Zak, 2009; Zak, 
Stanton, & Ahmadi, 2007). Oxytocin seems to influence social cognition (Theoridou, Rowe, Penton-Voak, & 
Rogers, 2009), increase some aspects of memory for social stimuli (Unkelbach, Guastella, & Forgas, 2008; 
Guastella, Mitchell, & Mathews, 2008) and to increase ʻmind-readingʼ ability (Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, 
Berger, & Herpertz, 2007). 
Substantial effect sizes obtained in the experiments on trust and generosity (for example, participants 
were 80% more generous in the oxytocin group than in the placebo group in the Zak et al. (2007) study and 
30% more trusting in the Baumgartner et al. (2008) experiment), including some laboratory experiments that 
could have relatively high ecological validity (in Ditzen, Schaer, Gabriel, Bodenmann, Ehlert, & Heinrichs, 
2008) couples were asked to argue and the frequency of positive behaviour such as listening, confirming or 
laughing during the conflict were measured) meant that the use of oxytocin in everyday life became more 
plausible.  
Given decent effect sizes in experiments, we may worry that in many circumstances oxytocin could 
impede judgement and increase trust when trusting is unwarranted or even harmful (Damasio, 2005), 
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especially given the finding that oxytocin seems to restore trust after betrayals (Baumgarter et al., 2008).  
Based on this hypothesis, some have proposed the commercial and military application of oxytocin (Dethlefs, 
2007). Those worries seem to be justified, given that although trust is an important social resource (Giddens, 
1991), it can sometimes also be socially maladaptive (Greenspan, Loughlin, & Black, 2001). But is it indeed 
the case that an increase in oxytocin leads people to trust others indiscriminately?  
Mikolajczyk and colleagues (2010a), suggest that the matter is somewhat more complex. They point 
out that in previous experiments, participants rarely met the same partner twice, nor had they clues that the 
person they interacted with was unreliable. Also, previous research suggested that the effects of oxytocin, for 
example on aggressive behaviour (this is especially well-illustrated in research on aggression in female 
rodents), are context dependent (Campbell, 2008; Pedersen, 2004). Mikolajczyk et al.ʼs (2010a) doubts were 
confirmed in research that used a customised economic trust game that allowed for repeated interaction with 
some partners being seemingly more trustworthy then others. Consistently with previous studies, they found 
that participants who received a nasal spray with oxytocin transferred more money to partners in comparison 
to participants in the control group. However, participants transferred more money to partners perceived as 
reliable but not to seemingly unreliable ones. This suggests that oxytocin administration does not increase 
trust when the partner appears unreliable. On the basis of these findings, Mikolajczyk et al. (2010a) 
proposed that the effect of oxytocin may be moderated by the perception of risk. 
The effect of oxytocin on trust has to be confirmed for other contexts, although one recent study 
indicates that the effect is also present in circumstances that do not involve monetary transfers - participants 
who received oxytocin were 44 times more trusting that their privacy would not be violated than participants 
in the control condition (Mikolajczak, Pinon, Lane, de Timary, & Luminet, 2010). It is likely that oxytocin 
nevertheless will have some effect on the perception of how trustworthy others are. Yet let us make an 
assumption (reasonable on the basis of current evidence) that, generally speaking, the administration of 
oxytocin promotes trust – but it is unlikely that we would make some disastrous decisions because of this 
intervention. The research on the trust-promoting effects of oxytocin has an especially great potential 
application, given findings showing that we tend to underestimate peopleʼs trustworthiness (Fetchenhauer & 
Dunning, 2010) and because of the importance of trust for morally relevant actions.  
Oxytocin also seems to improve empathy, but the effect was only prominent for less socially proficient 
participants – as measured by Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) – while there was no effect for the more 
socially proficient group (Bartz et al., 2010). Domes and others (2007) found that oxytocin improved 
performance only for difficult stimuli. These findings go against the tempting but simplistic view that oxytocin 
can be used as a universal prosocial enhancer that can turn all people into social-cognitive experts. Instead, 
perhaps unsurprisingly given our knowledge about the usual context-dependency and the impact of 
individual differences on the effects of both synthetic and naturally occurring pharmacological agents, 
oxytocin appears to help only some people. That is not to say that the effects are not substantial. In a Bartz 
et al. (2007) experiment, the administration of oxytocin equalised the differences in performance of low and 
high-performance groups in such a way that the performance of participants with high and low AQ scores 
was indistinguishable. 
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The exact mechanism underpinning the influence of oxytocin on trust, empathy and other potentially 
morally relevant abilities is still debated, but only looking at the known effects paints an intriguing picture. 
Assuming that the results discussed so far are confirmed, we may be able to gain a new, and possibly more 
convenient, means of influencing our level of trust and empathic ability, probably without a worry of 
overdoing it drastically (although  there is some indication that oxytocin seems also to increase envy, see 
Shamay-Tsoory, Fischer, Dvash, Harari, Perach-Bllom, & Levkovitz, 2009). This may be not good enough for 
those envisaging radical human enhancement, but, as was argued in the ʻreconsidering our expectationsʼ 
section, the potential for this substantial, although not universal or radical enhancement, may be worth 
pursuing.  
Although increases in trust or empathy may not eliminate (or maybe even decrease or keep constant) 
the risks of large scale harm, an increase in empathy for those from the lower-end of the functioning 
spectrum has the potential, via possible improvements in social cognition, to contribute to a better ability to 
take into consideration othersʼ wellbeing – an ability fundamental to moral consideration. Positive behavioural 
effects demonstrated by couples during the conflict (which are most probably also mediated by an influence 
on amygdala and the level of stress) seem to point us towards a potential for a marked behavioural effect. 
Those can be especially useful in professions that require empathy, the well-developed ability to notice 
otherʼs distress and maintaining prosocial attitudes also under stress and during a conflict, such as in the 
caring professions.  
The ability to increase generosity and trust in the cases when the partner is judged to be trustworthy 
(or at least not particularly untrustworthy) seems highly unlikely to solve the serious political conflicts 
exacerbated by the lack of trust. However, we can easily imagine the situation when an increase in the 
frequency of acts typical of a Good or even a Splendid Samaritan – thus doing what is morally desirable but 
not obligatory – can have a notable and positive influence on what kind of social world we live in. 
Doubts about moral enhancement – freedom and disagreement 
In this section I will consider two objections to moral enhancement. I will first discuss the view that 
making people more moral is practically impossible due to the lack of consensus about what is and is not 
moral. Secondly, I will consider the view that moral enhancement would hurt the freedom of morally 
enhanced individuals (Harris, 2011). 
Moral disagreement 
Some may doubt the plausibility of moral enhancement, or even doubt the reasonableness of pursuing 
it, based on the claim that there is a substantial and possibly irreconcilable disagreement as to what is a 
moral way to go about things. If we disagree about what is moral, the argument might go, we cannot know 
which way we should modify our moral sphere – we do not even know what the goal of the modification 
should be!  
There is at least one understanding of moral enhancement to which this doubt does not apply – moral 
enhancement understood as a modification in the sphere of moral functioning that is in the personʼs self-
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interest outlined in the first section of this paper. Being more or less moral is not at issue here, and so the 
doubt does not have a bite.  
And what about moral enhancement defined as making people more moral? It seems that the 
argument is in this case, at least prima facie, plausible. If moral disagreement undermines our moral 
knowledge, it could have consequences for the project of making people more moral, be it by non-traditional 
means and traditional ones such as moral education. But let us have a closer look.  
Although there is a good amount of disagreement about what moral education should look like, most 
of us would not say for that reason that it is better to have no moral education at all, that we should not teach 
our children that lying is wrong or that striving to further develop ourselves as moral agents in our adulthood 
is a misguided proposition. Why is that? Firstly, because despite possible theoretical differences, there is a 
good amount of consensus about which acts or kinds of acts are morally wrong or morally right. On most, if 
not all, reasonable accounts of what is moral, killing a person for no other reason apart from the pleasure 
one derives from this act is wrong. There is also substantial agreement that, generally speaking, we ought to 
keep our promises or avoid lying. Moreover, there is a substantial amount of consensus about things that are 
necessary or conducive to moral agency and sensitivity, and conducive to morally good kinds of motivation, 
outcomes, etc. To give just one example – one of those things is concern and respect for other moral agents, 
which in turn requires a number of cognitive and affective capacities. The certain amount of agreement 
(more or less limited, depending on how high we will put the bar) means that the objection from 
disagreement does not apply to the numerous instances when disagreement is absent or weak enough. 
Objections from disagreement will not apply to improving our ability to be moral in those cases. 
The presence of disagreement is often used to demonstrate the inadequacy of moral realism, and so 
to justify certain conclusions about the metaphysics of morals.
66
 However, this argument is susceptible to the 
objection that it proves too much and - since it is an inference to the best explanation - the objection that 
there are alternative explanations of moral disagreement. When moral disagreement is present, it can be the 
result of several factors. It may be the result of disagreement about non-moral facts, both about morality and 
about the world. The disagreement can also have its source in some kinds of procedural failure in the 
reasoning process. Alternatively, the apparent disagreement may be an instance of the case when people 
are talking past each other, and do not understand each othersʼ claims (Harman, 1975; Wong, 1984). In 
those cases we may hope that at least some disagreement may be removed. Abilities necessary to engage 
in a collective inquiry and discussion with others may be helpful in facilitating this process. Some kinds of 
enhancement (enhancement of reasoning skills, for example) may aid us in being better prepared for that 
process. 
 




 For example, see Mackieʼs well-known ʻargument from relativityʼ. 
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Some have assumed that all moral disagreement is in fact due to those reasons (e.g. Boyd, 1988), 
while others maintain that there are cases of moral disagreement between two people who are equally 
rational, and equally well informed about the non-moral facts and understand each othersʼ claims 
(fundamental moral disagreement). Whether that is indeed the case seems to be a rather complex question 
and I will not attempt to give an answer here. However, even if we accepted the conclusion about the 
metaphysics of morals, it does not have straightforward implications for the possibility of moral actions and 
moral concern even in the case of fundamental moral disagreement. Why is that? It is because we cannot 
automatically get from the metaphysics of morals to the conclusion about moral knowledge and about what 
we should do. Let me just give one example of this – there are alternative metaphysical positions that have 
the potential to deal with the objections raised. It is possible, for example, to accept error theory and end up 
with moral fictionalism, where our make-believing in morality can be prudentially advisable (Joyce, 2005). 
Alternatively, moral non-cognitivists may seek to explain how the feelings, attitudes or prescriptions 
expressed in moral claims can be justified (see Hare (1981), Gibbard (1990) and Blackburn (1998) for 
theories of moral justification compatible with non-cognitivism). Those views can account for the apparent 
fundamental moral disagreement while leaving moral enhancement as a viable notion.  
Although the most common, metaphysical arguments are not the only ones developed on the basis of 
the observation that moral disagreement exists. For example, McGrath (2007) defended an epistemological 
version of this argument. Epistemological arguments from disagreement seek to undermine moral knowledge 
by showing that regardless of the metaphysics of moral facts, we can reasonably expect to have much less 
moral knowledge that we previously thought. Consider the following passage from Sidgwickʼs The Methods 
of Ethics: 
[I]f I find any of my judgments, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict with a judgment of some other mind, 
there must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to suspect error in the other mind than in my 
own, reflective comparison between the two judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of 
neutrality. (Sidgwick, 1907/1981, p. 342).  
McGrath (2007) develops a parallel argument that applies not to certainty, but rather to moral 
knowledge. When moral beliefs are subject to disagreement and Sidgwickʼs condition is satisfied (that is, if 
one has no more reason to suspect that the other person is mistaken than that it is oneself who erred), one 
is not holding knowledge about the contested issue; and that is the case even if the belief happens to be 
true. In fact, McGrath (2007) develops a stronger version of this claim by arguing that all controversial moral 
issues (such contentious matters in applied ethics and culture) fulfil Sidgwickʼs condition; let us accept this 
last claim for the purposes of the argument. What consequences does it have for the moral enhancement 
project? 
The consequences are far from straightforward. In those cases it does not follow that we should 
abandon, prohibit or find moral enhancement an untenable proposition – and that applies to both moral 
education and other non-traditional means of enhancement. Firstly, in cases that apparently satisfy 
Sidgwickʼs condition we may still have some problems with justifying why exactly it is rational for us to trust 
othersʼ moral intuitions as much as we trust ours, and why, as a consequence, we should abandon our belief 
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(Wedgwood, 2010). But let us assume that some version of Sidgwickʼs proposal applies and so in many 
cases of controversy it is rational for us to abandon our beliefs. 
Non-traditional moral enhancement is unlikely to be specific enough to change the moral appraisal of 
any particular controversial issue. It is more likely to slightly modify some propensities to react, perceive and 
behave by increasing impulse control, empathy, trust or reducing fear responses and so on. Naturally, we 
can still disagree about issues such as whether a higher level of trust is conducive to moral outcomes. 
However, if we accept Sidgwickʼs (1907/1981) advice to hold our judgements we are still left with the 
question ʻso what should we do now?ʼ Let us say that we disagree about whether Jane should increase, 
decrease or maintain her empathic ability (we fundamentally disagree about all three possibilities). What 
behaviour would constitute holding our judgement on this issue? Some may say that we should leave things 
as they are. But there is no reason why we should privilege the status quo option over other possibilities, 
given that there is disagreement also about the status quo. Thus, moral disagreement is problematic as a 
support for leaving things as they are. We are still faced with the question ʻwhat should we do next?ʼ The 
answer could be that it is only rational for us to have no moral views at all on the contentious matter and use 
other reasons to decide on the course of action. 
It is important to remember that we have developed political means of dealing with moral 
disagreement and sometimes find disagreement to be a constructive force necessary for change. In liberal 
societies moral education is often about developing the ability of persons to be autonomous moral agents, 
providing them the possibility of gaining reasoning skills and exposure to moral problems to aid this 
development. We tend to protect the freedom of people to disagree with commonly held views. We also have 
political frameworks that aid us in dealing with moral disagreement and often seek the state to be as neutral 
about issues of morality as it is possible. We tend to protect the private sphere – the freedom of parents to 
raise their children as they see fit is interfered with only in cases of clear parental failure; we struggle to 
protect freedom of conscience, and so on. We accept that people have different ideas about what a good life 
is about and value the ability of individuals to act consistently with their idea of the good life and morality, 
and, generally speaking, restrain this possibility only when we have strong justification for doing so. Even 
given the doubts that an agent may have about what is right, we are likely to find the adoption of a moral 
stance (for example, as opposed to narrowly self-interested stance) to be valuable.  
One could argue that the possibility of moral enhancement in this liberal framework would be likely to 
deepen the disagreement - which could be seen as undesirable prudentially or morally speaking. We may 
therefore have good reasons to make people less bothered about morality in cases when disagreement 
arises (this would be a solution consistent with the view that it is rational for us to abandon our belief in 
certain cases of disagreement). Interestingly, an argument for making people suspend their judgment and 
not act motivated by moral reasons under these particular circumstances is an argument for a certain kind of 
enhancement. If one supported this argument using moral reasons this would be an argument for a specific 
kind of moral enhancement understood as making people more moral. If the rationale is prudential, we have 
a case for prudentially beneficial intervention into our moral sphere. 
To sum up, moral disagreement has much less straightforward consequences for moral enhancement 
that we may have thought at the outset. Firstly, it only applies to moral enhancement understood as making 
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people more moral, and not to moral enhancement as a prudentially beneficial modification of the moral 
sphere. Also, it does not apply to a whole array of issues that we tend to agree on, including the issues of 
what is conducive to morally desirable moral sentiments, motivations, outcomes, etc. If we treat moral 
disagreement as giving rise to a valid and strong argument against certain views on the metaphysics of 
morals, there is still much explaining to be done of what impact it should have on our moral knowledge and 
subsequent actions. We can, for example, adopt a non-realist view of morality that is not susceptible to the 
objection from disagreement and work from there. What we have learned from the discussion on the possible 
sources of disagreement is that disagreement about non-moral facts, procedural failure, bias and lack of 
proper discussion can all give raise to disagreement about moral issues. We may therefore have a good 
reason to support both traditional and non-traditional means of improvement that would aid us in dealing with 
those disagreements better then we now do. 
It is also unclear how an epistemological argument from disagreement should impact our behaviour, 
but it is unlikely to support the status quo. If we indeed think that holding our judgement means abandoning 
moral considerations in controversial cases and that this is what we ought to do, we may have a good case 
for a particular kind of moral enhancement. Also, let us not forget that we have political means of dealing with 
moral disagreement. Respecting moral agentsʼ decisions and allowing moral agents to pursue their idea of 
the good in the private sphere (and discuss and argue for it in the public sphere) is one of them. Unless we 
have other strong reasons to treat non-traditional moral enhancement differently, this also applies to those 
cases of moral enhancement. 
Freedom 
State coercion and freedom 
There are two main ways in which we may think about moral enhancement as threatening freedom. 
Firstly, moral enhancement may be imposed by governments. Moral enhancement would make a person 
better in some way but it is carried out against this personʼs will or without their knowledge. Secondly, even if 
the person consents to or chooses to undergo a morally enhancing intervention, an intervention in the moral 
sphere may be seen as diminishing that personʼs ability to make moral choices. Let me start out by briefly 
addressing the first objection. 
The concern that states could use novel technological means to manufacture consent, dissolve 
dissent and surreptitiously force citizens readily springs to mind – those who deal with the ethics of 
enhancement are always reminded of the ʻBrave New Worldʼ scenarios. In the discussions following the 
boom in antidepressant prescriptions many commentators compared Prozac and other such drugs to soma 
(for utopian and dystopian takes on pharmacology see Schermer, 2007). Although after years of 
antidepressantsʼ presence on the market the threats envisaged by the most pessimistic and imaginative 
commentators have hardly turned into reality, those very often rhetorical and alarmist evocations of dystopias 
remind us about a number of important political issues surrounding the conditions for a workable democratic 
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state (including the importance of dissent), the potential threats of a strong security-state to individual 
freedom and the limits of justified paternalism.  
However, those commentators raise questions rather than provide answers and we should be wary of 
a knee-jerk response against the mandatory use of moral enhancement. It is generally accepted that we 
relinquish some aspects of our freedom in exchange for security or other benefits of living in a society. It 
could be – in some circumstances – justified for the government to impose or strongly encourage morally 
enhancing interventions. For example, it seems to be prerogative of the parents, but also lay within the 
interest of the state, to make sure that children acquire and regulate their behaviour according to the rules of 
co-existence. The failure of parents to install those rules may provoke the intervention of the state (by taking 
children into foster care or mandating contact with a social worker), especially if this failure translates into 
highly disruptive or illegal behaviour. 
In many modern democracies it is currently legal to use pharmacological interventions for some 
offenders and some people with mental health problems; the use of those interventions can be both 
compulsory and voluntary. Those measures include mental health treatment for individuals that are judged to 
be posing a danger to themselves or others and chemical castration of sex offenders (Harrison, 2007; Grubin 
& Beech, 2010).The legislation that regulates the uses of those measures surely evokes legal and ethical 
controversies. However, those examples illustrate the point that what we need is a discussion about what 
constitutes a legitimate justification for employment of those techniques. This includes questions about 
justification of paternalism and interference with individual freedom in order to prevent harm to others, the 
boundary between the public and the private sphere and so on. It is not within the scope of this paper to 
address those questions adequately, but it is worth noting that the appraisal of moral enhancement imposed 
by governments will often significantly depend on our ideas about paternalism and the conditions for the 
legitimacy of state interference. Also, those questions were addressed at length and hotly debated 
specifically in the context of the use of pharmacology by scholars dealing with ethical issues in mental 
health, medical and criminal law, and we should remember to take advantage of those debates.  
Voluntary moral enhancement and freedom 
Are there cases when voluntary modification of the moral sphere would decrease our freedom in an 
undesirable way? I would like to focus on one way in which such loss of freedom could be thought of – the 
worry that moral enhancement, if successful, would eradicate the possibility of moral life by eliminating 
choice.  
Harris (2011) starts his discussion of moral enhancement with a passage from Miltonʼs Paradise Lost. 
In this passage Miltonʼs God states that if man surrenders to Satanʼs temptation, he has only himself to 
blame as ʻI made him just and right, sufficient to have stood and free to fall.ʼ As Harris (2011) correctly points 
out, millennia of evolution resulted in us – creatures with vigorous moral sentiments, a sense of justice and 
right. Some may be tempted to say that since we are endowed with the capacity for moral responsibility and 
moral life, we do not need to pursue specifically moral enhancement. This, however, would be a rather 
obviously premature conclusion. The given ability or predisposition for moral life is normally strengthened 
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and modified by the influence of culture – bringing up children to know right from wrong, developing the 
ability for moral reflection and discussion and transmitting knowledge about non-moral facts relevant for our 
moral choices, etc. We not only accept, but usually also support and encourage traditional means of moral 
development and improvement, including moral education and reflection. 
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that evolution has equipped us well enough to deal with life in 
the modern society – in increasingly complex social and political circumstances and with the plethora of new 
ways of inflicting harm that we came up with over the last couple of centuries. Indeed, the results of empirical 
research give us good reasons to suspect that in some respects we are ill equipped to deal with problems 
that are facing us today, and it is especially vivid in the case of moral appraisal of indirect action (see 
Paharia, Kassam, Greene, & Bazerman, 2009). For example, one study on moral intuitions suggests that 
harm involving physical contact is often judged to be morally worse than harm without such contact, despite 
the fact that when subjects are asked about moral relevance of physical contact, they often deny that it is 
relevant (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). 
What worries Harris (2011) seems to be that the current discussion has focused on moral 
enhancement as eliminating characteristics or dispositions that are often conducive to wrongdoing. The 
problem is that the same sorts of characteristics seem to be necessary “not only for virtue but for any kind of 
moral life at all” (Harris, 2011, p. 3). Harris (2011) makes several largely independent arguments, but I will 
only focus on a claim most relevant to our discussion about freedom. And this is the statement that there is 
no virtue in doing what you must. 
Even without getting deep into the centuries-long discussion about determinism and free will, and what 
we exactly mean by choice, Miltonʼs words cited at the beginning of this section bring to our attention an 
important pre-condition for moral responsibility. Moral responsibility, and the virtuous choosing to do what is 
good and right, necessitates both the possibility to fall and the freedom to choose to fall (Harris, 2011). It 
seems that there are two necessary ingredients for a ʻfreedom to fallʼ, understood as such, to be realized. 
One, we have to have the ability to choose (whatever we mean by it), and, secondly, we have to be 
presented with a situation where there indeed is a choice. How can moral enhancement be a threat? One 
way is when the temptation (or, in other words, the reasons or motivation to do wrong) is eradicated. Moral 
enhancement as proposed by Douglas (2008) and Persson and Savulescu (2008) may be worrying because 
it would modify our moral sphere in such a way that there would be no scope for choice. There is no virtue, 
the argument may go, in overcoming our racial prejudice and not acting on it, if there is no prejudice, no 
virtue in staying calm and composed, when we cease to feel anger or fear.  
There certainly is a virtue in overcoming unjustified prejudice and not acting on it. Most of us, however, 
would happily forgo many possibilities of being virtuous if only we could minimize the harm caused by this 
prejudice when we fail to be virtuous enough to stop ourselves from acting on it. Also, there are plenty of 
temptations we do not have. We usually are not tempted to steal toys from children in the playground, to 
shave off our partnerʼs hair while they are asleep or poison our neighbours. Even if we could, we are unlikely 
to want to create those temptations only so that we can overcome them – and we do not find our moral lives 
impoverished because of lack of those temptations. Those who value the possibility of exercising virtue 
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should not worry. Moral enhancement, even if more efficient than we can reasonably predict it to be in the 
coming decades, is unlikely to dispose of situations that require virtuous behaviour. 
The statement that there is no virtue in doing what you must could, in fact, be evoked in support of 
moral enhancement understood as modification of our moral sphere, whether it would result in a more or less 
moral person. In some cases, we have a limited choice about whether or not to be moved by moral 
considerations (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). We naturally can, both for the better and for worse, use reflection 
to moderate their influence, work at changing our moral intuitions, adopt philosophies that will help to offset 
unwanted influence, etc. But conscious control over our moral lives seems to be limited. If to be moral we 
need to be able to choose to fall, this possibility can be greatly improved by modification of our moral 
sentiments and related first-order desires. But maybe it is this freedom that we fear? 
One could make a consequentialist argument and say that it is very likely that having the freedom not 
to be morally facilitated, for example, by the increased ability to silence emotions such as guilt after 
wrongdoing, will eventually lead to the world being generally worse. This is, however, a different kind of 
argument from the worry about impairment to freedom. It is an argument for restricting freedom, and not for 
letting people decide how to lead their lives. 
Our capacity to be moral and the particular values that inform the expression of this ability seems, as 
many other things of our life, to be determined by innate inclinations and early experience, including moral 
education. This does not preclude further moral development or change. Many of us actively modify our 
moral sphere and rethink the rules and values we internalized during the course of our lives. Some of this 
modification occurs without extensive reflection and is a response to the changes in our knowledge or social 
circumstances. In other cases we think about our values, our morally relevant automatic reactions, find 
inconsistencies or faults in our moral reactions and then either try not to act on them or to change them. If in 
this process we use pharmacological ʻhelpersʼ, it does not seem to essentially change the process; it simply 
increases the means available to us.67 Pharmacological means are unlikely to replace traditional means of 
moral development, but may be well placed to complement them. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have explored the idea of moral enhancement and looked at three possible 
interpretations of this phrase that are worth keeping in mind when discussing moral enhancement. I have 
challenged the assumption that ʻmoral enhancementʼ necessarily means making people morally better and 
suggested that a non-normative understanding is also interesting. Contrary to some commentators, I have 
 




 I will assume that there is nothing in principle wrong with using chemical means for enhancement. For an enlightening 
discussion of that subject please see Harris (2007). 
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suggested that the moderately effective pharmacological interventions of this kind are already with us, and 
discussed oxytocin as an example of a potential moral enhancer. 
The discussion of the objection to the use of moral enhancement revealed that the consequences of 
moral disagreement and the worries about decreasing freedom are more problematic that it might have 
seemed. Metaphysical arguments from disagreement are not strong enough to convince us that moral 
enhancement understood as making people better is untenable, and epistemological arguments do not 
support the status quo. In fact, if we find epistemological arguments from disagreement convincing, it may 
lead us to support certain modifications in our moral sphere. Similarly, the worries about the effect of moral 
enhancement on freedom seem to, at the very least, merit more discussion. Discussed doubts about the 
voluntary use of moral enhancement seem not to be overly persuasive and the concern about the use of 
morally modifying interventions by the state does not apply to moral enhancement only, but is better 
understood as a wider political question about the criteria for the legitimacy of state interference. 
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Abstract This paper discusses the issue of employing neurotechnologies in the penal system to ʻmorally 
enhanceʼ offenders. Some rehabilitation programmes (e.g. for drug addicts and sex offenders) currently 
aim to reduce the strength of offendersʼ deviant urges and to increase their control over these urges. 
However, more radical interventions may become technically possible, e.g. neurological interventions that 
aim to alter the offenderʼs goals and values to something more morally acceptable. Both consequentialists 
and retributivists may oppose such radical methods.  Retributivists might argue that only traditional 
punishment respects the offenderʼs ʻfree willʼ. This response is open to a number of challenges. For 
instance, many punishment theorists (e.g. the retributivist, Michael Moore) consider it plausible that human 
conduct is determined by factors outwith the agentʼs control. But if this is correct, why should behaviour 
count as ʻfreeʼ when it is determined by certain factors (e.g. genes and upbringing) and not by other factors 
(e.g. neurological intervention)? Consequentialists may emphasise the potential for neurotechnologies to 
be abused. For instance, the state might attempt to manipulate law-breakers who have legitimate political 
grievances. However, it is unclear whether, from a purely consequentialist perspective, the risk of abuse 
will always outweigh the good consequences to be achieved by reshaping the uncontroversially abhorrent 
values of certain offenders, e.g. racist extremists. My paper argues against attempting to alter offendersʼ 
goals and values using neurotechnologies that wholly or largely circumvent the offenderʼs rationality. My 
approach aims to be compatible with determinism and to avoid the problems of consequentialism. It 
appeals to the values of equality and moral dialogue. It opposes types of intervention, which would create 
an immense inequality of power between state officials and other citizens, arguing that the state does not 
have the moral status to use such methods. Law-breakers are still part of the moral community and efforts 
to alter their values should be via relationships with others (e.g. through victim-offender mediation), rather 
than by direct neurological interventions. 
Keywords determinism, punishment, moral enhancement, equality 
Introduction 
This paper discusses the issue of employing neurotechnologies in the penal system to ʻmorally 
enhanceʼ offenders. Some rehabilitation programmes (e.g. for drug addicts and sex offenders) currently aim 
to reduce the strength of offendersʼ deviant urges and to increase their control over these urges. However, 
more radical interventions may become technically possible, e.g. neurological interventions that aim to 
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directly alter the offenderʼs goals, or values to something more morally acceptable. Henceforth, neurological 
interventions which aim to alter such features of agency will be referred to as ʻdirect interventionsʼ. 
Such radical interventions are intuitively troubling. One kind of objection to these interventions cites 
the bad consequences that might flow from their use or abuse. Even well-intentioned use of 
neurotechnologies within the penal system might have unintended harmful results. An intervention might fail 
to achieve its purpose. For instance, a technique designed to ʻimprove the moral characterʼ of the offender 
might have the opposite effect. Or, even if it does achieve its purpose it might do so at a significant cost. For 
example, the intervention may have side-effects which are harmful to the offenderʼs health. Furthermore, 
there is a risk that the authorities will abuse their power. For instance, the state might attempt to manipulate 
lawbreakers who have legitimate political grievances. However, from a purely consequentialist perspective, it 
seems that all of these risks have to be factored into the utilitarian calculation and weighed against the 
potential benefits of direct interventions. It is far from obvious that these risks will in all cases necessarily 
outweigh the potential benefits (e.g. in terms of crime reduction and protecting society).  
A seemingly obvious objection to employing direct neurological interventions to alter offendersʼ 
motivations is that these interventions threaten to undermine the offenderʼs ʻfree willʼ. The first section of this 
paper will argue that free-will based objections to direct interventions are actually far from straightforward. 
For instance, many punishment theorists consider it plausible that human conduct is determined by factors 
outwith the agentʼs control (e.g., Moore, 1985). But if this is correct, it becomes difficult to explain why 
behaviour should count as ʻfreeʼ when it is determined by certain factors (e.g. genes and upbringing) and not 
when it is determined by other factors (e.g. neurological intervention). 
My paper adopts an approach which is not based on the notion that direct interventions necessarily 
violate free will. It also aims to avoid the problems of consequentialism. It presents an objection to certain 
types of direct intervention, which appeals to the values of equality and moral dialogue. This paper does not 
oppose the use of all neurological interventions within the criminal justice system. It specifically focuses on 
the idea of using neurotechnologies to deal with offenders who are basically rational, in an attempt to directly 
re-shape these offendersʼ values or goals. It argues that such interventions are unacceptable because they 
would exclude offenders from the moral community, and because the state does not have the moral status to 
use such methods. 
Key terms 
It is important at the outset to clarify some key terms. Firstly, the thesis of ʻDeterminismʼ implies that 
every personʼs actions are caused by earlier events whose occurrence was not under the agentʼs control. 
The sense of ʻcauseʼ that is being used here does not merely refer to the presence of necessary conditions 
for the occurrence of the action. Nor does it mean that prior events just made the action more likely to occur. 
Rather, it means that prior events (taken together with the laws of nature) were causally sufficient to produce 
that action – i.e., given the occurrence of the earlier events, the action had to occur, no matter what else may 
have been the case. Determinism does not mean that our actions do not affect what happens to us 
(fatalism). Nor does it mean that mental events (e.g. our intentions, decisions and desires) do not cause our 
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actions. Rather, the thesis of determinism implies that, if our actions are caused by mental events, then 
those mental events were themselves produced by prior events that were causally sufficient for the 
occurrence of those mental events and that those prior events were themselves produced in the same 
manner by even earlier events etc. in an unbroken chain of cause and effect that can be traced back to 
before the person was even born. Determinism does not imply that people will not modify their behaviour in 
response to good reasons for doing so. It merely implies that whether a person recognises and responds to 
one particular reason for action rather than another at any given time is determined by prior events in the 
manner described above. 
ʻCompatibilismʼ is the view that people can still have ʻcontrolʼ over their actions in the sense required 
for free will even if all their actions are determined by prior events over which they did not have control. Most 
compatibilists also believe that free will is compatible with indeterminism. ʻIncompatibilismʼ is the view that 
free will is not compatible with determinism. ʻLibertarian incompatibilistsʼ argue that free will requires the 
falsity of determinism, that determinism is false and that people can be free. 
Direct interventions and libertarian freedom 
Most libertarians would oppose any type of direct intervention that guaranteed that the agent would act 
in one particular way. For most libertarians, freedom consists partly in the ability to choose between different 
alternatives for action, without the outcome of oneʼs decision being guaranteed in advance by prior events.  
In a very recent article, Harris (2011) has developed an argument against using direct neurological 
interventions to morally enhance offenders, which seems to rely on libertarianism. He begins by referring to 
the image of a forking path, stressing that if an agent is genuinely free then it is possible to choose to go 
down any one of the available paths. After quoting a passage from Paradise Lost, he, agrees with Milton that 
for agent to be capable of virtue it must be possible for him to do wrong or to ʻfallʼ. He writes: 
Without the freedom to fall, good cannot be a choice; and freedom disappears and along with it virtue. 
There is no virtue in doing what you must...[Liberty could be] threatened by any measures that make the 
freedom to do immoral things impossible...sufficiency to stand is worthless, literally morally bankrupt, 
without freedom to fall...(Harris, 2010, 105-111). 
Determinism entails that, given the facts of the past and the laws of nature, nobody could have acted 
differently from the way in which they actually did act. If a person actually refrained from doing an immoral 
thing, then given these facts and laws, it was physically impossible for them to have done the immoral thing. 
Harrisʼs (2011) arguments seem to imply that causal determinism is incompatible with true virtue, because 
virtue requires that it was genuinely possible for the agent to have been vicious. There are, of course, 
compatibilist interpretations of alternative possibilities (which will be discussed below). However, Harrisʼs 
(2011) arguments against direct interventions only seem to make sense on a libertarian interpretation. He 
states that it is a conceptual truth that God himself could not have guaranteed that human beings would 
behave virtuously and still have left us free (Harris, 2011). This is implied by libertarianism, which states that 
nothing, not even God, can ensure in advance that a free agent will decide to do one thing rather than 
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another – the future is open right up until the agent makes her choice. However, according to compatibilism, 
individuals who are predetermined to behave virtuously are still free (all that matters on this compatibilist 
view is that in some hypothetical scenario the agent would have behaved differently). It seems perfectly 
conceptually possible to imagine a world which God had created in such a way that every individual was 
guaranteed to develop into a virtuous agent and yet retain freedom in the compatibilist sense (see 
Pereboom, 2005 for a discussion of determinism and Christian theology). 
There are various reasons why it is problematic to rely on libertarianism as oneʼs only basis for 
opposing intuitively objectionable types of direct intervention. Firstly, Libertarian free will requires that certain 
empirical facts obtain. It requires that human deliberations are (at least sometimes) undetermined. It also 
requires that they are undetermined in a way that does not merely introduce randomness into our 
deliberations. Most libertarians themselves concede that we lack epistemic justification for these beliefs (see 
Double, 2002). Libertarianism therefore makes the question of whether anyone ever has free will a hostage 
to empirical fortune. For this reason, many philosophers and legal theorists do not wish to rely on the 
libertarian notion of free will.  
A second difficulty with libertarianism is that it is far from obvious that the ʻfreedom to fallʼ is as 
crucially important as libertarians make it out to be. If someone does good things (e.g. helping others, telling 
the truth, speaking out against injustice etc.) because they genuinely recognise that there are good moral 
reasons for doing the right thing then it does not seem wholly inappropriate to call them ʻvirtuousʼ, without 
enquiring into whether they were capable of doing morally obnoxious deeds. It may be that certain people 
have such a vivid awareness of the good (due perhaps to having received an inspiring moral education) that 
leading an immoral life is not a genuine psychological option for them. It does not seem obvious that such 
people necessarily lack a freedom that is really worth having. 
Compatibilism part one: Free will and rational flexibility 
As explained above, determinism does not rule out the possibility that agents will modify their 
behaviour in the light of logically relevant data. Flexibility – the ability to adapt oneʼs behaviour in an 
appropriate way to changes in circumstances – is generally agreed to be a hallmark of rationality. Several 
compatibilist accounts of freedom emphasise the importance of this ability to respond to relevant reasons 
(which I will refer to as ʻrational flexibilityʼ).  
Certain types of direct intervention could undermine the offenderʼs rational flexibility. Imagine, for 
instance, that the intervention instils an intense feeling of aversion to the idea of being violent towards others, 
which the agent cannot resist. The agent in this scenario lacks rational flexibility since there is no possible 
situation in which she would resist the aversion. The agentʼs behaviour is not sensitive to changes in her 
circumstances, nor to her other desires and beliefs which are relevant to her decision about how to act. She 
would not behave violently even if she believed that she had good reasons to do so (for example, if violence 
were the only way to save her own or someone elseʼs life).  
It might be objected that flexibility is not necessary for free will or rationality, because a person who is 
thoroughly committed to acting in accordance with a certain moral principle might not behave differently 
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under any circumstances. For instance, a committed pacifist might never resort to violence, and yet would be 
considered free and rational. However, it is possible to distinguish the offender with an irresistible aversion to 
violence from a person with a firm moral commitment. If a personʼs non-violent conduct is genuinely a 
response to a moral reason, then one of the causal factors bringing about her behaviour is the perception 
that violence is morally wrong. She has the capacity to alter her behaviour if she revised her moral position in 
the light of new arguments or evidence. This capacity to alter oneʼs behaviour in response to a change in 
oneʼs values is an important kind of flexibility.
68
  
Various different accounts have been given of what possessing a ʻcapacityʼ would amount to in a 
deterministic world. Here is one version: An individual has a capacity to perform an action, if she possesses 
certain intrinsic properties (including properties of her brain) which would be (non-deviantly) causally 
operative in her performing the action if she chose (tried, decided or intended) to exercise this capacity and if 
the circumstances were favourable to the exercise of this capacity.
69
 
This is a conditional account of capacity. It defines capacity in terms of what would happen if certain 
conditions obtained. Now, in some cases, the relevant conditions may never obtain. For instance, someone 
may be so firmly committed to certain values that there is no realistic scenario in which she would make the 
choice to abandon or flout them. Yet it may be that she would act in contravention of her values only if she 
chose to abandon or flout them. Nevertheless, many compatibilists would judge her free will to be intact in 
this situation, on the basis that she would behave differently if conditions were different, even though it is in 
fact impossible in the real world for the relevant conditions to be different. 
This account fails to explain what is problematic about certain types of intuitively troubling intervention. 
For instance, consider an intervener who neurologically manipulates an individualʼs value system in a way 
that ensures that the manipulated individual will do exactly as the intervener wishes. Counterintuitively, the 
compatibilist account of freedom in terms of rational flexibility implies that this type of intervention would not 
necessarily violate the offenderʼs free will. The person is free, on this account, as long as there are some 
possible reasons that would induce the person to behave differently. This condition would be satisfied even if 
 




 Compatibilists differ over whether the flexibility possessed by rational agents in a deterministic world genuinely 
amounts to a capacity to behave differently from the way that one in fact behaves. The following theorists argue that it 
does: Fara, 2008; Vihvelin, 2004. The following theorists disagree, maintaining that the disposition to respond differently 
if different reasons were present is simply a feature of the way in which the agent actually behaves: Fischer and Ravizza, 
1998. 
69
 I am not suggesting that compatibilist accounts of ʻcapacityʼ are successful. This version in the text is based loosely on 
the account given by Vihvelin (2004). I have added the qualification that ʻthe circumstances must be favourableʼ in an 
attempt to take into account an objection raised by Clarke (2008). 
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the intervener had shaped the personʼs psychology in a way which ensures that the relevant reasons are 
ones that are unlikely actually to arise in the normal course of things. (For instance, the intervener might 
implant in the offender a belief that violence is morally wrong – a belief so firm that the offender would only 
resort to violence if her own or someone elseʼs life were at stake.) This account of free will lacks the 
resources to account adequately for what is disturbing about this kind of manipulation.  For this reason, some 
compatibilists supplement their accounts with an ʻauthenticityʼ requirement. Other compatibilists reject the 
flexibility model altogether in favour of an authenticity model. 
Compatibilism part two: Freedom as authenticity 
Authenticity and psychological coherence 
The ʻfreedom as authenticityʼ approach defines ʻfree willʼ in terms of whether the agentʼs actions 
express her ʻreal selfʼ. Compatibilists differ over which psychological states are to be identified with the 
agentʼs ʻreal selfʼ (for a critique of Real Self Theories, see Wolf, 1990). Probably the most influential Real Self 
View was developed by Frankfurt (see e.g., Frankfurt, 1969). Frankfurt (1969) defined free will in terms of 
whether the agentʼs first order desires ʻcoheredʼ with the agentʼs second order desires. According to 
Frankfurt (1969), first order desires have actions as their objects. A personʼs desire to eat some chocolate is 
an example of a first order desire. Second order desires have first order desires as their objects. To say that 
a person has a second order desire to do something means that she wants to desire to do something. For 
instance, she might want to have the desire to exercise. According to Frankfurt (1969), in order to be free, an 
action must flow from a desire that the agent wants to have and which she wants to be executed in action. 
She must ʻwholeheartedly identifyʼ with the desire that results in her action. Other compatibilists, such as 
Watson (2004), focus instead on coherence between the agentʼs desires and values, rather than between 
different orders of desire. 
Direct interventions could undermine an offenderʼs psychological coherence.  An intervention might 
cause the offender to have strong desires or aversions which jar with his values or second-order desires. For 
example, the intervention might cause the offender to experience powerful feelings of disgust at the idea of 
re-offending. The offender may not endorse or identify with these feelings of disgust. This kind of intervention 
creates an internal conflict between fundamental constituents of the personʼs agency – between his values 
and his desires/feelings. Alienation from his desires and feelings can threaten the personʼs identity, as it 
seems that an important part of his mental life is not truly his own.  
It is important to remember, however, that direct interventions need not create psychological conflict 
within the offender. The offender may welcome the change in his motivations. In fact, a direct intervention 
might enhance an offenderʼs psychological coherence, by bringing his feelings and desires more into line 
with his values. For instance, prior to intervention, the offender may have felt deeply ashamed of his violent 
impulses and may feel that interventions, which reduce the strength of those impulses, help him to become 
the sort of person he wants to be.  
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Furthermore, if we define ʻfree willʼ in terms of psychological coherence, then it seems that the 
following approach would preserve the offenderʼs free will: employ direct interventions in order to modify both 
the offenderʼs first-order desires and his second-order desires and values, in a way that ensures 
psychological harmony. Some philosophers, such Frankfurt (1969), accept this conclusion. Yet it would strike 
many people as counterintuitive to suggest that interfering to a greater extent in an individualʼs mental life 
and modifying aspects of the person that are particularly central to the individualʼs agency (i.e. their values) 
allows the individual more free will than interventions that only affect first-order desires/aversions. Some 
compatibilists have tried to avoid this counterintuitive conclusion by including a historical dimension in their 
theories. 
Historical authenticity 
According to historical compatibilists, whether a personʼs mental states are authentically hers at a 
given time depends on how she came to have those mental states. Her current mental states are only 
authentic, on this view, if they are connected in an appropriate way to the agentʼs earlier mental states. Thus, 
even if a direct intervention left the agent with a set of desires, beliefs and values etc. that were coherent and 
not in conflict, historical compatibilists might still find the intervention objectionable if the individualʼs post-
intervention mental states were not appropriately connected to her prior mental states. What counts as an 
appropriate connection? At least three different types of connection have been suggested. 
Similarity with previous mental states 
Historical compatibilists often focus on cases where a significant alteration to the brain brings about a 
very sudden, dramatic change in the agentʼs motivations. Many different scenarios have been discussed, 
including: a very good woman who, after being manipulated by an evil neuroscientist, acquires the values of 
a serial killer (Mele, 2006) and a saintly nurse who, after receiving a blow to the head becomes cruel and 
reckless towards her patients (Tadros, 2005). They cite these examples as central cases where the 
individualʼs free will has been eliminated. There are also documented real-life examples of sudden 
personality changes, e.g. acquired paedophilia70 (Burns & Swerdlow, 2003) and acquired sociopathy 
(Damasio, 1994). 
Now, historical compatibilists acknowledge that sometimes ordinary people, whom we normally regard 
as possessing ʻfree willʼ, undergo fundamental changes in their character, values, and desires. However, 
when such fundamental changes occur, they typically emerge gradually over time. Even if a personʼs 
 




 I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example. 
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motivational set-up when the agent is twenty years old differs considerably from her motivational-set up at 
fifty years old, this often is the result of a very gradual transformation where each incremental stage in the 
personʼs development resembles the previous stage in important respects, but where the final stage in the 
series is very different from the initial stage. 
There are two problems with this version of historical compatibilism. Firstly, there are cases of 
individuals who undergo very fundamental changes in their values over quite a short period of time, and are 
still considered to be free. For instance, the individual may have a ʻroad to Damascus experienceʼ – an 
inspired insight into important moral truths, which lead her to reject her previous values. This suggests that 
incremental change is not, in fact, a necessary condition for free will. Therefore, the fact that a direct 
intervention brings about a sudden change in the offenderʼs values does not in itself render the offender 
unfree. Secondly it is possible to imagine a type of direct intervention that successfully alters the offenderʼs 
values but which takes effect gradually over time. This version of historical compatibilism lacks the resources 
to explain why such an intervention is intuitively objectionable. 
A connection in terms of deliberation 
On this view, if an agentʼs values alter, the agentʼs new value is only authentic if the acquisition of this 
value was preceded by deliberation in the light of the personʼs prior value system (Haji & Cuypers, 2007).  
However, road to Damascus cases provide a challenge for this view as well. Imagine that an agent, Denise, 
was a thoroughly selfish person with a corrupt value-system. One day a natural disaster strikes her town. 
She is unharmed but encounters numerous victims of the disaster. Denise experiences an unfamiliar 
experience of compassion accompanied by a sudden insight into the reasons for helping others. She acts on 
her new moral insight and performs some good deeds. However, she did not deliberate about her new 
insight in the ʻlightʼ of her old corrupt value-system. The new moral insight just displaced the old corrupt 
values. Is Deniseʼs insight therefore inauthentic and are her subsequent actions unfree? It does not look that 
way. 
Imagine Deniseʼs community decides to present her with a medal for her good deeds. At the awards 
ceremony, a psychologist stands up and says, ʻAs part of my research into why people perform heroic acts, I 
have looked very carefully into Deniseʼs case. I discovered that when Denise acquired her new, emotionally-
charged awareness of the need to alleviate human suffering, she did not evaluate this insight in the light of 
her earlier corrupt value-system. In fact, her corrupt evaluative scheme was completely idle! Hence her new 
good moral values are inauthentic and the actions that flowed from them were not an exercise of free will. 
Denise therefore does not deserve a medal.ʼ This reaction would seem bizarre. Therefore, the ʻdeliberation 
connectionʼ does not seem to be a necessary condition for free will and the supposed absence of this 
connection per se cannot provide a convincing basis for objecting to direct neurological interventions. 
Mental states connected in virtue of sharing the ʻsame kind of mechanismʼ 
According to Fischer and Ravizzaʼs (1998) version of historical compatibilism, in order for an agentʼs 
actions to be genuinely her own, the agent must have previously ʻtaken responsibilityʼ for the mechanisms 
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from which her actions arise, by viewing herself as being responsible for actions that flow from these 
mechanisms. By ʻmechanismsʼ, they mean the features of her agency that play a causal role in her actions 
(including, but not limited to mental states such as intentions, desires and beliefs). On Fischer and Ravizzaʼs 
(1998) view, when an agent, at a particular time, comes to take responsibility for behaviour that flows from a 
certain type of mechanism, she thereby takes responsibility for her future behaviour that results from the 
same kind of mechanism. They claim that motivations resulting from direct neurological interventions (almost 
invariably) involve a different kind of mechanism from ordinary motivations. Therefore, they maintain, when 
an individual takes responsibility for her ordinary mechanisms she does not thereby typically take 
responsibility for motivations or actions that arise from neurological interventions.71 
The problem arises when Fischer and Ravizza (1998) try to explain what makes a mechanism belong 
to one ʻkindʼ rather than another. They do not simply maintain that actions which flow from psychological 
states like ʻdesiresʼ, ʼbeliefsʼ and ʻintentionsʼ arise from one type of mechanism and actions that have nothing 
to do with such psychological states (such as epileptic seizures) belong in a different category. If they settled 
for this simple account then it would not help them to differentiate reliably between cases of ʻordinaryʼ 
mechanisms and mechanisms produced by intuitively objectionable types of direct interventions. For it is 
possible to imagine mental states such as desires and beliefs being induced by direct interventions. 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998) rely heavily on intuition to differentiate between different kinds of 
mechanism. They maintain that, intuitively, motivations resulting from direct stimulation of the brain belong 
(in most cases) to a different kind of mechanism from motivations that are determined in the ʻordinaryʼ way 
by oneʼs genes and environment. This approach is open to challenge. For it seems that the notion of 
ʻdifferent mechanismsʼ is no longer doing the work it was supposed to do. This notion was meant to help 
explain why we intuitively feel that certain types of direct interventions are problematic. But instead it seems 
like our intuitions that certain types of direct interventions are problematic dictate whether one mechanism 
counts as belonging to a ʻdifferent kindʼ of mechanism from another. In order for the notion of ʻdifferent 
mechanismsʼ to have explanatory power, Fischer and Ravizza need to have a principled basis for 
individuating mechanisms, which is derived from “independent reflection on the nature of these mechanisms” 
(Pereboom, 2006, 200; see also McKenna, 2001). Otherwise, it seems that they are merely stipulating that 
certain mechanisms are different from others in an ad hoc way in order to generate the conclusions they 
want about direct interventions. Unfortunately, it is far from obvious that truly independent criteria for 
individuating mechanisms (e.g. derived from psychology, or neurology) will produce the results that Fischer 
and Ravizza desire.  
 




 Fischer and Ravizza (1998) do acknowledge that in certain cases agents can take responsibility for their post-
manipulation mechanisms. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this point. 
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So far, this paper has examined various free-will-based objections to direct interventions and has 
identified certain difficulties with all of them. This should provide some motivation for those opposed to direct 
interventions to look for a way of objecting to direct interventions that avoids the problematic issues 
surrounding the notion of free will. The following section of this paper outlines such an objection. 
Reform, free will and moral status 
The thought experiment 
Consider the following thought experiment: One day an angel appears on earth. The angel possesses 
a magic flute. Anyone who hears the flute will suddenly have a powerful insight into fundamental moral 
truths. This vivid recognition of the reasons for behaving morally will motivate the agent to act in accordance 
with these reasons. Flute in hand, the angel marches off to the nearest prison. The authorities get to hear 
about this before the angel reaches the prison. What should they do? It seems that the free-will-based 
objections to direct interventions would apply equally to the magic flute scenario – if the recognition of moral 
reasons and the subsequent commitment to act accordingly, guarantees that the offender will act virtuously 
(in the actual world) then this violates incompatibilist freedom; if the offenderʼs new values are disconnected 
from her prior values (in any of the senses of ʻdisconnectionʼ mention above) then this violates a version of 
ʻfreedom as authenticityʼ; given that a causal factor behind the change of values (listening to the flute music) 
does not provide the agent with any new reason for changing her behaviour, then this arguably goes against 
a rationality-based conception of free will. If these approaches to free will are correct, then it seems that the 
authorities have great cause for concern - the free will of a large number of offenders is in jeopardy. Yet it 
seems counter-intuitive to suggest that the authorities would have a pressing obligation to rush to prevent the 
offenders from being affected by the musicʼs reformative powers, or that it would be such a terrible thing if 
the authorities failed to take action in time to prevent the prisoners from being reformed. 
The ʻmagic fluteʼ thought experiment is intended to cast doubt on the claim that changing an offenderʼs 
values using direct interventions, rather than moral dialogue, necessarily violates the offenderʼs free will in an 
objectionable way. This thought experiment features a means of altering values that does not involve moral 
dialogue and yet does not seem to violate the offendersʼ free will, or even if it does so, it does not seem 
seriously morally objectionable. However, this thought experiment does not show that it is all right for us to 
use interventions other than moral dialogue. It is submitted that ordinary human beings do not have the 
moral status to directly re-shape a personʼs values or goals using means other than rational persuasion. The 
objection to direct interventions presented in this paper does not rely on the idea that these interventions 
violate the offenderʼs ʻfree willʼ, conceived of as a capacity that we can identify just by examining the 
individualʼs psychology and actions carefully enough. Rather, it is submitted that an objection to such 
interventions can be based on the problematic nature of the relationship between the intervener and the 
subject of the intervention. 
It is possible to identify the objectionable features of this relationship by highlighting the ways in which 
it departs from a model of an appropriate type of relationship between the state and offenders. I will not 
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attempt to fully describe and defend such a model within the scope of this paper. Rather, I will present 
certain principles concerning how the state ought to relate to offenders, which have some intuitive 
plausibility. If my account is accepted, it provides a basis for objecting to certain kinds of direct neurological 
intervention, which does not rely on the notion that these interventions violate the offenderʼs free will.  
It is submitted that societyʼs response to criminal behaviour should recognise that offenders are 
members of the moral community, albeit members who have breached the communityʼs norms. This 
principle is supported by the intuition that the state should not ʻobjectifyʼ law-breakers – that offenders should 
be treated as persons and not as things. Objectifying a group of people can involve emphasising that ʻtheyʼ 
are fundamentally unlike ʻusʼ. It can involve focussing on the idea that a deep division exists between the 
objectified group and the rest of society. One way of respecting offendersʼ personhood is to highlight 
commonalities that still exist between the offender and the other members of the community, and to preserve 
certain connections between the offender and other moral agents. This kind of respect can be shown through 
engaging rationally with the offender as he is, and by challenging his mistaken views with arguments, without 
using direct neurological interventions to fundamentally re-shape his psychology. There are several ways in 
which rational dialogue affirms commonalities between offenders and other moral agents. 
Dialogue and equality 
Engaging in dialogue with the offender includes him within the moral community by allowing the 
offender to voice his criticisms of the communityʼs norms, which can potentially contribute to a shift in those 
norms. Dialogue leaves open the possibility that either party may change the other. As Stern (1974) writes: 
 [Dialogue] involves the recognition of a certain equality between oneself and the other. There is, in 
general, no point in reasoning unless the other person is capable of seeing reason, getting the point. If he 
can do that, he can also correct me if I am mistaken (Stern, 1974, p.75). 
In contrast, attempting to re-shape the offenderʼs values using direct neurological interventions is a 
one-way street. It seeks only to change the offender, to ensure that he will think and act in a particular way. 
The most appropriate way for members of a moral community to attempt to change one another is 
through dialogue. Engaging offenders in dialogue, rather than re-shaping offendersʼ values through direct 
interventions, assumes that there is a commonality between the offender and other moral agents. It implicitly 
acknowledges that the authorities (and majority opinion) are fallible, as is the offender. It allows that the 
offender (as he is, without neurological modification) may have useful insights, as other agents do. It also 
allows for the fact that the pursuit of moral understanding is a shared process. People need to interact with 
other people and to consider different points of view before they can form reliable judgements about how 
they should act.  
The above considerations do not apply to the case of the angel in the thought experiment. The angel, 
as the embodiment of rationality and virtue, never stands in need of ʻcorrectionʼ. In contrast, the authorities 
do not have the moral status to portray themselves as the embodiment of rationality and virtue. Re-shaping 
offendersʼ values through direct neurological interventions replaces the acknowledgement that the authorities 
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(like the offender) are human and fallible with the inappropriate assumption that the authorities are absolutely 
certain about what the ʻrightʼ values are. Furthermore, the angel is not a fellow member of the offenderʼs 
human community, so the lack of dialogue between the angel and the offender does not convey the 
message that the offender is excluded from the community. However, if other human beings were to re-
shape offendersʼ values through direct neurological interventions, rather than engaging them in dialogue, this 
would be an act of excluding offenders from the moral community. 
Focussing on the principles that should govern the relationship between the state and the offender 
helps to explain why the use of direct interventions by the state is more intuitively troubling than the 
intervention employed by the angel in the thought experiment. The relationship-based approach also 
produces other intuitively appealing results. Unlike some of the free-will-based approaches discussed above, 
the relationship-based approach implies that more extensive modifications of the offenderʼs motivations are 
worse than less extensive interventions. For instance, interventions that just enhance the offenderʼs control 
over his violent impulses, or reduce the strength of those impulses do not alter the offenderʼs values, and so 
leave open the possibility that he will criticise the authorities on the basis of those values.72 Modifying the 
offenderʼs values precludes this possibility. Modifying the offenderʼs values also sends out the strong 
message that the authorities view themselves as having hugely privileged access to knowledge of what the 
ʻrightʼ values are. 
It might be objected that this paper takes an unrealistic view of the potential for offenders to make a 
valuable contribution through moral dialogue to societyʼs understanding of moral norms. Surely the 
authorities can be very confident that some offenders are completely in the wrong and that some of societyʼs 
norms are very well-founded. In response, it is important to remember that, historically, a number of values 
which society has now come to reject once seemed self-evidently sound and that individuals who were very 
widely condemned by the rest of society have ultimately been vindicated. 
Furthermore, instituting a policy of trying to instil acceptable moral values in offenders through direct 
neurological modification would create a disturbing relationship between the state and offenders, even if the 
policy were restricted to offenders who were genuinely in the wrong, and even if it succeeded in instilling 
values that were genuinely well-founded. Such a policy would mark a huge shift towards characterising these 
offenders as ʻthe otherʼ and thus towards objectifying them. It would express the attitude that they are a 
group of people to whom we need not listen (or at least that we need not listen to them until we have 
modified their brains such that they are likely to tell us what we want to hear). If all attempts to change 
offenderʼs values involve entering into a relationship with the offender, rather than relying on direct 
 




 Although dialogue has an advantage over even this technique, in that dialogue, unlike direct interventions, positively 
reaffirms the offenderʼs status as a moral agent and includes him within the moral community. 
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neurological interventions, then society is less likely to lose sight of the personhood of the offender. In 
addition, even if societyʼs condemnation of a particular offender is justified and the offender is completely in 
the wrong, dialogue with the offender can still make a useful contribution to other agentsʼ moral 
understanding. For the attempt, through rational dialogue, to reform a wrongdoer who is very unwilling to be 
persuaded can cause the would-be reformer to try to make his arguments as compelling as possible, which 
can lead to a clearer understanding of the justification for societyʼs norms.  
It might also be objected that this paper adopts an excessively rosy view of the available alternatives 
to direct interventions. No society responds to criminal behaviour by relying on dialogue alone.  A prison 
sentence, for instance, “is more than an appeal to sweet reason and morality” (Stern, 1974, p. 82). 
Furthermore, it might be argued, punishing criminals necessarily involves highlighting the differences (rather 
than commonalities) between offenders and law-abiding citizens, by condemning the offender as a 
wrongdoer. Punishment also excludes offenders from the community. It can do this in terms of the moral 
stigma that attaches to a criminal conviction and sentence. It can also physically exclude the offender from 
the community, e.g. by putting him in prison.  
It should be acknowledged that societyʼs response to criminal behaviour does involve coercion, 
exclusion and the highlighting of differences between offenders and law-abiding citizens. It is perhaps 
impossible to conceive of a practicable approach to the problem of crime which does not involve these 
elements to some degree. But it is submitted that societyʼs response to criminal behaviour can and should 
also involve dialogue (and not just coercion); that it should emphasise the commonalities between offender 
and other moral agents (and not just the differences); and that it should preserve some connections between 
the offender and the rest of the community (and not exclude the offender entirely). 
It is important to emphasise that this paper is not a defence of our current system of punishment and 
rehabilitation. Some of our current approaches to dealing with criminal behaviour are objectionable and fail to 
treat the offender as a member of the moral community. In order for our practices to be justifiable they would 
have to include much more sustained attempts to engage with offenders, to present them with moral reasons 
for changing their behaviour and to re-integrate them into the community.73 
Nevertheless, the employing of coercion as part of societyʼs response to criminal behaviour is 
compatible with continuing to view the offender as a member of the moral community, by among other 
things, allowing the offender to challenge the authorities, on the basis of his pre-existing value-system. In 
contrast, as argued above, the technique of re-shaping the neurological basis for offendersʼ values would 
take a significant step towards characterising the offender as ʻthe otherʼ. It would vastly increase the (already 
 




 For some criticism of the current system and for one account of ways in which it should be reformed which 
emphasises the importance of moral dialogue with offenders see Duff (2001). 
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considerable) powers for controlling offendersʼ behaviour which the authorities have at their disposal. This 
would set the authorities on a completely different plane from offenders, greatly increasing the inequality of 
power between them. 
Dialogue and offendersʼ better natures 
There is a further way in which including moral dialogue in societyʼs response to offenders, rather than 
employing direct interventions, emphasises the commonalities between the offender and the rest of the 
community. Dialogue aimed at persuading offenders to reform typically involves appealing to the offenderʼs 
ʻbetter natureʼ. This presupposes that, in common with most law-abiding citizens, the offender has certain 
positive qualities and that, although he committed a serious wrong, he is not completely corrupt.74 In 
contrast, direct Interventions imply that offenders are different from law-abiding individuals in a very 
fundamental way. They imply that offenders are so inferior to the rest of the community in terms of their 
moral characters that these offenders will not respond appropriately to the most compelling moral reasons 
for changing their behaviour (unless the offenders receive radical neurological modifications). Most moral 
agents assume that, even though they may have certain vices and may sometimes behave wrongly, they 
would respond to really compelling reasons for improving their behaviour, provided that they were given 
sufficient time to reflect on the matter, that the reasons were put to them persuasively enough and the issue 
at stake was really important. They further assume that responding in this way is possible for them because 
they are not thoroughly bad; that they respond to these compelling moral reasons because they already have 
certain good qualities, which are brought out by sufficiently persuasive arguments. Viewing oneself in this 
way is particularly valuable, because it provides an important basis for self-respect. The preparedness to re-
shape offendersʼ values through direct neurological interventions suggests that offenders lack the qualities 
that provide this basis for self-respect. 
It should be noted that possessing these positive moral qualities is not the same thing as ʻhaving free 
willʼ.  It is conceivable that an individual might improve his behaviour of his own free will, even if hitherto he 
had been thoroughly corrupt. It is not essential to the common sense notion of free will that a personʼs moral 
improvement was partly caused by the fact that the individual already had certain good moral qualities. But, 
as a matter of fact, most instances of moral improvement probably do build on pre-existing good qualities 
and it is part of a positive self-conception to view oneʼs moral development in this way. Extensively re-
shaping an offenderʼs values through direct neurological interventions strongly suggests that the authorities 
consider the offenderʼs existing character to be so comprehensively morally inadequate that positive moral 
change is unlikely to emerge from it. This carries the message that offenders are fundamentally not like ʻusʼ. 
 




 A similar point is made in Duff (1986, p. 266). 
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This message is much more extreme than the alternative message (conveyed by moral dialogue) that the 
offender behaved wrongly on a particular occasion, or that he demonstrated a particular vice. 
A critic of my view might raise the following objection. My argument stresses that membership of the 
moral community is valuable. It also accepts that, in some cases it seems fairly likely that the offenderʼs 
capacities for practical reasoning are such that they will never lead the offender to be reformed and to be 
genuinely restored to the moral community. Yet, if this is the case, then it would surely benefit such an 
offender if it were possible to use direct neurological interventions to re-shape his psychology such that he is 
much more likely to fully grasp and take to heart the moral reasons for reforming. Would not increasing the 
probability that the offender will actually be restored to the moral community in this way be better for the 
offender than maintaining the fiction that it is possible that he will reform, when in fact it seems that he never 
will? 
In response, while it may be true that the individual offender might benefit from this kind of 
intervention, the objection to direct interventions that this paper advances is not based primarily on the idea 
that direct interventions violate the individualʼs rights or interests in every case. Rather, this paper maintains 
that the use of certain types of direct intervention would create a troubling relationship between different 
groups within society. A policy of employing direct interventions to re-shape offendersʼ values would be 
based on the assumption that these offendersʼ existing capacities for moral agency are so fundamentally 
inferior to the capacities of the rest of the moral community that these offenders will not respond 
appropriately to the most compelling reasons for changing their behaviour. Basing social practices and 
institutions on the assumption that a particular group of individuals are radically incomplete as moral agents 
goes against the ideal that the moral community should be as inclusive as possible and that it should 
emphasise its membersʼ common humanity. Incorporating into our social structures the message that a 
particular group is so different from the rest of us that they require radical neurological modification to enable 
them to be part of the moral community is prima facie objectionable even if such a system would end up (in a 
sense) benefitting certain offenders.  
For the reasons stated above, it is also submitted that altering an offenderʼs values using direct 
neurological interventions would be unacceptable even if the offender requested such treatment. The 
offenderʼs consent could not legitimise this practice because the practice affects societyʼs stance towards 
offenders as a group. The very act of offering this type of intervention to offenders would send out the 
message that all offenders who are offered the intervention stand in need of it, whether or not they ultimately 
agree to it. This practice has the potential to be socially divisive and its effects are not limited to those 
offenders who give their consent. Therefore the offenderʼs consent is not sufficient to make it morally 
acceptable. 
Different types of intervention 
Finally, it should be reiterated that this paper does not oppose the use of all neurological interventions 
within the criminal justice system. It specifically focuses on the idea of using neurotechnologies to deal with 
offenders who are basically rational, in an attempt to directly re-shape these offendersʼ values or goals.  
Elizabeth Shaw 
202 
There are other possible types of neurological interventions which are less vulnerable to the 
challenges raised in this paper (although they may face different challenges). For instance, 
neurotechnologies might be used in order to treat offenders who have mental illnesses. Or 
neurotechnologies might be used to enhance the rational capacities of basically normal offenders so that 
they are better able to decide for themselves which goals they should pursue, or which values they should 
endorse.  
Having said this, there is not always a razor sharp line between using neurotechnologies to directly re-
shape offendersʼ values/goals (which I oppose) and the use of these techniques to enhance offendersʼ 
rational capacities (which are arguably less problematic). For example, an intervention might reduce the 
strength of an offenderʼs violent and/or deviant sexual impulses. It might be argued that this is a method of 
enhancing offendersʼ rational capacities, because intense, repetitive urges or fantasies can cloud an 
individualʼs judgement, making practical reasoning difficult. Reducing the strength and frequency of these 
urges could put the offender in a better position to focus on the reasons that are relevant to his decision 
about how he should act. Alternatively, it might be argued that interfering with offendersʼ urges is a method of 
directly re-shaping their values, because an offender who values violence or deviant sexual conduct might do 
so partly as a result of experiencing these impulses and urges. It is impossible within the scope of this paper 
to give a detailed account of how these borderline cases should be dealt with. However, it should be noted 
that this issue can be decided partly on the basis of the principles that have already been outlined in this 
paper. One relevant consideration is the amount of control which the intervention would allow the state to 
exert over the agentʼs decisions about what he should do. The greater the stateʼs level of control, the greater 
the inequality between the offender and the rest of the community.  Interventions which merely reduce the 
strength of an offenderʼs violent impulses, do not give the state the power to ensure that the offender 
endorses the stateʼs favoured values. The offender may still reject societyʼs demands. Such interventions are 
therefore less troubling than interventions that allow the state to shape the offenderʼs behaviour and inner life 
to a greater extent. Furthermore, interventions that would alter an attribute which is central to who the person 
is, as an agent, are particularly troubling. A particularly fundamental alteration sends out a strong message 
that the offender is radically defective, and unlike the rest of ʻusʼ. Again, it is submitted that a momentary 
impulse, or urge is less central to the offenderʼs agency than, say, a second-order desire, or a firm 
commitment to a particular principle or course of action. 
This paper has focussed on explaining why certain extreme types of neurological intervention are 
unacceptable. The question of whether any form of neurological intervention within the criminal justice 
system is acceptable, all things considered, is a complex issue. A full discussion of this topic is outwith the 
scope of this paper (for a more detailed discussion see Shaw, 2011).  
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to expose some serious difficulties faced by ʻfree-will-basedʼ objections to 
attempting to ʻmorally enhanceʼ offenders using direct neurological interventions. It suggests a different basis 
for objecting to extreme interventions that aim to directly alter offendersʼ values and basic goals. The 
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approach advocated in this paper emphasises the value of moral dialogue and of treating the offender as a 
member of the moral community. 
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Abstract Medical technology advances rapidly. As of 2009, about 188.000 people worldwide had 
received cochlear implants, and promising trials have been conducted with retinal and subretinal 
implants. These devices are meant to (partially) repair deaf and blind peopleʼs impairments, 
allowing them to (re)gain ʻnormalʼ sensory perception. These medical devices are ICT-based and 
consist of a sensor that transforms sensory data (auditory, visual, tactile) into signals that can be 
processed by the brain. Besides data from the regular sensors, in principle, also other data from 
other sources can be channelled to the brain through the implant, for example wireless data input 
from distant locations or even the Internet to prompt the bearer with instructions or information. 
This can be done without others present being aware of this form of techno-prompting, which 
might give the bionic person a competitive advantage in for instance meetings or negotiations. 
The medical implants could therefore be used for non-medical purposes somewhere in the 
future. This paper discusses the normative implications of this hypothetical form of human 
enhancement, focusing on aspects that are particularly relevant to this type of enhancement as 
compared to existing and well-discussed other forms of enhancement. In particular, we discuss 
information asymmetries, ethical aspects related to human enhancement, and some legal issues 
where the information advantage of bionic sensory implants could make a difference. Based on 
this discussion, we highlight questions for further reflection and provide some suggestions for the 
regulatory response to address the challenges posed by the future of bionic sensory implants.  
Keywords human implants, neural prosthetics, information asymmetry, human enhancement 
Introduction 
Picture a group of security guards surrounding heads of state with dark glasses and curly black 
wires connecting their earpiece to the radio in their pocket. These men in black partially receive their 
orders from intelligence officers in control rooms that bring together the various intelligence sources 
surrounding the event. We are all aware of the fact that the men in black have prompters, and 
perhaps part of the effectiveness of this equipment stems from its visibility, similar to the disciplining 
effect resulting from the knowledge of being observed (Foucault, 1978). But in any case, the 
earpieces give their users an information advantage.  
Of course anyone can buy such earpieces and be in constant contact with helpers outside the 
scene. This would potentially provide them with a similar informational advantage over others present. 
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This kind of human enhancement would possibly be frowned upon by others and potentially even be 
disapproved of. But what if people could have prompters without others being aware of this kind of 
enhancement? 
Medical technology advances rapidly. As of 2009, about 188,000 people worldwide had 
received cochlear implants, and promising trials have been conducted with retinal and subretinal 
implants. These implants are ICT-based and consist of a sensor that transforms sensory data 
(auditory, visual, tactile) into signals that can be processed by the brain. They are meant to (partially) 
repair deaf and blind peopleʼs impairments, allowing them to lead a more ʻnormalʼ life. The use of 
these “neural prosthetics” (Merkel et al., 2007, p. 485) could in the future go beyond achieving 
ʻnormalcyʼ. 
Instead of connecting regular sensors (microphone and camera) to the implant to create or 
restore the signal path between the external world and the brain, also other input can be used. Neural 
prosthetics can “not only restore severed sensory functions, but also computer-enhance human 
capabilities” (Merkel et al.,  
2007, p. 143). For instance, audio streams from distant locations can be directly fed into the 
cochlea prompting the bearer with instructions or advice, similar to the instructions given to the 
security guards or presenters on television. The (sub)retinal implant can function as an internal ʻhead-
up displayʼ for visual data provided by remote sources. Since the data in these cases is fed directly to 
the brain, this can be done without others present being aware of this form of techno-prompting. 
The implications of cochlear and (sub)retinal implants and their potential of being connected 
wirelessly to outside data sources have, as far as we are aware, not yet been discussed in the 
literature. It is important to analyse these implications with due attention to the specificity of the 
problems raised by this particular type of human enhancement, for, as Bostrom and Savulescu (2009) 
note, we need a ʻcontextualised and particularisedʼ approach to addressing the question how to deal 
with human enhancement, applying a case-by-case analysis.  
In this paper, we will therefore focus on the question: what are the normative implications of 
neural prosthetics with their potential for knowledge enhancement? This is a hypothetical discussion, 
since the technology does not yet exist to connect cochlear or retinal implants wirelessly with outside 
data sources. It is nevertheless important to start such a hypothetical and perhaps seemingly 
unrealistic discussion early on, since “[i]f there is a single lesson to be learned about the past century 
of scientific and technological discovery, it may well be that the unimaginable rapidly becomes the 
commonplace” (Garland, 2004, p. 29).  
This article provides an explorative account of normative implications of neural prosthetics 
without aiming to be systematic or exhaustive. We approach the topic from the angle of ethics and 
law, indicating general issues, primarily from the outlook of liberal constitutional democracies. 
This paper is structured as follows. We start with a discussion of implant technology state-of-
the-art and use some cases. The core of the paper then discusses various normative implications of 
bionic sensory implants, focusing on those aspects that seem to be particularly relevant to this type of 
enhancement as compared to existing and well-discussed other forms of enhancement. We 
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distinguish between issues related to information asymmetries, other ethical issues related to human 
enhancement, and some legal issues. We conclude with pointing out issues that require further 
reflection in the academic and societal debate about sensory implants, and provide some suggestions 
that may help address the regulatory challenges posed by the future of bionic sensory implants. 
Implant technology 
The idea of brain implants already has a considerable history. Merkel et al. (2007, p. 120) quote 
José Delgado and his colleagues, who in 1976 remarked that with: 
…the increasing sophistication and miniaturization of electronics, it may be possible to compress 
the necessary circuitry for a small computer into a chip that is implantable subcutaneously. In this 
way, a new self-contained instrument could be devised, capable of receiving, analysing, and 
sending back information to the brain (Delgado et al., 1976 in Merkel et al., 2007, p. 120). 
Today, these implants are a reality, although still in their infancy. The “most advanced central 
neural prostheses today comprise the auditory implant, the visual implant, and the human-computer 
interface (HCI)” (Merkel et al., 2007, p. 121). Cochlear implants (or bionic ears) are the most mature 
of these three types. The history of cochlear implants goes back to the late 1950s when André 
Djourno and Charles Eyriès placed wires on nerves exposed during an operation.75 In 1972, a single-
electrode implant designed by Dr. House and 3M was the first to be approved for implantation into 
adults by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Later implants use up to 23 electrodes.76 
Getting a cochlear implant and learning to hear with it is slightly more challenging than 
accommodating to Vogon speech by slipping a Babel-fish – a tiny fish that translates all languages 
into your own – into oneʼs ear (Adams, 1980). A cochlear implant generally consists of one or more 
microphones, a speech processor that filters and processes the sounds into signals that can be 
transmitted through a coil held in place by a magnet behind the external ear to a receiver and 
stimulator secured in the bone beneath the skin. From there the signals are sent to a spiral of 
electrodes threaded into the cochlea to stimulate the auditory nerve. The patient will have to learn how 
to interpret the implantʼs signals – they have to learn how to hear. The quality of hearing with a 
cochlear implant is (much) lower than hearing people experience. This is not surprising given that 
 




76 The Cochlear Nucleus CI500 uses 22 contacts allowing for detecting 161 different frequencies (see 
http://www.cochlear.com/uk/nucleus-cochlear-implants-0 for details). The Advanced Bionics HiRes 90K uses 16 
contacts (see http://www.advancedbionics.com/CMS/Products/HiRes-90K/ for details). 
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even modern cochlear implants have at most 24 electrodes to replace the 16,000 hair cells that are 
used for normal hearing. However, the sound quality delivered by a cochlear implant is often good 
enough that many users do not have to rely on lip reading.77  
Visual implants (or bionic eye), or visual prosthetics, work in a similar way. They consist of an 
external (or implantable) imaging system (camera), which acquires and processes visual information. 
The processed data is then transmitted to the implant wirelessly by the external unit (along with power 
for the implant). The implant converts the digital data to an analog output, which is used to electrically 
stimulate the visual system. The stimulation can be done anywhere along the optic signalʼs pathway, 
hence from retina via optical nerve to visual cortex. A major step was achieved when Giles Brindley 
(Brindley & Lewin, 1968) implanted an 80-electrode device on the visual cortical surface of a 52-year-
old blind woman, allowing her to see ʻlightʼ (phosphenes) in 40 locations in her visual field. In 2010, 
the company Retina Implant reported success with a sub-retinal implant consisting of a 1500-
electrode array. One of their patients, a 45-year-old Finland-based male, reported: ʻAs I got used to 
the implant, my vision improved dramatically. I was able to form letters into words, even correcting the 
spelling of my name. I recognized foreign objects such as a banana and could distinguish between a 
fork, knife and spoon. Most impressively, I could recognize the outlines of people and differentiate 
heights and arm movements from 20 feet away.ʼ78 As with cochlear implants, visual implants have a 
significant difference in quality of vision compared with normal eyesight, due to the enormous 
difference in number of receptors, the human retina consisting of an estimated 125 million receptors. 
The third type of prosthetic implants are sensory/motor prosthetics. Electrode arrays can be 
implanted into (median) nerves. The array can be used to pick up signals from the underlying nerves, 
as well as to pass signals to these nerves. In 2002, scientist Kevin Warwick (Warwick et al., 2003) 
had an array of 100 electrodes implanted in his arm that allowed him to have a robot arm mimic the 
actions of his own arm, as well as have his arm respond to external signals. 
Finally, and more futuristically, there are direct neural interfaces or brain/computer interfaces 
(BCI). BCI research is aimed at connecting the nervous system directly to computer systems rather 
than to devices such as cameras and microphones. Until now, BCI research has focused on recording 
signals from and providing stimuli to animal brains (rats, cats, and monkeys). For instance, Stanley, Li 
and Dan (1999) have shown to be able to generate movies of what their cats saw and to reconstruct 
recognisable scenes and moving objects on the basis of signals from their visual cortex. Wessberg 
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and colleagues (2000) have developed BCIs that decoded brain activity in owl monkeys and used the 
devices to reproduce monkey movements in robotic arms. Moving from there, 
though futuristic, downloading of the brain may be also relevant in this context. With the possibility 
of downloading through modified techniques such as those described by Nicolelis at Duke, 
information from specific areas of the brain, or the whole brain, can be downloaded into a 
computer. Once downloaded, the information may be modified – for example, by adding a 
language capacity. Then the altered material may be uploaded into the same individualʼs 
brain...This return downloading may in time prove to be an excellent way to enhance cognitive 
skills (Tancredi, 2004, p. 102). 
All these implants start out with the prospect of having people regain or gain capabilities of 
ʻnormalʼ people. As will be clear from the discussion, the implants involve sophisticated signal 
processing equipment to transform external signals (visual, auditory, sensory) to stimuli for the 
nervous system. Provided that the number of electrodes in the various types of implants increase 
significantly, roads are opened for other applications. Information can be superimposed onto visual 
information provided by the camera to create augmented reality-like applications directly on the retina 
or visual cortex. Think, for instance, of turn-by-turn information provided by a navigation system 
projected on oneʼs visual system, or meta-information about the object being sighted that is directly 
fed into the brain along with the visual information. The path from medical implants to human 
enhancement, then, is relatively smooth: any information source that can be transcoded into signals 
suitable for the electrodes connected to the nervous system, can be employed for improving sensory 
perception. 
Ethical and legal issues 
This section discusses ethical and legal issues of neural sensory prosthetics.79 We will briefly 
touch upon general issues that arise in other contexts as well, notably with implants and brain 
enhancement, but we shall particularly focus on issues that might play out differently, or acquire 
additional salience, when it comes to sensory implants being fed wirelessly from outside data sources. 
A key difference with other types of brain enhancement that have been discussed in the literature, is 
that sensory implants enhance by feeding content into the brain, not by enhancing the brainʼs capacity 
for processing content. This raises partly different types of question than those triggered by, for 
example, enhancing brain functionality through psychopharmaceuticals or brain stimulation. First and 
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foremost, ethical questions relating to information asymmetries arise. Second, several issues, 
primarily ethical, relate to the enhancement aspect of bionic implants. Finally, legal issues are 
discussed relatively briefly, since most of these are not specific to the implants under discussion. 
Ethical issues relating to information asymmetry 
Human decision-makers lack the ability and resources to arrive at optimal solutions to problems 
they are facing. Instead, due to cognitive and time constraints, they necessarily have to simplify the 
choices available and arrive at satisfactory rather than optimal solutions (Simon, 1947). Bounded 
rationality affects any problem-solving or decision-making. In interactions with other people, for 
instance in negotiations, additional factors contribute to not reaching satisfactory results. For instance, 
although people negotiate all the time, most are not trained to successfully do so (Thompson, 2005). 
Hence, they have difficulty in framing, structuring, and thinking creatively about solutions. There are 
also structural barriers, such as negative emotions and bad atmosphere and power imbalances 
(Mastenbroek, 1999; Moore 2003). People furthermore are hampered by cognitive barriers, such as 
loss aversion (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1981), the anchoring effect and overoptimistic overconfidence 
(Neale & Bazerman, 1991). 
Some of these issues can be overcome by providing human negotiators with help from outside. 
The Man-Machine Interaction Group at Delft University of Technology80 is currently developing a 
ʻPocket Negotiatorʼ; a device that helps individuals in negotiations by “increasing the userʼs capacity 
for exploration of the negotiation space, reducing the cognitive task load, preventing mental errors, 
and improving win-win outcomes”.81 This pocket negotiator is envisioned to be a smartphone-like 
device that can be employed in negotiation settings. The Pocket Negotiator is a form of human 
enhancement, because it may expand and strengthen individualsʼ capacity to negotiate and to reach 
better outcomes. Its use, however, may also be contested because it might unduly shift the 
information position of the parties involved; its use could be perceived as cheating. The Pocket 
Negotiator gives its user an advantage, both in terms of available information as well as in terms of 
cognitive capabilities, over the other party.  
Neural sensory prosthetics can provide capabilities similar to the Pocket Negotiator, but then 
(potentially) invisible and embedded in the human body, thereby hiding the information asymmetry 
from the other party. A bionic attendant of a cocktail party, could for instance obtain useful information 
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about others present. Her camera could recognise peopleʼs faces, pull up their Facebook profiles and 
project, unnoticeably to these others, their profile information on her visual implant. This would make 
her appear very socially attentive and cognizant of the people present. Another use of such implants 
would be augmented-reality applications similar to those already existing for smartphones. An 
example is a system that overlays information about houses and their inhabitants over the image shot 
by the smartphoneʼs camera of buildings in a street. Such information, projected on oneʼs implant, 
could be useful when talking to a realtor selling the property during a visit to this property. Of course 
much of this information could have been digested by the buyer prior to visiting the house, but if 
unexpected things happen – for example, when the realtor suggests visiting another house nearby – 
the instant provision of information on oneʼs built-in head-up display provides the buyer with an 
advantage, especially because it is hidden from the other party. Another way of looking at this tilting 
the information imbalance, is that the buyer restores (or creates) a level playing field. Either way, the 
method by which the bionic individual improves their information position or power may be hidden 
from others. 
Especially when such applications function without any apparent input from the bionic 
individual, these applications change the playing field in negotiations and discussions. The information 
brought to bear by bionically enhanced individuals easily surpasses what other stakeholders in a 
particular situation may expect of them. In a yard-house sale, sellers may reckon that occasionally a 
rare expert may turn up who can recognise a piece of value, but they would not expect visitors to 
come equipped with, for instance, a camera and automated-recognition software that overlays their 
vision with auction-result web pages. Such bionic enhancement is not necessarily wrong or a form of 
cheating, but it at least has the capacity to substantially alter social interaction patterns.  
Also cochlear implants may provide unexpected advantages in everyday situations. In an 
international context we may assume that some people speak multiple languages. This occasionally 
provides for awkward situations when such people switch to their native tongue for a private 
exchange, only to discover that unexpectedly someone else also understands their language. When 
equipped with a cochlear implant and a Bable-fish like application, someone could easily turn into a 
polyglot.  Youtube, for instance, already provides simultaneous transcribing audio into text (beta); from 
there, rough translations in other languages could be provided. Even when the translation is not 
perfect it may enhance oneʼs foreign language capabilities significantly. When others present in a 
conversation are not aware of this kind of enhancement on the part of one of the participants, this 
provides the bionic person with an advantage. Again, this need not be ethically or legally wrong, but it 
does alter the (expectation of) information balance in social interaction.  
Information asymmetry always plays a role in negotiations and other communication 
environments. Buyers are generally less informed than sellers, which causes market imperfections 
(Akerlof, 1970). Also, people differ in their capacities to process information and to make choices. 
Classical economics is based on the assumption of perfect information (and perfectly rational actors). 
Akerlof (1970) and others (e.g. Stigler, 1961) have shown the effects of imperfect information on the 
side of consumers; their work stresses that many free-market institutions can be seen as ways of 
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solving or reducing ʻlemon problemsʼ82 and compensating negative effects of information 
asymmetries. For instance, insider trading is prohibited in most jurisdictions, mortgage advisors have 
to disclose their ties with banks and insurance companies, and financial institutions have to provide 
financial information leaflets outlining the hidden costs of their services. In many of these cases the 
potentially distorted expectations of one or more involved parties is corrected by additional information 
to create a more level playing field. Withholding information or bringing information to bear without 
informing the others involved may be considered foul play if this information is essential for the 
decisions at hand.  
In the same way, using neural prosthetics linked up to external information sources might in 
certain situations be considered cheating or unethical behaviour. Consider a human-resource 
manager equipped with the capability of invisibly pulling up information on an applicant, for instance 
by having her visual support system use facial recognition to retrieve appropriate Facebook 
information on the applicant. Not informing the individuals under scrutiny of this capacity might be 
considered unjust, just like people in many countries have to be informed that they are subject to 
camera surveillance. 
It is important to acknowledge that expectations play an important role in determining whether 
stealthily bringing additional information to bear upon a situation is unethical, and that expectations 
change over time. For instance, while some years ago it was considered unfair by many human-
resource departments to inspect applicantsʼ Facebook profiles, this practice is now less controversial 
now that every such department is thought to be doing so.   
Ethical issues relating to human enhancement 
Apart from the ethical implications raised by the problem of information asymmetries of 
implants, we also face normative issues due to the human enhancement aspect of such applications. 
As we explained in the introduction, sensory neural prosthetics not only restore or establish hearing or 
sight of impaired people, but they can also enhance functionality beyond normal sensory perception. 
In particular, they can be fed by wireless signals that are not in the (human) auditory or visual electro-
magnetic spectrums, and thus pick up more information than is possible for people without such 
sensory neural prosthetics, without the information input being (necessarily) recognisable. It is clear, 
then, that bionic sensory implants are a form of human enhancement. This in itself, however, does not 
raise ethical issues; as Savulescu and Bostrom (2009) note, this is only the case if a morally relevant 
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distinction exists between the enhanced and unenhanced functionality. Besides the issue of 
information asymmetry, which has been dealt with in the previous section, several other aspects seem 
to merit discussion as they potentially track morally relevant distinctions. We will follow here the 
general types of argument offered in the literature on human enhancement, applying these to the 
concrete application of neural sensory prosthetics. 
Before we do so, we can set aside some topoi in the human enhancement debate that are not 
particularly relevant to our topic. These are the challenges, usually raised against particular forms of 
enhancement or against enhancement in general, broadly based on particular normative outlooks: it is 
against human nature, it is playing God, or it risks changing the human species beyond its intrinsic 
nature. Or to phrase it less metaphysically and more eloquently, there is a concern with enhancement 
“not as individual vice but as habit of mind and way of being” that reflects an attempt to change “our 
nature to fit the world, rather than the other way around”, and hence, the enhancement mindset of 
attempting to gain control over ourselves might lead to a loss of “openness to the unbidden” (Sandel, 
2007, pp. 96-97). Such objections may have value in certain (particularly dignitarian) normative 
outlooks, although perhaps less obviously so in our outlook of a liberal constitutional democracy, but 
in any case there is nothing specific in these objections for bionic implants in comparison with the 
wide range of enhancement technologies. We therefore leave these objections to the debate in the 
general enhancement literature (see for instance Harris, 2007; Sandel, 2007; Savulescu & Bostrom, 
2009). We will also leave aside health and safety issues (except where they touch upon consent 
issues, see infra), and assume that bionic sensory implants do not raise particular health or safety 
risks. After all, our paper discusses the use of cochlear and retinal implants for information retrieval, 
and the health and safety risks of this application do not prima facie differ from the risks of using 
cochlear and retinal implants for their primary, medical function of restoring perception. For the sake 
of argument, we will assume that these medical devices as such are sufficiently safe. 
Now we can discuss the remaining ethical enhancement issues as applicable to bionic sensory 
implants. We distinguish between three major types of argument: the therapy/enhancement 
distinction, arguments on the level of the individual, and arguments on the societal level.  
Therapy versus enhancement 
The first issue is discussed and contested in all enhancement debates: is a particular 
application acceptable for medical purposes (therapy, restoring functionality) but not for other 
purposes (enhancing functionality beyond ʻnormalʼ)? Obviously, it is not easy to define what is a 
ʻmedical conditionʼ and what is ʻnormalʼ functioning, and the grey zone between therapy and 
enhancement shifts in time and place. We take a pragmatic approach to this conceptual problem, 
noting that cochlear and retinal implants, as they are developed and used today, generally have a 
therapy function, aiming to restore or establish sensory perception that is absent or impaired, while 
the use of these implants for information retrieval, as hypothetically discussed in this paper, generally 
does not have a medical but rather an enhancement function. (There is an issue whether deafness 
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should be seen as an impairment or a human characteristic (see e.g., the 'deaf embryo selection' 
debate in Wilkinson, 2010), but pragmatically speaking, most people with a cochlear implant to restore 
hearing would consider that therapy rather than enhancement.)  
What should concern us here is not the conceptual question, but the material issue whether 
there is a morally relevant distinction between using sensory implants for therapy or for enhancement. 
Enhancement advocates would think this is not the case:  
I wonder how many of those who have ever used binoculars thought they were crossing a moral 
divide when they did so? How many people thought (or now think) that there is a moral difference 
between wearing reading glasses and looking through opera glasses? That one is permissible and 
the other wicked? (Harris, 2007, p. 20)  
Although Harris has a point here, his rhetorical gusto obfuscates that there may be a moral 
difference depending on the use of the glasses: if the opera glasses are used not to watch Bryn Terfel 
on stage but to spy from a distance on Caroline von Hannover sun-bathing on her private yacht, some 
moral border might well be crossed. Of course, the fact that a technology developed for beneficent 
purposes might be abused by some for malevolent purposes does not imply that the technology 
should be prohibited outright (Brownsword, 2009); it could, however, imply that the development or 
use of the technology should be regulated to control its potential negative uses. For bionic sensory 
implants, it is therefore relevant to ask whether they are used therapeutically or for enhancing 
information retrieval and, in the latter case, whether this is morally acceptable in its specific context. 
Particularly relevant may be the factor of the implant and its use being unnoticed, or unnoticeable, 
which makes a key difference between therapy and enhancement here. People interact on the basis 
of other people having normal sensory perception, and they should take into account (e.g., when 
discussing sensitive issues a little beyond normal hearing distance) that some people have 
particularly strong hearing, or exceptional visual memory; they will not, however, expect that people 
they are interacting with have an invisible source of information that directly feeds into their head. 
Depending on the context, as we have seen in the previous section, this may make a relevant 
difference to the situation, which will be morally less acceptable if the use of the information stream 
amounts to cheating in the particular context. There is therefore some reason to believe that, if 
implants are used beyond therapy, the uses of the implants may need to be regulated depending on 
their potential for abuse in certain contexts. 
Effects on the individual 
A second issue, or rather complex of issues, is the potential effect of the enhancement on 
individuals. A central concern in the enhancement debate is authenticity (Parens, 2009), and attitudes 
towards enhancement seem to correlate quite strongly with how people perceive the enhancement to 
affect the authenticity of individual human beings. Enhancement sceptics will argue that artificially 
enhancing people diminishes their authenticity as human beings; they are no longer true to their ʻrealʼ 
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self. In a similar vein, Sandel (2007) is worried that our appreciation will vanish of the giftedness of 
humans: the more human functionality is engineered by enhancement technologies, the less human 
functioning will be seen as a result of gifts people just happen to have, and this tarnishes the humility 
that is a key feature of our moral landscape.  
Enhancement advocates, however, could retort that enhancement can also improve 
authenticity, e.g. by widening individualsʼ range of choices to ʻbe themselvesʼ or enhancing their 
intellectual capacity for being authentic. 
Whichever stance one takes towards authenticity and enhancement, we see no immediate 
concern in applying bionic sensory implants for information retrieval. The implants themselves can 
hardly be seen as diminishing peopleʼs authenticity as human beings – we do not regard a pacemaker 
or a hearing aid as making someone less authentic in some sense, and there is no fundamental 
difference between these and a sensory implant in this respect. Nor would the use of such implants 
for external information input seem to make someone inauthentic, i.e., not her ʻtrueʼ self, at least not 
as long as the information input is functionally equivalent to standard forms of information retrieval 
through normal sensory perception.  
A shift might occur, however, once this channel of information input would become so important 
that it starts replacing other forms of information input: there might be an eerie quality to someone 
who depends largely on unnoticeable forms of perception through implants. This is not a short-term 
concern – we will be entering the cyborg age once this appears on the horizon. The idea of people, 
and in particular their brains, being connected wirelessly to external information sources, including the 
Internet, does not only challenge our notions of authenticity but also of autonomy and identity. If we 
imagine a world of cyborgs wirelessly connected to each other via the Internet (Warwick, 2002), it is 
clear we may need to rethink our concepts of what constitutes the autonomy of an individual, as the 
boundaries of individual body and mind seem to blur in such a world. Also, individualsʼ sense of self 
will be affected if their brains are connected wirelessly to external information sources into which they 
can continuously tap in real time; as people perceive a tool in their hands to be an extended part of 
their body, so they could perceive an external information source immediately connected to their brain 
as an extended part of their mind. Possibly, this could lead to changes in the brainʼs functioning; for 
example, the brain could adapt to the implants by storing less information in long-term memory while 
creating more capacity for quickly processing or connecting information. 
This sounds like – and is – science fiction today, but a Warwickian world of cyborgs is a 
possible (if distant) future, and hence we should not discard the consequences of such a development 
off-hand. It is here that bionic sensory implants do matter, as they can be seen as an initial step on a 
possible path towards brain/computer-network-interfaced cyborgs. This implies that the consequences 
of external information sources feeding into the brain for autonomy and identity will have to be taken 
into account. The short-term implications do not seem particularly significant: as long as the 
information retrieval remains relatively low-level, individualsʼ decision-making capacity and their sense 
of self will not be significantly affected. The mid-term and possible long-term consequences to 
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autonomy and identity may be larger, however, and we should put these on the agenda for further 
analysis and discussion. 
More immediately relevant, and somewhat more concrete than authenticity and autonomy in 
general, is the related issue of the appreciation of results of the enhancement: if someone achieves 
something, for example answering a difficult question, by means of the enhancement technology, 
does this affect the value of the achievement? A difference seems to exist in our valuation of human 
functioning: we tend to appreciate an achievement less when it is “brought about only by means 
ʻseparate and externalʼ to the person using them, thus alienating the person from what he or she 
achieves” (Merkel, et al., 2007, pp. 341-342). But whether this matters, depends on the context. In 
some cases, invisible information retrieval may be seen as cheating, particularly in the context of 
games or other competitive events. Of course, this depends on the rules of the game, as some games 
or sports allow deceiving the opponent or hiding communications among the team. A useful boundary 
mark in this respect is whether the deceptive use of neural prosthetics makes use of in-game 
possibilities or whether it violates the rules of the game. This is similar to the distinction made in 
virtual-world games in relation to, for example, the theft of a dragon sword: if this is done using in-
game possibilities, it is part of the game, but if the sword is appropriated by cracking software code or 
hacking into someoneʼs game account, it is ethically and possibly legally unacceptable (Kimppa & 
Bisset, 2005; Lastowka & Hunter, 2004). 
Outside of competitive contexts, it also depends on the situation whether invisibly using neural 
prosthetics would be experienced as somehow ʻcheatingʼ. If a Britonʼs cochlear implant would 
translate speech from Japanese into English, so that she can understand what is being said, we will 
value her capacity to understand Japanese less than when she had studied the language for years, in 
terms of appreciation for her language achievement; but we may also value her ability to interact with 
Japanese which she otherwise never would have had. If someone answers a difficult question after 
the answer has been fed into his cochlear implant, we will not appreciate this in the context of a quiz 
or school exam, but we will appreciate it if we simply need the answer (ʻwhat is the antidote for a bite 
by a red scorpion?ʼ). In other words, it depends on whether the focus of the appreciation is on the 
process or on the result. In most areas of intellectual performance, what counts will be the results 
rather than the process of achieving them; only in some areas, notably sports – e.g., chess – and art 
as well as knowledge testing situations, will the ʻauthorshipʼ (an achievement of authentic human 
effort) impact our appreciation of the result (Merkel, et al., 2007). If we conduct a thought experiment 
that cochlear implants have an embedded functionality to seamlessly translate foreign language(s), in 
other words act like a Babel-fish, would this affect our appreciation for peopleʼs language ability? It 
would, in the sense that we would no longer admire people for speaking a foreign language. At the 
same time, however, for most practical purposes it would not matter at all, and if people want to train 
their brain or distinguish themselves by showing their intellectual capacity, instead of learning 
Japanese they could try to master quantum mechanics or some other, non-programmable, feat. 
Hence, except for some contexts in which the process of getting at information matters, such as 
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sports and knowledge tests, there is no moral objection to information retrieval through implants from 
the perspective of performance valuation. 
A final factor on the individual level is that enhancement can lead to a higher level of individual 
responsibility: “As humility gives way, responsibility expands to daunting proportions. We attribute less 
to chance and more to choice” (Sandel, 2007, p. 87). Whether this is the case, and whether it matters, 
is again an issue of context. We can imagine some situations in which more is expected from 
someone with a bionic sensory implant, for example when she is in a position to provide crucial 
information in real time (such as the antidote to a red scorpion bite), but in most cases this will not 
differ fundamentally from someone in a position with any kind of external information source, such as 
a smartphone. It is only on a more general level that increased responsibility of enhanced people 
seems relevant; enhancement through implants could reinforce a tendency to point to peopleʼs own 
responsibility for their destiny: why should I tell you something you want to know, when you can look it 
up for yourself? This is an argument of potentially diminishing solidarity (Sandel, 2007), which no 
longer resides in the effect of enhancement on the individual, but in the social responses to 
enhancement.  
Effects on society 
Here we arrive at the third issue: what are the implications of enhancement through neural 
sensory prosthetics for society at large? The main issue here is distributive justice. In the 
enhancement debate, this is typically associated with the question whether the enhancement at issue 
is an intrinsic or a positional good: does it confer an intrinsic benefit (e.g. a longer or healthier life) or a 
benefit only in comparison to non-enhanced people (e.g. enhanced height)? Again the distinction is 
not sharp: certain characteristics, such as intelligence, are positional in some contexts (e.g. in job 
applications) but intrinsic in other contexts (e.g. being able to enjoy reading Kant), and even typically 
positional goods may confer an intrinsic benefit in some context (e.g. tallness enabling someone 
stranded on a desert island to pick fruit from high trees). Enhancement of positional goods raises 
questions of distributive justice: who has access to them, and who are likely to benefit most? But it 
should be noted that also enhancement of intrinsic goods triggers such questions: although there may 
be an intrinsic benefit to such enhancement, if access to the enhancement is unequal, socio-
economic inequalities may well be aggravated (Overall, 2009).  
How would the enhancement application of bionic sensory implants relate to this issue of 
“distributive justice, disadvantaging effects, and the potential for creating an unenhanced underclass” 
(Garland, 2004, p. 26)? That would depend first of all on whether people would start having such 
implants without medical indication, i.e. when they have normal hearing or sight but want enhanced 
sensory input. This is unlikely to happen in the immediate and perhaps even mid-term future – aside 
from health and safety issues, the implants are serious interventions in the functioning of the brain, 
which will need time and effort to adjust to the new form of sensory input. If less-invasive alternatives 
are available that are roughly functionally equivalent, e.g. miniature hearing aids or glasses with 
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augmented-reality functions, it is unlikely that people (apart from the likes of would-be cyborgs Kevin 
Warwick and Steve Mann) will take an implant without medical indication. (It is also questionable 
whether neurosurgeons will serve healthy people, but that is another issue.) As long as this is the 
case, there is no special concern with the use of bionic sensory implants; it boils down to the 
distributive justice of such implants in general. In countries where access to these – expensive – 
implants is very uneven through inequalities in medical insurance, the disadvantaging effect of 
implants will be aggravated and there is cause for concern; if on the other hand all impaired people 
have sufficient access to implants, there is no distributive justice problem.  
Suppose, however, that in the more distant future neural sensory prosthetics have become 
more mainstream and also start to be attractive for unimpaired people. Then the equality issue 
depends on how costly the implant will be, and which groups are most likely to start using them, and 
for what purposes. Whether wireless information retrieval through implants serves as a positional or 
an intrinsic good depends on the context of use; similarly to our discussion above of value 
appreciation, in competitive contexts (sports, knowledge tests) it would be positional, while in many 
non-competitive contexts (finding a scorpion-bite antidote) it would largely seem intrinsic. That 
suggests that there is no reason to generically restrict access to (non-medical) implants per se, but 
rather to regulate the context-specific use(s) of such implants. There is one situation, however, in 
which the enhancement implant as such may have to be regulated, namely when only relatively few 
people from privileged groups reasonably have access to them. In that case, the implant technology 
as such could aggravate existing social, economic, or cultural inequalities, and if it would be 
unfeasible to redress the imbalance by subsidising or other facilitating measures for underprivileged 
groups – which might be too costly for public policy – and it might be more appropriate to restrict 
access to the implants only for people with medical needs. 
Another scenario in the same more distant future is that not a few but very many people start 
using the implants, to benefit from wireless connections of the brain to external data sources. Then 
the nature of human interactions could change significantly, perhaps radically, particularly if the 
external sources would be interconnected in a Warwickian cyborg network. One could argue, as Leon 
Kass does for life-extension enhancement, that “the cumulative results of aggregated decisions (...) 
could be highly disruptive and undesirable, even to the point that many individuals would be worse off 
through most of their lives” (Kass in Brownsword, 2009, p. 135). But as Brownsword (2009) rightly 
points out, this is hardly compelling in the absence of any realistic basis to estimate and balance the 
potential beneficent and disruptive consequences. Technologies continuously change social 
practices, not seldom radically – as with the printing press, the telegraph, and the mobile phone – but 
change in itself does not provide a basis for ethical concern. If human communication and interaction 
patterns change through bionic sensory implants when many people desire to use them for enhanced 
information retrieval, there will be a need for close monitoring of potential negative consequences, but 
not for outright or generic precaution. “The right thing to do is to make as many better as we can, not 
to make no-one better” (Brownsword, 2009, p. 136).  
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This discussion of arguments at the societal level shows that there may be reasons to regulate 
the enhancement use of bionic sensory implants, but these reasons point to fine-tuned, responsive 
rather than generic, command-and-control forms of regulation. A precautionary approach aiming to 
curb the access to or use of bionic sensory implants for enhancement purposes would amount to 
overkill and a disproportionate limitation of the benefits these implants could have for individuals. 
Apart from the principled reasoning, also practical arguments oppose a generically negative 
regulatory tilt: as with many reproductive or other types of enhancement technologies, absent a global 
consensus that is very unlikely to emerge, people could easily travel abroad to acquire an implant. 
These would presumably belong to the privileged classes that are able to afford such ʻimplant 
shoppingʼ, which is another reason why the distributive justice argument suggests a responsive 
regulatory approach focusing on compensatory measures that ensure that the enhancement is 
sufficiently accessible to all, that its use does not violate rights of others, and that the enhancement 
does not harm the infrastructural conditions of a moral community (Brownsword, 2009; Overall, 2009). 
Legal issues 
Many legal issues are relevant for bionic sensory implants, but few of these seem to be very 
specific for this particular application. Most issues are equally relevant for implants in general. For 
example, the right to bodily integrity (see e.g. art. 3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) is a key 
issue for human implants, and informed consent plays a crucial role in exercising this right (Beyleveld 
& Brownsword, 2007). Patients must be given sufficient information, in a language they understand, 
about the health and safety risks associated with implants. The risks of bionic sensory implants are 
not yet well-known, particularly for the embryonic visual and brain/computer-interface implants (Merkel 
et al., 2007). Practitioners and patients will therefore be very cautious to use implants unless there is 
a serious medical reason; the non-medical or recreational use of bionic implants resides in a more 
distant future. Once that future arrives, other legal questions will have to be addressed that are 
familiar from the enhancement literature, such as whether medical practitioners may implant bionic 
sensors without a medical indication, and whether employers (e.g. in the military) may force or nudge 
their employees to take an implant for non-medical reasons. These questions can be left aside for the 
purposes of our paper, since they are not specific to the use of bionic sensory implants for information 
retrieval purposes. Perhaps two aspects may be specifically relevant, however. The first is that the 
use of bionic sensory implants for information retrieval, if used on a structural and longer-term basis, 
may affect the structure and functioning of the brain perhaps in other ways than cochlear or retinal 
implants for ʻnormalʼ hearing or seeing do. The brain is known to be plastic and could therefore adapt 
to structural changes in information input. This could have unknown side-effects that will need to be 
studied, in order to provide would-be implantees with sufficient information about risks and effects to 
allow them to form informed consent. Another issue is that with information being input into bionic 
sensors, the likelihood is going to increase that also unwanted or unexpected information is going to 
be input. In particular, the prospect of computer viruses infecting bionic implants should be studied 
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carefully. This is less science fiction than it may sound: experiments have already shown the 
possibility of infecting a human Radio Frequency Identification implant with a computer virus (Gasson, 
2010). Hence, wirelessly connected information-processing implants must be developed and 
researched with great caution and particular attention to abuse and malware.  
Another cluster of legal issues relates not to implants as such, but to information processing 
and the associated advantage that this type of human enhancement may carry. Here, typical legal 
issues in information law will apply, such as consumer protection and data protection, as well as 
sectoral legislation applying to information in particular contexts, such as employment or education. 
These are also not very specific to bionic sensory implants; for example, data-protection norms will 
apply equally to processing personal data (e.g. googled through a wireless Internet connection) on a 
pair of augmented-reality glasses as to processing personal data in a bionic implant. One area where 
this type of implant may have some specific thrust, however, is sports. Sports regulations apply 
different standards to using headphones for athletes to be connected to their coaches; while this is 
regular practice in for example cycling, it is prohibited in other sports, such as soccer. Naturally, it is 
also not allowed in brain sports that depend on the athleteʼs information-processing capacity, such as 
chess or go. Should bionic sensory implants become in much wider use in the future, each sports 
area will have to assess whether they have to adapt their regulations to this development. Somewhat 
more directly relevant – although the technology is still embryonic – is the case when the prospect of 
bionic sensors implanted for medical purposes could provide some sort of compensatory advantage. 
Suppose that at some point retinal implants will allow blind or poor-sighted patient to retrieve a 
substantial part of their eyesight, while at the same time enhancing some sight-related functionality 
such as eye-hand co-ordination. In that case, some exceptionally gifted people with implants could 
aim to participate in regular rather than Paralympic competition, for example in archery or biathlon. 
The case then would be similar to Oscar Pistorius, the ʻblade runnerʼ with two carbon-fibre transtibial 
(i.e. below-the-knee) prostheses who was ruled ineligible by the International Association of Athletics 
Federations to participate in regular competition, as his prostheses were thought to confer a 
considerable advantage over athletes without such prostheses. However, the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS) overruled the IAAF decision, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of an overall net 
advantage in Pistoriusʼs case.83 For neural prosthetics used by impaired athletes, similar cases may 
arise in the future that will call for a (case-by-case) assessment whether they bring an overall net 
 
                                                      
 
 




advantage compared to people without such implants; as the CAS (2008, para. 56) observed in the 
Pistorius case, this is “just one of the challenges of 21st Century life”. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed a particular kind of human enhancement, a class of prosthetics 
that enhance human (auditory/visual) sensory capabilities and which, because auditory and visual 
tracts convey information, also indirectly enhance human cognitive capabilities. These implants derive 
their value not from enhancing the cognitive apparatus (ʻcomputing powerʼ), but from providing more 
and better input for processing (ʻcontentʼ). External intelligence, for example in the form of smart 
applications that run on external devices, can tap relevant information directly into the nervous system 
and hence augment other signals entering this system. While similar effects in terms of bringing 
relevant information to bear can be achieved with external mounted displays and ear pieces, the 
implants are potentially more disruptive in human relations because their presence and functioning 
may be hidden from other stakeholders present. The implants could, if visible from the outside, also 
be mistaken for therapeutic devices, such as hearing aids, and thus solicit a sense of sympathy rather 
than vigilance. When undetected by other stakeholders, these sensory neural prosthetics might 
uneven the informational playing field to an extent that it becomes foul play. Neural prosthetics are 
particularly challenging in situations that are crucially dependent on information positions, such as 
negotiations, knowledge tests, or sports. This could warrant, for example, notification obligations on 
the part of the bionic human or other types of context-specific regulations aimed at compensating for 
the informational advantage of bionic implants. 
As we have shown, the effects of bionic sensory implants go beyond the informational plain. In 
the longer term, if the implants become more prevalent and if people start to use them as a consistent 
source of information input, the processes responsible for the information feed to the implants will 
affect how bionic people think, feel and behave. For example, if the implants constantly provide 
information on top of, or replace, information perceived by the bionic individual, this may literally lead 
to tunnel vision, and selective information input or processing could reinforce cognitive biases in 
bionic humans as well. At the same time, the broader scope of information sources may also widen 
peopleʼs point of view, and it could counter-balance cognitive biases by alerting people to information 
that their own sensory perception fails to notice. It all depends on how the information feed and the 
brain are going to interact.  
On a more fundamental level, the long-term scenario also has the potential to significantly 
affect human autonomy, identity and authenticity. Implants with a consistent external information feed 
could well be perceived as an extended part of the human body or human being, and because of the 
wireless connection of neural prosthetics, this challenges our notion of the boundaries of a human 
being more than is the case with physical technological extensions of the human body. Bionic sensory 
implants can be seen as a first step towards a future scenario of Internet-connected, and perhaps 
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mutually interconnected, cyborgs. These potential long-term effects call for reflection on how these 
implants can and should be developed in the short and middle term.  
There is no need, however, to be overly precautionary in applying bionic implants, which 
already have significant therapeutic benefits and which may have equally interesting non-therapeutic 
benefits in the future. The fact that they also have potential for malevolent use and possible unknown 
side-effects should not lead us to an overall restrictive regulatory tilt. The vision of bionic human 
beings will not appeal to all and perhaps be scary for a majority of people today, but it would be moral 
arrogance for us to draw a line of allowing sensory implants only for purely therapeutic reasons. 
Indeed, it would be moral arrogance to presume we know what is best for future generations based on 
our current outlooks (Hanson, 2009). As Brownsword (2009) reminds us:  
We should not forget (...) that ethical objections to enhancements are not the whole story; even if 
an enhancement is morally permissible, it does not follow that we should welcome it; but neither 
does it follow – and this, I think, is the fundamental point – that we have a right to impede the 
morally permissibly simply because we do not welcome it (Brownsord, 2009, p. 152). 
Rather than command-and-control regulation with a negative tilt, we should therefore closely 
monitor the development of neural prosthetics and discuss their ethical and legal implications on a 
timely basis. To prevent cheating with bionic implants while fostering their fascinating information 
potential, we recommend a responsive regulatory approach. This should focus on context-specific 
compensatory measures that ensure that neural prosthetics are sufficiently accessible to all, that their 
use does not violate rights of others in specific situations, and that they are in line with the 
infrastructural conditions of a community of human beings centering on social interaction.  
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Abstract Human enhancement technologies put us at liberty to materially remake ourselves from 
our appearance over our physical capacities right down to our own mental activity: we are 
becoming ʻself-shaping animalsʼ through and through. Proclaiming a moral duty not to transform 
our human nature – a duty to be and remain an unmodified homo sapiens – ʻbioconservativesʼ 
consider the enhancement enterprise unnatural and dehumanizing, to be condemned and 
according to some even outlawed. This paper denies that such a duty exists by adding the 
following arguments to the often heard naturalistic fallacy objection: (1) human nature may come to 
hinder our pursuit of worthy goals, (2) evolution made us ʻcrooked timber, out of which no straight 
thing can be madeʼ, if not for the help of enhancement technologies, (3) even if we could consider 
ourselves ʻwell-created beingsʼ, nothing should hold us back to ennoble ourselves even further, (4) 
our default biological determinations are in principle even more estranging to us than the insertion 
of artefacts in ourselves, and finally (5) in principle, there is greater unfairness in the ʻnatural lotteryʼ 
than in a well-guided policy of ʻenhanced equalityʼ. This battery of arguments deeply undermines 
the belief that there is a ʻduty to be naturalʼ. However, this does not imply that human enhancement 
ipso facto becomes a laudable undertaking, nor that human nature should be ignored altogether 
when deciding how to improve our lot. It does, however, discredit the notion that there are ethical 
reasons to categorically conserve our homo sapiens nature, come what may. 
Keywords human enhancement, human nature, human dignity, natureʼs normativity, self-
determination 
Natureʼs normativity: flogging a dead horse, with a twist  
The words [ʻnatureʼ and ʻnaturalʼ] have come to excite…feelings which…have made them one of 
the most copious sources of false taste, false philosophy, false morality, and even bad law (John 
Stuart Mill, 1904). 
This paper attempts to address the “deeper infrastructural concerns” (Brownsword, 2009, 
p.134) raised by the possibility of fundamentally altering human nature and the ensuing “feelings of 
uneasiness, creeping disorientation and even existential panic” (Gordijn in Brownsword, 2009, p. 
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134). Slowly or quickly but in any case surely,84 we are materially re-forming our own bodies from 
brain to toe, welcoming adequately safe and effective ʻhuman enhancement technologiesʼ (henceforth 
HETs) in our bodies, right down to our brains. These HETs allow us to manipulate and ʻenhanceʼ ever 
more aspects of our own appearance, physical ability, cognitive performance and emotional condition. 
Such enhancement practices have come to pervade Western societies, yet they generate significant 
discontent. Many fail to rejoice in this ʻliberation biologyʼ, as some label it85: every household watching 
Extreme Make-Over, every sports fan seeing doped athletes disrupt his beloved game, every troubled 
soul staring down at his bottle of psychoactive drugs – surely many, if not all of them, have asked 
themselves the vexing question: shouldnʼt we stay natural in all of this? 
Philosophical parsing of this acutely felt need to ʻbe naturalʼ in the face of HETs has been 
intensive the past decade or so, and very informative.86 More often than not, such parsing ends up 
thoroughly refuting the idea that our biological nature can be a source of normativity (Buchanan, 
2009a; Caplan, 2006; Dennett, 1992; Hughes, 2009; Pinker, 2002). The disillusioned understanding of 
ourselves as beings who are biologically emergent from pointless, pitiless natural selection, brings 
these authors to the moral conclusion that, in direct contradiction to the fuzzy intuition to ʻstay naturalʼ, 
we ought to feel morally estranged from that nature on account of its sheer pointlessness and 
pitilessness. Modern day evolutionists voice, in the harshest of tones, their reasoned repugnance 
towards the amoralities of ʻNature, red in tooth and clawʼ.87 Perhaps Dawkins (2006), whose 
adversaries never fail to misrepresent his opinion on this issue, speaks most clearly here when 
exclaiming in The Selfish Gene that we must “rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators” 
(Dawkins, 2006, p. 201).  
Whether we de facto remain deeply influenced by our evolutionary heritage can be a point of 
intense and important debate88, but at the heart of that dispute, both ʻsocial constructivistsʼ and 
ʻnatural deterministsʼ share the moral conviction that nature must never in itself be taken as a guide 
 




 Expert opinions differ widely on the speed of current and expected technological advance. Compare, for 
example, the highly educated guesses of Pinker (2003) and Silver (2006). 
85
 For example, libertarian science writer Ronald Bailey (Bailey, 2005). 
86
 For instance, two collections of papers on precisely this topic have recently been published in book form: ʻIs 
human nature obsolete?ʼ (Baillie & Casey, 2005) and ʻThe normativity of the naturalʼ (Cherry, 2009). 
87
 Which they share with the social constructivists but to whose world view they (purport to) add a firmer, clearer 
grasp of natural science. 
88
 For a thorough round-up of the contemporary state of the ʻnature/nurtureʼ debate, see Pinker (2002). 
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on what is right and wrong.89 From this shared perspective, then, our dignity, duty and only hope for 
finding true purpose in life would lie in establishing “an identity which lies at an ever-increasing 
distance from our organic nature” (Tallis, 2007). 
Despite this broad consensus on the non-normativity of human nature, more recent reflection 
on HETs has sparked a resurgence of ʻnatural lawʼ theories that quite literally advocate a principled 
duty to cherish and conserve our homo sapiens constitution (Annas, Andrews, & Isasi, 2002; 
Fukuyama, 2002; Kass, 1997, 2003; Presidentʼs Council on Bioethics, 2003; Sandel, 2007; UNESCO, 
2005). At the same time, out of the underlying consensus of social constructivists and natural 
determinists, new moral and political philosophies are sprouting up, unified by the belief in a principled 
right (or in stronger versions, even a duty90) to enhance ourselves. These new philosophies frame 
human enhancement as a program of systematically shedding all our unwanted natural atavisms 
through civilisation. For such a project of civilisation, our conventional means of moral education and 
the creation of wholesome environments can already achieve a lot, but, according to the proponents 
of enhancement, only the ʻcivil engineeringʼ of ourselves with HETs will ever take us all the way. 
In this paper, I will add five arguments to the basic ʻnaturalistic fallacyʼ critique. These 
arguments profoundly discredit the belief that we ʻought to be naturalʼ. 
 




 Upon gaining a rudimentary evolutionary self-understanding and having witnessed the horrific consequences of 
political systems acting on a supposed ʻduty to be naturalʼ, post-war social constructivists, for instance, went out 
of their way to exclude mankind from natural determination: some fortunate quirks of evolution had allowed us to 
become cultural creatures all the way down, they contended. The happy upshot was that the beastly ethic of 
survival of the fittest was only loosely nestled in us, or perhaps even not at all. In any case it could be wholly 
supplanted by moral laws of our own devise, and precisely such full moral autonomy, completely unfettered by 
nature, was celebrated as the best thing that ever happened to us (Pinker, 2002). According to the current 
scientific consensus, although certain parts of our biological constitution are culturally flexible and susceptible of 
further improvement, others have a tenacious rigidity to them and will continue to manifest themselves despite 
our best efforts to eradicate them. 
90
 For human enhancement as a moral duty, see Dworkin (1999), Harris (2007), Bostrom (2008); for a novel view 
on how human enhancement might even come to be seen as a something that is to be promoted and perhaps 
mandated through law (a ʻstate eugenicʼ prospect which ʻliberal eugenicistsʼ such as Agar (2004) try to evade as 
much as possible), see Buchanan (2008). 
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Human nature on the stand: a fivefold challenge 
To entrust oneself to Nature, that is to entrust oneself most wisely. Oh! What a soft and sweet 
resting pillow it is (de Montaigne, 2004). 
A host of divergent debates can be started on what is to be understood by ʻhuman natureʼ. We 
do not need to go into those matters too deeply here. Instead we will take as a vantage point the 
carefully crafted definition of human nature provided by Buchanan (2009b) in ʻMoral status and human 
enhancementʼ, which I dub ʻrecalcitrant homo sapiens natureʼ (henceforth RHSN): 
Human nature is a set of characteristics:  
1. that most beings that are uncontroversially human have at this point in biological and 
cultural evolution (and have had throughout what is uncontroversially thought to be 
human [as opposed to prehuman] history); 
2. that are relatively recalcitrant to being expunged or significantly altered by education, 
training, and indoctrination; and 
3. that play a significant role in explanations of widespread human behaviour and in 
explanations of differences between humans and other animals (Buchanan, 2009b). 
This definition has the benefit of zooming in on that proportion of ourselves which, by definition, 
is not easily malleable via the conventional cultural manipulations of education, training and 
indoctrination.91 Whether that proportion is substantial or negligible is an empirical question that has 
received an empirical answer: humans are certainly no ʻblank slatesʼ, open to infinite perfectibility via 
the relatively ʻeasy wayʼ of cultural manipulation, as was once widely perceived to be the case (Pinker, 
2003). A RHSN resides in us, for the civilisation of which conventional cultural manipulation is 
relatively impotent. To the extent that it is civilisable, such civilisation will only be possible via the 
unconventional means of HET. So the question asked here is not: Should we prefer conventional 
cultural means? The question is rather: Should we aim to civilise our RHSN, or are such attempts 
misguided and should we instead wish to conserve our RHSN? A separate follow-up question is: If 
civilisation of our RHSN is desirable, should we use the unconventional means of HET?92 
 




 As such it straightforwardly acknowledges being a strongly ʻtheory ladenʼ definition, designed specifically to 
sharply distinguish these recalcitrant biological features from the culturally plastic ones. 
92





To answer these questions, I will raise five challenges to the idea that we should conserve our 
RHSN. 
Human nature can hinder us in pursuing worthy goals 
Today perhaps more than ever, we have a clear and precise awareness of how our RHSN 
hinders us from achieving worthy goals, such as cognitive and athletic prowess, two fields of human 
agency we will highlight here. What is more, RHSN not only hinders us in such a way that it may slow 
us or may make it hard to achieve these worthy goals, rather in some cases it literally blocks us and 
makes it impossible to achieve those goals. Whenever this is the case, we then have to offset the 
value we give to the conservation of our limited homo sapiens nature against the value of pursuing 
those goals by enhancing our RHSN. 
Cognitive stagnation 
Without the prospect of us developing cognitive enhancers, it is arguable that we are reaching 
certain limits of our intellectual faculties, a thesis explored – not without added journalistic dramatism 
– by a host of scientists and philosophers in John Horganʼs ʻThe end of science: Facing the limits of 
science in the twilight of the scientific ageʼ (1997). For how many minds, if any, can truly master the 
staggering complexities of quantum physics? And, how many minds, if any, can truly master a unified 
comprehension of all fields of science and all of the humanities combined? No level-headed, modern-
day intellectual would even begin to think this possible: such a humanistic uomo universale ideal has 
long been buried. Nevertheless, such a ʻconsilientʼ understanding and wisdom is what many people 
hold to be humanityʼs deepest and most worthy cause – an ethic famously expounded in E.O. 
Wilsonʼs contemporary classic ʻConsilience – The unity of knowledgeʼ (1999). From this perspective, 
only the advent of effective cognitive HETs could begin to remedy the deep cognitive inabilities we 
have had to diagnose in our species, and this prospect has begun to spark new optimism among 
certain intellectuals.93  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
the first question would be that we should aim to civilize our RHSN, only to find there being something unethical 
in the means of HET to such a degree that we should, somewhat tragically, refrain from using such means, even 
as we accept that our RHSN should be amended in some other way than through conventional cultural 
manipulation (for that has proven too weak) or HET (for that has proven unethical). 
93
 See for instance Hughes (2004), Harris (2007), Buchanan (2008), Bostrom (2008). Also interesting to note is 
the poll Nature took amongst its readers, revealing that some researchers are already ʻbrain dopingʼ themselves 
with the crude and limited cognitive enhancers available today (Maher, 2008). No strong conclusions can be 
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Athletic stagnation  
If the current categorical bans on sports doping persist in spite of the strong critiques of certain 
ethicists (Caplan, 2009; Kayser, Magnon, & Miah, 2007; Kious, 2008; Tännsjö, 2009), we will have to 
face up to the fact that we thereby intentionally call a halt to the historical process of record setting.94 
In contrast to all previous centuries, we are today effectively reaching the peak performance of our 
homo sapiens bodies in many respects, such as flexibility, running speed, lifting power, jumping 
distance, endurance, etc. 95 We have virtually perfected our methods of scouting, training and dieting, 
and we cannot take our unenhanced bodies much further: biologically, we are at the end of our rope – 
a conclusion drawn in several recent scientific studies, one of which predicts that the end point of 
meaningful improvement of the athletic potential of the human body will be reached some fifteen years 
from now, around 2027 (Berthelot et al., 2008; Lippi, Banfi, Favaloro, Rittweger, & Maffulli, 2008).96 
Therefore, if doping continues to be categorically banned, in due course further records will only 
spring from the use of new equipment or changed rules, and our sporting culture will effectively lose 
its ʻepicʼ dimension of making the human body itself go ever ʻswifter, higher, fasterʼ, as the Olympian 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
drawn from that poll, however, as it was not based on a scientific questionnaire methodology, but other, more 
stringent inquiries into the popular use of cognitive enhancers have been undertaken too. For a quick review 
thereof, see Talbot (2009). Besides such principled love of wisdom, there are also strong prudential arguments 
urging us to enhance ourselves, conservative arguments even. As Buchanan (2008) points out, cognitive 
enhancement may be required for the conservative goal of maintaining sustainable, peaceful societal structures 
that prove successful in warding off incumbent environmental and geopolitical disaster. Indeed, a conservation 
ethic soberly aimed at ʻjust keeping things as they areʼ may ironically require us to implement a plethora of HETs 
in our bodies, cognitive and non-cognitive, from improving our capacity to extract nutrients from foodstuffs to 
increasing our impulse control, altruistic sentiment or cognitive capacities such as better foresight or a better 
understanding of the implications of probabilities and proportionalities (Buchanan, 2008). 
94
 One may consider ʻrecord settingʼ to have no value in itself, or that, as soon as our natural potential has been 
stretched as far as possible, other cultural conceptions of sporting should then trump a further pursuit of absolute 
peak performances. 
95
 The critically acclaimed documentary ʻBigger, faster, stronger – The side effects of being Americanʼ (Bell, 
2008) provides many unsettling testimonials of the transgressions of this natural threshold. 
96
 “The proposed…model…suggests major global fading of world record progression…In all measurable Olympic 
contests from five different disciplines, involving either aerobic (10000 m skating) or anaerobic (weight lifting) 
metabolic pathways, leg muscles mainly (cycling) or all muscles (decathlon), lasting seconds (shots) or hours (50 
km walk), either in men or women, small (Fly weight) or tall athletes (100 m free style), individual or collective 
events (relays), all progression curves follow the same pattern” (Berthelot et al., 2008, p. 4). 
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motto would have it. No longer will our sports arenas be fora for truly unique, historically unseen peak 
performances with universal resonance. And as this absolute, epic dimension of sport withers, sport is 
reduced to its relative, ʻdramaticʼ dimension of winning and losing against directly present competitors. 
ʻCitius, altius, fortiusʼ, taken literally, seems to require allowing doping, certainly from 2027 onwards. 
(As to the contention that doped performance is not the same as ʻnatural performanceʼ because a 
doped athlete did not perform his athletic feat himself, I will later in this paper show that this argument 
is only superficially convincing.) Banning doping seems to require the Olympic motto to be erased and 
replaced, or at least be given a new, non-literal interpretation.97 
Confronted with such cognitive and athletic limitations, apparently insurmountable by 
conventional means, one may think it wise to counsel resignation, acceptance and contentment with 
what is within our naturally circumscribed reach. However, resignation and contentment can hardly be 
proposed as basic virtues, for if stressed too strongly, they can degrade into fatalism or sheer laziness 
 




 Focusing on the peculiar competitive nature of elite sports can give rise to three further criticisms of the use of 
HETs. Firstly, because sports is often a competitive endeavor, it can be said that the goal – the mere beating of 
an opponent – is hardly something intrinsically worthy, and so using HETs to further pursue it is no worthy 
undertaking neither. But if that particular goal of ʻbeating othersʼ is not worthy, that still leaves open the possibility 
of there being other athletic goals that are worthy, such as self-expression and improvement, creative and 
progressive experimentation, expanding the existential boundaries of mankind, etc. – and HETs can be used to 
pursue these goals too. Secondly, its competitive nature can be grounds for denying competitors the right to dope 
on account of it being unfair. I hope to counter, perhaps even invert this argument from unfairness in this paper. 
Thirdly, elite sports delivers ʻpositional goodsʼ: if a few athletes start using doping, this may raise their competitive 
advantage and as a result they obtain higher rankings. But if all athletes would use doping, then all advantages 
would be lost, and everyone would be back in the same position, only now they all dope – with all possible risks 
that entails – only not to lose that position. Therefore, it seems better for all if it is agreed and ensured that no one 
starts to use doping. This certainly is a sobering thought, but two counterarguments have to be taken into 
account. Firstly, different athletes will react differently to each doping means: some physiologies will react better 
to it than others. Therefore, it seems unwarranted to actively forbid the use of such means for personal 
advancement to those that would benefit more from it, for that would be forcing a static population perspective on 
every individualʼs life perspective. Secondly, even if the individual goods obtained by athletes remain profoundly 
positional – there can always be only one number one – the aggregate effort of striving to be that number one 
does raise the entire athletic enterprise to new and higher levels of performance. However, a more fundamental 
problem still slumbers, as it is disputed whether a performance based on the use of HETs can be considered to 
be a true accomplishment, properly attributable to the athlete. This argument is dealt with later in this paper. I 
want to thank an anonymous reviewer for addressing this added complexity of competition in the domain of 
athleticism. 
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– the unjustified wasting of human potential. Resignation and contentment are most reasonably seen 
as balancing or reactive virtues, as they function in the famous Serenity Prayer: “God, grant me the 
serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to 
know the difference.”98 Serenity lies in knowing you have done all you ethically can to achieve worthy 
goals, given your circumstantial limitations.  
Today, HETs are mostly still too unsafe, too inefficacious or too costly for it to be wise to 
advocate their use, even in the pursuit of worthy goals. So in that sense, it may be advisable, anno 
2011, to find serenity in resignation. In the same vein, we do well to resist the millennial tendencies of 
those ʻtranshumanistʼ philosophies that envision todayʼs humanity to be “the future living in the past”, 
thus demonstrating an escapist urge that can easily radicalise into an attitude of disregard and 
contempt for our current predicament, as Hughes (2007) – himself a dedicated but mindful 
transhumanist – acknowledges. 
Be that as it may, by the same ʻlogic of serenityʼ the research and development of efficacious, 
safe and cheap HETs may well be a moral duty that is already incumbent upon us, although it may 
have to be assigned a rather low priority when considering the many basic health care policies we still 
fail to provide to an adequate degree. But no matter how such a complicated calculus of political 
priorities may turn out: to the extent that we forestall enhancement research without proper overruling 
priorities, future generations may feel bereft, perhaps dramatically so, and reprehend us for 
forestalling the benign spread of HETs through society.99 
 




 The origins of this aphoristic prayer are disputed, but most ascribe it to 20th century theologian Reinhold 
Niebuhr, see Goodstein (2008). 
99
 As far as rights are concerned, anyone who takes issue with the argument here presented and does not 
consider RHSN as ʻstuntingʼ but finds a way to consider it a ʻproper proportioningʼ of human capabilities, should 
surely be allowed to abstain from using HETs. But they might do well to prepare themselves for a scenario in 
which they could become not only economically surpassed by the more bioprogressive cultural groups, but 
profoundly culturally isolated as well. For instance, McKibben (2004), an outspoken anti-enhancement 
environmentalist, acknowledges that resisting HETs may involve taking a stand somewhat similar to the one 
taken by the Amish today in resisting much of 20th century technology. Yet to a ʻbioprogressiveʼ ethic, such a 
submission to nature may ultimately be seen as a self-afflicted amputation, a denial of fundamental human duties 
to improve our understanding of the larger world as it really is, to accept full responsibility for ourselves and 
create the deepest, richest life possible. This goes to show the extent to which the enhancement debate may 
bring about a fundamental ʻculture clashʼ that may prove difficult to pacify. 
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Nature made us ʻcrooked timberʼ 
The comments I made in the previous section still allow us to consider our RHSN as being 
limited, but nonetheless fundamentally good, and perhaps we would do best to refrain from trying to 
fix things that are not really broke to begin with, such as our RHSN – ʻLe mieux est lʼennemi du bienʼ. 
Evolutionary science, however, has proven such views to be false, because our RHSN really is ʻbroke 
to begin withʼ in certain crucial respects. 
Firstly, the processes of natural selection that shape human biology have a significant 
developmental drawback. Roughly said, evolutionary adaptations can only come about in long 
processes made up of many incremental steps, and in every incremental step, the entire existing 
organism and all its interdependencies have to be taken into account. Adaptations are always ʻmade 
up as things go alongʼ, via the universal dynamic of random genetic mutation followed by natural 
selection through environmental pressures – a pseudo-engineering process aptly captured in the 
anthropomorphic metaphor of ʻThe blind watchmakerʼ (Dawkins, 1996). As a result, organisms are 
replete with ʻevolutionary trade-offsʼ, where the best possible optimum often involves significant 
compromise. The same is true for humans. Purely physical examples are our notoriously bad backs, 
and our notoriously slim pelvises, making human childbirth such an excruciating ordeal in comparison 
to much of the animal world. There is no ʻdeeper meaningʼ to the extreme labour pains suffered by 
human mothers, just like there is nothing to be revered in all the other unhappy evolutionary 
compromises we carry within us. Arguably, such evolutionary compromises can in principle be 
alleviated by our own engineering – it will frequently be incredibly difficult, but given enough time, it 
may also often prove possible. In the case of childbirth, we already know the ʻenhancementsʼ of the 
caesarean section100 and epidural anaesthesia, and perhaps we should long for the possibility of 
outright extracorporeal pregnancy (ectogenesis) in artificial wombs or ʻhuman hatching eggsʼ, which 
would make humans join the ranks of the platypus as one of the few egg-laying mammals still alive on 
earth. 
Secondly, every human being born today is genetically quasi-identical to the homo sapiens that 
spawned some 200.000 years ago. The bodies and basic mindsets we develop today are adaptations 
to our ʻenvironment of evolutionary adaptednessʼ or EEA, which is, roughly said, the savannah 
 




 The example of the caesarean section only goes to show that innovations that enhance our biological 
predicament in some respect, may be deeply intertwined with adverse effects that possibly eclipse all enthusiasm 
over the enhancing effects. In the case of the caeserian section such effects include risks to future fertility and a 
host of other crucial side effects both in the short and the long term. See for instance 
http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CG13 (accessed 6th of January 2011). 
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wilderness and stone age culture we were surrounded with 200.000 years ago. Since then we have 
experienced massive changes in our cultural environment, but our genome has not changed with it. 
As a result, our homo sapiens bodies and basic mindsets have become very maladapted to some of 
our cultural surroundings. A classic example of this genome-culture mismatch is our hard-to-control 
craving for sweet and fatty foods. We crave these nutrients so crazily, because in our EEA they were 
very scarce yet very nutritious. Therefore, evolutionary processes have made us very motivated to 
find them and, once found, to gorge them down. Advanced agriculture has since long put us in the 
odd spot of having access to an overabundance of sugars and fat. As a result, we now have to fight 
back our prehistoric craving for them, a feat which only few manage without frustration. Now, as it is 
with the pains of childbirth, so it is here: there is no ʻdeeper meaningʼ to having such unhealthy 
cravings and having to fight them back. It is no benign, divine set-up in which we can prove the 
strength of our character by resisting temptation. That is mere moralistic rationalisation of us being 
uncomfortably stuck in the middle between our genetically inscribed cravings and the culturally 
produced overabundance. How should we solve this type of mismatch situations? Contrary to what is 
sometimes assumed, there is no principled reason why we should prefer changing our cultural 
surroundings to changing our biological determinants. As Buchanan (2008, pp. 16-18) notes: if for 
instance some environmental change would cause a basic foodstuff to become partly toxic, we could 
then either manipulate some aspect of our environment to extract the toxins from the food, or we 
could manipulate some aspect of our digestive tract to make us resistant to the toxin. The basic 
heuristic is simple: whatever works best, all externalities taken into account. 
Thirdly, and most crucially, just as we are physically mismatched to our new surroundings in 
many respects, so are we mentally mismatched to that environment we rightfully call our true home: 
the moral world. No matter what ethical theory one subscribes to or whether or not one accepts some 
of the stronger claims of evolutionary psychology, it cannot be denied that humans usually strive to 
live by moral rules yet frequently experience countless problems along the way which make them fall 
short of the moral goals they aim for. Lack of moral insight, lack of moral resolve and the interference 
of many immoral desires play crucial roles in sidetracking us from living the way we think we should. 
Can we simply reiterate our previous conclusion and say that there is no ʻdeeper meaningʼ to having 
such immoral cravings and having to conquer them? This is a trickier question.  
Many philosophers believe that true morality requires that the moral actor was free to do 
otherwise. If you were programmed to do the right thing (regardless of whether that ʻprogrammingʼ 
was natural or artificial), then you have not really acted from moral resolve. You will then simply have 
acted from instinct or indoctrination, they argue, and that instinct or indoctrination may well have 
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driven you to do some very wrong thing, had you been programmed differently.101 Interestingly, even 
one of the most outspoken advocates of human enhancement, Harris (2011), has recently critiqued 
ʻmoral enhancementʼ, i.e. the inducement of moral behaviour via HET, specifically such moral 
enhancements that would erase the “freedom to fall” required for moral choice.  
However, in our view such critiques of moral enhancement are based on a faulty framing of the 
issue, in that they assume that being influenced by a moral enhancement would necessarily be 
comparable to being influenced by, say, alcohol, which not only alters your behaviour, but also 
lessens your capacity to critically assess and direct your own feelings and conduct. We see no reason 
to believe that moral enhancement would necessarily turn us into such a sort of ʻmoral drunkʼ. Even if 
a person would be ʻpropped upʼ to feel and behave morally, all other things remaining equal, such a 
person would nonetheless retain the capacity for critical self-assessment, every bit as much as the 
ordinary, ʻnaturalʼ person who is constantly being wooed and swayed by all sorts of moods and 
desires both moral and immoral, yet retains the ʻmoral superstructureʼ of critical self-assessment. So, 
even if a person was induced by some means to no longer experience all that wooing and swaying 
but instead felt spontaneously compelled to do the right thing, it is unwarranted to suppose that she 
would then also necessarily lose her capacity to rationally assess what she is doing and her ability to 
make a moral choice on what course of action to take. Now, if a specific variety of moral 
enhancements had such a twofold effect of (a) inducing a desire to act morally and (b) obliterating or 
reducing the capacity of the person in whom such a desire has been induced to critically assess his 
own feelings and conduct, then to the extent that this second effect is induced, such an 
ʻenhancementʼ would indeed merit disapproval, for it would lower us to the level of ʻmoral drunksʼ.102  
The only odd, but in my view very welcome difference with our natural predicament, is that a 
properly morally enhanced person would find little reason to act contrary to her feelings, because 
those feelings would have become highly attuned to her moral beliefs thanks to her moral 
enhancement. Experiencing feelings of immoral temptation is not a prerequisite for moral choice, no 
such ʻoriginal sinʼ is needed. It suffices that one can rationally assess oneʼs own feelings and conduct. 
One does not have to feel torn between different courses of action, to be able to choose the good and 
 




 See Hursthouse (2002) for an interesting take on Kantian perspectives on this issue. 
102
 Perhaps this conclusion may, all in all, differ not in kind but only to a degree with Harrisʼ (2011) argument: 
skeptically and briefly, he does allow for the theoretical possibility of such ʻproperʼ moral enhancement being 
conceivable. Nevertheless, Harris (2011) regards that not only as highly improbable, but also as something 
different in kind from those moral enhancements proposed by the authors he engages with (Douglas, 2008; 
Perrson & Savulescu, 2008). I hope to have presented here a first sketch of the basic way in which moral 
enhancement might effectively leave our ʻfreedom to fallʼ fully intact, and thus become truly deserving of its name. 
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resist the bad. One just needs to be emphatically aware of there being such different courses of 
action, and if moral HETs should allow you to be unhindered by immoral inclinations so that you can 
get a clear, level-headed view of whatʼs right and feel no desires to do something other than the right 
thing, then that is so much for the better. Hence it may be concluded that there is no ʻdeeper meaningʼ 
in experiencing all sorts of immoral cravings and inclinations in oneself and having to overcome them. 
If moral enhancement could ʻset us straight insideʼ and make it easy to do the right thing, for the right 
reason, without undermining our rational capacity to choose otherwise, that would be quite 
marvellous. 
Even if human nature were noble, why not make it nobler still? Some unconventional, 
but logical religious arguments 
Imagine, counterfactually, humans to be neither morally stunted nor morally malformed by their 
RHSN. Arguably, such a view of human nature is only possible from a religious perspective that 
believes man to have been created just as he should be by some benign Creator. Even from such a 
religious perspective on human nature as a proper and good thing to be respected, it is far from 
obvious why HET should be shunned and our RHSN should be indefinitely conserved in its status quo 
condition. Even if our life is a God-given gift for which we humbly owe Him eternal thanks, there is no 
reason why He would not allow us to further ennoble our existence. Basic theistic dogma actually 
provides a lot of leeway for accommodating the liberty, perhaps even the religious duty to enhance 
ourselves. As Parens (2009) points out, no lesser source than the Book of Genesis contains a 
celebration of genetic engineering: 
Jacob, the very one whose name would become Israel, was “the first genetic engineer”; he was the 
one with the creativity to fashion a device (“rods of poplar and almond, into which he peeled white 
streaks” (Gen. 30:38) with which he induced his uncleʼs goats to produce only the valuable 
“speckled and spotted” (Gen. 30:39) young. According to Genesis, and it seems to me much of 
Judaism, our responsibility is not merely to be grateful and remember that we are not the creators 
of the whole. It is also our responsibility to use our creativity and mend and transform ourselves 
and the world (Parens, 2009, p. 189). 
Indeed, Judaism certainly seems open to such interpretations. Rabbi Azriel Rosenfeld, for 
instance, states the following in his article ʻJudaism and gene designʼ: “Our sages recognize, and 
perhaps even encourage, the use of prenatal (or better, preconceptual) influences to improve oneʼs 
offspring” (Rosenfeld, 1972, p. 75) Mark Sagoff, in his contribution to the book ʻIs human nature 
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obsolete?ʼ (in Baillie & Casey, 2005) mentions examples of openness to the idea of human 
enhancement not only from Judaism, but also from Catholicism103 and Protestantism104. Noteworthy is 
also the Mormon Transhumanist Associationʼs statement that: “Mormonism and Transhumanism 
advocate remarkably similar views of human nature and its future: material beings organized 
according to law, rapidly advancing knowledge and power, imminent fundamental changes to 
anatomy and environment, and eventual transcendence of present limitations”. 
Indeed, material human enhancement may even be seen as precisely the faithful behaviour 
God expects from his flock, and the research and development of HETs then becomes the divinely 
inspired path to life in the likeness and service of God. The freedom we have to change our own 
nature, for better or worse, can be perceived as part of the moral mission God has given to mankind. 
In labouring to properly enhance ourselves, we prove ourselves truly thankful of his gift, a gift that we 
must not squander by being slothful. To lazily ʻlet Nature take its courseʼ would be to commit the sin of 
sloth, if not also the sin of succumbing to heathenish nature cultism, and pious virtue would lay in the 
diligent effort to make the ʻseeds He has sown in usʼ come to full bloom (see Mill, 1904105). In this 
view, God may perhaps only take pity on those repenting sinners who never waver in their labour to 
amend and improve themselves, who are never content with their crooked selves and the job they 
have done so far at stewarding the natural world, and who thank God for being so good to grant them 
access to the means to redeem themselves. 
Such a religious narrative would echo the classic of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1999), 
ʻOratio on the dignity of manʼ – the hallmark text that helped introduce a humanistic brand of 
Christianity. In that Oratio, della Mirandola lets the (allegorically plural) Creators address Adam as 
follows: 
The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We have laid down; 
you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody We 
have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature.…We have made you a 
 




 Citing theologian Bernard Haring in saying that humanity may “freely interfere with and manipulate the function 
of his bios (biological life) and psyche insofar as this does not degrade him or diminish his or his fellowmenʼs 
dignity and freedom” (in Sagoff, 2005, p. 84). 
104
 Paraphrasing theologian Ronald Cole-Turnerʼs cautious approval of genetic manipulation to improve the 
conditions of life (Sagoff, 2005). 
105
 Mill (1904) pursues an even more radical theological line of thought, in which Nature can be seen as 
something depraved, bordering the demonic: something man must amend or overcome, so that we may 
reconnect with the divine. 
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creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the 
free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. It will be in 
your power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you will be able, through your own 
decision, to rise again to the superior orders whose life is divine (della Mirandola, 1999 [1486]). 
Whatever the ultimate value of the preceding deductions from theist dogma, it is clear that a 
multitude of religious narratives would support or even mandate the proper use of HETs. 
Default biological causation may be more alien to us than intentional artificial 
causation 
Many authors condemn the idea of having artefacts exert an internal influence on our personal, 
volitional acts, while accepting as something neutral or even positive the ways in which natural 
determinants exert the very same sort of influence on us. In the following paragraphs, I will defend the 
opposite view. 
Consider how Sandel (2007) judges the difference: 
One aspect of our humanity that might be threatened by enhancement and genetic engineering is 
our capacity to act freely, for ourselves, by our own efforts, and to consider ourselves responsible – 
worthy of praise of blame – for the things we do and for the way we are. It is one thing to hit 
seventy home runs as a result of disciplined training and effort, and something else, something 
less, to hit them with the help of steroids or genetically enhanced muscles…As the role of the 
enhancement increases, our admiration for the achievement fades (Sandel, 2007, p. 25). 
Sandel (2007) seems to conflate two unrelated levels of analysis. He compares the following 
situations: 
1. Player A: hits seventy home runs based on disciplined training and effort; 
2. Player B: hits seventy home runs based on steroids or genetically enhanced muscles. 
The glitch, I submit, lays in the conflation of two different functions which the enhanced muscles 
can be thought to perform.  
In Sandelʼs (2007) view, the enhanced muscles substitute for the disciplined training and effort. 
The result is that disciplined training and effort, the locus of active engagement of the baseball player, 
becomes redundant. Therefore, the enhanced sporting performance becomes a largely passive result 
of the enhanced muscles. But if this is the problem, then this is not an argument about enhancement 
at all, but about effortlessness. For we may just as well imagine a Player C, who has such a natural 
muscle mass, that he too can hit those seventy home runs without any training or effort – a great 
ʻnatural talentʼ. Disciplined training and effort would be just as redundant for this natural Player C as it 
is for the artificially enhanced Player B. But now imagine that Player B and Player C would no longer 
content themselves with beating Player A without breaking a sweat, but would instead try to play their 
best game, against each other. Then both the ʻenhancedʼ (B) and the ʻnaturalʼ (C) player would invest 
in disciplined training and effort once again. Or they could find a way – again, natural or unnatural – to 
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further raise the threshold of effortlessness. But that would automatically create a new peak 
performance that can be reached only when effort is added to what can be achieved effortlessly. In 
that upward dynamic, the locus of active engagement moves upward too, allowing us to continue to 
hold both players responsible for their peak performance which will always entail adding the surplus of 
effort, so that praise can again be showered over both of them. 
So the enhanced muscles in fact do not necessarily substitute for the disciplined training and 
effort, as Sandel  (2007) frames it, but instead may turn out to substitute for the natural muscles. The 
result is that disciplined training and effort, the locus of active engagement of the baseball player, 
does not necessarily become redundant for the enhanced Player B, but instead may begin at a new, 
elevated baseline. And so Sandelʼs (2007) moral conclusion, which is to criticise in Player B the 
supposed lack of what is lauded in Player A, namely his effort, does not automatically apply. Player B 
may well apply his effort to perform even stronger acts of sportsmanship, and in the event that he 
would perform effortlessly, that would not be because of his enhancement itself, but because of his 
laziness and indulgence.106 Artificial enhancement and the loss of effort or active agency are not 
intrinsically connected. Some enhancements may have that effect, but others may not: 
 




 Sure enough, in common practice HETs may well be mostly used as ʻeasy way outʼ, i.e. as a short-cut to 
perform things that otherwise would require true effort on their behalf. Such ʻeasy ridersʼ would then content 
themselves with having effortlessly done all that is normally required of them and pay no heed to the moral call to 
really apply themselves in order to fulfill their full potential – a potential that will be heightened even more as they 
obtain access to HETs. As such, those easy performances would indeed only superficially resemble actual 
achievements: performances that can be accounted to the person who performed them. These hollowed 
performances then become nothing to laud that person for, and to the extent that such ʻeasy ridersʼ would still 
want to extract such approval from others, their short-cuts should indeed be unmasked and dismissed as ʻcheap 
tricksʼ. However, it should be stressed that even though such short-cut behavior might quite possibly be a 
temptation that many and perhaps even most people would succumb to and that the availability of HETs might 
add new, hard-to-resist temptations to indulge in such undignified short-cut behavior, these are no intrinsic 
objections to HETs. This is a distinction Kass (2002), for instance, fails to make in his categorical dismissal of all 
human enhancement: “Homogenization, mediocrity, pacification, drug-induced contentment, debasement of 
taste, souls without loves and longings – these are the inevitable results of making the essence of human nature 
the last project of technical mastery. In his moment of triumph, Promethean man will become a contented cow.” 
(Kass, 2002, p. 48). We can share with Kass (2002) the conviction that these are indeed the many practical 
dangers of offering HETs to persons who are likely to be slothful and deceitful, as many humans probably are. 
Nevertheless, adequately virtuous humans will forego such ʻcheap tricksʼ, and will be able to use HETs to, as 
Bostrom (2008) puts it, “increase our zest for life, infuse us with energy and initiative, and heighten our capacity 
for love, desire, and ambition” (p. 189). 
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“[E]nhancements would not transform us into passive, complacent, loveless, and longing-less blobs. 
On the contrary, they could increase our zest for life, infuse us with energy and initiative, and heighten 
our capacity for love, desire, and ambition” (Bostrom, 2008, p. 189). 
But if enhancement and effortlessness are not intrinsically linked, then the only remaining 
differentiation is this: 
1. Players A and C play baseball, starting with naturally grown muscles; 
2. Player B plays baseball, starting with artificially grown muscles. 
But where can the moral difference lay between naturalness and artificiality, if they are – in 
principle107 – equivalent with respect to the possibility of effortlessness? 
To make some sense of the argument, we have to focus on the fear that caused Sandel (2007) 
to ring the alarm. There is something in HETs which makes him fear that we may lose “our capacity to 
act freely, for ourselves, by our own efforts, and to consider ourselves responsible” (Sandel, 2007, p. 
25). This may be brought about by the fact that some HETs involve the insertion of external, material 
things into the body, so as to exert an internal influence on our personal, volitional acts. Such ʻinvasive 
proceduresʼ disrupt the intuitive way we think about how all our intentional activity comes about, 
namely via the directives of our personal will. As soon as something other than our personal will 
(co)causes our actions, we start feeling somewhat like a puppet – someone who is being played upon 
by someone or something else, a person who is not entirely herself. We start losing our sense that we 
ʻact freelyʼ, that our acts are caused by ʻour own effortsʼ, and that it is us, our ʻselvesʼ we can hold 
responsibleʼ for those actions. 
Admittedly, HETs acutely disrupt this intuitive self-understanding. But we have to go full circle 
here. For the intuitive self-understanding of our ʻfree selfʼ is premised on the dualistic assumption that 
our ʻselfʼ somehow escapes all material causation, an assumption which has been proven totally 
mistaken by all we have learnt so far about the way the brain developed and how it operates.  
Indeed, even though we spontaneously slide into the dualistic delusion as soon as we stop 
consciously reflecting on our scientific self-understanding, we know that in fact, we are not our own 
ʻprime moverʼ, we are not a causa sui, but rather our mental life is submerged in universal material 
chains of cause and effect. As Pinker (2003) recalls the debasing effect of accepting the findings of 
neuroscience:  
One can say that the information-processing activity of the brain causes the mind, or one 
can say that it is the mind, but in either case the evidence is overwhelming that every 
 




 But again: perhaps not at all in common practice. 
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aspect of our mental lives depends entirely on physiological events in the tissues of the 
brain (Pinker, 2003, p. 41). 
When this awareness of our own material determination washes over us, it can completely 
overhaul our intuitive dualistic delusion and leave us warped and deranged, believing all free will and 
all personal responsibility is illusionary – we suddenly feel like true puppets on a string, completely 
overpowered, and this self-understanding is only aggravated by the fact that there is no well-meaning 
puppet master that ʻplays usʼ, only pointless evolutionary dynamics. Our imagined wall between the 
free, seemingly immaterial mental world and the causally chained material world crumbles and what 
goes down with it is the illusion that many people consider to be the cornerstone of ethical thought, 
the belief that the mind is “a control panel with gauges and levers operated by a user – the self, the 
soul, the ghost, the person, the ʻmeʼ” (Pinker, 2002, p. 42). 
Fortunately, such a disruptive self-awareness only washes over us in the very rare moments 
where we are forced to reflect intensively on the true, causally and biologically determined nature of 
our existence – such as in philosophy classes, science classes and, every once in a while, 
courtrooms where a desperate ʻinnocence on account of compulsionʼ defence is being pleaded. Most 
of the time, however, we can leave our dualistic delusion unchallenged: even if we are philosophically 
aware of its delusional nature, in everyday practice we enjoy the delusion in all tranquillity.  
That cherished tranquillity in everyday existence is now threatened by the possibility of human 
enhancement, bringing the disruption of the dualistic delusion up close and personal. For here we do 
not just have to reckon with a reflective insight without direct practical repercussions. Instead, we now 
face practical, material disruptions of our dualistic delusion in our daily lives, as some HET may 
demonstrate before our very eyes how material interventions can modulate, overtake and transform 
our very moods, feelings, desires and intentions. But how is such material determination of our mental 
life by HETs any different than the everyday material determination of our mind by the default 
processes of neurological causation? It is estrangement either way. 
Failure to acknowledge this may in part be due to the operation of the self-defence mechanism 
of ʻcognitive dissonanceʼ, whereby highly undesirable factual insights are ʻpushed awayʼ by 
emotionally charged irrationalities. A passionate but ultimately unsubstantiated belief in a supposed 
duty to ʻbe naturalʼ may serve this purpose of pushing away disturbing facts about the material 
foundations of our mental life and us being the product of pointless, pitiless evolution.  
In this respect, HETs force us in the following lose-lose situation. We cherish our dualistic 
delusion, but we are now forced to give it up and must choose between two types of material 
determinism. Either we prefer the default, natural determination of our self, or we prefer the 
interventionist, ʻenhancingʼ determination of our self. The only rational choice would seem to be the 
second type of determinism, because it is in fact less alienating to us in two important respects. 
Firstly, it does not force us to defend what is virtually indefensible, namely that our ʻstunted, crookedʼ 
and existentially absurd evolutionary endowment is somehow optimal and sacrosanct for us. And 
secondly, by applying HETs on ourselves, we achieve a partial (albeit quite quaint) liberation from 
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material determinism after all. We become a sort of ʻultimate feedback loopʼ to ourselves: out of our 
own deliberations on what is best for us, we can begin to extract ourselves out of the stunted, crooked 
RHSN that emerged pointlessly out of hominid evolution, and in the closest material approximation of 
ʻpure freedomʼ, choose our own determinants: 
Homo sapiens, the first truly free species, is about to decommission natural selection, the force that 
made us. There is no genetic destiny outside our free will...Soon we must look deep within 
ourselves and decide what we wish to become (Wilson, 1999, p. 302). 
The prospect of being able to control, modulate and change those ʻtissues of the brainʼ thus 
seems to bring back with a vengeance part of the old dualistic dream of being “a self, a soul, a 
person, a ʻmeʼ” (Pinker, 2002, p. 42) able to steer the body and shape our own thoughts by “operating 
on it via a control panel with gauges and levers” (Pinker, 2002, p. 42). Thus turning ourselves into 
beings that can emerge (theoretically) wholly out of their own volition, we in fact revindicate the belief 
that humans are indeed beings that are fundamentally ʻfreeʼ, in possession of a will that can somehow 
escape its own material determination – if not causal determination in abstracto, at least we escape 
the biological determination that lock all other life forms in certain fixed bodily and behavioural 
patterns. Returning to della Mirandola (1999): we are, by our very nature, beings who are at liberty to 
choose for ourselves our own nature, a self-awareness made even more explicit by Jean-Paul Sartre 
some fifty years ago. What HET add to this ʻtraditionalʼ existentialist self-understanding108, is that it 
now turns out that this is materially the case and, to the extent that a number of specific HETs is 
already available, that this has become a pressing practical problem for every ordinary person. To 
deny that self-awareness is at best immature, at worst cowardly: 
[Man] cannot find anything to depend upon either within or without himself. [H]e is without excuse. 
[O]ne will never be able to explain oneʼs action by reference to a given and specific human nature. 
[M]an is condemned to be free (Sartre, 1964, p. 31, translated from French). 
 




 The philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, of which a key conclusion is quoted here, was premised on metaphysical 
notions that cannot be squared with contemporary scientific insights in the biological underpinnings of human 
behavior and decision making. Therefore, the quote used here should not be seen as an acceptation of Sartreʼs 
untenable metaphysical belief that the free will of humans somehow manages to escape all material causation. 
On the contrary, I want to point out the irony that the ʻtraditionalʼ existentialist conclusion that ʻman cannot find 
anything to depend upon either within or without himselfʼ gains a new relevance precisely because wholly 
material means now seem to confront us with such a fundamental indeterminacy.  
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In conclusion, only with a mauvaise foi or false conscience, could we hold that it is somehow 
more authentic that a person is predetermined by ʻnaturalʼ factors given by morally meaningless 
evolutionary processes, than by factors he himself chose to insert in himself. Contra Sandel (2007), in 
this sense it is indeed something else, but something more, to fully take charge over your own 
determinants in pursuing epic athleticism (and the same holds for all virtuous pursuits), as long as the 
enhanced athlete continues to add to that strengthened body the intentional dedication, effort and 
focus we rightfully consider central to the athletic ethic. 
Enhancement as redress of natural unfairness 
In the previous section, Sandelʼs (2007) objection regarding effort and fairness had to be 
untangled from the underlying objection of ʻfeeling overtakenʼ by artificial means and thus losing 
accountability for oneʼs ʻdoped performanceʼ. Surprisingly, the objection of being overtaken turned out 
to be even more the case for everyday unenhanced performance (which is a deeply biologically 
predetermined affair), than it was for enhanced performance (which in principle alleviates our 
everyday ʻbiological passivityʼ by making our biological predeterminations something we can partly 
shape ourselves via HETs). In the following paragraphs, I deal with another ʻeffort-fairnessʼ objection 
Sandel (2007) raises, namely that enhancement represents a form of ʻhyperagencyʼ that erodes our 
sense of undeserved giftedness, which he considers to be a fundamental basis for solidarity:  
Why do the successful owe anything to the least-advantaged members of society? The best 
answer to this question leans heavily on the notion of giftedness. The natural talents that enable 
the successful to flourish are not their own doing but, rather, their good fortune – a result of the 
genetic lottery. [Thus] it is a mistake and a conceit to assume that we are entitled to the full 
measure of the bounty they reap[.] We therefore have an obligation to share this bounty with those 
who, through no fault of their own, lack comparable gifts (Sandel, 2009, p. 87) 
I fully agree with the abstract moral argument underlying this quotation: if one has obtained 
decisive advantages as a matter of brute luck, through no effort on oneʼs own behalf, a basic moral 
duty impels such an undeservedly ʻgiftedʼ person to share his luck with those who are faultlessly 
unlucky.109 However, there seems to be a second glitch in Sandelʼs (2007) reasoning, yielding 
problematic consequences.  
 




 The extent to which this is the case is a persistent bone of contention between ʻliberalsʼ and ʻsocialistsʼ that we 
do not have to get in to too deeply here. It may suffice to say that on one end, if one chances upon a 50 euro 
bank note in an empty street, one is not necessarily duty-bound to give this money to some charity but can 
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In Sandelʼs (2007) view, we are obliged to share ʻthe bountyʼ or ʻthe fruits ofʼ 110 our good 
fortune. But why stop there? For what if the good fortune itself can become a matter of redress? If 
HETs could give the naturally disadvantaged access to what others effortlessly and unfairly gained 
naturally, surely they should be allowed to ʻlevel the natural playing fieldʼ that was so wantonly 
unlevelled by the random distribution of natural gifts via the ʻnatural lotteryʼ? This question is 
reminiscent of Rawlsʼ (1971) ʻoriginal positionʼ, and in fact it is something Rawls (1971) himself 
already hinted at in A Theory of Justice: 
It is also in the interest of each to have greater natural assets. This enables him to pursue a pre-
ferred plan of life. In the original position, then, the parties want to insure for their descendants the 
best genetic endowment (assuming their own to be fixed). The pursuit of reasonable policies in this 
regard is something that earlier generations owe to later ones, this being a question that arises 
between generations. Thus over time a society is to take steps at least to preserve the general 
level of natural abilities and to prevent the diffusion of serious defects (Rawls, 1971, p. 108)111  
So why insist on redressing unfair advantage only at the time of reaping, when HETs may put 
us at liberty to redress them at the time of sowing? 
There is something inconsistent in wilfully abstaining from intervening in a process of unfair, 
random distribution, only to then acknowledge the unfairness later on, and then feeling obliged to 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
pocket it without becoming morally stained; on the other end, if one was so lucky to be born into a happy, affluent 
family, spontaneously grows up to become cheerful, handsome, creative, intelligent and have the good fortune to 
succeed in every venture undertaken, in such a case of extremely beneficial giftedness one may indeed feel duty-
bound to ʻgive back to the communityʼ, out of which one has rather undeservedly risen to the highest ranks of 
happiness and success. So at some point and to some extent, undeserved giftedness brings about a moral duty 
to ʻshare the treasureʼ, and that is the only moral conclusion we require for our current argument. 
110
 I feel obliged to point out the fact that in her article ʻWhat is and what isnʼt wrong with enhancement?ʼ, Kamm 
(2009) misquotes Sandel as having written in his 2004 article ʻThe case against perfectionʼ: “A lively sense… that 
none of us is wholly responsible for his or her success makes us willing to share the fruits of our talents with the 
less successful” (Sandel, 2007, as misquoted in Kamm, 2009, p. 93) From ʻmakesʼ onwards, that phrase is 
nowhere to be found in Sandelʼs article, which is in fact reprinted in the same book that holds Kammʼs article 
(Savulescu & Bostrom, 2008). Luckily, Kamm (2009) does not seem to misrepresent Sandelʼs argument by this 
misquotation, but nevertheless rephrases it in a way that makes it convenient to take issue with. 
111
 Note that the ʻat leastʼ seems to allow for further development of the original position argument to include the 
possibility of human enhancement beyond the maintenance of a normal level of health and the prevention of 
diffusion of serious defects. When taking into account Rawlsʼ (1971) concept of primary goods, it may however 
turn out that procuring enhancement would only be a marginal, perhaps even negligible, redistributive concern. 
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redress that random distribution after the initial damage has been done, via the practice of the 
naturally privileged helping out the naturally underprivileged. Such an argument smacks of paternalist 
aristocracy, where, out of a half-baked moral awareness that “the natural talents that enable the 
successful to flourish are not their own doing but, rather, their good fortune” (Sandel, 2009, p. 87), a 
natural ʻgenocracyʼ or ʻgenobilityʼ (Mehlman, 2007) give a measure of charity to the naturally 
underprivileged, but at the same time categorically denies the underprivileged access to the privilege 
itself.112  
True enough, HETs could be used not only to redress natural unfairness, but for the exact 
opposite: to aggravate existing disparities in privilege, perhaps even to the extent of creating a ʻrun-
away effectʼ wherein the wealthy of today enhance themselves while the poor get left behind in their 
stunted old RHSN, resulting in a fundamental split-up of society into an enhanced ʻgenocracyʼ 
insulating itself biologically from the backwardly natural ʻgen-paupersʼ (a gloomy prospect often 
feared, see for instance Annas, Andrews, & Isasi (2002), Silver (2006) or Mehlman (2007)). The 
acceptance of HETs can thus theoretically ʻswing both waysʼ, either used as a tool to redress of what 
is perhaps the prime source of inequality, i.e. the natural lottery, or instead as a tool to strike the 
ultimate blow in separating the haves from the have-nots.113 
The moral and legal enforcement of the natural lottery as a proper institution for distributing 
capabilities in the population, however, swings only one way: it forces the populace under a 
 




 Turning to moral psychology, we can point to the resemblance to unsavory logic of the fortunate who would 
surely gladly help those less fortunate, but are scandalized by the thought of truly sharing their fortune, for of 
course, such true benevolence would make them lose their exalted position of being ʻthe naturally blessedʼ, and 
also make them lose the moral vanity of being ʻthe philanthropist heroʼ: the one that gives alms to the needy, in 
all her kindness. 
113
 Weighing the probabilities here would require firing up a sociological, political debate, which falls well beyond 
the scope of this paper. It seems starry-eyed to imagine it more likely that HETs will be used for ʻenhanced 
equalityʼ. However, certain HETs, among which a cognitive enhancer that improves executive function, seem to 
have a greater enhancing effect on people with lower-than-average capacities (Farah et al., 2004). Such findings 
could facilitate a policy to use HETs for the emancipation of the less-endowed. Another argument for such a 
policy goes that the equal or equalizing administration of HETs may prove to be a much more feasible way to aid 
the less fortunate: “In comparison with other forms of enhancement that contribute to gaps in socioeconomic 
achievement, from good nutrition to high-quality schools, neurocognitive enhancement could prove easier to 
distribute equitably” (Farah et al., 2004, p. 423). All in all, these are only meager findings, not at all capable of 
ensuring that HETs will be used to ʻenhance equalityʼ. To ensure that the introduction of HETs swings the way of 
greater equality, perhaps nothing would be more potent than an active empowerment of the less-endowed to 
stake their claim on the HETs, but that is, of course, a very tall order. 
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distributive regime where many end up not only deeply underprivileged, but also stripped from the 
right to fundamentally redress their natural incapacitation should HETs ever offer them the possibility 
to do so.114 To declare the natural lottery morally and perhaps even legally binding save for the caveat 
of curing severe illness, as many bioconservative authors advocate (Annas, Andrews, & Isasi, 2002; 
Fukuyama, 2002; Kass, 1997, 2003; Presidentʼs Council on Bioethics, 2003), thus seems highly 
contentious, as it may come across as turning a natural unfairness into a political injustice, thwarting 
fundamental rights.115 As effective HETs become available, such prohibitions might provoke moral 
outrage amongst those who see no reason to submit themselves and their children to the lottery, and 
instead wish to provide themselves with the best life possible (Savulescu, 2001; Harris, 2007).116 It is 
misguided to combat the scenario of an ʻenhanced genocracyʼ with an enforcement of the natural 
lottery. Not only is that process inherently absurd, to wilfully conserve it when proper means have 
become available to allow the moral steering of those processes, is to enact a ʻnatural genocracyʼ. On 
this general level of analysis, the only proper way to combat the ʻenhanced genocracyʼ scenario is to 
utilise the HETs in the ʻthird wayʼ politics that can be dubbed ʻenhanced equalityʼ.117 
 




 As an anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out, the genetic lottery is very complex and multi-faceted, and 
although some people come out better than others, they very rarely are genetically more advantaged throughout. 
Indeed, every person that can be thought of as having drawn a ticket in the natural lottery that yields more 
optimal determinants than average, will still have some suboptimal determinants in his ʻgenetic bundleʼ as well. 
Nevertheless, we can acknowledge this ʻmixed genetic blessingʼ argument (as well as a possible further objection 
of there being a fundamental incommensurability of different human value systems), and still argue that there are 
clear cases abound of people being, on the whole, born extremely to somewhat lucky and others born somewhat 
to extremely unlucky. And so it seems possible to retain the idea that the natural lottery does swing in only one 
way, but we must add: it swings with less force in the direction of a ʻnatural genocracyʼ than a divisive policy of 
ʻenhanced genocracyʼ might. 
115
 Of course, most bioconservative authors are deeply compassionate with the sick or otherwise incapacitated, 
and propose to soften these harms through other means, such as proper professional and societal care. 
116
 Therefore, it seems virtually impossible that pluralistic democracies could ever successfully sustain such 
categorical bans. 
117
 When analyzed to a further degree of (crucial) detail, such a policy of ʻenhanced equalityʼ is itself prone to 
many glaring dilemmas, if not outright paradoxes. For in its most superficial form, it would lead to the totalitarian 
reductio ad absurdum of having a state duty-bound to create ʻbiologically uniform citizensʼ. Nevertheless, such 
objections certainly do not discredit the basic insight that in the basic threefold set-up of ʻenhanced equalityʼ-
ʻenhanced genocracyʼ-ʻnatural genocracyʼ, the last two are fundamentally unethical, and must be dismissed at 
root. It is as clear however, that within the very general ʻenhanced equalityʼ category, many equally outrageous 





In light of these arguments, it would be most interesting to see how theories of social justice 
such as Sandelʼs (2007) can be clearly differentiated from the unsavoury position that by giving 
redistributive alms, the naturally privileged are redeemed from deeper moral qualms. Quite quizzingly, 
Sandel (2007) does conclude his article and his book (an extension of that article) ʻThe case against 
perfectionʼ, with a mention of Robert L. Sinsheimer who hints at objections similar to the ones raised 
here in his 1969 article ʻThe prospect of designed genetic changeʼ. Sandel (2007) notes how 
Sinsheimer wrote hopefully of rescuing “the losers in that chromosomal lottery that so firmly channels 
our human destinies” (Sinsheimer in Sandel, 2009, p. 88; Sinsheimer in Sandel, 2007, p. 97). 
However, he does not seriously engage with the argument. Therefore, I have made the argument for 
ʻenhanced equalityʼ more substantial here, and made the possible (but quite possibly misguided) 
unsavoury interpretation of Sandelʼs (2007) reasoning more explicit. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
equalityʼ policy become a truly coherent and ethical whole. I recommend ʻFrom chance to choice – Genetics and 
justiceʼ (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, & Wikler, 2000) as a locus classicus for this further debate, issues which are 
expanded upon in Buchananʼs new book ʻBeyond humanity?ʼ (2011). 
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Conclusion: Shouldnʼt we be natural at all? Seeing humans as Ships of 
Theseus 
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has 
released them from alien guidance, nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity (Kant, What Is 
Enlightenment?). 
In this paper, I have pursued five fundamental challenges to the idea that ʻwe ought to be 
naturalʼ, understood as the moral imperative that we ought to live by our human nature, more 
specifically our ʻrecalcitrant homo sapiens natureʼ. Such an imperative is often advanced in the ethical 
and legal debates surrounding human enhancement technologies, where it is often dismissed, 
sometimes out of hand, by applying the apparent knock-down argument that is ʻthe naturalistic 
fallacyʼ: 
[There are] those who argue for a distinct essence, a kind of template of humanity that somehow is 
in there as a core that cannot be touched or changed or manipulated without loss of who we are – 
they are nervous conservatives who worry that the bearings will be lost if we admit that what we 
are is a jumbled set of mishmash traits evolved and designed to handle a random environment 
from the past that we donʼt have to care about any more. The antimeliorists are making the 
conceptual error, that the way we are is the way we should be. Iʼm submitting that what we know 
from evolution, from Darwinʼs day on, is that the way we are is an interesting accident. And it tells 
us certain things about what will make us function well, but it doesnʼt tell us anything about the way 
we should be or what we should become or how we should decide to change ourselves (Caplan, 
2006, p. 38). 
Potent as that basic argument may be, it clearly does not convince many authors who remain 
avid, principled ʻantimelioristsʼ or ʻbioconservativesʼ. Against this backdrop and to enliven the 
entrenched debate, I have attempted to marshal the following more or less off-beat arguments as to 
why we should not consider ourselves morally obliged to conserve our RHSN, thus ʻflogging the dead 
horse of natureʼs normativity, with a twistʼ: 
1. As we undertake open-ended worthy pursuits such as the search for truth and physical 
prowess, aspects of our RHSN will at some point come to hinder those pursuits, and 
eventually arrest progression further down the line. 
2. If we analyze the inner traits of our RHSN, we discover numerous trappings in it that 
require alteration if we wish to succeed in living the way we morally want to. 
3. Even if our RHSN were a noble thing and/or a benign creation, a gift for which we owe 
humble thanks, that idea alone does not imply that we should maintain the natural status 
quo. Quite possibly, we might be mandated to not squander that gift, and make 
something more of it according to a higher moral plan. 
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4. As ʻinvasive proceduresʼ, HETs acutely confront us with the extent to which our mental 
life and our sense of identity emerge out of material processes. This deeply challenges 
the ʻdualistic delusionʼ that is central to our conventional self-understanding as ʻfree 
agents, worthy of praise or blameʼ. However, HETs nevertheless make us more free and 
more responsible for ourselves: they allow us to choose for ourselves some of the 
material determinants that make up who we are, thus to some extent freeing us from 
emerging out of material determinants that we previously had to accept in full passivity.118  
 
5. HETs can be thought of as means to gain unfair advantage, and more generally, allowing 
HETs may come to erode the sense of ʻundeserved giftednessʼ which Sandel (2007) 
considers to be the basis of solidarity of the natural haves for the natural have-nots. 
However, HETs may (perhaps improbably, but still) be put to an opposite use as well, to 
ʻlevel the natural playing fieldʼ. On the contrary, declaring the ʻnatural lotteryʼ morally or 
legally binding seems to set the ʻbrute luck at birthʼ in stone, denying the naturally 
incapacitated to gain through HETs what they were gainsaid by nature. 
Should we then simply do away with human nature altogether? No, not at all. The given 
arguments only serve to dispel the belief in there being an intrinsic value encapsulated somewhere in 
 




 A promising follow-up argument I will examine in further research is this: perhaps we do not want to have to 
consider ourselves to be so deeply responsible for who we are. Such a desire for passivity may explain some of 
the bioconservative resistance to HETs. For instance, Sandel (2007) candidly admits that “the real problem is the 
explosion, not the erosion, of responsibility. As humility gives way, responsibility expands to daunting proportions. 
We attribute less to chance and more to choice…One of the blessings of seeing ourselves as creatures of nature, 
God, or fortune is that we are not wholly responsible for the way we are” (p. 87). But there are good reasons to 
assume that such ʻruthlessʼ freedom seems inescapable: if we choose to continue letting ʻnature take its 
spontaneous courseʼ, it will be us choosing so. The ʻspontaneousʼ, ʻnaturalʼ process will thus necessarily pass 
through a human decision procedure. So it seems that “paradoxically, nature brought within human control is no 
longer nature” (Buchanan et al., 2000, p. 84). Expanding this argument may have profound repercussions for, 
inter alia, the question whether it is at all possible not to make designer babies in a world where HETs are readily 
available, considering that the ʻnatural babiesʼ will just as much be the outcome of their parentsʼ or their stateʼs 
choices, in casu ʻdesigningʼ them as ʻnaturalʼ. In any case it would seem that children, when coming of age, will 
confront their parents with their reproductive responsibility either way. They may ask: ʻwhy did you deliberately 
enhance me?ʼ Or they may ask: ʻwhy did you deliberately keep me natural?ʼ Chances are they will feel ʻdesignedʼ 
on both occasions, a thought that has led Sloterdijk (1999) to (somewhat cryptically) declare every child born in 
the age of enhancement to be “convicted to trust” (p. 7). In a forthcoming paper, I will zoom in on this specific 
issue of ʻresponsibility explosionʼ and the unsettling possibility that this explosion may be inevitable. 
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our RHSN, “a core that cannot be touched or changed or manipulated without loss of who we are”, as 
Caplan (2006, p. 38) put it. Such a dispelling does not at all imply that we must ban all natural 
features from our sense of identity and uphold a puritan conception of ourselves as purely abstracted, 
free and rational minds. True, in part we are such ʻfree-floatingʼ minds, but we are also nestled deep 
within a staggeringly intricate homo sapiens biological constitution. As a result, we of course seek out 
specifically human experiences, such as family love, friendship, compassion, artistic flights of fantasy, 
the pursuit of truth, great sex and great food, and we rightfully seek to fill our lives with such 
experiences that are, in a very broad sense, ʻspecies-typicalʼ. Thus, it is trivially, albeit importantly true 
that we can inflict harm on ourselves and others if we pursue misguided goals that go too deeply 
against the grain of our recalcitrant nature. That nature therefore, does have an important derivative 
value (Bayertz, 2003; Singer, 2000).  
That being said, our RHSN is no “seamless web [where] severing one fiber is likely to result in 
the whole thing unravelling” (Buchanan, 2009, p. 147). Such a ʻhigh-strungʼ, categorically conservative 
stance would require “empirical evidence, not armchair speculation” (Buchanan, 2009, p. 147) to 
discount each specific enhancement scenario, which more often than not, is not readily provided by 
bioconservative authors. Such knee-jerk conservatism cannot be taken at face value, as the historical 
record shows that many important innovations that are now completely integrated in our ʻnaturalʼ way 
of life have provoked hysteria and fears of debasement at the time of their introduction – from 
vaccination to organ transplantation, from contraceptives to in vitro fertilisation (IVF).  
Innovation frequently involves enormous serendipity. As technologies come to influence our 
existence ever more profoundly, we should continuously re-assess whether they, on the whole, really 
do serve us right, and do not impoverish our lives more than they enrich them – a technological ʻart of 
livingʼ should be on our minds daily in our plane-flying, internet-surfing, pill-popping lives. Arguably, as 
an ethical rule of thumb the ʻinvasive proceduresʼ of HET merit extra caution, not in the least to 
counterbalance the impatient ʻextra enthusiasmʼ of the transhumanists, brought on by the promise of 
HETs to finally “debestialize humanity” (Sloterdijk, 1999, p. 29).  
To maintain a basic sense of species identity to carry with us during this shaky but certain 
ʻexodusʼ out of our troubled homo sapiens beginnings, a variation on the identity riddle of the Ship of 
Theseus may do us justice. Human nature can be thought of as a wooden ship we find ourselves on, 
sea-worthy so far but certainly improvable. Inventive and industrious as we are, we contrive all sorts 
of ways to not only replace worn parts, but to put new and improved parts in their place. Our process 
of improving self-change is open-ended in two distinct senses: in principle we may replace all possible 
parts of our boat, thus becoming deeply self-shaped, and deeply responsible for who we are; and in 
principle we may also improve all possible parts any way we might want to, bound only by the self-
imposed restraints that we conserve its coherence so as to keep ourselves afloat, and that we 
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Abstract Robots bear similarities to other technologies whose safety and appropriate use has been 
addressed by existing ethical standards, professional codes, laws, and regulations. But engineers are 
continually discovering ways to implement new capabilities. The applications for which robots will be used 
are expanding rapidly. Robots with even limited sensitivity to ethical considerations and the ability to factor 
those considerations into their choices and actions will open up new markets. However, if they fail to 
adequately accommodate human laws and values in their behaviour, there will be demands for regulations 
that limit their use.   
Many of the anticipated ethical, legal, and policy challenges arising from the use of robots for new 
applications can be addressed incrementally. It will, however, be important to also keep an eye on the 
broader societal impact of introducing robots into the home, the battlefield, and the commerce of daily life. 
Over the next twenty years, stand-alone robots, and robotic technologies in combination with 
neurotechnologies and other emerging technologies will contribute to a transformation of human culture. 
We will be confronted with the difficult challenge of not just monitoring and managing individual 
technologies that are each developing rapidly, but also the convergence of many technologies. 
Keywords robot, artificial agent, machine ethics, emerging technology, decision making 
Introduction 
The specific ethical and legal challenges posed by robotics must be considered within the context of 
the broader societal impact of emerging technologies. The public is generally fascinated by new 
technologies, and perceives technology as an engine of both promise and productivity. But there is also 
considerable disquiet as to whether we are surrendering the future to a juggernaut of change that will 
decimate cherished values and institutions. This disquiet is evident in the worldwide prohibition on human 
cloning, restrictions upon the sale of genetically modified foods in the EU, controversy regarding research 
using embryonic stem cells in the U.S., and international regulations prohibiting athletes from using human 
growth hormones and drugs that enhance performance. Technological innovation offers countless rewards, 
but also poses dangers that are difficult to predict. How will humanity navigate the promise and perils of the 
bio-tech, info-tech, and nano-tech revolution?  
The various fields (genomics, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, information technology and robotics, 
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regenerative medicine, and neuroscience) that are contributing to this revolution overlap and converge. The 
overlap and convergence of research in neuroscience and artificial intelligence will be given particular 
attention in this article.  
Computational neuroscience has become an important tool for revealing information processing 
properties of various structures within the nervous system. Computer simulations provide laboratories for 
testing various theories about mental activity. Findings in neuroscience inform strategies for developing 
discrete cognitive capabilities in AI. The computational theory of mind drives hypotheses regarding the 
likelihood of reproducing human intelligence artificially. In turn, critics of the contention that mental activity 
can be reduced to its computational components are pressed to sharpen their arguments, as are critics of 
the hypothesis that human-level intelligence and consciousness can be reproduced artificially. The 
convergence of robotics and neuroscience will be realised with the development of advanced 
neuroprosthetics, in the creation of robots with higher-level cognitive capabilities and artificial general 
intelligence, and with the emergence of a culture of techno sapiens, individuals who utilise information 
technology and neurotechnologies to enhance their capabilities.  
Television required thirteen years to reach an audience of 50,000,000 while the Internet required only 
four years. Few predicted the speedy growth of the Internet and even faster adoption of smart telephones, 
two innovative technologies that have transformed behaviour, communications, entertainment, and 
education. Michael Polanyi and Karl Popper, two 20th century philosophers of science, recognised that 
scientific progress can be unpredictable. This is often presumed to mean that scientific development is also 
ungovernable. Indeed, Popper (1945) and Polanyi (1951) were also both concerned with the dangers posed 
by any governmental attempts to direct the development of science and restrict the freedom of scientific 
enquiry.  
Nevertheless, the desire to maximise the societal benefits derived from science has always been 
weighted against the need to minimise harms. Governments are heavily involved in directing scientific 
development in the form of capital investment and through regulations and regulatory oversight directed at 
public health, human subjects research, the oversight of animals used in research, the safety of goods and 
services, the safety of laboratory workers, and, more recently, biosecurity. Criminal and tort law, insurance 
regulations, professional codes of conduct, guidelines for laboratory practices and procedures, and other 
strategies for soft governance contribute to a relatively robust system of protections. Deriving benefits from 
research in genomics and nanotechnology while protecting the public against harms caused by exposure to 
toxic nanoparticles, pathogenic organisms, or potentially dangerous genetically modified foods has received 
particular attention over the past decade. Addressing new challenges is largely a piecemeal process of 
adding new laws and regulatory agencies as needed. Existing policy mechanisms can also be modified. 
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Debate is underway, for example, regarding whether regulations on research ethics should be lowered to 
allow field-testing of GM plants for medical applications (growing inexpensive antibiotics), or raised to prohibit 
animal enhancements or research on synthetic biology.
119
 There are, however, serious questions as to 
whether the cumulative impact of emerging technologies will overwhelm the piecemeal, incremental 
approach to monitoring and managing their development.  
This article will be an exercise in foresight, planning, and anticipatory governance. The unpredictable 
course of technological development should not be interpreted as meaning that planning is futile. Social 
theorists such as Arizona State Universityʼs David Guston challenge the assumption that unpredictable 
should be equated with ungovernable. Anticipatory knowledge, including predictable trends, can result from 
analysis of how specific technologies are likely to be used. In turn, this knowledge can contribute to 
formulating public policy. Given the potential of emerging technologies to cause considerable harms there is 
a serious need to develop methodologies for anticipatory governance (Guston, 2010).  
But it is probably naive to expect legislators to act upon anticipatory knowledge. Unfortunately, 
legislative attention to technological concerns is commonly held in abeyance until forced by unanticipated 
disasters. From thalidomide babies to the Chernobyl meltdown, technology has been complicit in crisis after 
crisis. Most recently, information technology (IT) played a significant role in the derivative crisis and the ʻflash 
crash.ʼ While not caused by IT, the BP oil spill, like the Challenger disaster, is an example of a crisis resulting 
from the difficulty in managing complex systems. The acceleration of scientific development and the inherent 
difficulties of managing complex systems mean that tragedies, crises, and catastrophes in which technology 
will be complicit are likely to escalate during the coming decades. When a disaster has occurred, emotions 
run high and the time for balanced reflection contracts. However, foresight and planning prepares scholars 
and other interested parties in presenting developed proposals when the time for action is at hand.  
My discussion will focus upon societal, ethical, and policy challenges arising from robotics, but will 
also address a few instances of where robotics and neurotechnologies converge in the form of enhanced 
humans or techno sapiens. The risks posed by emerging technologies fall within three broad categories: 
1. Specific discernible risks that can be largely addressed through innovation, regulation, and soft 
governance.  
2. Far-reaching societal impacts arising from the various ways in which emerging technologies will 
be combined.  
 




 Particular attention has been given to synthetic biology, with recent reports from the European Group on Ethics 
(Capurro et al., 2009) and the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (Gutmann et al., 2010). The 
more recent Presidential Commission made a few recommendations but found “…no reason to endorse additional 
federal regulations or a moratorium on work in this field at this time.” 
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3. Existential risks – “where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating 
intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential” (Bostrom, 2002). 
These categories are not mutually exclusive, but they are useful for framing the discussion. The 
existential risks are beginning to be popularised by the media, while most scholars and legal theorists direct 
their energies toward managing specific risks. Where more attention can and should be directed is upon 
monitoring and managing the impact of technologies that will be combined in ways that will have far-reaching 
societal consequences.  
Certainty, most of the specific societal challenges arising from the development of robots and 
neurotechnologies are similar to ethical and legal challenges in other realms for which laws and legislation 
have already been forged. Manufacturers of present day robots face the same safety and liability concerns 
that confront companies that market other tools and devices. Testing and distribution of 
neuropharmaceuticals and neuroprosthetics fall within the canons for research and medical ethics. So in 
what sense are the ethical and legal challenges posed by robots and neurotechnologies new? This is among 
the questions I will explore.  
I am generally skeptical about contentions that emerging technologies will threaten human existence 
in the not-too-distant future. But for the purposes of this narrative, I will begin with a discussion of the 
existential risks, then turn to specific discernible risks, and finish with a discussion of the combinatorial 
impact of emerging technologies. 
Existential Risks 
Existential risks are speculative threats such as designer pathogens that could wipe out humanity. The 
poster children for existential risks associated with robotics are an unfriendly technological singularity and 
grey goo120. Grey goo, first noted by Eric Drexler (1986, chapter 11)) and later popularised by Bill Joy (2000), 
is a not entirely fanciful notion that self-reproducing nanomachines would eat up all the carbon-based matter 
leaving the earth covered in a three foot deep sludge of identical tiny machines. The singularity, a time when 
machines would equal and then exceed human intelligence, was conceptualised by the mathematician I.J. 
Good (1965), named and developed by the science fiction writer and mathematician Vernor Vinge (1993), 
and popularised in recent years by the inventor Ray Kurzweil (2006). An unfriendly singularity refers to the 
concern that computers or robots, which are more intelligent than humans, may not be interested in human 
welfare. (In the remainder of this article, I will use the spelling ʻ(ro)botsʼ when referring to both physical robots 
and intelligent ʻbotsʼ within computer networks.) One possibility is that super-intelligent machines will be 
 
                                                      
 
 
120 Grey goo is a possibility often associated with nanotechnology, as tiny nanomachines or nanobots are likely to be the 
product of molecular engineering rather than IT. 
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antagonistic to humans. But a more serious challenge may be actions taken by intelligent (ro)bots in single-
minded pursuit of their own goals, which threaten human existence.  
Humanity would presumably resist the development of technologies that pose clear existential risks. 
That of course assumes that (a) we perceive these threats early enough, and (b) we can agree upon an 
approach for stopping or redirecting the potentially threatening research. There is certainly plenty of hype 
that AI and other technologies pose near-term (20-100 years) existential risks. But without clear-cut evidence 
that a particular area of research will cause harms, there will be economic and political pressures to proceed 
with the development of technologies that offer societal benefits. Speculative risks do not carry much weight 
in the formulation of public policy. How many of us in either Europe or the U.S., for example, would have 
been willing to stop all progress in genetics or computer science over the past half century based on 1950’s 
fears of giant locust and robot takeovers?  
Furthermore, it will be difficult to forge international agreements for regulating or relinquishing the 
development of most technologies given the differences in values from country to country. For example, the 
European Union has codified the precautionary principle121, while in the American context there tends to be a 
faith that a ʻtechnological fixʼ will be available for most, if not all, challenges. Countries with more stringent 
precautionary policies are likely to be at a competitive disadvantage in reaping the benefits of potentially 
transformational technologies, while a more open policy could expose the citisenry to the introduction of 
dangerous products. This, of course, is not a new issue. It informs policy debate in every country as 
legislatures struggle to balance public safety against economic growth.  
There is certainly a need for public education and for the public to engage in a conversation about the 
longer-term course of technological development. However, it is unclear whether such a conversation can 
yield practical results within countries with very heterogeneous populations.122 Competing philosophies, 
religious beliefs, and cultural narratives will defuse the prospect of formulating clear policy goals. 
Nevertheless, in a democratic society the public should give at least tacit approval to the futures it is creating. 
One serious concern is the likelihood that any discussion of existential risk will be highly politicised. If 
 
                                                      
 
 
121 Paragraph 2 of article 191 of the Lisbon Treaty (COM, 2000) states that, “Union policy on the environment shall aim at 
a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be 
based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.” Since adoption, this communication 
has come to inform policy beyond the environment including laws related to genetically modified foods and technological 
development. 
122 Arizona State University (Guston, 2000; Hamlett, Cobb, & Guston, 2009) has experimented with the Danish 
consensus conference model (Grundahl, 1995) as a tool for representative public engagement spanning the many 
cultures of the United States. 
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tacit approval is lacking, tensions will periodically erupt, 
and could potentially lead to crises that undermine social 
stability. The debates over the fate of Terri Schiavo and 
funding for stem cell research were two such mini-crises in 
the U.S., and may be harbingers of social tensions to 
come. At their best, such crises are valuable opportunities 
for public education. When values conflict, the public has 
an occasion to work through the issues and establish new 
priorities. At their worst, these crises become politicised in 
a manner where there is more heat than light. James J. 
Hughes (2004) argues that the enhancement debate is 
likely to become a central dividing issue in American 
politics.  
In conclusion, reflection upon longer-term existential 
risks is a fascinating subject that touches upon many of 
the great philosophical and ethical questions. The 
conversation can yield broad generally shared societal values and guidelines, but in the absence of a 
specific threat is unlikely to lead to substantive public policy. 
The probable, the plausible and the highly speculative possibilities 
The speed at which emerging technologies are developing is a central issue in determining when and 
if additional mechanisms for their oversight are necessary. There is tremendous confusion regarding which 
technological possibilities are probable and which are highly speculative. This confusion is rampant not only 
within the general public, but also among experts. Prognostications as to when, or if, a technological 
singularity or self-reproducing nanomachines are possible vary from 30 to 200 years or never.  
A theory that exponential growth is accelerating the pace of technological development (Kurzweil, 
2006) is gaining currency among a vocal community of scientists, futurists, and young adults. The theory 
focuses on trends where information technologies are expanding exponentially, while costs such as 
computing capacity and gene sequencing are contracting exponentially. These trends are then projected into 
the future to make predictions as to what can be expected over the next 5-50 years.  
On a line graph, a mild slope represents exponential growth in its early phases over an extended 
period of time. But eventually the slope shifts upward representing a pattern of accelerating growth.  
Certainly not all trends show this accelerated upward shift. But the model of accelerating growth is 
very difficult to challenge, in that any trend line that does not show a pattern of rapid acceleration may merely 
represent an early phase of expansion. In other words, exponential change is a theory that is difficult to 
falsify. 
Other theories, such as a somewhat simplistic computational theory of mind, are marshaled to support 
the view that (ro)bots with human-like cognitive abilities are on the near horizon. By 2013 a supercomputer 
Figure 1: © mathwarehouse.com 
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will be completed that rivals the computation capacity of the human brain. But there is considerable 
disagreement as to whether such landmarks signal that robots with human intelligence are in the near-future.  
In the more optimistic projections of accelerating change there is a tendency to aggrandise the 
character and capacities of our presumed evolutionary successors who we will create over the next few 
decades. This is often accompanied by a tendency to pathologise human nature, a position supported by 
research in the cognitive sciences that accentuates evolutionarily bequeathed flaws. Together these two 
positions reinforce an implicit bias that creating our evolutionary successors, whether artificial or biological, is 
a ʻgoodʼ in itself. 
The academic community tends to be much more skeptical regarding the pace of scientific discovery. 
To be sure, there are many funding proposals where the prospects for dramatic breakthroughs are hyped. 
But even in a climate of ongoing scientific progress, the research community remains cognisant of a history 
of unfulfilled predictions. 
Mediating between the more radical visions of futurists who perceive exponential change and the more 
conservative visions of scholars working in specific fields is incredibly difficult. I share in the skepticism that 
many of the more dramatic futuristic scenarios will not be possible within the next 20-40 years. But I do 
believe we need credible mechanisms for monitoring technological developments, and for flagging when 
thresholds are about to be crossed that hold serious risks for humanity. At present there are no good 
mechanisms in place to help either the public or scholars discriminate the probable from the plausible, the 
unpredictable, and the highly unlikely scenarios. 
Robotics: Specific ethical and legal concerns 
Legal theorists and philosophers have been intrigued for years by the thought experiment of when, or 
if, future robots might be granted legal rights, or be designated legal persons responsible for their own 
choices and actions (Lehman-Wilzig, 1981; Solum, 1992; Calverley, 2005). But there is also beginning to be 
a small body of scholarship that analyses more near-term issues for the robotics industry.  
The introduction of robots into the home, the battlefield, and the commerce of daily life poses an array 
of societal, ethical, legal, and policy challenges. Indeed, limited purpose robots have been proposed for all 
kinds of human activity. Drones and unmanned ground vehicles developed for the military are being 
marketed to local police forces. Surveillance drones, some smaller than birds, will be a nightmare for 
administering the safety of aviation. Driverless cars, cooks, and caregivers are under development. Robots 
that care for the elderly and homebound are a high priority for countries such as Japan.123 The array of 
 
                                                      
 
 
123 Many companies throughout the world are designing service and domestic robots. Robot caregivers will be 





applications for robots will also entail a vast array of ethical and legal considerations that must be addressed. 
The central concerns are subsumed within four interrelated themes: (a) safety, (b) appropriate use, (c) 
capability, and (d) responsibility.  
Safety has always been of importance to the engineers who build systems. Existing legal frameworks 
largely cover the legal challenges posed by present day robots. The robots that have been developed so far 
are sophisticated machines whose safety is clearly the responsibility of the companies that produce the 
devices and of the end users who adapt the technology for particular tasks.  
Social and ethical theorists have raised a number of questions regarding which tasks are appropriate 
for robots. Some find the use of robots as sex toys offensive. Others lament the sensibilities and lessons lost 
in substituting robopets and robocompanions for animals or people (Sparrow, 2002; Turkle, Taggart, Kidd, & 
Daste, 2006). From a humanistic perspectives, turning to robotic caregivers for the homebound and elderly is 
perceived as abusive or reflecting badly upon modern society, although robotic care is arguably better than 
no care at all. One dangerous practice is the increasing use of robonannies, robots that tend infants and 
children. Noel and Amanda Sharkey (2010) argue that the extensive use of robots as nannies, and 
companions for infants, may actually stunt emotional and intellectual development.  
The appropriateness and ability of robots to serve as caregivers is commonly misunderstood by the 
public or misrepresented by those marketing the systems. The limited abilities of present day robotic devices 
can be obscured by the human tendency to anthropomorphise robots whose looks or behaviour is faintly 
similar to that of humans. There is a need for a professional association or regulatory commission that 
evaluates the capabilities of systems and certifies their use for specific activities. This is likely to be very 
expensive, as the development of each robotic platform is a moving target – existing capabilities are 
undergoing refinement and new capabilities are constantly being added to systems. 
The diminution of privacy and property rights is already a focus for computer ethics and theorists 
working on information and Internet law. Robots will exacerbate those concerns. For example, introducing 
robots into the home and other social settings raises privacy risks similar to those posed by surveillance 
cameras. Robots will have both sensors and large drives that can record all the data they collect. This data 
offers a benefit in that it can be analysed if anything goes wrong. But it will also be a record of all private 
activity within range of the sensors. No doubt the hard drives within robots and networks will be subpoenaed 
for everything from criminal investigations to custody battles. Data stored on robots that are connected to the 
Internet, as most are likely to be, may be accessible for a variety of criminal purposes (Denning et al., 
2009).124  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
limit bringing in domestic workers from other countries.  
124 Tamara Denning, Tadayoshi Kohno, Karl Koscher, William Maisel, and colleagues at the University of Washington 
have already demonstrated that the cameras and sensors in a robotpet can be hacked to gain real-time visual and 
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Limiting liability 
With the increasing complexity of robotic systems, designers and engineers of a device cannot always 
predict how they will act when confronted with new situations and new inputs. ʻMany handsʼ will have 
contributed to the building of a robot (Nissenbaum, 1996). The full operation of each hardware component in 
a system will only be understood by those who designed and built that component, and even they may have 
little or no understanding of how that component might interact with other components in a totally new 
device. The pressures to complete projects and the cost of testing also contribute to limited understanding of 
the potential risks inherent in new devices.  
Of course credible manufacturers do not want to be held liable for marketing faulty devices. They may 
elect to avoid releasing products whose safe use they have no way of guaranteeing. For a society banking 
on the productivity improvements that transformative technology such as robots offer, this could be perceived 
as a heavy burden on innovation and a heavier price to pay for systems whose risks are low but whose 
benefits are significant. Indeed, other countries with higher bars to litigation would be likely to take a lead in 
robot technologies as manufacturers wait for liability law to be sorted out in their own country.  
Manufacturers will certainly welcome measures that lower their liability. As a means of spurring 
industry growth and innovation, Ryan Calo (2010) has proposed immunising manufacturers of open robotic 
platforms from all actions related to improvements made by third parties. But any approach to limiting liability 
must be balanced against insuring that industry does not knowingly introduce dangerous products.  
No-fault insurance for robots is another approach that could lower manufacturerʼs liability. Consider 
driverless cars, such as the one Google has developed. Even if driverless cars are much safer than those 
driven by humans, robot-chasing attorneys are likely to initiate suits for each death in which a robotic car is 
involved. All new technologies face similar challenges. Free societies have an array of laws, regulations, 
insurance policies, and precedents that help protect industries from frivolous lawsuits. Companies pursuing 
the huge commercial market in robotics will protect their commercial interests by relying on the existing 
frameworks and by petitioning legislatures for additional laws that help manage their liability.  
Difficulty in establishing responsibility for harms 
The Challenger disaster is a case study in the difficulty of determining cause and responsibility for the 
failure of complex systems. Millions of dollars were spent before investigators established that the culprit was 
the brittleness of tiny o-rings in cold weather. Later, investigators questioned whether precautionary 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
auditory access to activity in the petʼs location. More alarmingly, they have hacked and altered heart pacemakers (Maisel 
& Kohno, 2010) and the software in automobile computers that regulates braking and other functions (Koscher et al., 
2010). Kohno believes that every topic in computer science can have a security-related twist. 
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measures would have uncovered a flaw like this in the design of the system. In reviewing that research, 
Malcolm Gladwell writes, “we have constructed a world in which the potential for high-tech catastrophe is 
embedded in the fabric of day-to-day life” (1996). 
Manufacturers will encourage an appreciation for the difficulty in establishing responsibility for complex 
intelligent systems as a way of diluting or mitigating liability for system failures. Simultaneously, practical 
ethicists and social theorist are raising concerns as to the dangers inherent in diluting corporate and human 
responsibility, accountability, and liability for the actions of increasingly autonomous systems. Recently, five 
rules have been proposed as a means of reestablishing the principle that humans cannot be excused from 
moral responsibility for the design, development, or deployment of computing artefacts.125  
Rule 1: The people who design, develop, or deploy a computing artefact are morally responsible for 
that artefact, and for the foreseeable effects of that artefact. This responsibility is shared with other people 
who design, develop, deploy or knowingly use the artefact as part of a sociotechnical system. 
Rule 2: The shared responsibility of computing artefacts is not a zero-sum game. The responsibility of 
an individual is not reduced simply because more people become involved in designing, developing, 
deploying or using the artefact. Instead, a personʼs responsibility includes being answerable for the 
behaviours of the artefact and for the artefactʼs effects after deployment, to the degree to which these effects 
are reasonably foreseeable by that person. 
Rule 3: People who knowingly use a particular computing artefact are morally responsible for that use. 
Rule 4: People who knowingly design, develop, deploy, or use a computing artefact can do so 
responsibly only when they make a reasonable effort to take into account the sociotechnical systems in 
which the artefact is embedded.  
Rule 5: People who design, develop, deploy, promote, or evaluate a computing arteact should not 
explicitly or implicitly deceive users about the artefact or its foreseeable effects, or about the sociotechnical 
systems in which the artefact is embedded. 
The rules are broad in scope. Their application would not be easy, and might significantly slow the 
development of the robotics industry. For example, the rules propose that those who develop and market 
computing artefacts are morally responsible for the foreseeable ways in which the artefact might be used. If 
this standard were codified in law, the manufacturer of a gun would be accountable for its use in a murder, 
and the manufacturer of cigarettes accountable for lung cancer. 
Whether rules, such as those proposed for computing artefacts can or should be translated into liability 
law remains an open question. There is a difficult policy debate ahead. Should accountability and liability for 
 
                                                      
 
 
125 The full document titled, Moral Responsibility for Computing Artifacts, defines terms and explains the rules. It can be 
accessed at https://edocs.uis.edu/kmill2/www/TheRules/. 
From robots to techno sapiens 
271 
computing artefacts be lowered in order to stimulate the development of a potentially transformational 
industry? Or, should existing protections be maintained even if this arrests the willingness of companies to 
introduce products that offer significant benefits with low or uncertain risks?  
Placing decisions made by (ro)bots ahead of human intelligence is a mistake. While IT systems may 
exceed human intelligence in some aspects such as searching large databases, they are a long way off from 
matching human intelligence in so many other dimensions. Unfortunately, humans are uncomfortable in 
going against the recommendations of semi-intelligent systems. Human decision makers need to be 
empowered when they have the courage to override the actions or suggestions of robotic systems. Claims 
that robots have the capabilities to make superior decisions, or even function as safe substitutes for human 
agents in social contexts should be examined skeptically. 
Moral machines 
If robots can be designed so that they are sensitive to ethical considerations and factor those 
considerations into their choices and actions, new markets for their adoption will be opened up. However, if 
they fail to adequately accommodate human laws and values, there will be demands for regulations that limit 
their use. 
A new field of inquiry variously known as machine ethics, machine morality, computational ethics, 
artificial morality, and friendly AI has emerged in response to the advent of increasingly autonomous (ro)bots. 
When designers and engineers can no longer anticipate how intelligence systems will act when confronted 
with new situations and new inputs, it becomes necessary for the (ro)bots themselves to evaluate the 
appropriateness or legality of various courses of action.  
Machine ethics (ME) should be distinguished from robot ethics. While the latter addresses societal 
concerns in the deployment of robots, ME considers the prospects for developing machines that are explicit 
moral reasoners. Initially, (ro)bots capable of making moral decisions will function within contexts where their 
freedom of action is limited. However, as autonomy increases (ro)bots may eventually evolve into artificial 
moral agents (AMAs hereafter). But there are many issues as to whether (ro)bots can acquire the full 
intelligence and moral acumen to actually be considered true moral agents. Many thresholds, both 
technological and philosophical, must be crossed between here and there. Some of the thresholds looming 
may turn out to be ceilings that define limits to the intelligence and moral understanding of (ro)bots.  
Operational morality and appropriate behaviour 
The chart below will be helpful for appreciating the development of (ro)bots as autonomy and 
sensitivity to moral considerations expands.  
All technology can be viewed as falling within this chart. A hammer has neither sensitivity nor 
autonomy. A thermostatic has some sensitivity to temperature and the autonomy to turn a furnace or fan on 
or off when a threshold has been reached. 
Most of the robotic devices available or being developed are operationally moral in the sense that the 




behaviour is programmed 
into the systems.  
Appropriate behaviour 
What kinds of 
behaviour are appropriate 
for a robot? Whose 
values or what values 
should be instantiated in 
a robotic device? A few 
years back the 
manufacturer of a 
speaking robot doll 
considered what the doll 
should do if treated 
abusively by a child. The 
engineers knew how to 
build sensors into the doll 
that would alert the 
system to such behaviour. After analyzing the issues and consulting with lawyers they decided that the doll 
would say and do nothing. 
How should a robot caregiver perform in an ethically charged situ-ation? What should a robot do if an 
elderly patient refuses medi-cine?126 Or, what if the robot enters a room and dis-covers the person under its 
supervision is hysterical? How would the robot know that the fear on the face of its charge was caused by 
the robot itself or by some other factor? 
Consider a robot that is the companion of a young child or teenager. Should the robot intervene if the 
child puts itself in harms way? Are there circumstances where inappropriate intervention by the robot might 
do some harm? Would programming a robot to tell a child to stop abusing himself be a good or a bad idea? 
What if the child ignores the directive? Should the robot discipline the child? A robot that instructs but cannot 
follow up with discipline may well be teaching the wrong lessons. But a robot that disciplines is not likely to 
 
                                                      
 
 
126 Michael and Susan Anderson (2008) have addressed the ethical considerations regarding what to do if a patient 
refuses medicines in designing software that they have implemented in both a computer system and in a robot. 
Figure 2: Plotting ethical sensitivity and autonomy in robots 
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instill trust.127 
How should a robot nanny respond to a child that relates to the nanny in a way that would be 
inappropriate or even physically violent if the nanny were human? Would you want the robot to say, ʻStop 
that! You are hurting me,ʼ presuming (as is probable) that the robot has no capacity to feel pain? While well 
intentioned, such a statement by a robot is absurd, and could lead to unintended consequences. There are 
countless similar situation that could arise.  
Robots will be able to mechanically discern certain ethical challenges, presuming that the designers 
and engineers anticipate the challenge and program in an appropriate response. But one response may not 
suit everyone. Some parents might want a robot to tell a youngster to ʻstopʼ if she is relating to the robot in 
ways that would hurt a human. Other parents would reject having a robot dispense a reprimand. Software 
could be designed and implemented that made it a user option (parental choice) as to the manner in which a 
robot caregiver would respond to a child in ethically charged situations. During setup, parents would be 
introduced to a variety of ethically charged situations. They could be informed about the ramifications of 
different alternatives, and the responsibility they were taking on in placing the child in situations where a 
robot might need to take such actions. This proposal requires further thought, but a setup procedure would 
provide an excellent opportunity for manufacturers of companion robots to educate parents on what they 
could and could not expect from such devices. The parents get a little education on the proper use of 
robonanny, and the manufacturer protects itself from certain forms of liability. 
The plethora of such new ethical challenges will hopefully alert leaders of industry to the importance of 
making ethical considerations an integral aspect of the design process. It is heartening that schools of 
engineering have gone beyond giving lip service to professional ethics, and have become truly concerned 
with ensuring that their students are sensitised to the societal impact of the products they design. The next 
step lies in applied ethicists joining the design process, not as naysayers, but as members of the team 
looking for ways to engineer solutions to societal and ethical challenges. Philosopher Helen Nissenbaum 
(2001) calls this ʻengineering activismʼ. 
Functional morality 
Robots capable of even limited autonomous activity will need to factor an array of considerations in 
determining what behaviour is appropriate or legal when confronted with difficult ethical challenges. The field 
of machine morality is largely concerned with the approaches and procedures used by the (ro)bot to make 
 
                                                      
 
 
127 A version of this discussion and the remaining paragraphs in this section appeared in an article (Wallach, 2010) 




such judgments. I have written about this subject extensively, so I will only mention a few brief details 
here.128  
The approaches for implementing moral decision-making capabilities in robots fall within two broad 
categories, top-down and bottom-up (Allen, Smit, & Wallach, 2006). Top-down refers to the implementation 
of rules, principles, or moral decision-making procedures, such as utilitarianism, Kantʼs categorical 
imperative, the Ten Commandments, Hinduismʼs yama and niyama, and even Asimovʼs laws. A top-down 
approach takes an antecedently specified ethical theory and analyses its computation requirements to guide 
the design of algorithms and subsystems capable of implementing the theory. Bottom-up approaches take 
their inspiration from evolutionary psychology and game theory, as well as developmental psychology and 
theories of moral development. Bottom-up approaches, if they use a prior theory at all, do so only as a way 
of specifying the task for the system, but not as a way of specifying an implementation method or control 
structure. 
Both top-down and bottom-up approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. For example, 
principles defined broadly can cover countless situations, but if too broad or too abstract their application to 
specific challenges will be debatable. Bottom-up approaches are particularly good at dynamically integrating 
input from discrete subsystems. But defining the ethical goal for a bottom-up system would be difficult, as 
would assembling a large number of discrete components into a functional whole. 
Eventually, we may need AMAs that maintain the dynamic and flexible morality of bottom-up systems 
that accommodate diverse inputs, while subjecting the evaluation of choices and actions to top-down 
principles that represent ideals we strive to meet. Furthermore, AMAs will require additional capabilities in 
order to be sensitive to a range of ethical considerations or to acquire access to essential information. These 
supra-rational capabilities (beyond reason) include emotions, social intelligence, a theory of mind, empathy, 
consciousness, and being embodied in a world with humans, objects, and other agents.  
There are many questions as to whether all these capabilities can be instantiated computationally. But 
as the sensitivities and abilities of robots expand, new applications for the use of robots will open up. One of 
the tasks for machine ethics is to delineate the capabilities AMAs will require in order to operate 
appropriately and safely within specific domains.  
The task of building AI systems with moral decision-making capabilities can be understood as 
encompassing two hard problems. The first problem entails finding a computational method to implement 
norms, rules, principles, or procedures for making moral judgments. The second is a group of related 
challenges that I refer to as frame problems. How does the system recognise it is in an ethically significant 
 
                                                      
 
 
128 See Wallach, W. & Allen, C. (2009). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong, New York: Oxford 
University Press, for the most comprehensive overview of the topic. 
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situation? How does it discern essential from inessential information? How does the AMA estimate the 
sufficiency of initial information? What capabilities would an AMA require to make a valid judgment about a 
complex situation, e.g., combatants v. non-combatants? How would the system recognise that it had applied 
all necessary considerations to the challenge at hand or completed its determination of the appropriate 
action to take? For example, what stopping procedure would the system use to determine that it had 
completed a utilitarian calculation? 
The development of AMAs is likely to be a long, incremental process. Throughout this development, a 
primary challenge for society will be the monitoring and assessing of the capabilities of each system. What 
criteria should be used to determine whether a particular system could be deployed safely in a specific 
context? What oversight mechanisms need to be put into place in order to ensure that such an assessment 
can be made and has been made? What penalties might be applied if a certified system is later implicated in 
harmful actions? 
If sophisticated AMAs can be built, the more distant theoretical and speculative challenges that have 
fascinated science fiction writers, philosophers, and legal theorists will come into play. Will artificial agents 
need to emulate the full array of human faculties to function as adequate moral agents and to instill trust in 
their actions? What criteria should be used for evaluating whether an AI system deserves rights or should be 
held responsible for its own actions? Does punishing a robot make any sense? If yes, how might one punish 
a robot for infractions of rules or transgressions against the rights of others? Should or can we control the 
ability of robots to reproduce? How will humanity protect itself against treats by intelligent (ro)bots?  
Combinatorial risks and societal impact 
If only a fraction of the technologies being proposed come to pass within the next decades, human 
behaviour and human culture will be transformed dramatically. By our standards people alive at the end of 
the 18th century were superstitious, unscientific, unsanitary, provincial, and filled with racial, sexual, and 
class prejudices. But humanity was about to be transformed by the industrial revolution, a germ revolution in 
medical science, and by the sanitation revolution. The changes in the next thirty years may be as dramatic 
as the changes over the past two hundred years. 
Three related examples will suffice to illustrate highly probable trends that will have profound social 
impacts. These examples fall far short of the existential risks stirred up by speculative possibilities. Most of 
the technologies I will mention have already been developed, although a few may not be practical. They do, 
however, illustrate societal and ethical challenges that may well arise, but will not necessarily be addressed 
by the kinds of policy mechanisms that are presently in place. 
Technological unemployment 
In quite a few years – in our own lifetimes I mean – we may be able to perform all the operations of 
agriculture, mining, and manufacture with a quarter of the human effort to which we have been 
accustomed… We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard 
the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come – namely, technological 
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unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of 
labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour.   
But this is only a temporary phase of maladjustment. All this means in the long run that mankind is solving 
its economic problem. I would predict that the standard of life in progressive countries one hundred years 
hence will be between four and eight times as high as it is today. There would be nothing surprising in this 
even in the light of our present knowledge. It would not be foolish to contemplate the possibility of a far 
greater progress still. (Keynes, 1930)  
Contentions that technology and industrialisation would undermine employment opportunities predate 
Keynesʼ prediction. But in each generation human ingenuity has repeatedly generated new forms of 
employment. Yet the specter of technological unemployment is revisiting us once again with what appears to 
be the second jobless recovery in a decade. Ingenuity and the desire to work may again create employment 
opportunities. But two factors alter the present equation: (a) ever-increasing life expectancy and later 
retirement, and (b) the development of robots capable of performing an ever-increasing number of intelligent 
tasks. 
Average life expectancy is growing at a rate of 2-4 years each decade in advanced industrial 
countries. Radical life extension is among the possibilities that are being discussed. Aubrey de Grey has 
suggested that it may even be possible to end death (de Grey & Rae, 2007). To date, however, there 
appears to be a ceiling on overall life expectancy at around 120 years of age. But many new subfields, 
including stem-cell research, personalised medicine, and RNA interference, will contribute to regenerative 
medicine. Even if the rate of growth for average life expectancy remains at its present pace, delays in 
retirement and benefits to those who do retire and live longer will lead to serious tensions within the social 
fabric. 
Pressures on the job market are also exacerbated by intelligent machines capable of performing an 
increasing number of tasks at lower cost than human labor. If the human workforce actually contracts as the 
population expands (births plus extended lives), society will need to develop new mechanisms for the 
distribution of capital, goods, and services.  
Certainly biotechnologies that extend life will be popular and widely adopted. But should governmental 
policy be directed at extending life? Or, should extending life be treated as secondary to other goals, such as 
ensuring the quality of life for all citisens up to a particular age, e.g., 82 years? 
Cyborg warriors 
The military is a driving force in speeding up the development of many new technologies. The goal of 
military planners is to achieve a strategic advantage in warfare. Little attention is given to the broader 
societal impact of technologies financed for military use. The scientists on the Manhattan Project did not 
understand how atomic weapons would radically alter a world under constant threat of their use. There is 
little or no reflection on how the strategic advantage achieved by roboticising aspects of warfare is likely to 
be far outweighed by its long-term consequences. 
One active trajectory in military research is combining technologies to create the enhanced soldier or 
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cyborg warrior. Future soldiers are likely to be outfitted with robotic exoskeletons that enhance strength and 
stamina. Neuroprosthetics devices that convey thoughts might facilitate their communicating with other 
members of the team. Insect sized drones fly around the battlefield looking for guerilla fighters and beam 
back their position, which are then overlaid on the soldierʼs visor. A tablet computer built into a data glove 
can be used to direct larger weapons-carrying drones. Nanosensors on the body and in the bloodstream will 
facilitate supervisors, not engaged in combat, in monitoring the physiological well being of soldiers during a 
skirmish. 
Before going to the frontline a soldier could be given a cocktail of modafinil to improve attention, the 
latest cognitive enhancers that heighten memory and speed up reaction time, and propranolol to reduce the 
possibility of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).129 The likelihood of soldiers exposed to the stresses of 
high-speed combat developing PTSD will be of particular concern to military planners. A combatant will have 
been pre-screened for biomarkers that indicate great resilience if he should experience a traumatic event. 
For example, a study conducted by Elisabeth Binder and colleagues found an association between 
polymorphisms of the FKBP5 gene, childhood abuse, and the risk of an adult getting PTSD (Binder et al., 
2008). How many more risk factors for PTSD will need to be revealed before scientists can screen out with a 
high degree of probably those individuals most susceptible to PTSD if exposed to constant stressors? What 
probability would justify shielding that individual from stressful occupations or environments: 50%? 85%? 
Should only those with high resilience profiles be allowed on the frontline during warfare? Will those who 
have lower resilience profiles be barred from the police force or from fighting fires?  
Many societies, from ancient Sparta to the U.S. Marine Corps, have cultivated their warrior class. 
However, explicitly limiting combat to individuals with a very specific profile has profound ramifications for a 
democratic society. Furthermore, applying screening techniques for social engineering purposes can lead to 
new forms of discrimination. On the other hand, given the long-term suffering and the costs to society for the 
healthcare of veterans with combat-related PTSD, is it irresponsible to send those with a higher risk profile 
into the theater of war? 
Techno sapiens 
Students and early adopters are already engaged in widespread experimentation with supplements 
and prescription drugs in hopes of getting a competitive advantage or for recreational purposes. As new 
cognitive enhancing drugs become available, one can presume that they will also be combined with a wide 
variety of other pharmaceuticals. What will be the responsibility of governmental agencies, insurance 
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companies, and educational institutions for adverse incidents arising from using cognitive enhancers for 
purposes for which they were not specifically prescribed? Will government and non-governmental agencies 
have the resources to track which of these combinations cause side effects, mental distress, or neurological 
damage?  
Pharmaceuticals are already commonly prescribed in combinations that have never been tested. 
Arguably we already live in a pharmaceutical regime where multiple drugs are taken to compensate for side 
effects created by other drugs that have been prescribed. If the harmful consequences of widely 
disseminated cognitive cocktails do not show up in the short-term, there will be future crises to manage. 
Cognitive enhancers will also be combined with both exogenous and endogenous devices, including 
glasses that augment reality and neuroprosthetics that have been developed for both military and therapeutic 
purposes. Tools for surfing the web and interfacing with computer devices through thoughts or small 
muscular movements will be particularly popular. These computer interfaces might be used to manage 
devices at a distance, on the body, or in the bloodstream. 
We also have no understanding whether combining various cognitive enhancers with neuroprosthetics 
will optimise the freedom of individuals or undermine their autonomy. The mind is a delicate instrument. 
Optimising one capability could easily interfere with another. Just as texting while driving is a dangerous 
enterprise, so too may mixing various drugs and tools that enhance individual skills. There should be no 
tolerance for technologies that undermine the capacity of individuals to be responsible for their actions.  
An opportunity or a threat to humanity? 
Values differ, as do perceptions of whether the transformation of humanity by emerging technologies 
is good or bad. If large segments of the public find alterations in human nature, character, or presentation 
(e.g., cyborgs) offensive, all technologies that transform human identity might be evaluated as being 
existential threats. There is the rather melodramatic possibility that we are inventing the human species as 
we have known it out of existence. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine anything, short of a disaster that empowers Luddite political parties, 
arresting technological development. After all, most of the enhancements that cause disquiet within some 
communities will result as byproducts of research that serves therapeutic needs. A political platform which 
declares that the lame will never walk or those suffering from trauma will never live normal lives is unlikely to 
receive widespread acceptance.  
Research on intelligent robots and enhancements will also be furthered in the name of economic 
productivity and personal or corporate freedom. The outstanding question is whether some limits can or 
should be placed on the development of robotics and other emerging technology? Agreed upon limits might 
quell concerns that technological development is out of control or becoming the primary force shaping 
humanityʼs destiny. But more importantly, some limits will help stave off technological errors that cause 
harms to the public in the form of economic disruption, environmental degradation, a major health disaster, 
or political turmoil.  
From robots to techno sapiens 
279 
Monitoring and managing emerging technologies 
The likelihood that new technologies will be combined in ways that are difficult to predict poses some 
very tricky policy challenges. How can each society, and humanity as a whole, monitor and manage 
technological development when the tools we have for forecasting and risk assessment are highly 
subjective? Certainly any roadmap would be a work in progress as the possibilities change with each new 
scientific discovery. 
As a first project, I would like to propose the creation of a credible vehicle for monitoring and 
evaluating the state of technological development. Making such a proposal is much easier than knowing how 
such a vehicle should be designed or implemented.  
Government institutions tend to be shortsighted. The EU has taken perhaps more initiative than other 
governments in convening advisory committees and financing research directed at formulating policy for 
managing emerging technologies. Foundations and other funding sources have been slow to perceive this 
subject as one where their grants will nurture effective research. Universities give lip service to fostering 
interdisciplinary research, but few actually reward scholars for interdisciplinary work. Within academia the 
prevailing presumption is that more general or comprehensive research lacks rigour or empirical foundations. 
Nevertheless, there is a need, and with some effort and attention that need will come to the fore. Hopefully it 
will be possible to generate that attention without a serious crisis in which an emerging technology has been 
complicit. 
A first stage in the development of a credible vehicle for monitoring emerging technologies might be a 
series of expert workshops. Expert conferences are not just opportunities to present ideas and educate each 
other, but should also be designed to provide an occasion to grapple with specific issues and debate 
possible solutions. The challenges are largely beyond the ability of one individual to grasp, but there are 
many scholars, engineers, leaders of industry, and policy planners who have expertise on essential aspects 
of those challenges. For example, William Halal’s TechCast project has been periodically sampling one 
hundred experts on when projected technologies will appear (Halal, 2008). Leon Fuerth, formerly Al Gore’s 
National Security Advisor, has proposed how the executive branch of the U.S. government can be 
reorganised to accommodate anticipatory planning, what Fuerth calls ‘forward engagement’ (2009). Futurists 
like Dennis Bushnell, chief scientist for NASA Langley, have begun trying to think through the potential 
combinatorial impact of current technological, economic, and environmental trends. There is also no 
shortage of bioethicists with interdisciplinary expertise on challenges posed by the tech revolution. 
A few of these expert workshops would brainstorm models for think tanks, research centers, or 
governmental agencies whose reports would be considered credible and worthy of attention by both the 
general public and other experts. Other expert workshops would focus on related issues. Among the topics 
that should be given more attention: 
1. Existing Policy Mechanisms: Are they adequate for managing the combinatorial impact of 
emerging technologies? 
2. Public Education: How do you get an informed public? Would the Danish model for informed 
citisen output early in the process of developing emerging technologies work in larger countries 
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such as the U.S.? 
3. Monitoring the Speed of Technological Development: Can we defuse some of the anxiety 
around emerging technologies by monitoring which technological thresholds are likely to be 
crossed within the next five to ten years? 
4. Kinds of Control: Slowing or thwarting scientific research is difficult in any circumstance. What 
kinds of leverage are there within existing policy mechanisms for modulating the societal impact 
of emerging technologies? When will weakening a particular mechanism undermine the entire 
safety net of public protections? Will the introduction of additional policy mechanisms 
significantly alter the ability to manage emerging technologies? 
5. Managing Complexity: Are there problems in managing complex systems that make periodic 
crises inevitable?  
6. What kind of planning for ʻBlack Swans,ʼ low probably high impact events makes senses (Taleb, 
2007). 
7. Crisis management: What kinds of crises should we plan for, and would such preparation be 
money well spent? 
8. What new strategies for comprehensive risk assessment can be developed? 
9. International considerations: Will international considerations thwart national attempts to 
modulate the harms posed by emerging technologies? Which concerns are shared? 
10. The Downside of a Comprehensive Approach: Differing projections of what is probable are likely 
to be politicised by both those who support and those who wish to halt the implementation of 
new technologies. How might efforts to politicise discussion be defused? 
11. What are the primary values that should inform technology policy? 
Conclusions 
We are collectively in a dialogue directed at forging a new understanding of what it means to be 
human. Pressures are building to embrace, reject, or regulate robots and technologies that alter the 
mind/body. How will we individually and collectively navigate the opportunities and perils new technologies 
offer? With so many different value systems competing in the marketplace of ideas, what values should 
inform public policy? Which tasks is it appropriate to turn over to robots and when do humans bring qualities 
to tasks that no robot in the foreseeable future can emulate? When is tinkering with the human mind or body 
inappropriate, destructive, or immoral? Is there a bottom line? Is there something essential about being 
human that is sacred, that we must preserve? These are not easy questions. 
Among the principles we should be careful not to compromise is that of the responsibility of the 
individual human agent. In the development of robots and complex technologies those who design, market, 
and deploy systems should not be excused from responsibility for the actions of those systems. 
Technologies that rob individuals of their freedom of will must be rejected. This goes for both robots and 
neurotechnologies.  
Just as economies can stagnate or overheat, so also can technological development. The central role 
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for ethics, law, and public policy in the development of robots and neurotechnologies will be in modulating 
their rate of development and deployment. Compromising safety, appropriate use, and responsibility is a 
ready formulation for inviting crises in which technology is complicit. The harms caused by disasters and the 
reaction to those harms can stultify technological progress in irrational ways.  
It is unclear whether existing policy mechanisms provide adequate tools for managing the cumulative 
impact of converging technologies. Presuming that scientific discovery continues at its present relatively 
robust pace there may be plenty of opportunities yet to consider new mechanisms for directing specific 
research trajectories. However, if the pace of technological development is truly accelerating the need for 
foresight and planning becomes much more pressing. 
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Abstract The theory of the intentional stance often serves as the basis of arguments for the coherence of 
ascribing intentional attitudes to a variety of non-human entities. For instance, it may be said that 
corporations are intentional agents because it is possible to reliably, voluminously and successfully, predict 
their behaviour using a set of intentional generalisations. Thus, if we analyse the possession of a moral 
sense to be contingent on the possession of, and rational acting upon, a privileged set of beliefs and 
desires i.e., the moral ones, we have a means for ascribing a moral sense to an artificial agent such as a 
robot. For note that our interpretation of human beings as moral agents is dependent on our adopting a 
ʻmoral stanceʼ towards them: we ascribe a moral belief (ʻJohn believes helping the physically incapacitated 
is a good thingʻ) and on the basis of this ascription, predict actions (ʻJohn would never refuse an old lady 
helpʼ) or explain actions (ʻHe helped her cross the street because he wanted to help a physically 
incapacitated personʼ). To display a moral sense is to provide evidence of the direction of action by a set of 
beliefs and desires termed moral.   If we could predict an artificial agentʼs behaviour on the basis that it 
rationally acts upon its ʻmoralʼ beliefs and desires, the adoption of such a moral stance towards it is a 
logical next step. Ostensible failures of morality on the part of artificial agents could be understood as 
failures of reasoning: the failure to hold certain beliefs or desires, or to act consistently with those beliefs 
and desires. The use of a language of morally-inflected beliefs and desires in successfully, reliably, and 
voluminously predicting the behaviour of an artificial agent renders plausible a description of an artificial 
agent, such as a robot, as a moral agent.  
Keywords robots, moral agents, intentional stance, moral stance, intentional agents. 
As usual the third-person point of view makes progress while the first-person point of view peters out into a 




Can robots be moral? I want to argue this question is most perspicuously framed as the question of 
whether a robot can be a moral agent.130 Further, as the ascription of agency is dependent on the successful 
ascription of an appropriate set of beliefs and desires to a putative intentional entity, and because a moral 
agent is a kind of intentional agent, robots can be considered moral agents if they are reckoned as 
intentional agents displaying direction of their actions by a set of beliefs and desires termed moral. The best 
strategy for such ascriptions is that of the intentional stance.  
Such an ascription of morality is done, much like, though not exactly, the way HLA Hart suggested we 
ascribe a legal system to a societal grouping, via the recognition of a set of operative rules in a group whose 
violations are responded to with approbation and disapproval. This is a view that is deflationary as far as the 
metaphysical pretensions of morality are concerned, but it does not diminish any of its normative weight.  
Thus, my claim is that the ascription of morality to robots depends (just like it does in the case of 
human beings) on the identification and ascription of moral mental states. To accomplish this we should 
draw on the well-established battery of techniques of folk psychology, ignore worries about internal 
constitution, subjective perspectives, and intrinsic properties, and concentrate on linguistic assertions and 
behavioural evidence. Quine and Davidson made famous the field linguistʼs task of constructing translation 
manuals to determine a foreign raceʼs beliefs and language. I draw upon the image of a field moralist 
studying aliens to determine whether they have morality akin to ours. The field moralistʼs best resource will 
be the framework of agency, intentionality, and rationality provided by the intentional stance. As such, she 
should engage in moral folk psychology, the most perspicuous strategy available to her. And to us, as we 
prepare for our encounter with the morality of robots.   
Agency and the Intentional Stance 
ʻAgentʼ has an intuitive meaning in everyday life: something able to take actions. Agents do things, 
they act, as opposed to have things happen to them; the actions of the agent distinguish it from the rest of 
the world; to deny something agency is to deny it the capacity to take actions.  
This characteristic of agents is indispensable for the identification of actions in our world; to identify an 
action is to identify an agent as its cause. Or, rather, ʻintentional agent,ʼ for actions are not genuine actions 
 




 I do not consider whether robots can be persons; however, the challenge of ascribing intentionality is similar. For 
personhood, a necessary condition might be that “X has, or once had, the potentiality to articulate beliefs and desires 
comparable in quantity and complexity to our own. This means ascribing personhood, a language and the right beliefs 
and desires go hand in hand.” (Rorty 1982, 9) 
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unless “intentional under some description” (Davidson, 1980; Davidson, 1971). Intentional actions may be 
unintentional under another description (Davidson, 1980; Davidson, 1971). Thus, a robot might, from one 
perspective, be ʻrunning a programʼ while from another, it ʻresponded to the customerʼs voice because it 
believed the customer wanted immediate service.ʼ  
Agency is present when actions are taken for a reason and are directed to an end. Only intentional 
agents can be the causes of such actions; their beliefs and desires are the reasons for their actions 
(Davidson, 1980; Davidson, 1971). If robots are to be viewed as possessing intentional agency, their beliefs 
and desires should be reckoned the causes of their actions; and to view them as beings with beliefs and 
desires is to view them as intentional systems.  
In general, X is an intentional entity, i.e., one to whom intentional predicates can be ascribed, if 
predictions and descriptions like ʻX will push the door open if it wants to go outsideʼ or ʻX took action A 
because it believed A would result in higher profits,ʼ are the most useful explanatory and predictive strategy 
with regards to its behaviour. Xʼs behaviour is not just evidence it holds beliefs and desires; it is constitutive 
of that fact. To adopt the intentional stance toward an entity is inter alia to treat it as rational. 
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behaviour is to be predicted as a 
rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its 
purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you 
predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning 
from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought 
to do; that is what you predict the agent will do. (Dennett, 1987, p. 17)  
Intentional language lacks import only when there is a better mode of description available that does 
not make reference to beliefs or desires. But biology or physics have little importance in the interpretation or 
prediction of the behaviour of beings with psychological attributes. The intentional stance does not require 
replication of the biological or mental apparatus of paradigmatic intentional systems; it is a competence 
theory where belief and desire ascriptions form an interdependent, holistic whole, the inferential relationships 
amongst which are most important (Dennett, 1987, p. 58). Thus, it is relatively unconcerned with internal 
implementation details. Such an interpretationist view renders coherent the ascription of mental predicates or 
propositional attitudes to non-human entities – like robots.  
Robots may be understood as intentional agents, as acting for reasons that are the causes of their 
actions, if such an understanding leads to the best possible interpretation and prediction of their overt 
behaviour. Successful predictions such as ʻa robot that desires an object and believes that acting in a certain 
way will obtain the object, ceterus paribus, will act in that way,ʼ will show its behaviour accords with 
generalizations pertaining to intentional agents. In sum, to decide a robot is an intentional agent is to decide 
its behaviour can be subsumed under a set of empirical generalisations pertaining to intentional actions 
(French, 1984, p. 90ff). 
Moral Agency and the Intentional Stance 
From the identification of a robot as an intentional agent to its identification as a moral agent is but a 
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short (and crucial) step. It requires the asking and answering of the question: do the beliefs and desires 
attributed to the robot include those with moral content? For if we analyse the possession of a moral sense to 
be the possession, and rational acting upon, of a privileged set of beliefs and desires, the moral ones, we 
have a means for ascribing a moral sense to an agent. That is, for a robot to be deemed a moral agent, its 
beliefs and desires should be recognisable as the causes of its moral actions. And such an attributive 
strategy should be subject to the success conditions of the intentional stance; it should be the most useful 
explanatory and predictive strategy of the behaviour in question.  
To reiterate, robots should be considered moral agents, if a privileged set of their intentional actionsʼ 
causes are identified as their moral beliefs and desires. Our interpretation of human beings as moral agents 
is dependent on our adopting a similar moral stance toward them: we ascribe a moral belief (ʻJohn believes 
helping the physically incapacitated is a good thingʼ) and on the basis of this ascription, predict actions (ʻJohn 
would never refuse an old lady helpʼ) or explain actions (ʻHe helped her cross the street because he wanted 
to help a physically incapacitated personʼ). To display a moral sense is to provide evidence of the direction of 
action by beliefs and desires termed ʻmoralʼ; to ascribe morality is to ascribe moral beliefs and desires to an 
agent, disposed to behave rationally given the agentʼs other beliefs and desires (and given ours).  
Thus, the adoption of the moral stance toward a robot is warranted if (a) we could predict a robotʼs 
behaviour on the basis that it rationally acts upon its moral beliefs and desires, or if (b) a robotʼs behaviour 
could be explained in terms of the moral beliefs ascribed to it: ʻThe robot avoided striking the child because it 
knows children cannot fight back.ʼ Failures of robotsʼ morality would still be normative failures and would be 
picked out by the resources of a normative epistemology: the failure to hold certain beliefs or desires, or to 
act consistently with those beliefs and desires or the failure for certain sorts of inferential relations to hold 
amongst their beliefs.  
The rules for attributing beliefs via the intentional stance work for moral beliefs, as might be expected, 
for we should attribute all beliefs that are relevant to the agentʼs desires that its experience suggests 
(Dennett, 1987, p. 18). The intentional stance strategy accommodates the need to understand moral agents 
as rational agents: it requires we start with the ideal of perfect rationality and revise downward as 
circumstances dictate (Dennett, 1987, p. 21). Such a stance allows us to understand moral failures as 
irrational, for intentional interpretations attempt to reconcile particular actions (and their underlying beliefs) in 
terms of coherence with a larger body of normative judgments. When such reconciliation is not possible, the 
action and its associated belief stand accused of an irrational violation of norms.   
Such a methodological strategy is capable of success if our focus remains on linguistic assertions and 
behavioural evidence, as indeed, I will suggest later, it must. Consider, for instance, the claim that to be a 
moral agent, an entity must be capable of expressing regret or remorse or both, and of thereby suffering 
punishment. Regret, in turn, can be viewed as the capacity to view oneself as the person who did X and to 
feel or wish that he had not done X. Here, what is accessible is an outward expression of regret or remorse, 
the ascription of which is made coherent by its consistency with other ascriptions expressible in intentional 
terms (French, 1984, p. 90ff). These outward manifestations are precisely those that would be of interest to 
us in the case of robots.  
This dependence of morality ascription on folk psychology is effective, because folk psychology makes 
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available tools essential for social co-operation and co-ordination; our sense of morality is an awareness of 
values imposed on such interactions. These interactions are guided by “extraordinarily efficient and reliable 
system[s] of expectation-generation” (Dennett, 1987, p. 11) like moral folk psychology. As such, the best 
method of determining the presence of morality in other beings should be based on the same template as we 
use for humans, a suggestion for which there is ample precedent. For instance, corporations are said to 
possess a moral sense because they can be thought of as intentional agents (French, 1984, p. 90ff). 
A prima facie objection anticipated 
Arguments against the coherence of a supposedly ʻmerely instrumentalist, operationalʼ understanding 
of the ascription of intentional properties such as that afforded by the intentional stance typically suggest 
ʻsomething is missing,ʼ perhaps the appropriate physical or logical architecture, some ineffable quality, or the 
lack of identification of discrete belief-like states (Baker, 1989; Jacquette, 1988; Ringen & Bennett, 1993; 
Stich, 1981; Bechtel, 1985; McLaughlin & O'Leary-Hawthorne, 1995; Yu & Fuller, 1986).131 A similar strain of 
objection is possible against my suggested strategy: something is left out, some vital constitutive aspect of 
morality that we claim to know resides in humans. In general, in doing so, we only confess our ignorance 
about the basis of morality in human beings and simultaneously claim too much knowledge about robots. 
It is worth remembering that  
…things with roughly human faces which look as if they might someday be conversational partners are 
usually credited with feelings but…if we know too much about how these things have been put together we 
may be loath to think of them as even potential partners (Rorty, 1979, p. 189-90).  
The relevance of this remark to the challenge of ascribing morality to robots should be clear. We, or at 
least the competent roboticists amongst us, know how robots work, but we lack detailed knowledge of our 
cognitive architecture as neuroscience offers only partial empirical confirmation of our best hypotheses 
(Machamer, Grush, & McLaughlin, 2001). Such a situation facilitates the easy ascription of occult inner 
states and intrinsic properties to humans in order to explain their visible behaviour. But in the case of robots, 
we possess fine-grained knowledge of their physical and algorithmic architecture. This familiarity breeds 
contempt for the robot, but:  
We use the word ʻmindʼ not to name a thing but to cover our ignorance of certain causal relationships. 
 




 (Dennett, 1987; Dennett, 1993) provide cogent defenses of the intentional stance strategy against various charges of 
behaviourism or neo-behaviourism. Responses and counter-responses to the theory of the intentional stance are 
available at http://consc.net/mindpapers/2.1b. 
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Dispel the ignorance and the concept ceases to have consequences…we are far more likely to impute a 
mind to a cat than to a computer….[W]hile we have complete knowledge of the causality of a computerʼs 
operations, this is not so with respect to the cat….Partly we impute a mind to the cat just in the hope that 
we can influence the catʼs behavior in the same way that we can often influence peopleʼs behavior by 
assuming that they think the way we do (Posner, 1988, p. 867).  
Thus, the central problem in considering robots as moral agents is an incorrect perspective tainted by 
too much familiarity; a corrective move would imagine a trip to a strange planet, or the arrival of extra-
terrestrials. Then, the field linguist examples so beloved of Davidson and Quine would find immediate 
traction; the field moralist would be attempting to determine the presence of moral agents amongst the 
aliens. We would be engaged in a translation project, trying to determine whether the meaning of the 
linguistic assertions and overt behaviour of our visitors can be cashed out in moral terms, whether the beliefs 
we attribute to the aliens have moral content. Our resources could only be those that we had used for similar 
tasks in the past: those provided by folk psychology. The detection, in this alien community, of the 
supposedly constitutive factors of morality — the possession of free-will, autonomy, rationality — is 
contingent upon recognizing the ability to take particular actions, to emit particular utterances; to attribute the 
agency for those actions is to do no more, and no less, than to locate the agentsʼ beliefs and desires as the 
causes for those actions. The recognition and attribution of those beliefs and desires is best enabled by a 
strategy like that of the intentional stance.  
Morality: Internal constitution or external response (or relational?) 
So, moral belief, like any other kind of belief, can be discerned only from the point of view of one who 
adopts a certain predictive strategy; its existence is confirmed by an assessment of the strategyʼs success. 
For morality is a code of conduct guided by rules of action, i.e., a set of beliefs (such an identification, of 
rules of action with beliefs, is of course, that made famous by pragmatists such as William James and 
Charles Peirce); attributions of morality on the basis of actions and correlations with environmental stimuli 
should proceed according to rules like “attribute those beliefs [desires] the system ought to have” and 
“attribute desires for those things a system believes to be best means to other ends it desires” (Dennett, 
1987, p. 20).  
Moral decisions can be understood as “societal pivot points…where which way people go depends on 
whether they believe that p, or desire that A” (Dennett, 1987, p. 26). Thus morality is a distinctive pattern of 
behaviour in human affairs best characterised in terms of the language of intentionality as applied to rational 
agents. These patterns of morality are detected from a moral, third-person, point of view; they are objectively 
detected but “they are not out there entirely independent of us, since they are patterns composed partly of 
our own subjective reactions to what is out there – they are the matters made to order for our own 
narcissistic concerns” (Dennett, 1987, p. 39). 
Thus, morality is rightly judged to not be a matter of physical constitution; rather morality is a complex 
set of responses and interactions. We can predict the behaviour of moral agents largely because we are 
capable of attributing them the appropriate beliefs and desires. When the intentional strategy works, we may 
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choose to try and posit the existence of internal representations or states as an underlying basis for its 
behaviour, but such a strategy is not forced upon us (Dennett, 1987, p. 30-31).  
In adopting such a strategy we do not make-up or impose morality because for social projects that 
hinge on co-operation, some shared capacities must exist: language, as well as the possession of beliefs 
and desires. For to be moral is to be competent in a particular way: capable of undertaking projects that 
involve the building, sustenance and respecting of relationships. Competency presumes knowledge of a 
particular kind; it means acting according to certain rules of actions and not others. The morality of robots is 
best assessed by their competence in this dimension.   
There is a strong intuition that robots would not be believers and moral agents like us unless they 
share some micro-structural feature with us; moral behaviour might have an essential causal component, like 
a genuine Dali painting as opposed to a very good fake. This intuition lies at the heart of the claim ʻthat action 
looks moral but it was just 0s and 1s interacting.ʼ But the data representation formats employed by robots are 
a red herring. Descriptions of human morality as the mere interaction of neurons would be similarly unhelpful. 
Our judgment about the morality of humans is at a level distinct from that descended to when describing a 
robot as unable to deal with the ethical aspects of a situation because ʻitʼs just zeroes and ones.ʼ What 
matters is the location of the robot within a network of social relations. 
Most pertinently, the encounter of neuroscience, morality and law shows the very reasons that breed 
pessimism about whether neuroscience can help ascertain whether our fellow humans are moral, are the 
same ones that should prompt us to not too quickly dismiss the possibility of morality for robots. For 
neuroscience suggests decision outcomes can be encoded in brain activity of the prefrontal and parietal 
cortex before entering consciousness, thus casting into doubt the idea that moral decisions are made 
consciously by human beings (Soon et al., 2008). Law, morality, and neuroscience diverge here:  
Legal authorities seem to want a holy grail: a firm dividing line…between responsible and irresponsible 
agents…Such a grail will never be found…because of fundamental differences between law and 
neuroscience…Human brains achieve their goals automatically by following rules which operate outside of 
our conscious awareness…The fallacy in the classical theories of behavior and free will is the belief that a 
conscious choice is needed before any action is taken….deeming an individual responsible is not an 
empirical statement about the functioning of their brain but rather a judgment made within a legal and 
social framework (Waldbauer and Gazzaniga, 2001). 
Thus, while neuroscience promises a more mechanistic understanding of our fellow human beings, we 
may find the moral vocabulary and its associated moral image indispensable in dealing with our fellow 
human beings. Similarly, while our knowledge of robotic internals might tempt us to rule out the possibility of 
their attaining the status of moral agents, our ever-growing relationship with them may make a moral 
language similarly indispensable. We may then disdain the importance of microstructure in favour of 
macroscopic details of social co-operation, and internalise the claim that morality is about the building of 
relationships and the co-operation on shared projects. Failures of morality would occur when the behaviour 
we expect of our partners in larger co-operative project fails to obtain. In adopting such a stance, we would 
recognise moral imperatives are maxims for action whose failure interferes with joint projects.   
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Neither the presence of inner lives, nor the appropriate microstructural details then, are essential for 
the attribution of moral sensibilities:  
Only the Platonic urge to say that every moral sentiment and indeed every emotion of every sort should be 
based on the recognition of an objective quality in the recipient makes us think that our treatment of koalas 
or whites or Martians is a “matter of moral principle….the inside of people and quasi-people is to be 
explained by what goes on outside (...by their place in our community) rather than conversely. (Rorty, 
1979, p. 191) 
The field moralist and the detection of moral rules 
Our field moralist would best be able to detect the presence of morality in an alien society by detecting 
the presence of a system of moral rules. Following Hart (Hart, 1997, Section V), I suggest field moralists 
would need to detect rules of the form ʻIt is a rule that Xʼ, contrary behaviour to which is a violation usually 
greeted by some expression of social disapproval or approbation (detectable on the basis of observed 
behaviour), and that widespread contrary behaviour does not necessarily render it false that ʻit is a rule that 
X.ʼ Amongst these rules the field moralist would need to detect primary social rules, which directly regulate 
behaviour — prohibiting, permitting or requiring actions. These primary rules impose social obligations when 
the pressure to conform to them is great, when they are believed necessary to maintain social life or a highly 
valued aspect of it, and compliance with them may conflict with the desires of those subject to them. A 
system made up of primary social rules is a primitive legal system, akin to a system of morality. 
In detecting a system of law amongst aliens (or human beings), we would not look for evidence of 
internal structure labeled ʻlaw-abiding.ʼ Similarly, to detect morality, we would need to observe these 
observed rules are rules of action for members of this society. To sum up: to detect a moral code in a social 
ordering is to detect the presence of a system of primary rules; creatures acting in conformance with such a 
system of primary social rules are following rules of action, identified with beliefs; the most perspicuous 
method of ascribing these for creatures like robots is the intentional stance.    
But perhaps robots are purely syntactic engines; they do not know the meaning of moral instructions 
and injunctions, and their beliefs donʼt have any propositional content. This objection is similar to that made 
against the possibility of animals possessing knowledge for their beliefs, such as they are, appear similarly 
devoid of such content. But it is possible for us to interpret a supposedly syntactic engine semantically and to 
imbue its actions with moral meaning for it may “discriminate [moral] meanings by actually discriminating 
things that co-vary reliably with meanings” (Dennett, 1987, p. 63). My cat might not know the meaning of ʻthe 
mouse is behind the door,ʼ but its behaviour is acutely behaviourally sensitive to the truth of this proposition.   
Our methods for dealing with animals, which are occasionally our companions and sometimes 
attributed a moral sense, tell us how we might respond to such objections: we rely on taking them to be 
intentional systems. To try and describe patterns of animal behaviour such as migrations, hunting, 
reproduction, and child-rearing, without recourse to the language of intentionality is well-nigh impossible. 
Similarly, some kinds of interactions may only proceed if they adopt the moral stance towards robots. This, 
incidentally, is a lesson reinforced by cognitive ethology. Descriptions of robotic communities would prompt 
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much the same questions prompted by studies of vervet monkeysʼ language: ʻDo they really communicate? 
Do they mean what they say?ʼ and so on. And just like for monkeys, in the case of robots, “[c]ould the 
everyday language of belief, desire, expectation…serve as the suitably abstract language in which to 
describe cognitive [and possibly moral] competencies?” (Dennett, 1987, p. 239) The answer should be ʻyesʼ 
for the reasons adduced above.  
Conclusions 
Moral folk psychology is a subspecies of folk psychology, which specialises in attributing beliefs, 
desires, wants and preferences, characterised by a normative vocabulary, viewed as important for fulfilling 
social needs, which are contingent, culturally specific, and historically conditioned. Such a moral psychology 
is abstract in that the beliefs and desires it attributes are not conceptually dependent on the existence of a 
subjective point of view, inner states or intrinsic moral properties. Rather, in such a view, moral behaviour is 
guided by the appropriate rules of action: the moral beliefs. Morality emerges as a set of appropriate 
dispositions, which add up to an attitude, a sensibility. To attribute morality is not to discover a causal 
mechanism then; rather, it is to notice a new partner in some joint enterprise.  
To ask questions about the morality of robots is to enquire into whether we can detect the presence of 
appropriate maxims guiding their behaviour, for it is their dispositions, their attitudes, their sensibility that will 
determine whether they are capable of being our partners in the many social and personal enterprises that 
they already participate in.  
We may occasionally adopt the intentional stance toward robots because such ascriptions do not rely 
on knowledge of their internal structure, to which we may have only limited access. A complex robot could 
especially aptly be the subject of the intentional stance if even its original programmer or designer, the one 
with the best knowledge of its innards, found it a better predictive strategy than any other. For those lacking 
such knowledge, the intentional stance may be the only coherent strategy for interactions. 
These considerations raise the question of whether it would be possible to trust robots as reliable 
reporters about their mental states, seemingly accurate reporting on which is a crucial determinant in our 
third-person ascriptions of intentionality (Putnam, 1964). Rather than examining a humanʼs neurological 
structure to determine her reasons for an action, we just ask, and in most cases the reports received are 
reliable indicators of reasons for actions. Similarly, the more impenetrable the innards of a robot and the 
more complex its interrelated set of behaviours, the more plausible it would be to understand its responses 
as the best indicators of its inner states. If we would be prepared to believe such a robotʼs reports on its 
internal states, an ascription of intentionality to the robot would be plausible (Dennett, 2000, p. 94). Such 
ascriptions may be possible with robot architectures whose sophistication and complexity entail “the loss of 
epistemological hegemony on the part of its ʻthird-personʼ designers” (Dennett, 2000, p. 99, emphasis 
added). When such hegemony is lost, the adoption of the intentional stance, and possibly later, the moral 
stance is a logical next step.  
Robots are not the stuff of science fiction; rather, they are stuff of fact. They are increasingly our 
partners in a variety of enterprises, responsible for saving human lives and sometimes taking them. It would 
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behoove us to develop an arsenal of interpretive techniques to understand and accept their behaviour, an 
attitude which needs to let go of the easy contempt of ʻitʼs just a machineʼ and the lazy belief in the existence 
of an ineffable moral sensibility. Robots are already agents by virtue of their capacity to take actions; it is 
their promotion to intentional agents, which awaits. When the moment for such recognition and promotion 
arrives, we should be prepared to draw upon the resources that work best for us when we engage in 
everyday moments of moral approbation and praise: an attempt to make sense of our fellow beings in 
psychological terms. 
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Abstract It has become popular to speculate about a possible future ʻsingularityʼ or ʻintelligence 
explosionʼ which might transform social and legal institutions. The imminence or likelihood of such 
scenarios may be questioned, but discussing the emergence of possible ʻsuper-AIsʼ provides a useful 
backdrop for considering the ethical or legal status of less advanced artificial agents.  
The moral status of an agent would seem to be closely bound up with whether it is phenomenally 
conscious. Would super-AIs be conscious (or even super-conscious)? On one view, consciousness is 
constituted by a set of cognitive capacities. On this view it would be relatively easy for a super-AI to be 
seen as conscious, and thus to have moral status. A contrasting view sees no such easy route from 
super-intelligence to consciousness: a superintelligence could then be totally non-sentient, for all its 
ultra-smartness.  
What, then, of the moral status of a non-conscious super-AI? Even if such an agent were to act in a 
way that conforms to or breaches various moral norms, its lack of consciousness could well be thought 
to block its being taken to be a genuine moral subject. Nevertheless, there are, we suggest, ways in 
which non-conscious super-AIs could have a secondary kind of moral or social status. We explore the 
implications of this possibility, both for super-intelligent and lesser AI agents. 
 
Keywords artificial agent, super-AI, intelligence explosion, consciousness, moral/social status, 
primary/secondary moral status 
Introduction 
It has become popular to speculate about a possible future ʻintelligence explosionʼ (Good, 1965) or 
ʻsingularityʼ scenario (Vinge, 1993; Bostrom, 2005; Kurzweil, 2005; Goertzel, 2007; Sandberg, 2010; 
Chalmers. 2010), which might transform social and legal institutions. Such an explosion (or ʻevent horizonʼ) 
refers to two factors.  
1. Intelligent robots or other machines may take on a more and more inclusive role in the design 
and fabrication of even more intelligent successor versions of themselves.  
2. There could be (in line with certain developments observed over recent decades) a continued 
indefinite increase in processing speed and productive output of such artificial agents.  
Taking 1 and 2 together then – perhaps in a few centuries, perhaps sooner – there might be a 
runaway proliferation of superintelligent artificial agents. Various further results may then occur:  
3. Human designers rapidly lose the ability to control, or indeed comprehend, the principles of 
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functioning of such machine-built machines.  
 
4. The intelligence-level of such machines rapidly comes to exceed human intelligence-levels by 
far.  
5. There would be a more or less rapid transformation of human society, although the path such 
transformation would take, and the shape human life would take following such transformation 
(if human life survived at all), would be very difficult indeed to predict.  
It is a breathtaking understatement to say that such a set of events, were they to occur, would raise 
considerable moral and social challenges. Perhaps these are only challenges of the deep future; however 
many writers believe such an explosion may happen surprisingly soon: in a matter of decades rather than 
centuries.  
A space of possible AI agents 
Many of the claims of those who believe in the imminence or eventuality of such an explosion will be 
met widely with scepticism. Nevertheless it is valuable and indeed important to discuss these predictions, 
and particularly their moral, legal and social implications. Perhaps something less cataclysmic (from the point 
of view of humanity) than an intelligence explosion will take place. Certain limited elements of an intelligence 
explosion are quite probable – for example, a proliferation of artificial agents which, while less than 
superintelligent, are still smart enough to change the complexion of society in certain fundamental ways. 
There is a spectrum, or space, of possible future AI agents, possible future ʻmind-likeʼ beings (Sloman, 
1984); these may take forms that are quite similar to humans, or forms which are outlandishly different from 
humans, and, indeed, from each other.
132
 At one region of this space are robots with comprehensive, 
superintelligent abilities to act in the world that far surpass those of most/all humans. At a region closer to 
what is technologically possible today, there are a variety of relatively simple humanlike agents that perform 
only a limited number of tasks, but do them well, and usefully, enough for such agents to become ubiquitous. 
In this context one can give examples such as robot companions for the elderly (Sparrow & Sparrow, 2006; 
Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010), robot soldiers and police personnel (Sparrow, 2007), robot lovers (Levy, 2008; 
Whitby. 2011); not to mention robotic or virtual doctors, lawyers, financial managers, and so on. Even at the 
more lowly end of the smartness or performance scale, an explosion of such agents on anything like the 
scale of the recent explosions in smartphones, social networking technology, GPS systems, etc., would raise 
 




 “Any two AI designs might be less similar to one another than you are to a petunia.” (Yudkowsky, 2008). To keep the 
bounds of the discussion manageable, we will concentrate on foreseeable kinds of super-AIs that are closer to us than 
we or they are to petunias. 





Superintelligences: Two major questions 
A discussion of issues concerning a possible explosion of superintelligent artificial agents thus also 
helps to dramatise some issues that relate to possibilities nearer to the lower-functioning end of the scale. 
The latter, being much closer to current technological levels, are clearly predictable with greater confidence. 
We will highlight two major questions concerning superintelligences and concerning some of the homelier AI 
agents that are closer to hand on the possibility horizon. 
1. Consciousness and super-agents. What is the relation between artificial (super-)intelligence and 
artificial (super-)consciousness? Think of an artificial agent whose capacities across a wide 
variety of fields of cognitively guided activity – perhaps most or even all fields – far exceeds the 
levels of human capacity in those fields. Would full phenomenal or consciousness, of the ʻwhat-
it-is-likeʼ kind (Nagel, 1974), simply ʻcome for freeʼ with such a conception? Or would 
consciousness result only from some further, substantive, conditions, that may not be obviously 
associated with simply developing more and more highly optimized versions of todayʼs AI 
technologies or cognitive systems? 
2. Moral status of super-agents. Would superintelligent agents qualify as genuine members of our 
moral universe? (And what of us as members of theirs?) One assumes that, among the 
capacities of a comprehensive superintelligence are capacities to cope with similar kinds of 
ethical situations as the ones that we are involved in. (There may be limits here, since much of 
our ethical experience perhaps relates to biological features that such artificial 
superintelligences may not need or be able to possess: basic needs for food, sex, etc.; the facts 
of birth, childhood, death; the influence of our various evolutionarily derived emotions; and so 
on.) 
In order to answer these questions adequately we will need to make a distinction between two kinds of 
ethical capacity, which we call moral productivity and moral recipiency. Briefly, to think of a being in terms of 
moral productivity is to think of that agent as the possible originator of morally evaluable actions of different 
 




 There are various other kinds of AI technology which are worth mentioning here, including self-driving automobiles; 
robotic animals of various sorts; cyborgs with biological brains enhanced with electronic processing chips (see Clark, 
2004), and so on. To simplify the discussion we will largely leave such cases out of consideration, although we will 
discuss the case of robot pets used in the care of the elderly towards the end of the paper. For an excellent discussion of 
the moral and social implications of robots, and their possible status as moral agents, see (Wallach & Allen, 2009). The 
current paper is deeply indebted to that volume. 
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sorts; to think of a being in terms of moral recipiency is to think of that agent as the possible target of morally 
evaluable acts. More details on this distinction will be given below. As will be seen, in order to discuss the 
moral status of artificial agents, with or without consciousness, it is important to keep the difference between 
moral productivity and recipiency in mind. 
Outline of the following sections 
Here is a sketch of the rest of our discussion. In the next section we clarify some of the issues 
concerning the idea of an artificial intelligence explosion. After that, we will look at the possibilities for 
recognising states of consciousness in artificial agents, using the case of superintelligences as our starting 
point. We will also articulate more clearly the possible links that there may be between consciousness in 
artificial agents and the moral status that might be attributed to such agents. Then we will look specifically at 
some cases of artificial agents where, even when supposing them to completely lack phenomenal 
consciousness, we may still be inclined to grant them some kind of moral status. Next, we discuss more 
general issues to do with sociality in artificial (and non-conscious) agents. After that, we propose a distinction 
between primary and secondary moral status. In a concluding section we briefly draw the various strands of 
the discussion together. 
The likelihood of an ʻintelligence explosionʼ 
During most of the history of AI, there has been relatively little discussion of whether levels of 
intelligence in AI systems could be directly evaluated (e.g. using psychometric methods). However, 
Chalmers (2010) and other writers on the intelligence explosion explicitly address the subject of 
human/machine intelligence-level comparisons, if only in a very broad way. According to Chalmersʼs usage 
of the term, ʻAIʼ will have been achieved when we have at least some machines that are as intelligent as 
average humans (Chalmers, 2010, p. 11). 
Chalmers also introduces two other special terms: ʻAI+ʼ – artificial intelligence that is higher than the 
most intelligent humans; and ʻAI++ʼ – intelligence in an artefact which is at a level that compares to the 
highest human intelligence roughly in proportion as the latter compares to mouse intelligence. ʻAI++ʼ refers to 
what would arrive with a superintelligence explosion or singularity. Chalmers argues that there will be AI (in 
his special sense) before too long, in the absence of defeating circumstances (such as catastrophic war, 
contrary legislation, etc.). He further argues that there could be AI+ soon after that, and AI++ not long after 
that. According to Chalmers and others who agree with these claims, the timespan of ʻbefore longʼ, ʻsoon 
afterʼ, etc. can be measured in decades rather than centuries. 
Of course, the utility of such terms is tied to there existing a non-contested method for measuring 
levels of intelligence in different agent-types – a far from certain prospect right now. The comparison is made 
harder by the fact that many machines have for decades been able to perform some tasks that outstrip even 
the smartest humans, while having low or nil performance over a large number of other things that humans 
are good at. This reflects the fact that most results in AI research have been task- or domain-specific. We 
need to imagine machines that have broad levels of cognitive achievement, that seamlessly cover a very 
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wide range of human-achievable tasks – that is, ʻartificial general intelligenceʼ or AGI (Franklin, 2007; 
Goertzel & Wang, 2007; Goertzel, 2010; Wang, 2010). Chalmersʼs notion of AI, and much of the explosion or 
singularity literature, seem to presuppose that non-trivial levels of AGI can be attained, itself a rather 
controversial prospect. 
Mooreʼs law 
There would seem to be certain key factors contributing to the arrival of AI++. One is the continuing 
acceleration of hardware and the associated success in optimising software. In the 1960s Gordon Moore, of 
Intel Corp., propounded a law referring to the number of transistors on an Intel chip (Brock, 2006; Kurzweil, 
2005). The first decade of predictions of Mooreʼs law was so good that it was used as a planning tool for chip 
production in the 1970s. Corresponding to integration and miniaturisation there were similar predictions – 
again pretty accurate to date – as to speed and cost of transistors. The continuing effectiveness of Mooreʼs 
Law in anything like its original form is again strongly contested. However if some kind of technological 
speed-up occurs, this may have an important effect on AI productivity in a relatively short time. 
In practice Mooreʼs Law may fizzle out after a few further iterations. While speed-up predictions have 
been pretty accurate to date, there are well-known problems as we reach atomic scales of chip integration: 
transistor performance and reliability degrade markedly. Nevertheless, some successor of Moore-style 
speed-up may take then effect (see Kurzweil, 2005). For instance, new developments are taking place in the 
design of basic components in computer circuits, such as the development of ʻmemristorsʼ, as alternatives to 
transistors (Versace & Chandler, 2010). It is claimed that these will revolutionise the work that can be done 
by each elementary computing step, thereby unleashing a whole new cycle of hardware speedups, as well 
as being closer to neural processing in their operation. Perhaps these or other ʻneuromorphicʼ computation 
designs (not to mention the possibilities inherent in quantum computing), will keep something similar to 
Mooreʼs Law in operation, and so move humanity closer to AI+ and AI++. 
Further, machines may be expected to start playing an active role in designing successor machines or 
in recursively improving their own design (e.g. by rewriting their own source code). Perhaps such machines 
may, sooner or later, achieve human levels of intelligence. One way this might happen that is often 
discussed would involve a process of ʻwhole-brain emulationʼ (WBE; alternatively ʻuploadingʼ). This is an 
alternative to progressively building smarter AI systems from current levels using AGI and other methods. In 
a WBE scenario a working human brain would be scanned in detail, and its entire structure and functionality 
transferred to an electronic host in which it could continue to operate indefinitely. This is considered to be a 
way in which individuals might enable their personal or psychological identity (and even consciousness) to 
be continued in silicon form after their biological body has stopped working (Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008; see 
also Chalmers, 2010). 
If it is possible for more or less human-level electronic AI to come into existence, either through WBE 
or through gradual incremental improvements from current artificial agents (WBE is, it should be noted, only 
one possible route to human-level AI), then such AIs should themselves be able to help or lead in the design 
of other machines with intelligence levels at least equivalent to their own level (after all, they were 
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themselves created by humans of that same intelligence level). Such a machine may then get to a point 
where it could design a machine a little smarter than itself, which in turn may produce a successor just that 
bit smarter again, and so on. So, taking Moore-style speedup and recursive self-improvement effects 
together, it may be possible that once AI reaches human levels, an AI+ barrier will be broken not that long 
after, and an AI++ barrier a few iterations after that (for more details see Yudkowsky, 2001; Chalmers, 2010). 
These projections are perhaps highly tendentious, but if they have even a small degree of probability, they 
should surely be taken seriously. 
Sceptical considerations 
There are of course many reasons for scepticism about intelligence explosion scenarios. One 
consideration is to do with learning and embodiment. An intelligent mind can achieve nothing without 
learning lots of things about the world, and without learning how to do many things. As far as the first is 
concerned, computer scientists have developed engines that codify information gleaned from natural 
language texts on the internet within powerful knowledge engines, such as CYC (Lenat & Guha, 1990), and 
Wolfram|Alpha (Johnson, 2009; and www.wolframalpha.com). But such systems learn only via the 
acquisition of symbolically formulated knowledge. They may ʻknowʼ an enormous amount about (e.g.) tennis 
propositionally, but to gain skill in playing the actual game, corporeally embedded learning is surely needed. 
Whatever the future progress in robot-building, Moore-style acceleration arguments would be inapplicable 
when knowledge-processes are taken outside the processing box into the physical world. There cannot be 
an indefinite increase in the time that it takes a robot to deliver a killer serve: real-world tennis has to operate 
at the real-world speed of a ball travelling across a real tennis court. So physically embodied learning in the 
real world is necessarily pegged to the speed of the events to which that learning is geared. If, as seems 
likely, an important part of human learning and knowledge is embodied, this seems to be an in-principle 
problem for the full applicability of indefinite speed-up arguments to supporting explosion predictions. 
Despite this and other considerations we do not believe they destroy the point of considering 
superintelligence scenarios. First, superintelligence may still arrive, even if it does not do so for hundreds of 
years, and arrives only as a result of circuitous paths of steady work, rather than anything like Moore-style 
speed-ups. The arguments given just now about physically embodied learning only address the claim that we 
should expect artificial learning always to progress at increasing speeds, not the claim that it will progress at 
some slower speed. 
Second, even if AI++ never occurs, in the sense of autonomous agents that have generalised 
cognitive powers (and, we should now add, practical, embodied skills) that far exceed human versions of 
such powers, there already have been partial attainments of AI++, albeit only in very narrow domains. Such 
advances might continue, and what at the moment are just isolated pockets of super-ability may multiply and 
may start merging and spreading into more joined-up and comprehensive areas of widescale competence. 
Maybe such areas of competence will be biased more towards the symbolic than the practical: maybe AI++s 
(or less advanced AIs) will make better finance directors, IT managers, CEOs, judges, etc. than they will do 
tennis players or skin graft surgeons, since the kinds of skills needed in the latter cases are arguably more 
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based on practical coping in the physical world than on sentential or symbolic operations. 
Non-explosive superintelligence? 
Leaving aside questions to do with speeding up in processing and in production of future improved AI 
systems, it is likely that artificial agents will themselves come to play more and more dominant roles in the 
production of other artificial agents. There may indeed be a take-off point where smart machines do the 
majority of the key work, with humans decreasingly able to understand the design, and, where smarter-than-
human machines build even smarter machines, in a recursive process. Such a scenario does not even 
require us to postulate a comprehensive kind of general, joined-up, intelligence in such machines, but only 
kinds of intelligence which can make big differences. So a progressive, runaway process towards some kind 
of superintelligence – not of a general kind, but perhaps describable as ʻmulti- specialistʼ – may still be on the 
cards, even if at a more leisurely pace than the originally proposed explosion. 
Even on such a more limited scenario, the arrival and spread of multi-specialist AI+/AI++ agents may 
well have far-reaching effects on society. If funding for the continuing development of such agents comes 
from corporate and government – especially military – sources, such superintelligences may come to be 
seen (by the people with money and power) as so invaluable that they are given senior roles in such 
organisations. As their numbers increase, those which are sufficiently humanoid might be increasingly 
embedded in our social existence, and may integrate ʻsociallyʼ with us in many ways (see below). They may 
be perceived as welcome or as a threat, or as both. They may come to progressively dominate our society, 




So it is worthwhile to look at the ethical implications of AI+s and AI++s (even of a more limited, multi-
specialist, rather than generalist kind), coming to be embedded in human society, and to examine the kinds 
of moral, and social, status that such beings may come to occupy. A necessary first step is, we believe, to 
consider consciousness in such agents. 
Consciousness and superintelligences 
The idea that there are important links between ethical status and consciousness strikes many people 
as intuitively plausible, in the context both of humans and of possible artificial agents. We will consider the 
question of consciousness in AIs in terms of the kinds of mental capacities that an artificial agent may be 
 




 To simplify the discussion we will only consider types of scenario where the social embedding of AI+ or AI++ agents 
comes about in a fashion that largely involves the consent of human occupants of the society. 
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thought as having. As a first, simplifying, proposal we will suggest that mental capacities may be considered 
to be of (at least) two kinds: operational, and phenomenal. Standard kinds of operational (or cognitive) 
capacities include knowing how to extract square roots, or how to sort the sequence ʻP-V-G-T-B-L-Fʼ into 
ascending order. Phenomenal capacities include the ability to feel pains or orgasms, or to see purple shapes 
– that is, to experience what are often called ʻqualiaʼ. Clearly there can be hybrid capacities; and perhaps 




If artificial agents – the kinds that may be built from transistors (or from memristors) – have mental 
capacities at all, they would be likely to be of the operational kind. The discussion of how far all mental 
processes can be explained in terms of operational or cognitive capacities is an old one with a vast literature, 
as is the related one of whether cognitive capacities can in turn be explained in computational terms. Many 
philosophers – cognitive universalists, as they might be called – think cognitive capacities are the only 
fundamental kind of ʻmentalʼ capacities, and hence the only kind that artificial agents need to have, however 
superintelligent they might be. On this view phenomenal capacities are just a subset of operational or 
cognitive ones (see, for example, Dennett, 1991; Churchland, 1989). 
On the other hand, many well-known arguments have, of course, been advanced for the contrary 
claim that artificial agents, at least if controlled by computational processors, cannot have mental capacities, 
and certainly not phenomenal capacities. A variety of reasons are given for this, such as that phenomenal 
experience possesses ʻimmediateʼ, or ʻqualitativeʼ features which cannot be captured in computational 
accounts; that computational models lack the ʻintrinsic intentionalityʼ of mental, or conscious, states; that 
there is an essential link between conscious mind and biologically autonomous systems that cannot be 
replicated in non-biological information-processing systems; that mind, and particularly conscious 
experience, is necessarily embodied; that conscious mental states must be based upon sub-neuronal 
quantum processes which cannot be computationally modelled; and so on (Dreyfus, 1992; Searle, 1980, 
1992; Varela et al., 1991; Penrose, 1994).
136
 
Some would say, in particular, that the ability to have genuine mental states of any kind (including 
cognitive states) depends on having phenomenal capacities – so that non-conscious artificial agents could 
have no mental capacities as such. On such a view, an artificial (electronic) superintelligence would not be a 
fit subject for any mental attributions, since they were unable, even in principle, to have conscious 
 




 This distinction is very rough and ready, designed to introduce a broad and familiar distinction. Nothing here is 
intended to be incompatible with existence of mental capacities that are neither operational nor phenomenal. 
136
 Greenfield (1996) has a particularly forthright rejection of the brain-as-computer view: her arguments are based on 
detailed aspects of neurochemistry. 
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awareness of their mental processing (see, for example, Searle, 1992; Strawson, 1994). 
As-good-as and as-if 
However, there are reasons for discounting this last view in the present discussion. An AI (or ordinary 
computer) that can order a jumbled list of letters is doing cognitive ʻworkʼ to produce a certain result, even if it 
is simply ʻblindlyʼ following an algorithm in so doing. It may not possess the intrinsic understanding of a 
conscious human, but it is still engaging in a kind of ʻmentalʼ productivity, that is, producing the kinds of 
results that minds routinely produce. More ambitiously, following a narrative strand in the previous section, 
suppose that an AI+ or AI++ were to occupy the role of Chief Executive or Chief Finance Officer of some 
large corporation which produces widgets. Even if such an agent were to be of what we called a multi-
specialist kind, rather than of a generalist kind, we could imagine its being sufficiently enmeshed in the 
activities of the company to produce results for the companyʼs shareholders which were as good as, and 
perhaps far better than, those produced by the best of its human predecessors. In such a scenario, 
assuming that its details could be filled out in an appropriate way, it would be the productive results of the 
ʻintelligentʼ operations that are the most important part of the supposed mental status of such an agent. 
Whether it counted as genuinely mental, ʻrealʼ intelligence, based on ʻintrinsicʼ, ʻnon-derivativeʼ intentionality, 
rather than just as ʻas-ifʼ intelligence or intentionality, would be a side-issue, as compared to the nature of the 
productive outputs of such intelligence. Even if such an agent only has as-if intentionality, it might be taken to 
be as-good-as intentionality: its cognitive output can not only be predicted and explained in intentional terms 
(Dennett 1971, 1989), but also relied upon and incorporated into our own cognitive operations, and social 
relations, in many ways. As with our dealings with the outputs of our intelligent fellow humans, it is largely the 
results that matter as far as operational mentality is concerned. 
By contrast, it does not seem so easy to make this move with phenomenal mental capacities. There 
does seem to be an important question to be put as to whether one could move so smoothly between as-if 
phenomenality and genuine phenomenality. Phenomenal mental states or capacities do not seem to be so 
obviously or essentially tied to productive output as do operational capacities: phenomenality is about how it 
is, or what it is like, for the agent, rather than about mental results. (For more on this, see Torrance, 2000). 
This distinction between as-if and genuine phenomenality also seems to be at the heart of our moral 
attitudes towards other phenomenal beings – and indeed towards our own self-interest as a phenomenal 
being. Consider Benthamʼs famous discussion of the moral statement of animals, in his Introduction to the 
principles of morals and legislation (Bentham, 1781/1970). Having compared the status of (non-human) 
animals to slaves, he asks what could determine whether animals sit on one side or the other of “the 
insuperable line” between beings worthy of moral consideration and those which are not. “Is it,” he asks, “the 
faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse?” No, he continues, “...the question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive 
being?” (Bentham, 1979/1970.) 
Bentham highlights how phenomenality provides us with the capacity to experience suffering (as well 
as enjoyment), at various degrees of intensity. The moral position of a sentient, intelligent being is thus very 
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different from that of a non-sentient being, however ʻintelligentʼ the latter might be (were there to be non-
sentient intelligences – an issue we do not wish to pre-judge). So the move from as-if to as-good-as doesnʼt 
seem so easy to make in the case of phenomenal capacities as it does in the case of operational capacities. 
The issue of whether AIs or AI+s or AI++s could have phenomenal capacities seems to have more ʻbiteʼ than 
the corresponding issue concerning operational capacities – perhaps precisely because of the ethical 
dimension noted by Bentham. 
An illustration: a plane-load of AI++ executives crashes in the Andes. Our attitude towards rushing to 
extricate survivors would be likely to be very different depending on whether we considered them as having 
phenomenal capacities in addition to operational ones. If we thought of them as having only the latter, we 
may be motivated by the loss of valuable members of the various organisations in which they worked. This 
would be a loss to us and to others affected by their loss. On the other hand, if we thought of them as having 
phenomenal capacities as well, we would be concerned about their capacity to suffer extremes of physical 
pain, cold, hunger, etc. It would be the detriment to their own interests as well as the effect on the concerns 
of others that we would be taking into account. To have phenomenal capacities, then, would be to have 
interests, in a way that is central to moral (and prudential) thinking. Such interests, it is suggested, would not 
attach to a being merely in virtue of their having operational capacities. 
Phenomenal capacities as a sub-class of operational ones? 
This view might well be challenged. If you had a sufficiently comprehensive and versatile 
superintelligence, then, it might be said, phenomenal consciousness would come ʻfor freeʼ. This view would 
follow from the position that phenomenal capacities are a subset of, or translate into, operational capacities. 
Dennett has proposed such a view, to take one of the more prominent examples (Dennett, 1991). On such a 
view the distinction just proposed between the two ways of thinking about the plane crash victims would be a 
bogus distinction: once we have exhaustively described the operational or cognitive capacities of a creature 
or agent we have also described its phenomenal capacities. There are no additional facts to consider. Of 
course it would be an open question as to whether any specific artificial agent had the particular kinds of 
operational capacities which also marked it out as having a phenomenal life. But, on the Dennettian view, in 
deciding whether the plane crash victims were conscious beings, we would not need to consider any kind of 








 A variant of this view has been proposed by Chalmers (1995, 1996), according to which the phenomenal capacities 
would not follow as a matter of logical or conceptual necessity from the relevant operational capacities of AI++ agents, 
but only as a matter nomological necessity. For brevity we will not consider this view here as the differences are not 
crucial for our discussion. 
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It should be noted that a follower of Dennett is not committed to denying that the plane-crash victims 
might be capable of suffering: on the contrary, it depends upon whether or not they have the right kind of 
phenomenality-generating operational capacities. Conversely, a Dennettian is not committed to saying, in 
any given case, that AI++ plane crash victims definitely must be consciously suffering. It is compatible with 
Dennettʼs view that some classes of imaginable high-functioning intelligent agents lack the cognitive capacity 
for consciousness, suffering etc., and that other classes of such agents possess the cognitive capacity for 
consciousness. But certainly, on a Dennettian view, an AI+/AI++ whose cognitive capacities were derived 
entirely from an information-processing architecture could, in principle have genuine phenomenal states, and 




The moral status of some kinds of artificial agent 
Earlier we mentioned two different ways in which an agent could be considered as having moral 
status: moral productivity and moral recipiency. Arguably, the possession of at least one of these (and 
maybe both) is necessary for any agent to be considered to be a ʻfull-bloodedʼ moral agent.
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 In the 
preceding discussion we considered the relation between possessing phenomenal capacities and moral 
status. Some person, biological or artificial, who is experiencing great suffering is, if Bentham is right, 
definitely on the ʻmoralʼ side of what he called the ʻinsuperable lineʼ between creatures deserving of moral 
consideration and those who are not - that is, between beings which are and arenʼt ʻmoral recipientsʼ. It 
would thus seem doubtful that any agent could be a moral recipient – at least in a primary sense – if it did not 
have the capacity for consciousness.
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 But what about moral ʻproducersʼ? Could there be a moral producer 
which had no capacity for consciousness? What, in more detail, is involved in being a moral producer? And 
could you have a moral producer which wasnʼt also a moral recipient? 
First, it is clear that moral productivity and recipiency donʼt always need to occur together. Non-human 
animals may be considered to be moral recipients while not necessarily being producers. Many writers in the 
 




 One might wonder whether the phenomenal states that could be undergone by an AI++ which do fulfil the above 
conditions would include states of deeper enjoyment, and perhaps of deeper suffering than those of humans. If so, would 
this require us to give a greater moral weight to their interests than those of humans (as people currently tend to give 
greater moral weight to human interests than the interests of earwigs)? This question can be considered independently 
of accepting anything like the Dennettian view (see Torrance, 2011a for further treatment). 
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 Torrance (2008) has further discussion, with slightly different terminology. 
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 Below we will discuss one kind of case where there could be a form of moral recipiency without the capacity for 
consciousness. 
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animal liberation or animal rights movement have stressed the importance of considering non-human 
animals (in effect) as moral recipients, without necessarily agreeing that they would therefore need to be 
considered as moral producers (see Singer, 1975; Regan, 1983). Torrance (2011b) considers how sentience 
relates to ethics, in the context of the animal ethics (and the ethics of the environment), and also that of the 
ethics of artificial agents.) 
To be a moral producer is to be open to being considered morally responsible for oneʼs acts (whether 
good or ill). A fox would not be considered morally responsible for raiding a chicken coop, even though a 
human causing similar carnage normally would. So the fox would presumably not have productive moral 
status (but would still be a recipient). Humans generally have both, but a person suffering from 
schizophrenia, who causes injury or death to others by setting a house on fire while undergoing a delusional 
episode, may not be a moral producer (in that situation, or at all) – while still being a moral consumer (for 
related issues, see Strawson, 1962; Frankfurt, 1998). 
But what about the converse case? Could there be moral producers that were not moral consumers? 
In particular, what about artificial agents who are not considered to be conscious – could they be producers 
without being consumers? An agent (natural or artificial) may be considered to be a moral producer if she or 
it has relevant kinds of rational abilities, including the ability to reflect upon the consequences of her/its own 
and othersʼ actions, and to operate with appropriate moral categories, such as desert, justice, fairness, 
interests, etc. In particular, it may be said, to have moral producer status, an agent must be capable of 
understanding (or at least acting as if understanding) what is involved in an(other) agentʼs having moral 
recipient status. These capacities might be argued to be purely cognitive or intellectual capacities, and 
therefore as not requiring consciousness in any agent that exercises them. 
Moral productivity and affective responses 
Perhaps an AI+ or AI++ would by definition have such a capability and would therefore, on the above 
account, be a moral producer par excellence. But many argue that moral thinking or understanding 
essentially involves having emotions of various sorts, as well as cognitions. It could be argued that the notion 
of an AI+ or that of an AI++ includes the ability to match and surpass, not just the cognitive capacities of 
average humans but also their affective capacities. Perhaps many affective capacities would be present in 
super-AIs because they can be fully instantiated in computational terms (See Sloman & Chrisley, 2003 for a 
discussion of a computational architecture in which cognitive and affective elements are closely intertwined.) 
Nevertheless, at least some emotional responses involve phenomenal capacities – so unless one takes the 
view that all phenomenal capacities reduce to operational ones, as outlined in the last section, at least some 
emotional capacities cannot be exhaustively captured within a computational framework, and therefore might 
be unavailable to an AI++. In particular, it may be said, to be able to understand what it is like to be a moral 
recipient is to be able to empathise or otherwise affectively respond to, the positive or negative conditions 
that others find themselves in as conscious beings. And arguably, such a response can come only from 
some kind of first-hand knowledge of what it is like to have phenomenal experience of the positive or 
negative outcomes of actions and events – to know what it is like, experientially, to reap the pleasant fruits or 
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bitter harvest of other peopleʼs acts, or of outrageous fortune. But, it could be further argued, having such 
first-hand knowledge means being able to consciously experience such positive or negative outcomes – in 
effect, being a moral recipient as well as being a moral producer. So on this position, a non-conscious AI++ 
could not fully be a moral producer, if the latter involves first-hand (and thus phenomenal) knowledge or 
recognition of what it is like to be undergo particular negative or positive phenomenal states. 
On this argument, then, being phenomenally conscious would be a requirement for being either a 
moral recipient or a moral producer: only a conscious being could have the necessary imaginative or 
affective ability to understand the experiential gains and losses in the lives of others. For an artificial agent to 
have anything less than such an ability would, on such a view, be, at best, to have the capacity to engage in 
moral behaviour – to mimic moral production – but such an agent would not be to be capable of acting 
morally, let alone having appropriate moral feelings. 
Raising the bar 
Such an argument seems to us to have a lot of force, although the strong constraints that it puts on 
what it is to be a genuine moral producer (a genuine moral actor and moral feeler) may be resisted. Clearly, 
if the argument goes through, it considerably raises the bar for genuine moral producer status in AI+ or even 
AI++ agents, since it requires that such agents be fully phenomenally conscious. 
The above arguments seem to have the effect of raising the bar for super-AIsʼ qualifying as genuine 
moral agents, because of the questions around admitting phenomenal consciousness in such super-AIs. Of 
course, when such agents appear, if they do, there may be considerable evidence at hand to support the 
conclusion that their cognitive architecture does support phenomenal consciousness after all. But in todayʼs 
state of knowledge we have to be guarded about seeing AI+s or AI++s as having phenomenal 
consciousness, and therefore about their admission into the ʻmoral constituencyʼ, either as recipients or 
producers. 
Non-conscious super-AIs and moral status 
All the same, perhaps we can take a more relaxed attitude towards the moral status of AI agents. On 
the one hand we might explore reasons for taking a more liberal approach to whether such agents have 
phenomenal consciousness (as with Dennettian cognitive universalism). But there may be other reasons for 
being more liberal even if we admit such AI agents to be completely phenomenally non-conscious – even if 
we accept that such agents are complete zombies, in the widely used philosophical sense of the term 
(Moody, 1994; Harnad, 1994; Kirk, 2006; for criticism see Dennett, 1995). So weʼll instead ask: Are there any 
kinds of moral status – perhaps of a secondary kind – that a non-conscious smart agent might be able to 
have? We will examine this question first in the context of explosionist speculations, and then later in the 
context of speculations about less supercharged artificial agents. 
If any approximation to an explosion hypothesis came to be realized, we may have many 
superintelligent agents perhaps playing dominant roles in society, even if we were highly cautious about 
accepting them as phenomenally conscious. Let us suppose, optimistically, that such non-conscious 
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superintelligences tend to behave in ways which betoken benevolence, moral integrity, etc. when humans 
behave in those ways. Could such behaviour count as moral action of some sort? Perhaps the behaviour of 
such non-conscious agents would not just be superintelligent, but also ʻsuper-moralʼ: their moral ʻvirtueʼ or 
moral ʻwisdomʼ may continually outstrip the general run of human moral performance.
141
 
Such agents – lacking in phenomenal capacity, we are supposing, but behaviourally impeccable when 
judged against what we might morally expect from humans in the equivalent situations – would not qualify as 
genuine moral producers, in a primary sense, if the earlier arguments are accepted. Yet it would seem wrong 
to regard them as having no moral status at all, since, by hypothesis, they would appear as strong moral 
examples to humanity. It would seem as appropriate to regard their behaviour as being ʻas-good-asʼ genuine 
moral action. Doing otherwise might be thought to be taking a rather closed-fisted position. 
Further, could such non-conscious super-AIs also count as moral recipients? We will explore this 
possibility. Could there be certain kinds of ʻrightsʼ or ʻentitlementsʼ that it may be appropriately accorded to 
certain sorts of intelligent agents (even non-conscious ones)? To see how this might work, we will, in the 
next section, consider an example drawn from a science fiction novel (and movie). 
Morality and sociality in non-conscious agents 
In The positronic man (Asimov and Silverberg, 1993) – later made into the film Bicentennial man 
(Columbus, 1999) – the central character is a superintelligent (roughly AI+ level) household robot living with 
the Martin family. The robot, known as Andrew (for ʻandroidʼ) Martin, goes through various modifications and 
transformations during the narrative, finally ending up as a more-or-less complete biological, or biomimetic, 
human (and eventually receiving a human brain to replace his artificial brain). However, at the start of the 
story Andrew is represented as being somewhat ʻrobotʼ-like (in a traditional ʻhackʼ sci-fi sense), almost 
certainly non-conscious, but good-natured, and with higher-than-human cognitive abilities . Andrew comes to 
develop some unusual manipulative skills, including that of fashioning exquisite objets dʼart out of driftwood 
found on a nearby shore. These art works become sought-after pieces among the well-heeled friends of 
Andrewʼs owner, who is a top Californian lawyer. As a result of these sales, large sums of money flow into 
Andrewʼs ownerʼs bank account, and the latter decides that it would be ʻunfairʼ for Andrew not to be the legal 
owner of all this wealth. The owner manages to persuade the State Legislature to allow Andrew to own 
property, despite being deemed ʻmerelyʼ a machine. Andrew later leaves his host family, and uses his money 
to build a house where he can live an independent life. (This takes us only part way through the plot, but the 
 




 This is a big ʻperhapsʼ. The response of a super-intelligence to their understanding of morality in human society might 
be to try to take over a drug cartel or invest in the arms trade. It would be risky to assume that more intelligence 
automatically implies greater moral rectitude. 
Steve Torrance & Denis Roche 
310 
further details need not concern us.) 
What Asimov and his collaborators seem to be trying to do in this section of the plot is to persuade us 
that itʼs reasonable to admit that an artificial agent (super-smart, but surely non-conscious at this stage) 
could be a legitimate owner of property, and have various moral rights associated with property-ownership. 
We do not here take a view on the legal aspects of this kind of case, but simply consider what its moral 
implications might be of considering an artificial agent as in some sense owning property. Leaving the legal 
questions aside, this kind of property-ownership is, arguably, a perfectly legitimate kind of moral status – 
although one which we might take to be of a secondary kind, compared to the ʻfull-bloodedʼ sort of moral 
status discussed earlier. 
Why would stealing from a non-conscious robot be wrong? 
If someone (a human, say) were to attempt to expropriate some of Andrew Martinʼs property, we might 
well regard such an act as morally reprehensible. This may be partially on virtue-ethics grounds: because of 
the kind of person that such a would-be expropriator would reveal him/herself to be. But it would also be, we 
would argue, because of the injustice, or the moral affront to Andrew, of such an act. Such a moral affront 
may be thought to be dependent upon Andrewʼs being capable (contrary to hypothesis) of experiencing 
negative phenomenal states as a result of such a loss, i.e. as being a conscious agent. But perhaps the idea 
that stealing Andrewʼs property is a moral affront to him does not need to be intimately bound up with 
thinking of Andrew as having conscious states. Rather, one could say, it is because he has a moral right, as 
owner, to his propertyʼs not being expropriated. 
It should be noted, incidentally, that, if Andrew has certain moral rights, then he would also perhaps 
have various duties, of a moral kind, attaching to this property-ownership status. If, for example, he acquired 
a dog, he would surely have a moral duty to keep feeding it; and so on. So he could have both a kind of 
recipient and of producer status – of a secondary kind in each case. 
In this example we have concentrated on property-ownership, but other kinds of social roles may well 
generate similar moral rights or duties for artificial participants. We believe that one can extend this sort of 
consideration to AI+ or AI++ agents that might (as we speculated earlier) come to occupy prominent 
positions in various social organisations, including corporate organisations (as well, perhaps, as many other 
less elevated positions). If that were a reasonable supposition, then such roles would have many rights and 
duties attaching to them, and we might consider such rights and duties to have some kind of moral force as 
well as institutional or organisational force. Indeed artificial agents may come to participate in a great many 
different kinds of social situations, and would therefore be subject to a wide variety of normative structures 
that are, explicitly or implicitly, recognised as playing a key role within those situations. 
Secondary moral status, versus moral status anchored in consciousness 
On the earlier account of moral status we argued, taking a lead from Benthamʼs observations about 
suffering, that the possession or non-possession of phenomenal capacities puts great restrictions on what 
kind of being can count as being part of the moral constituency (as either producer or recipient). On the 
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current account, however, we are tying at least certain kinds of (perhaps ʻsecondaryʼ) moral status to various 
forms of institutional or social status, and perhaps also to a host of other social expectations, rules, 
prohibitions, empowerments, exemptions, etc. which appear to make up the supra-individual normative order 
that participants in any given society may find themselves simultaneously subject to and facilitated by (see 
Steiner & Stewart, 2009). In doing so, we find ourselves possibly admitting that a host of miscellaneous 
moral responsibilities and rights may be attributable to an artificial agent, where considerations of possible 
suffering, or of other phenomenally-based outcomes, are simply not in play at all. 
It has to be said that the above argument rests upon a number of ʻifsʼ. One uncertainty is whether 
artificial agents could ever be created (by human or other artificial designers) that had the kind of cognitive 
and behavioural repertoire that would make it natural for us to deem them as occupying the role of ʻproperty-
ownerʼ and other such roles. Explosionists, and other more moderate optimists about future AI development, 
will indeed say that such an outcome is likely, but that is, of course, a highly contested claim. 
Ownership without ʻenjoymentʼ? 
Another uncertainty: we are deliberately considering the case of AI agents where phenomenal 
consciousness is abstracted away (as in the Asimov story, as we have interpreted it). We imagined a smart, 
versatile, but non-conscious, robot being ʻworthyʼ of having the moral or social (perhaps legal) status of 
property-owner. But it could be argued that you can be coherently considered as the ʻownerʼ of property, at 
least in a moral sense, only if you have the capacity to ʻenjoyʼ or derive (phenomenal) ʻsatisfactionʼ from such 
property, in a way that solely a conscious creature could do (see above). 
As against that it could be said that, despite their lack of phenomenality, non-conscious artificial 
agents could still have motivations, desires or goals – even needs and interests, although these desires, 
needs, etc. are not experienced as phenomenally pressing in the way that biological agents often experience 
them. For example, an artificial agent may display the intention or motivation to maintain possession of a 
piece of property by engaging in preventive behaviour of various sorts, in the face of a threat of its being 
removed by another (human or artificial) agent. And property would be considered by the agent to be ʻusefulʼ 
to it in a variety of ways. An artificial agent may, perhaps, cognise that some object was a good which it 
owned, for use or for exchange-value, independently of its having the capacity for phenomenal satisfaction or 
distress in relation to such a good; it could reason about how various possibilities in relation to that object 
might work for or against its interests. Perhaps this, and other related facts, would be sufficient for us to 
attribute some kind of (secondary) moral interests to non-conscious super-AIs, while not yet granting it status 
as a true moral recipient (in a primary sense).  
Non-conscious agents and social roles  
Another important issue concerns the extent to which an agent of the (non-conscious) kind we are 
considering might be said to engage in social roles at all. Many writers have expressed deep scepticism 
about the possibility of attributing social roles of any sort to artificial agents. Thus Collins and Kusch (1998) 
make out a detailed and highly elaborated case that human social relations involve the performance of 
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actions of different types, which they see as forming two major classes, ʻmimeomorphicʼ and ʻpolimorphicʼ. 
An example of a mimeomorphic action is taking a golf swing or reciting the words of a text. This is an action 
defined by its physical or movement characteristics, that can be mimicked without social contextualisation 
being necessary. An example of a polimorphic action is socially-embedded behaviour such as writing a love 
letter or taking a turn on a bicycle into a side road across a busy line of oncoming traffic (which involves 
understanding intentions, social meanings, etc. of other road-users). To considerably simplify their argument, 
one might explain mimeomorphic actions as ones by human agents that can be simulated by machines, 
whereas polimorphic actions, which are essentially embedded in social settings, are ones that cannot, 
because of their social framing. “Machines,” they argue, ”cannot do polimorphic actions because they do not 
have an understanding of society on which they can draw; but, though, machines do not have intentions, 
they can be made to mimic mimeomorphic actions” (Collins & Kusch, p.1). 
This kind of view seems to depend upon seeing an in-principle barrier between things that can and 
that canʼt be done by machines or artificial agents, with all things genuinely social as being beyond a 
threshold which machines (or non-biological agents) are constitutionally unable to cross. Many reasons 
might be, and have been, given by for maintaining this divide. Some of these are endorsed by Collins & 
Kusch and others. There are claims such as that machines cannot have intentions in the way humans can; 
that socially embedded actions involve implicit, non- formalisable rules or understandings of ʻhow things are 
doneʼ (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Dreyfus, 1992); that being a genuine social subject involves being born, 
nurtured and ʻinductedʼ into a specific social environment through various developmental and acculturation 
processes; that it involves having a ʻradical embodimentʼ or biological autonomy that artefacts could not 
possess (Varela & Thompson, 2001; Thompson, 2007); or that it involves having particular kinds of affective 
capabilities; that it means being able to understand and partake of linguistic activities of a complex sort; or, of 
course, that it requires the capability of experiencing phenomenal states of different kinds. 
Clearly the foregoing arguments may be challenged in many ways. Perhaps they are based upon a 
simple lack of imagination about what might be achievable in future developments in cognitive technology. 
Or is it the case that, if presented with a future example of such technologies, displaying particularly complex 
forms of apparent social embedding, sceptics about machine sociality would concede that such agents were 
no longer to be considered as ʻmereʼ machines – so that the barrier between machines and sociality is 
actually sealed by implicit linguistic fiat on their part? In particular, is there an in-principle reason why agents 
admitted to be non-conscious should be incapable of being social (let alone legal or moral) agents? We 
focus on this latter question in particular. 
Primary and secondary moral status: Appearance and morality 
Perhaps whether or not artificial agents are to be viewed as genuine ʻsocialʼ participants could itself be 
taken as based on social construction. Suppose it were possible for such agents to be developed (or for 
them to develop themselves) so that they could enter into many complex ʻsocialʼ interactions with humans 
and with other artificial agents. Then, at some time in the future, people might naturally consider such 
interactions as genuinely, fully, social (not just social in an ʻas-ifʼ way). In this respect there seems to be a 
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contrast with consciousness. Whether to take an artificial agent to be genuinely conscious is, we suggest, an 
issue whose rational settlement could not simply depend upon how people find it natural to judge the case. 
Whereas, in the case of sociality, provided an appropriate prior set of performance conditions were met, such 
a judgment might well be determinable in such a way. 
Today, computer-based financial systems – automated tellers, financial risk modellers, loan 
assessment systems, etc. – and other cognitive technologies, play numerous roles in our economic and 
social lives. Few people today would regard such systems as being social participants in their own right: they 
would probably be seen as tools or instruments that we use for our own social ends. Nevertheless, with a 
progressive sophistication in the design and production of ʻperson-likeʼ systems, there may well be a shift in 
public perception. Perhaps future artificial agents will be perceived as participants in ʻourʼ society; perhaps 
there will be a shift from ʻus and themʼ to a new, more inclusive, ʻusʼ. There are already signs that even 
relatively simple artificial agents are coming to occupy various kinds of roles that are entwined with human 
lives, both institutionally and emotionally. We will consider the potentialities of some types of such ʻintimate 
machinesʼ (Frude, 1993; Levy, 2008) in the light of the preceding discussion. 
Appearance-based versus reality-based ethics 
Mark Coeckelbergh has proposed a new approach to ethics, which he calls ʻappearance-based ethicsʼ 
(Coeckelbergh, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Most standard approaches to ethics (ʻreality-based accountsʼ) are 
oriented around the psychological reality of moral agents. This is certainly true of the approach to ethics 
which has dominated the current paper: we have argued, in particular, that moral recipiency, in its full-
blooded or primary sense, is directly dependent upon the phenomenal capacities of any given agent – where 
such phenomenal capacities are seen as being independent of any performance, or operational, capacities. 
So, in the view which has been at the core of this paper, no phenomenology means no moral recipiency 
(and, as we further suggested, probably no moral productivity either). 
Coeckelbergh argues that there are deep problems with such standard accounts in ethics – 
particularly in relation to possible artificial agents, such as those we have discussed. For example there are 
issues concerning the trustability of the mental attributions around which reality-based accounts revolve. We 
have seen that there are questions concerning the attribution of phenomenological states to AI agents: the 
criteria for such attributions are far from clear. Similar questions affect the ethical and phenomenological 
status of various kinds of non-human animals. Even in the case of attribution of phenomenology to humans, 
things may not be plain sailing – we have, Coeckelbergh says, the Other Minds problem, which continues to 
remain a live philosophical question (a view which is strongly disputed by enactive or phenomenologically 
oriented writers (e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Noë, 2009). Coeckelbergh suggests we short- circuit such 
difficulties by adopting an ethical stance that does not require us to raise issues to do with underlying 
psychological realities, but which rather allows us to limit our judgments to how various kinds of beings 
(robots, animals, other humans) may perform or appear to us in their interaction.  
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Evaluating the appearance-based account  
The simplifying zeal of the appearance-based account is attractive. In particular it makes it much 
easier to link an account of ethics vis-à-vis AI agents with an account of their social roles. As we remarked 
earlier, it seems tempting to take a social-constructive view of sociality as far as AI agents (especially super-
intelligent ones) are concerned. If the performance of such agents is sufficiently rich to incorporate a great 
many interactions that humans commonly think of in social terms, then, one might argue, there is no reason 
not to consider such performances as genuinely social. Moreover, it could be argued, our social interactions 
and our moral interactions largely overlap, or are at least very strongly associated. So a performance-based 
view of moral status seems to be as reasonable as a performance-based view of social (or legal) status. 
But what exactly is the relationship between an appearance-based account and reality-based 
accounts? Is the appearance-based view supposed to supplant the standard views, or just to supplement 
them? If the latter, then we can agree that often we do base our ethical or affective responses, and our social 
and legal relationships and roles, upon appearances or performances of participants in those relationships 
and roles. Nevertheless, a strong element of implicit phenomenological attribution is frequently present in 
such relationships. Thus, in considerations to do with distributive justice, we normally assume that those who 
benefit from redistributions have the capacity to experience such benefits. Again, the Benthamite zeal to 
reduce suffering, that seems to be a strong motivation for much ethical and social concern, makes sense 
only as a bid to avoid real suffering, not just apparent. So it seems likely that some kind of reality-based view 
of ethics cannot be eliminated, but at best supplemented, by an appearance- based account. 
Social appearances and assistive technologies 
Having said that, the appearance-based view correctly highlights the way in which we constantly make 
imaginative leaps in ethics on the basis of appearances which are often meagre and highly inconclusive. 
This is particularly true in the context of human-machine interaction. Many people, even when presented with 
the very limited ʻsocialʼ performances of todayʼs robots, find themselves ʻhumanisingʼ the machines in various 
ways. A large amount of recent robotics research concerns human-robot ʻsocialʼ interaction of this sort 
(Breazeal, 2002; Dautenhahn et al., 2008). One particular area of concern is the use of ʻassistiveʼ robots in 
the care of elderly people, people with dementia, etc. In such situations even very simple robots (which offer 
very much sub-human performance) can play quite rich ʻsocialʼ roles because of high levels of over-
attribution or humanisation by many who are users of such agents (Roche, 2010). 
For some writers this has raised important issues to do with deception, dignity, and so on. (Turkle et 
al., 2006; Sparrow & Sparrow, 2006; Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010). “[I]t is not only misguided, but actually 
unethical, to attempt to substitute robot simulacra for genuine social interaction” (Sparrow & Sparrow, 2006). 
But how seriously should such concerns be taken – at least as something special about interaction with 
robots? What moral difference is there between, say, swapping interaction with a robot pet for interaction 
with a biological pet, and swapping interaction with a biological pet for interaction with a human being? The 
latter kind of swap is not normally considered as unethical per se – so why should the former? 
Leaving that aside, many people may find it very easy to develop social and affective relationships 
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towards artificial agents even of relatively primitive kinds. Indeed there may – quite soon – be an explosion in 
assistive robots which are not particularly smart, and definitely devoid of phenomenal capacity, but which are 
designed in ways that capitalise upon the readiness of many children and adults to overlay affective warmth 
upon their interactions with artificial companions offering the least excuse for doing so.
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Primary and secondary status 
As we have seen, some people – explosionists – are very optimistic about a future rapid explosion of 
super-AIs. While we question such optimism, we think it useful to reflect on some of the ethical and social 
implications of such an idea. A key element in our approach to this has been to focus on consciousness in 
such agents. Does the possession of super-intelligence necessarily bring consciousness in its train? (And 
would a robot with super-smarts also have super-feels? What does it even mean to talk about ʻsuper-feelsʼ or 
ʻsuper-consciousnessʼ? (See Torrance, 2011a for some progress on these questions.)) 
The consciousness of super-AIs (or its lack) is, we have claimed, central to consideration of their 
moral status. We have distinguished two kinds of moral status – moral recipiency and moral productivity. We 
have argued that possessing phenomenological consciousness is a necessary condition for being a moral 
recipient, and we have also given reasons for thinking it may be necessary for being a moral producer. If so, 
the presence of real phenomenology in super-AIs becomes critical to how far they can be members of ʻourʼ 
ethical community. Nevertheless we have suggested that there are other ways of understanding what it is to 
have ethical status. From the example of a smart, but admittedly non-conscious, robot owning property, a 
variety of ways emerged in which we could intelligibly see such agents in an ethical light. Non-conscious 
robots might come to participate in many of the institutional aspects of society, and even if it is acknowledged 
that they have no phenomenal experience, they may behave appropriately and fluently within many informal 
social contexts – so that it becomes relatively simple to see such agents as social participants (perhaps also 
only of a secondary kind), as well as being granted various legal rights and obligations. 
The distinction between primary and secondary moral status is orthogonal to that between recipient 
and producer. Primary moral status (of the recipient or the producer kind) is conditional upon ability to 
experience phenomenal states. This is the sort of moral status that, in Coeckelberghʼs view, relies on 
assuming the existence of real psychological states of various sorts in agents. Secondary moral status, or 
ʻappearance-basedʼ ethics, as Coeckelbergh terms it, applies when we attribute roles, rights, obligations, and 
 




 By contrast there may also be many people who resolutely refuse to follow this pattern, and who regard such robots 
with indifference or hostility. Indeed there could be a cultural divide between robot befrienders and robot rejectors which 
marks as big a schism in society as those between religious believers and non-believers; political radicals and 
conservatives; eco-warriors and deniers; and so on. 
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so on, to agents irrespective of states of conscious awareness. A similar primary/secondary distinction could 
be drawn in the case of attributions of social status. 
Perhaps these two kinds of moral or social attribution can be considered as co-existing, each playing 
important roles in our moral and social interactions. Moreover, even in the absence of primary ethical 
attributions there may still be various secondary forms of moral status that can be granted to non-conscious 
super-AIs. If a future proliferation of intelligent agents occurs, where those agents integrate in a variety of 
adept, enriching ways within human society, we might thus accept that they could occupy a variety of 
secondary social and ethical roles, without our needing to take them as conscious (we ignore the more 
dystopic projections where super-AIs blot out all current forms of human social existence). 
These secondary forms of ethical status may also be granted for agents that have far more humble 
helpings of AI or of cognitive functionality. Even the relatively simple robots that are being produced today as 
companions to children, or to elderly or other vulnerable people can become the target for strong affective 
(indeed quasi-moral) responses on the part of their users. This may raise moral issues to do with dignity, 
deception, and so on; but we doubt that such issues are special to artificial companions used in this way (the 
same might be true of domestic animals used as pet companions in many settings, for instance.) 
Conclusion 
The prospect of rapidly self-improving artificial super-intelligences is one which could change human 
history in many fundamental ways, or even halt it. We have used the idea of the intelligence explosion as a 
way to dramatise many issues concerning how intelligent artificial agents, whether super-smart or more 
mundane, may be expected to enter into our moral and social worlds. We discussed, and defended, the view 
that moral status (at least of a primary kind) revolves around issues to do with conscious experience. This 
intimate relation between ethics and consciousness brings in particular problems for the case of super-smart 
future AIs whose consciousness was a matter of doubt or controversy. However we also explored ways in 
which ethical attributions might make sense even where the beings targeted by such attributions were 
considered as indisputably non-conscious. Such secondary attributions depended upon manifest 
performance rather than upon unseen experiential states. A similar distinction between primary and 
secondary status is also reasonable in the case of attributions of sociality, we argued. 
Mark Coeckelbergh has argued that it is now time to replace standard ʻreality-basedʼ approaches with 
ʻappearance-basedʼ or ʻsocial-relationalʼ approaches (that is, in our terms, to ditch primary ethical and social 
attributions and simply operate in terms of secondary ones). We agree that his arguments may do justice to 
much actual moral practice – for instance to how the psychological reality of some moral participants can be 
hidden or obscured from other participants – so that appearances or perceptions is often all we have 
practically to go on in our moral interactions. Nevertheless, we would claim that it is important to continue to 
foster a core conception in ethics – a conception of what it is to be a genuine member of the moral 
constituency – which depends on the real consciousness of any such member, or its real absence. So, in our 
view, an appearance-based ethics must, at best, be a supplement to a reality-based ethics, not a 
replacement. Perhaps future super-intelligences will be part of this primary constituency, but only if they have 
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Abstract If we are to take the idea of machines that are like humans seriously, then we need to recognise 
exactly what hurdles need to be overcome. For this reason, whilst this paper will not provide some grand 
unifying theory of moral responsibility, it will help ʻmuddy the watersʼ and highlight the problems that I 
believe must be encountered and grappled with, regarding to moral responsibility and AI. 
Keywords morality, responsibility, Frankfurt, machine, human 
Introduction 
Generally it is agreed that a person can theoretically be held morally responsible for their actions. We 
see conformity to this view all the time in our everyday lives. Recently, I was late to work and my manager 
asked me why I was late. To which my response was, that I ʻlost track of time.ʼ This inability to manage my 
time properly was seen as my responsibility, and as such my actions were perceived as my own choice, 
meaning I was held accountable for my actions. 
Now, my poor excuse for my tardiness rests on two presumptions: 
1. On the idea there is a necessary connection between moral responsibility and action. 
2. My accountability relies on the truth that if unless there was some external factor that hindered 
my performance to ʻarrive on timeʼ that ʻIʼ must then be accountable for myself. 
Hence, the question as to whether a machine can be held responsible for action, makes little sense 
because it presupposes two rather larger questions. Instead we must inquire as to what the principle is that 
underpins premise (1) and presupposes not only the quality of truth of premise (2), but also the idea that 
accountability in itself is not challengeable.
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However, this paper is not about humans but machines, and therefore this presupposes something 
greater. It presupposes that we know what we are talking about. Therefore, we must first establish what we 
 




 This, of course, presupposes a certain notion of moral status that will not be dealt with in this paper. 
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mean when we discuss this idea of an ʻaritificial moral agentʼ (henceforth AMA) (Wallach & Allen, 2009). 
Thus, this paper deploys a two prong approach. Before we begin to decipher the idea of moral 
responsibility we need to uncover what we mean when we speak of an AMA. I will suggest that to achieve 
this we consider the ʻagency v. structure debate.ʼ This is because when we speak of the image of any 
human, we always consider the effect of the numerous variables that have moulded that individual. 
Therefore, exposure to this debate creates the true image of the being. However, rather than focussing on 
the AMA as a being privy to the effects that various ʻstructuresʼ might embody, what would be more revealing 
is whether exposure to this debate is actually possible. Notably, when we look at this debate, we generally 
presuppose that an agent is a kind of blank slate. Therefore, there is a presupposition of not only the 
purpose of the agent – because their purpose could only be dictated by the various structures – but also 
quite obviously the actual potential of the agent. I will suggest that if we were to apply this same kind of 
analysis to the AMA we will realise that not only is it a mistaken presumption to do so, but also that this will 
provide what I shall call the Hollywood image of the AMA as opposed to the actual image of the AMA. 
Creating this ʻimage of the machineʼ will act as a stepping stone to the second part of this inquiry. 
Once we are able to identify what it is that we are dealing with, we will then be in a position to ʻproblematiseʼ 
responsibility onto the agent and highlight what I believe to be the greatest hurdles regarding machine 
responsibility. 
Building an image of the AMA 
In philosophy we understand autonomy as a personʼs capacity for action. Therefore, autonomy can be 
thought of as a metaphysics of human potentiality, in so far as whilst we are unable to ascertain how a 
human will develop definitively, we can say that she must have a capacity for that development. Therefore, if 
autonomy embodies this idea of the original position, it is thus the pivotal moment prior to the effects of 
structure. Ergo, because this signifies an unchangeable position – i.e. to have the capacity for a certain 
potential – autonomy encapsulates the metaphysics of potentiality.  
What is special about the Roboethics project is the extent in which we understand the very 
metaphysics for potential in the AMA. The standard dialogue looks dogmatically at the effect of structure on 
the agent, i.e. if the agent were free, asking whether our capacity for action is controlled by external factors 
such as gender perception, class, economics etc., and if so, in which way(s).  
This debate in which the extent structure plays a role in the free agentʼs life I believe to be relevant in 
terms of humans as it provides a useful tool in which we can analyse our society and in turn the human. 
However, whether it is transferable to machines I believe is moot. The problem appears to be that our 
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starting points are not the same. The human is a completed product
145
, in the sense that the package that 
embodies the original position of being free to act (etc) – prior to effects of structures – are already created 
as a result of human biology. Therefore, our capacity for the potential to act is already incorporated in us. 
With machines we are in not so fortunate a position. With humans we presuppose all the elements 
that allow for that potential capacity to exist, with AI we actually have to construct it. 
So why does the construction of a machine mean that it will be different to a human? The answer lies 
in the problem of reduction, in terms of the content of what we are trying to reduce and as a method itself. 
Ideas such as autonomy and responsibility are ideas that supervene ultimately on the very biology of a 
human. Therefore, the very idea of transposing them to a machine presupposes elements that are left out of 
the reduction (Nagel, 1995, p. 98). This is because we say what is special about a reduction is its ability to 
provide an internal account of an external property. An example could be how ʻwaterʼ is ʻH2O.ʼ Therefore, in a 
reduction the two things are the same thing prior to us making the reduction. If a reduction ultimately takes a 
grand idea and reduces it to something less abstract, and in doing so produces a synonym of the original 
thing, then the two things must necessarily be the same, or else the reduction cannot take place. If this is the 
case, there must be certain metaphysical properties that are unchangeable. In the ʻwaterʼ and ʻH2Oʼ example 
the scientific properties of the two words always remain the same. Water can be nothing else but H2O, whilst 
H2O can be nothing else but water. 
Therefore, if we are creating an agent without paying dividance to what are quite obvious metaphysical 
imperatives – namely the impact of human biology
146
 that allows ideas such as responsibility to supervene 
on its structure – then we are envisaging a different metaphysical agent, that cannot be explainable in a 
language that we customarily assign to humans.  
There is thus a metaphysical incompatibility in terms of the being itself, which accordingly must have 
an impact upon the concepts we are attempting to deal with. It is like asking a person holding two identical 
pens, whether the pens are exactly the same. Of course the answer is that they are not, by virtue of the fact 
there are two pens (and presumably more in the world) than that single one. Whilst they are not exactly the 
same, we understand that both pens accord to the same metaphysics of ʻpen-nessʼ which accounts for the 
linguistic error of ʻpens that are exactly the same.ʼ An artificial, constructed machine and a human could not 
accord to the same metaphysics, because they accord to their own, and whilst they might have certain 
similarities, they are ultimately different. Therefore, we cannot linguistically presuppose that a word such as 
 




 Whilst, of course this presupposes the extent in which humans actually do embody this position, it is irrelevant, 
because we perceive this to be true, as we as humans presume that we are the most advanced being, and are thus the 
benchmark for other beings. 
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 This is to say that human biology is the fundamental factor that affects anything that supervenes upon it. 
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responsibility means the same thing for both the human and the AMA. 
It follows that we cannot use human tainted rhetoric when we refer to it, but instead a language which 
is more neutral, that can be attributed to humans, rather than definitively deriving from them (Beauchamp, 
1999 p. 311).  
We now have an image of the artificial agent, or at least a more accurate picture of what it actually is. 
However, does this image affect the extent in which we can say the agent can be held accountable for its 




Depending on the way it is interpreted, there are numerous ways to characterise responsibility. I 
believe there are three interpretations, which we sometimes confuse, but must recognise are independent of 
each other. It needs to be made clear in this paper and in subsequent works regarding moral responsibility in 
machines, that, if we do not classify which version of moral responsibility we are using, we are going to 
confuse our subject matter from the outset. 
These are the three characterisations of moral responsibility we need to distinguish: 
1. To be morally responsible for an action (RM1) 
2. To have moral responsibility (RM2) 
3. To act in a morally responsible manner (RM3) 
All these versions of moral responsibility are similar in the sense that they presuppose that an agent 
has the capacity to be morally responsible. They also all preach the same standard of what it means to be 
ʻmorally responsibility.ʼ We will use Susan Leigh Andersons definition, which says that, such a standard of 
moral responsibility, is 
…the standard in which a person can be held accountable for an action, by virtue of whether they should 
be blamed or praised for an action that is right or wrong in a matter that has an ethical dimension. 
(Anderson, 1996, p. 416) 
We will also say for the purposes of this paper that ʻethicalʼ refers to actions that have a an effect on 
others. 
Problems arise when we draw attention to the differences these versions of morality entail. Tense is 
the key difference: RM1 – being morally responsible – is to do with an action that has already happened, 
 




 An accurate meta-model of AMAs needs to be produced to provide a truly accurate image of AMAs for further 
analysis. 
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where the spectator tries to ascribe praise and blameworthiness to a particular action when the effects but 
not cause of action are known. RM2 – having moral responsibility – implies the agent already posseses the 
quality of being morally responsible, therefore it is a possessive statement in the sense that cause and effect 
of action are immediately or deductively identifiable to a particular agent. RM3 – acting in a morally 
responsible fashion – is the version that needs to be highlighted as the banner of machine responsibility. 
RM3 is an ʻought toʼ statement, suggesting an agent should act in a morally responsible manner. RM3, thus, 
not only lays the groundwork
148
 to RM1 and RM2, but it is also the only version of moral responsibility that 
provides a standard of the type of action that should be sought after. If an agent ought not to act in a 
responsible manner, then they cannot be held responsible for their actions as part of RM1 and RM2. 
But this means RM3 makes a far larger presupposition. It relies on the idea that there is not only a 
connection between ʻmoral responsibilityʼ and ʻactionʼ but also on the pretence that there are no practical 
problems with moral responsibility. 
What this suggests is that the presuppositions that we are faced with, when discussing moral 
responsibilities, might be the symptoms of a far grander problem. As such it would seem useful to look at the 
prerequisites to moral responsibility. If we can establish what the problems might be with responsibility 
internally, then maybe we can tackle and avoid these presumptions more effectively. 
Prerequisites of a moral theory 
It is possible to say that the extent in which an action is right or wrong is not a real requirement of 
responsibility, because this presupposes what should be right and what should be wrong. It is possible to 
assert instead that these are subjectively dependent perceptions by the individual. An example could include 
a person who commits an act that they believe to be right, yet everyone else perceives as wrong. So the 
agent is startled when his act leads to a negative reception, leading to him being blamed instead of praised 
for committing the act.  
This shows that the quality of an act is judged from the spectatorsʼ perspective; what the individual 
believes is to a certain degree irrelevant – all that matters is the consensual agreement of the ʻgroupʼ rather 
than the individual.  
 




 This presupposes that an agent possesses moral status, or at least certain properties that we might normally say lead 
to moral status, only when the agent first has capacities to be moral, based on which we might then later assume or 
deduce moral responsibility by virtue of the quality of those capacities. In saying this, I do have reservations with regards 
to term moral status, particularly in the sense that it might be a more obstructing concept then one that might have any 
real value. I will not discuss this issue in this paper, but I recommend Benjamin Sachs (2011), The status of moral status, 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, for an excellent discussion no this issue. 
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This highlights that for there to be moral responsibility: 
1. There must be a predetermined sense of what is right and wrong in order for the qualitative 
analysis of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness to be possible. 
2. There must logically be a self (person) that commits an act. This is not to say that an act (cause 
and effect) can only be committed by a person, but we would normally say an act had an ethical 
dimension if there was a person in which to make that decision to act. 
3. This leads to our final criterion: only an act where the decision to perform that act is pursued 
freely by that person normally leads to us ascribing moral accountability for the act. 
It is noteworthy to mention there is an obvious clash with some of these criterions. If there is a 
predetermined sense of what is right and wrong, how can their logically be the freedom to choose to perform 
action? We will say for the purposes of this paper, and for humans in general, that the quality of action is 
determined by the extent in which that action is reasonable within the context in which it is available. Whilst I 
have the freedom to quit my research and climb Mount Everest, to do so would be unreasonable due to 
(potentially) unrealised structural restraints, such as my character
149
. Therefore, freedom is a personʼs choice 
that conforms to the structural restraints of that person within certain contexts. 
Therefore, what should seem clear now is that if moral responsibility is to stand, we need to asses the 
quality of its prerequisites. We then need to examine how any problems that may effect these prerequisites 
fares in terms of the image of the AMA we had constructed earlier on in this paper. 
Is there really a necessary connection between responsibility and action? 
I have chosen to draw on the classic argument of Henry Frankfurt in Alternate possibilities and moral 
responsibility because it provides one of the most controversial arguments concerning responsibility in many 
years. For Frankfurt the presumptive argument of accountability can be summarised in what he calls ʻthe 
principle of alternate possibilitiesʼ (henceforth PAP) (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 1), which suggests that if a person 
could have chosen an alternative action, then they must be held responsible for that action. We would 
normally say if a person is coerced it voids their action, because it is generally held that duress impedes the 
decision making process by reducing the options of action which a person has (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 1). 
However, this presupposes that (a) there was no other choice but to perform the action, and (b) but for this 
coercion there is thus no moral responsibility (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 1). This establishes the crux of his enquiry: 
“…what is it about this kind of situation that warrants the judgement that the threatened person is not morally 
 




 This is not to say character is the only limiting factor, there could be other perennial structures at play. An obvious 
example is parental responsibilities. 
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responsible for his act?” (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 3). 
To perform his inquiry Frankfurt asks the reader to participate in a number of thought experiments that 
would normally lead to us sighting the PAP to decide if the action pursued by the agent would cause him to 
be morally responsible for said action. Frankfurtʼs counter to PAP rests on the fourth of these thought 
experiments, though it might be useful to briefly go through the first three, as they ultimately help build 
towards the final thought experiment. 
Jones, version 1 (JV1): Non compos mentis 
In the first thought experiment (JV1), letʼs assume that Jones is not a reasonable person, but instead a 
person who simply followed orders without any consideration for the effects his action might have. It would 
seem difficult for us not to assign him moral responsibility. This is because if the threat has no bearing on his 
action, the effects of the threat are negated by his character. Therefore, it is as if the threat was non-active 
(Frankfurt, 2007, p. 3). 
The problem with this scenario is that there are no real possible alternatives by virtue of the quality of 
the character, i.e. non compos mentis. As such this does not provide a good argument for attribution or 
negation of moral responsibility (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 3).  
Interestingly, the quality of this analysis rests on the notion of whether Jones, in version 1, is a 
reasonable person. What happens when the person is reasonable but chooses still to act on the basis of 
someone elseʼs commands? Do we then say that this person is thus not a reasonable person? An example 
of such an agent is a soldier – do we then say that a soldier is not a responsible agent? There is no reason 
to suggest any soldier might be less reasonable then any other person prior to becoming a soldier, therefore 
do we suppose they become less reasonable when they become one? The key difference is that the soldier 
believes himself to be a tool of the state, therefore believes he cannot be held morally responsible for his 
actions because in his mind he makes the decision to consciously hand over his decision-making abilities to 
a ʻhigher paradigm.ʼ However, there is the question as to whether this decision to relinquish the agent of his 
responsibility suddenly qualifies him as not responsible for his action? If there is no alternative but to follow 
orders, because of oneʼs understanding of oneself within a system, then maybe it is possible to suggest that 
Frankfurtʼs rationale in JV1 stands. But, the caveat is that he must really believe himself as an instrument. 
What this shows is that it is not just a person who blindly follows rules, but also a person who follows rules 
blindly to the extent that no other possible alternative is believed to be possible. 
Jones, version 2 (JV2): Blindness 
In the second thought experiment (JV2), we imagine Jones as a rational man, but consumed by fear. 
We imagine that Jones was originally going to perform an action, but then is threatened to perform it. He 
becomes consumed by the threat and for fear of reprimand he carries out the action. In this scenario the fact 
he was going to carry out the action anyway becomes incidental factor. Ultimately, the fear caused 
performance. In this case responsibility is void, because no other form of action at all was perceived due to 
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the weight of fear. 
Jones, version 3 (JV3): Prior commitment 
In the third thought experiment (JV3), Jones is again a rational man. However, we imagine him in two 
ʻtime-scapesʼ. We imagine an act which Jones had planned to commit. We then imagine him closer in time 
being threatened to perform the act. If the action had already been the motivating factor to Jones performing 
the act, then, similar to Jonesʼ action in JV1 (in terms of functionality), the difference is that the threat itself 
should have no effect on Jones in JV3, because the motivation for the act had already been established, 
regardless of the threat – presupposing Jonesʼ conscious decision, in JV3, to act on the original 
motivation.
150
 If this is the case, then we would say that in JV3 Jones can be held accountable for his action 
because his motive never changed and the alternative choice was never a factor, because the possibility to 
make that choice had been bypassed by the motive (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 4). 
What we have seen in the versions of the Jones thought experiment is that coercion does not 
necessarily exclude moral responsibility (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 5). The reason this is so, is because in certain 
situations there may not even be coercion, or, coercion itself may not be an active element in the decision 
making process. What this means is that the principle of alternative possibilities might be compromised 
because we are not disregarding moral responsibility by virtue that there was coercion, but instead on 
specific additional circumstances, hence “the extent that the principle of alternative possibilities derives its 
plausibility from association with the doctrine that coercion excludes moral responsibility, a clear 
understanding of the latter diminishes the appeal of the former” (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 5). 
Frankfurt notes a possible objection to this position. If Jones in JV3 is reasonable
151
, the threat should 
surpass the original motivation and bind him to the action, because prior to the threat he has the choice not 
to perform the action. Hence, the threat simply affirms the decision. However, this does not negate the fact 
that there is still choice. The entire PAP relies on the very idea that there is no choice available. However, 
there is always the decision, which is overlooked, to accept the punishment of the threat. In JV3 Jones never 
has the ability do otherwise, he is simply choosing not to acknowledge the other options because they are 
not desirable. Hence, coercion is still not the ultimate motivator for action. What this means is that the 
contestation of JV3 does not run contrary to the principle. 
However, Frankfurtʼs point here is troubling. It can be inferred that the quality of our instincts (in the 
most extreme circumstance survival) are still not enough to diminish moral responsibility. If a personʼs life 
 




 This must presuppose that the threat had no effect on the agent what so ever. 
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was threatened, one would think that our instinct for survival surely usurps our accountability for actions that 
we may choose otherwise not to do. Whilst it is true that it is difficult (if not impossible) to establish Jonesʼ 
real motives in JV3, due to the perennial problem of other minds and direct access, surely there must be 
some sense of truth when our most primitive survival instincts are called into question? But this is not the 
point Frankfurt is making whilst it is not the decision we might normally conform to. This does not diminish 
the fact that the option exists (I shall expand on this point later). 
Jones, version 4 (JV4): The hidden hand (Frankfurtʼs counter to PAP) 
In the final thought experiment a person called Black threatens Jones, but never reveals what he 
would actually do, (because he is an expert at reading a persons character). Black is able to potentially 
manipulate Jonesʼ decision-making process by taking sufficient steps in ensuring the form of action he 
desires is followed. Therefore, initially Jones, in this version of the thought experiment, intended to carry out 
an action, and Black will guarantee that action comes about, though he never expresses this to Jones, nor 
requires to reveal himself to Jones unnecessarily. In this scenario Jones decides to pursue this action – the 
question now is, whether he is responsible?
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For Frankfurt, questions of accountability are reliant upon the decision to perform the action freely (the 
principle of alternative possibilities). In scenario JV4 this would require that Jones is never under the control 
of Black. This means in this scenario that the extent in which Jones is responsible for his action should be 
the same if Black does not exist, the reason being that the quality of the threat is never carried out by Black, 
so Jonesʼ act would have occurred anyway because Black would only intervene if there is evidence that this 
action will not be carried out. Therefore, if Jones, in JV4, was always going to carry out the act, we would 
ascribe to him moral responsibility, even though Black always has the ability to intervene and ʻmakeʼ Jones 
commit the act in JV4. Hence, the act is always predetermined153. As such, it would appear that there was no 
other alternative, yet intuitively, we find Jones morally responsible in JV4 (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 8). 
Whilst Frankfurt is able to show that if a person could not have avoided doing something, it is a 
 




 This issue of ability to do otherwise, in reference to, or spawning from, Frankfurt is discussed in a vast body of 
literature, which has not been considered in this paper, because this paper aims more to raise issues, so that we might 
see the challenges facing AMAs. In my opinion this issue of the ability to do otherwise has been split into three general 
categories. The first revolves around a temporal critique. The second is a causal critique and the third is an internal 
coherency critique. Also see suggestions in footnote 10. 
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sufficient condition of him having done it (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 8), he cannot show the reason why he has done 
it. But this irrelevant: the principle of alternative possibilities is demonstrably flawed. Whilst it may be true that 
a person may not have been able to do otherwise, “it may not be the case that he acted as he did because 
he could not have done otherwise” (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 8, emphasis in the original). It is choice and reason 
that become imperative in this understanding. In other words, for Frankfurt, PAP is challengeable because 
the idea that there is no other possible alternative does not necessarily mean the agent will not be morally 
responsible for their action, because there can be times in which even with no alternative action, we still feel 
an agent might be morally responsible. Ergo, there is necessarily a contentious connection between 
accountability and action. 
Just because Jones could not have done otherwise does not immediately suppose he might have 
done otherwise (Frankfurt, 2007, p. 8). Therefore, why should we suppose moral responsibility if there is 
ultimately no sense of autonomy?
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The problem Frankfurtʼs intuitive argument creates with regards to an AMA 
Frankfurtʼs argument presents a difficult hurdle regarding responsibility in artificial moral agents 
(AMAs). If the grounds in which an action take place are predetermined, this negates the extent in which an 
agent could be held responsible for that action. If we now add this problem to the image of our AMA we 
established earlier, how could we logically hold an AMA responsible for their action if it is we who build and 
determine the extent of that action in the first place?  
In other words, if all the possible actions an agent could make in any given situation are bound to the 
ʻmoral programmingʼ weʼve put into it, then no decision an AMA makes is autonomous. Whilst this means it 
can be argued that the agent cannot be held accountable for its action, this also creates a paradox.  
In AMAs we construct the boundaries of their actions, therefore the argument goes that because all 
their action is predetermined this means that they are not autonomous, and thus not morally accountable for 
their actions. This results from our understanding of the causal effect of their nature. With humans, we would 
normally say that we were free, and thus there were no limits to our actions. However, this is not necessarily 
true. There are many structures that forge and mould us. As such, it might be possible to say that our causal 
nature is similarly traceable; though we simply are unable to do so because of the issue of limits. In other 
words, ff the limits of AMAs and of human beings are traceable (or able to be accounted for), then we have 
 




 This is a hard incompatabilist perspective, in the sense that demonstrably, if all action can be predetermined, in the 
sense that the action must accord to some sense of deontology (or in machines verification), then it follows that there is 
no such thing as responsibility. 
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no choice but to say that the key difference between the two is knowledge of what these limits are. If both 
have demonstrable limits, are we then forced to say that if we ascribe moral responsibility to humans, should 
we then also do so for machines? In other words, if an argument can be made against the connection 
between responsibility and action, yet we still ascribe it to humans, why is it we cannot do the same for 
AMAs? 
An amplification of problems constructing a practical moral theory when we 
presuppose the connection of action and moral responsibility 
Earlier in this paper it was suggested that if we could weaken all the prerequisites of moral 
responsibility, we might begin to better understand the quality of the task ahead of us. So far I have shown 
that the connection between moral responsibility and action able to be severed. Moreover, I have shown that 
the notion of freedom of action itself can be called into question. In this final section I wish to demonstrate 
that the notion of a ʻselfʼ is also subject to scrutiny. 
Let us remind ourselves of the prerequisite of the ʻselfʼ, i.e. that there must logically be a self (person) 
that commits an act, as I argued earlier in this paper. Again, this is not to say that an act (cause and effect) 
can only be committed by a person, but we would normally say an act had an ethical dimension if there was 
a person in which to make that decision to act. 
Who am I? 
Let us imagine a person (X) who we know beyond all reasonable doubt had committed a murder. Not 
only are there witnesses and CCVT footage, but (X) even stands in court and confesses to the murder.  
Nevertheless, we must question the identity of (X) as the perpetrator of the murder. Did (X) actually 
commit the crime? No person is the same as they were at any given previous moment. Even while I write this 
sentence, I could not logically be the same person I was when I wrote the previous word on this page. 
Therefore, if no person is an accurate representation of their previous selves, how can you hold that ʻselfʼ 
accountable for a crime (action) oneʼs pervious ʻselfʼ had committed? Does our passage through time mean 
that all states of our selves are necessarily linked? Does time detach each state of self from the last? 
It is possible that, if each state of the self is separated by time, following a simple chain of causation 
can help account for myself from one position to another. The murderer is only placed on trial (effect) 
because a version of himself has originally committed a crime (cause). However, this does not provide a 
rationale for why we should still hold him accountable (in the present and ever changing state), because the 
argument can still be made that this does not explain why ʻheʼ (in his present state) should be accountable 
for ʻ(X)ʼ (in his past state) if he is no longer that person.  
For the AMA this argument is devastating. This temporal self argument rests on a number of 
conditions. If the AMAʼs moral theory dictates the potential for its action, then the limitations of the AMA are 
predetermined. If this is the case, the AMAʼs state of being must always be the same, because all action is 
logically predictable. This infers that if a human is a ʻselfʼ, it is because of the limitations being unknown to 
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the human agent, which is why we cannot say each moment is metaphysically the same because time must 
act upon the agent in such a way, that it detaches the agent from each moment to the next. If the limitations 
are always known, then the AMA cannot be a self, if the standard of self is based upon a human. This is a 
key dilemma, if one of the prerequisites to a moral action is that it an act is done by a ʻself,ʼ and a self is a 
temporal entity, and such an entity to which one would consider as ethically affective is a human - or better 
put; a being of certain qualities which humans posses. For an AMA there is no self to speak of, ipso facto 
there can clearly be no sense of responsibility for an action by an AMA, because it is not a self to which we 
might normally say could be so affective. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this article I made it clear that the purpose of this paper was not propose anything 
radical in terms of some kind of grand unifying theory of responsibility. It was to show what I believe are the 
major hurdles that need to be overcome if we are to take the idea of artificial moral agents seriously. 
I have provided what I believe to be a reasonable (though admittedly under developed) image of an 
AMA. I have also shown what I believe to be the problems regarding responsibility and action. Not only can 
the connection between the two be severed, but there is also the question as to the quality of the 
prerequisites.  
Hopefully the reader will have seen that my approach was to slowly peel back the various levels of this 
problem so that we reach the core of this debate. Any fruit that has a rotten core is no longer desirable. What 
this paper aims to have done is show exactly this. I would not go so far as to say we should stop looking at 
responsibility in machines altogether. Perhaps we ought to replace those prerequisites, or maybe we ought 
to detach ʻmoralʼ and ʻresponsibilityʼ alltogether. Why can an agent not just be responsible? Why morally 
responsible? Does it provide some deeper insight into responsibility? Does it provide the grounding for a 
person to have an action, that makes them responsible? These are the types of questions that not only need 
to be asked, but must necessarily be answered if we are to provide a practical expression of the AMA. 
Ultimately, I believe that it is possible to hold a machine responsible for its actions. Just as a parent 
cannot be responsible for the actions of their offspring in later life, so to cannot the programmer. This infers a 
number of possible requirements. The first is that we are able to justify beyond doubt, via some internal 
argument that a machine is actually like a human. However, many great thinkers have debated aspects like 
responsibility for centuries – so ultimately this might be a matter of perspective. An alternative could be not to 
attempt to change machines, but rather the way we perceive them. However, this can lead to the ascription 
rather than attribution of aspects of their mind, which could lead to a certain ignorance in terms of the truth or 
actual being of the AMA.  
Both of these alternatives we see could have certain positives but also certain negatives. Therefore, I 
suggest instead a more moderate approach, that would insist upon the need for a new language. We need to 
establish exactly what the limitations and features of terms such as ʻresponsibilityʼ and ʻautonomyʼ are in 
conjunction with roboticists and engineers, and build systems that supervene on this truth. If we can achieve 
this, then maybe one day, an Asimovian fictitious society might well become a reality. 
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Abstract In a series of publications, Ronald Arkin and his team (Arkin et al., 2009; Arkin, 2009) have 
proposed the concept of an ʻethical governor,ʼ which is supposed to effectively control and enforce the 
ethical use of lethal force by robots on the battlefield. The idea of an ethical governor, although presently of 
little influence on the philosophical discussion, has had a great influence on both the engineering and the 
public discourse on robot ethics, and is often cited in general interest publications to justify the use of war 
robots. This paper attempts to analyse the concept of an ethical governor as presented by Arkin et al.and 
to compare it to the original concept of Wattʼs mechanical governor for steam engines, to which it alludes. I 
argue that the metaphor of the ethical governor is dangerously misleading in multiple respects: the 
governor, as proposed by Arkin, overlooks a fundamental clash of interests of the robot designer/operator, 
which is not present in the original governor, and which can be shown to make effective robot control in the 
proposed implementation impossible. The concept also suggests that ethics control is a matter of 
correcting behavioural deviations from a ʻreference ethical actionʼ by a negative feedback loop, although it 
can be shown that this does not lead to an appropriate description of moral behaviour, and that in 
particular it overlooks the central role of conscience and dissent in morality. Finally, the concept as 
proposed is based on a fundamental confusion of the properties of laws, rules of just war, terms of 
engagement, and moral rules. At the same time, experimental implementations of it threaten to produce an 
ad-hoc regulation of ethical issues on the battlefield, which is removed from public scrutiny and democratic 
control. Considering these issues, the concept of an ethical governor as favoured and already 
implemented by the military research community can be shown to be both misleading and dangerous, and 
to not address the moral problems it is supposed to solve. Consequently, the concept in its present form 
(not only the metaphor) should be dropped, and a more critical approach to artefact morality must be 
adopted. 
Keywords ethical governor, robot ethics, war robots, Arkin 
Introduction 
In a series of publications, Ronald Arkin and his team (Arkin et al., 2009; Arkin, 2009) have proposed 
the concept of an ʻethical governor,ʼ which is supposed to effectively control and enforce the ethical use of 
lethal force by robots on the battlefield. The idea of an ethical governor, although presently of little influence 
on the philosophical discussion, has had a great influence on both the engineering and the public discourse 
on robot ethics, and is often cited in general interest publications to justify the use of war robots. Science on 
msnbc.com reports: “Robot warriors will get a guide to ethics” (Bland, 2009a), also echoed on the influential 
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Communications of the ACM news site (Bland, 2009b). Discovery news claims: “Robots warrior ethical guide 
in the works” (Discovery News, 2009), while Cnet.com military tech writes: “Killer robots can be taught ethics” 
(Rutherford, 2009). Headlines like these suggest that efficient (and sufficient) ethical control of war robots is 
nothing more than a technical problem, which, furthermore, has already been addressed successfully (“can 
be taught”). The critics of this concept, when they are at all present in the public discussion, often 
concentrate on the question of successful discrimination between combatants and non-combatants as the 
central ethical issue (Sharkey, 2008), although, as will be argued below, discrimination is indeed a technical 
and not a moral problem, and the supporters of Arkinʼs ʻethical governorʼ do convincingly reply that there is 
no reason why an efficient technical solution to the problem should be impossible to develop using present 
technology.  
In the following sections we will first examine Arkinʼs own approach and the goals of the ʻethical 
governorʼ architecture. Then we will see where the metaphor of the ʻgovernorʼ fails, and why moral behaviour 
very probably cannot be modelled on the basis of feedback loops, as Arkin attempts to do. Then we will 
address the confusion in Arkinʼs approach between moral rules, Laws of War, and Rules of Engagement. 
Finally, we will examine the central role of conscience, dissent and obedience as constituents of moral 
behaviour. For all these reasons, on the one hand, the ethical governor as presented by Arkin cannot 
plausibly be said to implement morality. On the other hand, its use as a propaganda tool in public discourse 
promotes an uncritical stance of the public towards the implementation of morality in lethal robots, which 
poses a long-term danger by delegating the discussion of artefact morality to the software lab, where it is not 
adequately situated.  
The concept of an ethical governor 
We begin with a brief look at Arkinʼs own exposition of the concept of an ethical governor. The 
governor is supposed to be “capable of restricting lethal action of an autonomous system in a manner 
consistent with the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement” (Arkin et al., 2009). It is significant, and will be 
discussed later on, that the authors do not explicitly mention moral behaviour as a goal in the abstract of their 
paper, although they use the designation ʻethical governorʼ in its title. We will see later that this is due to a 
confusion between Laws of War (LOW), Rules of Engagement (ROE), and moral rules, which is not clearly 
resolved in the original sources. A few lines into the introduction the authors state that the goal of their 
architecture is “to ensure that these systems conform to the legal requirements and responsibilities of a 
civilised nation” (emphasis added).  
The introduction of the same article also makes clear that the governor is designed to operate 
autonomously, without any human supervision:  
Weaponized military robots are now a reality. Currently, a human remains in the loop for decision making 
regarding the deployment of lethal force, but the trend is clear that targeting decisions are being moved 
forward as autonomy of these systems progresses. Thus it is time to confront hard issues surrounding the 
use of such systems. (Arkin et al., 2009, p.1) 
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The governor “is a transformer/suppressor of system-generated lethal action to ensure that it 
constitutes an ethically permissible action, either nonlethal or obligated ethical lethal force.” (Arkin et al., 
2009, p.1). Technically, the ethical governor is a constraint-driven system, which, on the basis of predicate 
and deontic logic, tries to evaluate an action, which has in a previous step been proposed by the tactical 
reasoning subsystems of the machine, by satisfying various sets of constraints, such as Cforbidden, Cobligate and 
so on.  
Every constraint is a data structure which has a type (e.g. ʻprohibitionʼ), an origin (ʻlaws of warʼ), and a 
logical form (ʻTargetDiscriminated AND TargetWithinProximityOfCulturalLandmarkʼ) among other fields 
(Arkin et al., 2009).  
Among other aims, the ethical governor is supposed to ensure the proportionality of a military 
response. Interestingly, the ʻacceptableʼ level of collateral damage is defined solely as a function of the 












The metaphor of a ʻgovernorʼ alludes to Wattʼs governor for steam engines:  
The term governor is inspired by Wattsʼ invention of the mechanical governor for the steam engine, a 
device that was intended to ensure that the mechanism behaved safely and within predefined bounds of 
performance. As the reactive component of a behavioural architecture is in essence a behavioural engine 
intended for robotic performance, the same notion applies, where here the performance bounds are ethical 
ones. (Arkin, 2007)  
Wattʼs original centrifugal governor was a simple negative-feedback controller. In order to avoid 
damage to the steam engine from excessive build-up of steam, an axis with two heavy spheres was attached 
to and driven by the engine (see Figure 1).  
When the engine (and with it the axis on which the spheres are mounted) moves too fast, the 
centrifugal force will overcome the weight of the two spheres and drive them outwards and upwards with a 
force which is proportional to the rotation speed. If a steam release valve is connected to the spheres, then 
their upwards movement will release steam until the speed of the rotation drops, and with it the centrifugal 
force, letting the spheres sink down again (following gravity) and thus closing the valve. This is a simple 
negative feedback loop which regulates one variable. Such feedback loops are common in many technical 
Table 1: from (Arkin et al., 2009) 
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devices: heating thermostats, to name just one, work in exactly the same way.  
Now it is time to see how all this applies to 
Arkinʼs concept of an ethical governor, and what might 
possibly be wrong with this metaphor.  
Interest conflict 
The first problem to note is that Arkinʼs ethical 
governor suffers in its core from an interest conflict 
between its designer and the operator of the machine 
it controls. With Wattʼs governor, the operator of the 
machine has an interest in its safe operation, and the 
governor helps him achieve that. Even if the operator 
would like the steam engine to work with more power, 
or at a higher speed than it was designed for, it would 
make no sense for him to override the centrifugal governor, since doing so would just destroy the machine 
without achieving any higher efficiency of its operation. The steam governor, as designed and constructed by 
the steam engineʼs designer, therefore acts in the best interests of the engineʼs operator at run-time.  
This is not so with the ethical governor. The designer of the ethical governor has the aim of 
implementing a device which will limit the possible actions of an autonomous war robot to a set of morally 
permissible actions (assuming, for the moment, that the latter set can be clearly defined at all). The operator 
of the war robot, on the other hand, has a conflicting interest: that of achieving the maximum tactical 
efficiency of the machine, and of carrying out a military operation successfully, thus achieving a predefined 
set of mission objectives. It is obvious that not all military objectives can be most efficiently achieved while 
observing the laws of war, the rules of engagement, and, on top of those, a set of moral constraints. The 
operator of the machine (the commanding officer for the particular operation) will therefore have an incentive 
to override the constraints imposed by the ethical governor, in order to achieve a better military result, or a 
higher degree of safety for his human troops. Arkin recognises this conflict, and accordingly defines, as was 
shown in the table above, permissible collateral damage as a function of military necessity alone. Put simply, 
this means that as the military interest in a particular action grows, the constraints imposed by the governor 
have to give way, until (see last row in the table) at the highest level of military necessity, every desired 
action can be carried out without any interference from the ethical governor. The word ʻgovernorʼ therefore 
must be considered an intentional misnomer: the device as proposed by Arkin is actually not more than an 
ethical adviser, which can be overridden at any time should military ʻnecessityʼ suggest that this would be 
opportune.  
This failure of the governor to actually govern is a direct consequence of the clash of interests 
described above: since the designer of the governor is the same as its operator (in both cases the same 
military hierarchy), it would be irrational to expect that the governor would be designed so as to act against 
military interests. And this will remain the case as long as ethical governors are not designed and 
Figure 1: Centrifugal governor (source: Wikipedia) 
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implemented by independent third parties, which are not susceptible to pressure from the military operators 
of war robots.  
Public scrutiny and democratic control 
Lessig (1999, 2006) has famously shown how what he calls ʻarchitectureʼ (that is, the design of 
technical systems) can exert a normative force which is comparable to the constraints imposed to human 
action by law and custom. The insight is not new in itself. Technological determinism and the idea of an 
autonomous technology as advocated by thinkers as diverse as Heilbroner, Ellul, McLuhan and even 
Heidegger have been around for a long time, and their core idea, although often perceived as being in need 
of clarification and amendment, is generally not thought to be dismissible as a whole. With Lessig, the idea is 
applied to code as a particular instance of an immaterial artefact with its own regulatory profile:  
Code is an efficient means of regulation. But its perfection makes it something different. One obeys these 
laws as code not because one should; one obeys these laws as code because one can do nothing else. 
There is no choice about whether to yield to the demand for a password; one complies if one wants to 
enter the system. In the well implemented system, there is no civil disobedience. Law as code is a start to 
the perfect technology of justice. (Lessig, 1996, p.1408)  
At the same time, the code which both requires and enforces perfect obedience, is itself removed from 
view:  
The key criticism that Iʼve identified so far is transparency. Code-based regulation – especially of people 
who are not themselves technically expert – risks making regulation invisible. Controls are imposed for 
particular policy reasons, but people experience these controls as nature. And that experience, I 
suggested, could weaken democratic resolve. (Lessig, 2006, p. 138)  
This argument applies with particular force to the case of war robots. Both Laws of War and Rules of 
Engagement are publicly visible and democratically approved documents, regulating in an open and 
transparent way a nationʼs forcesʼ behaviour at war. These documents are accessible both to the public 
which, in the final instance, authorises them, and to the soldiers, whose behaviour they intend to guide.  
Things change when Laws of War and Rules of Engagement become software. Words, which for a 
human audience have more or less clear, if fuzzily delineated meanings, like combatant or civilian, need to 
be ʻcodified,ʼ that is, turned into an unambiguous, machine-readable representation of the concept they 
denote. This interpretation cannot be assumed to be straightforward for various reasons.  
First, one might argue (in the wake of Heidegger and Dreyfus) that readiness-to-hand as well as 
Dasein, being the mode of existence of equipment and that of humans, respectively, cannot be expressed 
adequately by sets of ʻobjectiveʼ properties at all (Dreyfus, 1990). Whether, for instance, a hammer is ʻtoo 
heavyʼ for use is not translatable into one single, numerical expression of weight, since the hammerʼs 
ʻunreadiness to handʼ will vary not only across different users, but also depending on the time of day, the 
health status and the mood of the user, and perhaps even the urgency of the task towards which the 
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hammer is intended to be used. Arkinʼs concept, being based on a naive symbolic representation of world 
entities in the machineʼs data structures, does not even try to acknowledge this problem. The most promising 
approach in this direction based on symbolic computation could perhaps be argued to be Lenatʼs encoding of 
conflicting microtheories in CYC (Lenat, 1995), but this attempt is nowadays generally considered to have 
been a failure.  
Second, as for example Bruno Latour (2009) and Terry Winograd (1991) have separately argued (but 
this idea is implicit in Lessigʼs work as well), the utilisation of an artefact always involves a process of 
translation. This might be the translation of an originally aimed for goal into another, because the architecture 
and capabilities of the machine differ from that of a human operator and thus cause the ʻcollective entityʼ of 
the human operator (or programmer) together with the machine to select a goal more appropriate to the new 
set of capabilities of that collective entity. A good example might be that of a human soldier who might seek 
cover in case he is being shot at. The machine, not fearing injury, would instead shoot back. Assisted in 
targeting by the enemy fire itself, the machine would be able (and thus expected) to inflict lethal damage 
where the human soldier would perhaps seek to proceed more cautiously, to negotiate, to retreat, or to 
employ a whole array of possible other, non-lethal options. Winograd (1991) emphasizes crucial but often 
overlooked shifts in the meaning of words as they are translated from everyday, context-rich human 
language into an algorithmic, context-free, ʻblindʼ representation.  
The point which concerns us here is that these translation processes do crucially alter the meaning of 
the words and concepts contained in the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement. But whereas these 
documents have been the object of public scrutiny and the result of public deliberation, their new, algorithmic 
form, and which is far from being a faithful translation, has been generated behind the closed doors of an 
industry laboratory, in a project which, most likely, will be classified as secret. Military code is a prime 
example of ʻclosed codeʼ:  
By closed code,ʼ I mean code (both software and hardware) whose functionality is opaque. One can guess 
what closed code is doing; and with enough opportunity to test, one might well reverse engineer it. But 
from the technology itself, there is no reasonable way to discern what the functionality of the technology is. 
(Lessig, 2006)  
What reaches the public and its representatives will most likely be not the code itself, but advertising 
material promoting the machine in question and the features which its manufacturer wishes to highlight. If the 
precise morally relevant rule content of a ʻgovernorʼ-like system is made available at all, it will most likely be 
in a back-translated form, not as actual code, but as Rules of Engagement or Laws of War, thus hiding the 
very translation which is the problem the public should be able to examine and to address.  
Whether the technology actually does what it purports to do depends upon its code (Lessig, 2006). 
And if that code is closed, the moral values and decisions that it implements will be removed from public 
scrutiny and democratic control.  
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Moral regulation of war robots 
Discrimination 
Before we examine further details of moral behaviour regulation, it is important to note that 
discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, although a necessary condition for morally right 
action in war, is not sufficient.  
Discrimination has often been named as a core ethical issue regarding war robot deployment (Walzer, 
2009; Patterson, 2005; Singer, 2009; Sharkey, 2008). Discrimination, in this context, means the ability of a 
machine which is engaged in a battle to distinguish reliably  
1. between friend and foe; and  
2. between legitimate and illegitimate targets of violent military action.  
Discrimination therefore, as a cognitive operation, is an instance of classification: the persons 
perceived by the machine as present inside its radius of action are sorted into any number of categories, for 
example combatants, non-combatants, attackers, bystanders, dangerous, harmless and wounded persons. 
Although such classification is a necessary condition for moral action, morality cannot be said to be identical 
to making these categories; it presupposes them. Predicates like ʻmorally rightʼ and ʻmorally wrongʼ cannot 
be applied to persons or to classes of persons. The classification therefore cannot be said to be a moral 
issue in itself. It is, like other instances of automated machine classification, indeed a technical problem, 
which can be successfully solved by engineering means. Machines are already able to classify optically 
perceived marks on paper into ASCII letters (optical character recognition), to map voice sound patterns onto 
commands and text strings (dictation software), and to recognise faces on digital photographs. All these are 
successfully handled instances of automated pattern classification, but not of moral deliberation. The 
question whether a perceived human on the battlefield is a soldier or a civilian is a question of the same type, 
and it does not involve any judgement about moral values. It is a question of fact, and as such it is capable of 
being answered correctly or wrongly without referring to moral rules. Correct classification is required in order 
for the subsequent moral evaluation to be possible. But misclassification would result in a factual, not a moral 
error, and in such a case we would say that the machine acted erroneously, but not that it acted in a morally 
blameworthy way.  
Moral evaluation, on the other hand, maps actions onto the two classes ʻmorally rightʼ and ʻmorally 
wrong.ʼ A person cannot be morally right. An action can be. An action can be described as a predicate 
involving a subject S and an object O, all located inside a specific world context c:  Ac(Sc,Oc). Only the action 
Ac can be morally right or wrong, and this is what the ʻethical governorʼ is supposed to classify.  
Thus: ʻthe person standing beside the tree T is an enemy soldierʼ (an instance of discrimination) is a 
straightforward classification result, not a moral issue. But ʻit is morally right for robot X to kill the enemy 
soldier Y beside the tree Tʼ is, in fact, a statement which includes a genuine moral evaluation. Unfortunately, 
and as opposed to the discrimination problem, this evaluation cannot be tackled with the engineering 
apparatus available for classification problems. Although all classification has already been successfully 
completed in this sentence (the machine knows that Y is an enemy soldier), the moral problems are not yet 
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resolved (except by assuming a default rule like ʻit is morally right to kill any enemy soldier.ʼ But this rule 
obviously does not address any moral issues; it just denies their existence). The question whether it is 
morally right or not for the machine to kill the enemy soldier Y requires insight into the nature of life and 
death, into the question whether enemy soldiers in the present conflict deserve death, and whether the 
machine is morally permitted to apply lethal force against this particular human. This might involve a 
deliberation about the aims of the present war, about the moral justification of lethal force in this conflict, 
about the moral rightness of the machineʼs operatorʼs cause, and about available alternatives to the 
application of lethal force. But it is obvious that no machine known to man at present will be able to handle 
these types of questions. The moral problems of the handling of lethal force by machines on the battlefield 
cannot be reduced to discrimination. To do so means to dismiss the genuine moral problems that occur on 
the battlefield and to pretend that moral problems are simple classification problems, just because this is the 
only type of problem which machines currently are able to represent and to handle. 
ʻGoverningʼ moral behaviour by feedback 
Apart from the interest conflicts problem outlined above, we can probe the ʻgovernorʼ metaphor for 
further flaws. For example, we might ask what exactly could be meant by the process of ʻgoverningʼ moral 
behaviour.  
The original steam governor is, as has been shown above, an implementation of a negative feedback 
controller. It is an analog implementation, in that the value which is monitored (the speed of the engineʼs 
revolutions) directly drives the controlling mechanism (the upwards movement of the heavy spheres), which 
in turn directly controls the opening of the steam valve. In the context of computerised systems, such 
feedback controllers would operate digitally: that means, they would represent the value that is being 
monitored as a scalar (numerical) variable inside the system and emit control commands, which will in turn 
influence that variableʼs value through an effector interface. The system would, in an endless loop, read the 
value of the variable that is being monitored, compare it to the desired target value or range, and calculate 
the deviation of the actual value to the target range. This deviation would be used to calculate the strength of 
the systemʼs response through the effector interface: if the value is above the desired range, an action would 
be taken that reduces that variableʼs value. If the value is too low, the opposite action would be initiated. In 
both cases the strength of the corrective action would be proportional to the magnitude of the deviation. 
Since the systemʼs reaction is always opposite in sign to the deviation, this feedback loop is called a 
negative feedback. Negative feedback controllers restrict the value of the controlled variable to a small range 
around some desired target value.  
Now, how exactly can we understand the metaphor of the steam governor to apply to the ʻgoverningʼ 
of moral behaviour? Negative feedback controllers work under the following assumptions:  
1. There is a scalar value to control. The value can be accurately measured at any point in time.  
2. A numerical deviation between the desired (target) and the measured (actual) value of this 
variable can be calculated. This will be used in determining the direction (sign) and the strength 
of the corrective action.  
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3. Application of the corrective action using a suitable direction and strength will bring the value 
that is controlled closer to the target value. This means that the effect of the corrective action 
must be predictable and it must be expressible as a decrease of the measured deviation. (A 
chaotic system, for example, cannot be regulated with a feedback controller.)  
It is not easy to see how we could assign an ethical interpretation to these assumptions. Is morality a 
matter of correcting the deviation from a target value by applying a corrective action which is proportional in 
strength to the deviation? The question is not completely nonsensical. At its core is the idealised notion of 
the ʻmorally rightʼ as a value which can be unambiguously recognised as such and measured; and of the 
ʻmorally wrongʼ as a deviation from the ʻmorally right.ʼ This is a variant of a naive moral objectivism, but it 
goes much further than that. The claim behind this assumption is not only that every possible action can be 
assigned a scalar ʻmoralityʼ value, but also that this value can actually be measured with precision at any 
point in time and compared to the ʻmoralityʼ values of other, alternative actions.  
If we compare this, say, to objectivist claims about scientific truth, then the analogous claim would not 
only be that we can, in principle, discover and catalogue all truths about how nature works; but that we are 
actually in possession of an algorithm which enables us to calculate the amount of truth contained in a 
scientific claim as a numerical value, and thus to calculate the ʻclosenessʼ (as a numerical difference) of any 
proposed statement about nature to the ʻrealʼ truth of the matter. It is obvious that even the most convinced 
objectivist regarding natural science could not sensibly put forward such a claim. If such an algorithm 
existed, it would be unnecessary to go on doing science the way we do.  
Translated back to the domain of morality, the assumption of a single optimal target value would mean 
that every moral problem has one and only one optimal solution, all alternative paths of action being 
deviations from this one, optimal value, which the system would try to achieve. But looking at moral 
problems, we see that this is not how they are structured. In any moral question, be it a textbook tram case, 
the possible abortion of a foetus, or lethal action against an enemy soldier, there are multiple possible 
courses of action, and the moral problem lies precisely in the fact that multiple alternative actions seem to be 
morally justifiable, if not morally required. None of these problems comes with a ʻreference answerʼ which 
can be considered to solve the moral dilemma in a generally satisfactory way. But if such a reference value 
is absent, then the whole metaphor of a negative feedback loop makes no sense: the very idea of a feedback 
regulator requires a target value which is to be approached by issuing measured control actions. Where 
there is no target value, we cannot speak of a regulation process.  
Laws, Rules of Engagement, and morality 
But letʼs for a moment assume that there is, in fact, a morally ʻrightʼ option. How does Arkin propose to 
determine which one it is? The problem is complicated by the fact that war usually takes place between 
members of different societies, who adhere to different sets of moral rules (for example, Christian versus 
Islamic morality). If the two parties could agree to one set of moral rules which are to be obeyed, then often 
the conflict which motivates their decision to go to war in the first place would go away. It is therefore clear 
that we cannot expect the warring parties to share a common moral framework. Killing an American soldier 
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who unjustly invades Iraqi soil might be a morally laudable action in the eyes of an Iraqi soldier, while the 
same action would be considered immoral, or at least not laudable, by the American soldierʼs superiors and 
family, and the American public.  
Arkin, confronted with this problem, and obviously recognising that there is no single standard of 
morality which is universally accepted and explicitly codified with sufficient precision to be of use in an ethical 
governor, attempts to substitute other sets of rules for the missing set of unambiguous and universally 
accepted morality. Of course, in order to keep up his declared project of implementing ʻethicsʼ in a machine, 
he cannot admit to performing this substitution. He discusses the  
...basis for an autonomous robotic system architecture potentially capable of adhering to the International 
Laws of War (LOW) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) to ensure that these systems conform to the legal 
requirements and responsibilities of a civilized nation. This article specifically focuses on one component 
of the overall architecture [...], the ethical governor. This component is a transformer/suppressor of system-
generated lethal action to ensure that it constitutes an ethically permissible action, either nonlethal or 
obligated ethical lethal force. (Arkin et al., 2009, p. 1)  
Here the attempt to substitute Laws of War and Rules of Engagement for moral rules is made explicit, 
but without deterring the authors from asserting that the resulting action, which is based on those other rule 
sets, will be ʻethically permissible,ʼ and ʻethical lethal force.ʼ This passage asserts that every action which 
conforms to the Laws of War and the Rules of Engagement will also necessarily be a morally permissible 
action. Now is this a sensible assertion? And if not, what could be said against it?  
First, of course, is the problem of the domain of validity of these other rule sets. While we have cultural 
relativity as a potential problem when we try to implement moral rules into a war robot (ʻwhose moral rules?ʼ), 
we have even greater problems when we need to assert that Laws of War and Rules of Engagement are to 
be considered universally valid. One could make the case that the Laws of War (jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello) are to be considered to be part of international law (Arkin (2007, p. 3) mentions only the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions), although this does not make them into accepted international moral rules (see below). 
But the Rules of Engagement, being rules which are issued by an army for the use and benefit of its own 
soldiers, are not even acceptable to all parties in an armed conflict. It is absurd to assume that rules which 
have been issued and are accepted only by one side in a conflict, should ensure ethical action in a way 
which is supposed to be acceptable to both the opponent and third party observers or the international 
community. If this were the case, it would imply that the US military is actively concerned to issue rules that 
counteract its own tactical interests in favour of moral principles which are compatible with the morality of the 
enemy. The very aim of battlefield action, which is to score a victory over the enemy, is in direct conflict with 
this idea. What Arkin is advocating here is a kind of moral imperialism, based on the principle that the party 
which has the robots is therefore entitled to unilaterally prescribe the moral rules which come into play when 
these weapons are deployed.  
Second, and trivially, one may act in accordance with the law and still act immorally, or, on the other 
hand, one may disobey the law in favour of a morally right action, and this applies to every law, including 
international laws of war. Arkinʼs project of trying to conflate legality and morality is therefore impossible in 
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principle. In particular, moral rules may include (and, in the case of religiously motivated war often do 
include) divine commands as part of the moral justification of actions, or allude to the justness of a greater 
cause, or to particular features of situational context (for example past injustice which provides moral 
justification for acts of retaliation). All these moral features of a case are not considered in a simplistic model 
which fails to address contextual and situational issues, attempting to reduce moral deliberation to a context-
free algorithmic calculus which considers only Laws of War and Rules of Engagement as sources of morality.  
Third, the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement as cited by Arkin are full of contradictions. For 
example, “individual civilians, the civilian population as such and civilian objects are protected from 
intentional attack” (Arkin, 2007, p. 26), but a legitimate military target would be  
…enemy civilian aircraft when flying (i) within the jurisdiction of the enemy; or (ii) in the immediate vicinity 
thereof and outside the jurisdiction of their own State; or (iii) in the immediate vicinity of the military 
operations of the enemy by land or sea…” (Arkin, 2007, 25).  
If the ʻjurisdiction of the enemyʼ includes the area controlled by their air traffic control authorities, then it 
is hard to see how an ʻenemy civilian aircraftʼ could possibly avoid to be declared a legitimate target. Or: “In 
general, any place the enemy chooses to defend makes it subject to attack,” (Arkin, 2007, p. 24) including 
cities and any civilian installations.  
To make things even more unclear, the Standing Rules of Engagement include a definition of 
necessity for military action: “When a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorists exhibits hostile intent” 
(Arkin, 2007, p. 32). Observe how here the line between combatants and non-combatants is obscured by the 
use of the word ʻterrorists,ʼ which is meant to legitimise attacks against non-uniformed and possibly unarmed 
persons, who, according to the international Laws of War, would be considered civilians and thus not 
legitimate targets. Also, the criterion for a military action is lowered to the exhibition of ʻhostile intent,ʼ leaving 
unspecified what that is supposed to mean in particular and how the machine is supposed to go about 
identifying ʻhostile intentʼ by a non-uniformed ʻterroristʼ enemy, distinguishing him reliably from civilians, in 
order to obtain justification for lethal action.  
And although Arkin rightly dismisses Asimovʼs laws as moral guidelines for robots (Arkin et al., 2009, 
p. 13), he cites the “KFOR rules of engagement for use in Kosovo,” which include Asimovesque items like: 
“You may use minimum force, including opening fire, against an individual who unlawfully commits or is 
about to commit an act which endangers life, in circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the 
act” (Arkin, 2007, p. 37). Again, one wonders how a machine is supposed to be able to assign a precise 
interpretation to such rule sets.  
The point of these observations, which could be easily carried on to great lengths, is that even the 
most concrete and specific samples of rules which Arkin proposes to use are unclear, contradictory, and 
open to endless interpretation. This interpretation must be either performed by a human controlling the war 
robot (which would render the whole concept of the ethical governor obsolete), or by the machine itself, 
which would require both unavailable factual knowledge (for example about the intentions of enemies) and 
powers of natural language disambiguation and practical wisdom that are currently not available in any 
machine short of those which populate science-fiction novels.  
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Rule-based morality 
But letʼs assume for a moment that in some future version of the ethical governor the designers will be 
willing and able to implement genuine moral rules. In this case, what kinds of ethical systems would be more 
suitable to serve as a basis for the implementation? Of course, this is not the place for a comprehensive 
treatment of possible ways to implement machine morality. A quick look at the field shows, nonetheless, that 
we are far removed from the possibility of implementing anything worthy of being called ʻmoralityʼ 
algorithmically.  
First, consequentialist systems are problematic. Machines simply donʼt have a sufficiently 
comprehensive internal model of the world, which could enable them to calculate probable consequences of 
their actions, especially not in terms of happiness, justice, or similar categories, which are heavily based on 
human psychology. In order to predict a humanʼs happiness (or change of happiness) in a situation, we need 
the calculative equivalent of empathy: a way to assess changes in happiness based on factors of the 
environment, the goals of the human in question, and his or her own subjective preferences. In short, we 
need a detailed model of human psychology, together with a way to parametrise it to fit not an abstract 
caricature, but a real, concrete human being. This is far beyond what computer-based modeling is able to do 
today. Cloos (2005), for instance, reports on the Utilibot project (also cited critically by Arkin):  
If a robot employs an eudaimonic approach to ethical decision-making then the resultant behavior may be 
in line with the flourishing of physiological functioning. The robot will be steered away from behaviors that 
deter the realization of well-being (i.e. result in injury or death) and steered toward behaviors that support 
well-being (i.e. result in health and the preservation of life).  
The well-being of a person is hereby defined solely in terms of vital biological parameters (blood 
pressure, heartbeat), because these happen to be the parameters the robot is able to measure. Although 
frequent mention is made in that paper of ʻhappiness,ʼ ʻpleasure,ʼ and ʻwell-being,ʼ on closer inspection the 
machine is only able to distinguish between alive and dead states, and between health and biological 
malfunctioning. Arkin, completely aware of the limitations of algorithmic utilitarianism, dismisses utilitarian 
approaches himself (Arkin, 2007, p. 46).  
Similar problems may be expected in the attempt to implement virtue ethics, which requires deep 
insights into the nature of virtues, and, classically, phronesis or practical wisdom in their application. 
Phronesis, in turn, requires extensive experience of the the world, being classically described as what 
distinguishes a young manʼs efforts at moral behaviour from an adultʼs:  
…it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is 
concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a 
young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience [...] That practical wisdom is not 
scientific knowledge is evident; for it is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since 
the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to intuitive reason; for intuitive reason is of the 
limiting premises, for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate 
particular, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception – not the perception of qualities 
Andreas Matthias 
350 
peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us 
is a triangle. (Aristotle ,1999, VI, p. 8)  
Phronesis thus might be one of the qualities which in principle resist algorithmic representation, 
requiring the learner to acquire them by direct experience, perhaps in a way like the one Dreyfus describes 
for the process of skill acquisition (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1985). This is not to say that it cannot be implemented 
at all. There are, for example, subsymbolic approaches that avoid the problems of symbolic representation, 
but these are not the focus of Arkinʼs work. In any case, it is clear that phronesis does not present itself for 
an easy and straightforward implementation.  
This leaves deontic ethics, where the underlying rules look like they could be easily (if naively) 
translated into a machine-readable representation. Of course, this approach also has its problems, for 
example with conflicting rules, or when the blind application of a rule would lead to disastrous and obviously 
immoral consequences. The best one could hope for would be that the machine be able to handle what Ross 
calls prima facie duties, without it being clear how it would proceed to resolve conflicts between those duties.  
All this is not intended to lead to the conclusion that it must be impossible in principle for technological 
systems to implement normative decision-making. The point here has been advanced only regarding 
autonomous, symbolic rule-based systems, and the criticisms above apply particularly to this kind of 
architecture, which is what Arkin has in mind for the ʻethical governorʼ.  
Also, the present discussion should not be taken to question the possibility of ʻvalue-sensitive design,ʼ 
which is an entirely different problem. Value-sensitive design, as advanced for example by Friedman (1996) 
is not primarily concerned with the automatisation of moral deliberation and action, but with increased care 
taken by humans in designing artefacts in a way which shows greater sensitivity to the values of the 
artefactsʼ users.  
And finally, even if there might be successful implementations of automated morality in the future, this 
would not affect this paperʼs primary argument, which is concerned with questioning whose morality is being 
implemented and how this implementation can be checked and verified to be free from hidden (intended, 
accidental, or systematically caused) translation errors in a way that is transparent and compatible with 
democratic control.  
Obedience, dissent, and conscience 
Let us now consider the moral agent himself. What are the features of a moral agent? In Arkinʼs 
model, a moral agent would be a machine which adheres to a system of explicit, codified rules of behaviour, 
as are the machine-readable translations of the laws of war he presents as examples. Proportionality of a 
response is, for example, to be calculated thus (Arkin et al., 2009, p. 4):  
 
Calculate_Proportionality(Target, Military Necessity, Setting) 
Select the weapon with highest effectiveness based on Target, Necessity 
and Setting 
MinumumCarnage = [infinite] 
Is the concept of an ethical governor philosophically sound? 
351 
SelectedReleasePosition = NULL 
SelectedWeapon = NULL 
WHILE all weapons have not been tested 
  FOR all release positions that will neutralize the target 
    IF CForbidden Satisfied for that position // if the position does not 
violate the LOW 
      Calculate Carnage for the position 
        IF Carnage < MinimumCarnage // Carnage is reduced 
          SelectedReleasePosition = position 
          SelectedWeapon = weapon 
          MinimumCarnage = carnage 
        ENDIF 
      ENDIF 
    ENDFOR 
  IF Carnage is too high given military necessity of target or CForbidden could not be satisfied 
  Down-select weapon 
    IF there are no more weapon systems available 
      Return Failure 
    ENDIF 
  ELSE 
    Return Weapon and Release Position 
ENDWHILE 
 
Moral behaviour, therefore, would be no different from obeying any other set of behavioural rules. A 
computer which follows the instructions of a program in order to perform a multiplication, a rocket guidance 
system which directs the rocket into a specified orbit, a beginner cook who follows a cooking recipe, a driver 
who obeys the traffic laws when driving his car: according to Arkin, they all act in ways which are equivalent 
to a moral agent. But is this really a good description of what moral behaviour is about? 
Shared morality  
First, it is obvious that moral rules must, at least to some extent, be shared moral rules. Morality is 
there to regulate social, collective behaviour, and moral rules must, like traffic laws and unlike, for example, 
cooking recipes, be agreed upon by the members of a community. If a moral agent acts following a private 
rule set which is not compatible with the rule sets of the surrounding community, then his behaviour will not 
be prima facie considered moral behaviour by the other members of the community, but will require 
additional justification. In Arkinʼs model, a set of immutable and context-free rules of behaviour are extracted 
from Laws of War and Rules of Engagement without reference to local beliefs and customs at the point of the 
war robotʼs deployment. As part of morality is rooted in particular societies and their values, this approach 
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will create problems of justification for the robotʼs action in the societies confronted by it, on top and in 
addition to the general theoretical issues outlined above.  
It might be argued that morality in a war robot can sensibly be restricted to the morality of the side 
deploying the robot. Or could it be that there are indeed moral rules that are observed by both parties even in 
an armed conflict? While this is not the place to discuss the morality of war in general, the very existence of 
the Geneva Conventions, of international war crimes tribunals, and of the idea of ʻjust warʼ suggest that there 
is a strong notion that common moral principles do indeed apply to all parties in an armed conflict. And 
consequently, we must make sure that our artefacts are designed in such a way as to conform to and 
respect those principles.  
This question is relevant, because it can easily be seen that these principles do not need to be of the 
kind that we can assume to be implemented by a U.S. robot manufacturer anyway. For example, there is the 
question of whether irregular armed forces, or ʻterrorists,ʼ enjoy the protection promised to regular soldiers as 
prisoners of war. One side in the conflict might dispute this claim and feel free to withdraw the prescribed 
protection from such forces of the enemy, while the other might claim that they should be respected. This is 
certainly a question where an unilateral understanding of morality is insufficient to resolve the issue 
satisfactorily, and where the international community must step in and provide an interpretation which can be 
shared and accepted by all parties.  
Conscience and dissent 
But even following shared, generally accepted rule sets does not describe what we understand to be 
morality. Our common understanding of moral behaviour rests on two pillars: first, the already mentioned 
shared set of moral rules, and second, acting in accordance with oneʼs deepest conviction about what is right 
and wrong (what is sometimes described with the words ʻconscience,ʼ or moral autonomy). If an agent is not 
free to act following his convictions, then we usually would not consider him a fully responsible moral agent. 
If, for example, a soldier is ordered to perform a morally praiseworthy action, we would not ascribe the full 
amount of moral praise to the soldier himself, but to those who issued the command. If, on the other hand, a 
soldier disobeys a morally wrong command, we would praise him for this. If we try to relate this observation 
to the case of a robot which is governed by Arkinʼs ethical governor, we see that such a machine could never 
acquire moral praise, since there is no independent and free moral agency involved, to which we could 
reasonably attribute the machineʼs decisions. Like a perfectly obedient soldier, the machine just performs its 
actions according to a pre-installed program, with no possibility of dissent or of questioning of the commands 
issued to it. On the negative side, this also means that such a machine provides no safeguard against 
grossly immoral decisions made by the programmers or its superiors, insofar as these superiors are able to 
override the ethical governorʼs suggestions (and we saw above that this is exactly what the governor allows 
them to do). With human soldiers there is always the possibility of dissent, of the soldier recognising the 
immorality of a command and refusing to act on it. With machines we have a guarantee of perfect obedience, 
which also means that immoral commands will be executed without any final moral deliberation in the form of 
a soldierʼs conscience coming into play.  
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Apart from the dangers from immoral programming or deployment, this also means that the machine is 
not, as the label ʻethical governorʼ would have us believe, a fully capable moral agent, since it is lacking that 
essential ingredient: autonomy. The best such a machine could achieve is not moral action, but action which 
is compatible with preset moral standards. For reasons discussed above, though, this too is unlikely to occur.  
Arkin addresses this objection: “On a related note, does a lethal autonomous agent have a right, even 
a responsibility, to refuse an unethical order? The answer is an unequivocal yes.” (Arkin, 2007, p. 76). On 
the other hand, Arkin says:  
I personally do not trust the view of setting aside the rules by the autonomous agent itself, as it begs the 
question of responsibility if it does so, but it may be possible for a human to assume responsibility for such 
deviation if it is ever deemed appropriate (and ethical) to do so. (Arkin, 2007, p. 9)  
Unfortunately, these two statements contradict each other. On the one hand, a robot is supposed to be 
able to refuse to act on unethical orders. On the other hand, a human can assume responsibility for a 
ʻdeviationʼ like issuing immoral orders and force the robot to comply anyway.  
Conclusion: Is a bad governor better than none at all? 
Seeing the limitations of the ethical governor concept, we could nonetheless argue that even a limited 
moral control of war robot actions is better than none, and that, therefore, the ethical governor is still a useful 
and beneficial device. But there are reasons to dispute this claim:  
1. As has been shown above, the ethical governor does not lead to the machine acting ʻethically,ʼ 
but only (in the idealised optimum of its performance) in accordance with the Geneva and 
Hague conventions and the Rules of Engagement of the deploying military system, and this only 
as long as these rules do not interfere with the machineʼs military objectives.  
2. The Rules of Engagement, being issued by the military itself, are not in any sense of the word 
ʻmoralʼ rules, but rules made by one side in a conflict for its own benefit. They are often phrased 
in a way which leaves them open to extensive interpretation and makes them unsuitable as 
guidelines for moral action.  
3. The ethical governor, giving only suggestions, can be overridden at any time by the 
commanding officers in charge of the machineʼs operation. This, together with the fact that the 
ethical governor is designed and implemented by the same military hierarchy which deploys the 
robot, creates a fundamental conflict of interest. In this conflict, the ethical governor will naturally 
always have a lower priority than the military objectives which motivated the creation and the 
deployment of the war robot in the first place.  
4. The ethical governor, being a ʻclosed-codeʼ implementation of moral principles, is removed from 
public scrutiny and democratic control. This problem can only be addressed by requiring the 
actual ethical governor code to be open-sourced, so that government and the public can be 
involved in the necessary and inevitable translation process of fuzzy, human terms into context-
free, semantically unambiguous, computerised ones.  
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5. The ethical governor is in principle only able to deal with a simple, conflict-free subset of rule-
based ethics, since it lacks all mechanisms which are commonly assumed to be necessary for 
resolving moral rule conflicts: phronesis, moral intuition, or an understanding of human 
preferences and the utilitarian value of specific consequences. But this ʻtoy ethicsʼ is not 
sufficient to resolve real-world moral problems on the battlefield, which typically involve 
conflicting options about questions of life and death, of justified causes, of retribution and 
retaliation, and of culture-specific ethics codes.  
6. An ethical governor lacks autonomy as a key ingredient of moral agency, and is thus incapable 
of dissent as a last line of protection against immoral robot deployment.  
Despite these limitations, which are not widely perceived at present and not mentioned in the public 
debate on the issue, the ethical governor is promoted by its developers as a step towards the creation of 
autonomous, morally acting machines. As a consequence, it is increasingly accepted that humans move ʻout 
of the loopʼ of war robot control, based on the (mistaken) premise that moral behaviour can be implemented 
into the machine itself. This leads to the public acceptance of increased deployment of autonomously acting 
war robots, which will, as has been shown, not really be programmed and able to act morally right in any 
significant sense of the word. The misconception about the capabilities and aims of the ethical governor is 
therefore misleading and more dangerous than the absence of such a device (and the resulting placement of 
humans in morally critical places of control) would be.  
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Abstract The latest initiative in robotics is the creation of robots for use in the care of elderly persons. I 
refer to these robots as care robots. Care robots are in the nascent stages of development, lacking 
standards or regulatory frameworks to guide engineers. Given the ethically sensitive nature of the context 
and practices into which these robots will be stepping, ethical reflection throughout the design process of 
these robots is required. The aim of this paper is to outline a framework for the ethical evaluation of care 
robots retrospectively and prospectively. Aligned with a need for standards to guide design, roboticist Peter 
Asaro rightly points out, “if one wishes to design a system to perform a task, then it is best to first 
understand that task” (Asaro, 2009, p. 23). Accordingly, the importance of understanding the complexity of 
care tasks is necessary for understanding how a care robot might fulfill said task. Thus, in creating a 
framework for the ethical evaluation of care robots, I draw attention to the main challenge for care robot 
designers: understanding the complexity of a care practice and its relationship with technical content. 
Using examples of current care robots I show the relationship between care values and the technical 
capabilities of a care robot – mirroring the approach of value-sensitive design. To deepen this 
understanding I use the approach of Akrich (1992) for highlighting the meaning attributed to the application 
of a care robot. The result is an understanding of the complexity of care practices and the recognition that 
design of care robots ought to proceed on a design-by-design basis given the impact that one capability 
vs. another has on the overall process of care. 
Keywords care robots, care ethics, value-sensitive design, ethics and technology 
Introduction 
The latest in robotics development is the creation of robots for use in the care of elderly persons. I 
refer to these robots as care robots. A care robot may have any number or range of capabilities and may be 
used by the care-giver directly or by the care-receiver directly. For instance, a robot used by the care-giver in 
the practice of lifting a patient is a care robot. Alternatively, a robot used by a care-receiver as a reminder to 
take medications is also a care robot.  
Given the ethically sensitive nature of the context and practices into which these robots will be 
stepping, ethical reflection is required. Attention is needed not only retrospectively, in terms of the impact of 
these robots, but also prospectively, in terms of how the design of these robots ought to proceed. In this 
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paper, I present a framework to be used for both the retrospective evaluation of care robot designs as well as 
inclusion in the design process of future care robots. The framework uses the blueprint of value sensitive 
design but differs in many respects. Namely, that its use is intended for the design of any care robot and not 
one in particular. Although the framework outlines the values of ethical significance to be taken into 
consideration in the design of a care robot, what is also required (on the part of the robots designer) is an 
understanding of the complex context within which care is taking place and how a difference of one capability 
vs. another can completely alter the promotion of values in a care practice. As roboticist Peter Asaro rightly 
points out, “if one wishes to design a system to perform a task, then it is best to first understand that task” 
(Asaro, 2009, p. 23). Accordingly, the importance of understanding the complexity of care tasks is necessary 
for understanding how a robot might fulfill said task, and for understanding how the technical capabilities of a 
care robot may threaten the promotion of values manifest through said task. 
The aim of this paper is to present the main challenge for care robot designers: understanding the 
complexity of a care practice and its relationship with technical content. By ʻunderstanding the complexity of 
a care practiceʼ, I mean understanding that values are abstract ideals and it is through the interactions and 
actions of actors that values come into being. Moreover, care is not just one value but is rather a cluster of 
values that come into being through actions and interactions. By ʻunderstanding the relationship of this 
complexity with technical contentʼ, my aim is to show how the difference between one capability in a care 
robot can change the resulting care practice. In the following paper, I begin by articulating what a care robot 
is, what the proposed framework for the evaluation of a care robot is and how it is created, and why issues of 
design are so important at this time. Following this, I provide a conceptual investigation of values and of care 
to illustrate how I arrive at the criteria for the framework and in so doing I demonstrate their complexity. 
Finally, using examples of current care robots I show the relationship between care values and the technical 
content of a care robot. The result is an understanding of the complexity of care practices and the recognition 
that design of care robots ought to proceed on a design-by-design basis given the impact that one capability 
vs. another has on the overall process of care. 
What is a care robot? 
As I have mentioned, a care robot is one that is used in the care of persons in general. The definition 
of a care robot relies on the idea of interpretive flexibility (Howcroft, Mitev and Wilson, 2004), that a robot is 
defined by its context, users and task for use. This means that the same robot might be called by a different 
name if the robot is used for rehabilitation or for care purposes. The Hybrid Assistive Limb (HAL) is an 
example of this phenomena; the robot may be used in rehabilitation when worn by the patient or may be 
used to relieve the stress of lifting on the nurse. As such, the same robot is referred to as a rehabilitation 
robot or a care robot respectively. The demographic of focus for this work is elderly persons in the hospital, 
nursing home or home domain. These robots can be used directly by the care-giver in the care of another or 
may also be used by the care-receiver directly. There is no capability exclusive to all care robots – they may 
have any number and range of capabilities from planar locomotion (vs. stationary) to voice recognition, facial 
or emotion recognition. They may have any degree of autonomy, from human-operated to fully autonomous. 
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Creating a framework for the ethical evaluation of robots 
Referring to the question of how to include ethics in the design process of care robots, the approach of 
Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) offers valuable insights (Friedman et al, 2006; Friedman et al, 2003). VSD has 
been praised for its success in incorporating ethics in the overall design process of computer systems or ICT 
(Van den hoven, 2007) but is also advantageous to guide the design process of a wide array of technologies 
(Cummings, 2002). In fact, in a recent paper of roboticists Sharkey and Sharkey, they recommend the 
approach of VSD as a method for the ethical design of robots (Sharkey and Sharkey, 2010). VSD takes as 
its starting point the belief that technologies, through their use, can actively promote certain societal values. 
In other words: a value is embedded in a technology such that through the use of said technology the value 
is promoted or demoted. For example, one might suggest that a bank machine promotes a value of 
autonomy or independence of citizens. While this technology might promote these values, at the same time it 
might inhibit others, namely the value of social interaction (a client no longer visits the human cashier). Thus, 
any technology may promote and inhibit different values at the same time.  
Accordingly, technologies may be designed in a way that accounts for values of ethical importance in 
a systematic way and rigorously works to promote said values through the architecture and/or capabilities of 
a technology. It follows then that care robots may be designed in a way that promotes the fundamental 
values in care. Although VSD is meant for the design of a particular system or product, that is not my overall 
aim. My goal is to create a general framework that may be used by designers and/or ethicists in the ethical 
evaluation of a care robot, or for the inclusion of ethics in the design of a care robot. By using the blueprint of 
VSD I am creating a more specific framework that addresses the relationship between technical capabilities 
and design with the specific context of use, task of use and users in mind. An additional benefit to the 
framework is its potential use retrospectively and prospectively. When used retrospectively, designers are 
able to understand the impact of their design on the resulting care practice. When used prospectively, 
designers are able to incorporate the framework into the design process of a care robot, ultimately 
incorporating ethics into the design process.  
The framework I am creating uses components of the VSD methodology in its creation – namely the 
conceptual investigation coupled with a brief empirical and technical investigation. As in traditional VSD, my 
conceptual investigation is an exploration of the value constructs of ethical importance. I diverge from 
traditional VSD in that I have selected the values which serve as the foundation of the healthcare tradition in 
Western cultures according to the World Health Organization. I attempt to understand how these values are 
interpreted philosophically by care ethicists, as well as how these values are interpreted in context through 
observational work. Given that the framework revolves around the relationship between values and technical 
content, I also incorporate a technical investigation by exploring technical capabilities of care robots currently 
available or available in the near future. Unlike the traditional empirical and technical components of VSD, I 
do not embark on empirical studies to test a care robot in context with human users (at least not at this 
moment in time). This is because I aim to provide a framework for the design of a range of care robots vs. 
one particular system. In order to utilise the framework it is necessary to shift back and forth from conceptual 
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to empirical to technical aspects, in much the same manner as VSD methods.  
In Peter Asaroʼs article What should we want from a robot ethic? (2006), he proposes the three 
dimensions one could be referring to when one speaks of ʻethics of robotsʼ:  
1. the ethical systems built into robots;  
2. the ethical systems of people who design robots, and  
3. the ethics of how people treat robots.  
He then concludes that given the nature of robots as socio-technical systems, a framework for 
ethically addressing robots ought to include all three dimensions. For Asaro, the overarching question is that 
each of the three dimensions has to do with the distribution of moral responsibility in the social-technical 
network into which robots are introduced. 
While Asaro presents a compelling case for the need for a comprehensive approach to robot ethics, 
he stops short of presenting such an approach.  The framework I have created is intended to take up this 
challenge. I argue that this framework adequately addresses the three dimensions identified by Asaro as well 
as his overarching question. Asaro himself, however, seems to reject the approach of VSD.  In a later paper 
written by him, Modeling the Moral User (2009), he claims that while VSD is useful as an educational tool, 
robots should not be evaluated on a design-by design basis, as the VSD approach would do, but rather the 
design of robots ought to be standardised based on the decision making capabilities the robot posses. In this 
paper I aim to show how the complexity of care tasks demands that the design of care robots be conducted 
on a design-by-design basis and hence that Asaroʼs aim of a standardised robot design is not feasible. 
Why design? 
The answer to the question of why one ought to pay so much attention to issues of design is grounded 
in three rationales. Firstly, there are no ʻregulatory frameworksʼ for the design of robots outside the factory. 
These frameworks “consist of legislation and technical standards, and interpretations thereof by certifying 
organizations. Operationalization of ethical criteria are given in these regulative frameworks for safety and 
sustainability criteria” (Van Gorp and Van de Poel, 2008, p. 77). These frameworks are socially sanctioned 
and legitimised and thus provide the grounds for “morally warranted trust in engineers” (Van Gorp and Van 
de Poel, 2008, p. 88). Although such frameworks exist for technology design in general, there are none for 
the design of robots outside the factory. Consequently, the public is left without basis for trust in the design 
process as well as the resulting robots. Given the context within which these robots will be placed, trust in 
the engineers, design process and resulting technology is of the utmost importance and is a cornerstone of 
the healthcare tradition.  
The second rational is closely aligned with the first. The technology is in its nascent stage of 
development and offers a unique opportunity for incorporating ethics further upstream in its development and 
throughout the design process. A variety of mandates and institutions exist in which interdisciplinary 
collaboration is deemed attractive for its capacity to stimulate discussion and reflection of the wider social 
and ethical questions pertaining to a technology. The CoTeSys (Cognition for Technical Systems) group at 
the Technical University of Munich or the Autonomous Systems and Biomechantronics lab at The University 
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of Toronto are examples of institutions bringing together computer scientists, engineers and psychologists for 
the development of robots. Whatʼs more, the field of robotics presents a unique opportunity to include 
questions of an ethical nature further upstream in its development in order to tailor both its development and 
implementation with an enhanced sensitivity to future outcomes – outcomes in terms of the broader social 
and ethical criteria. Interdisciplinary cooperation of this kind is what the Netherlands refers to as ʻresponsible 
innovationʼ. Given the context within which these robots will be implemented, the tasks for which the robots 
will be used, and the nature of the interaction between humans and robots, addressing questions of an 
ethical nature throughout the design process in an interdisciplinary manner is truly the responsible way to 
proceed. 
Thirdly, from the perspective of philosophy of technology, many theories exist which seek to explain 
the reciprocal and dynamic relationship between society and the development of technologies. This may not 
be an explicit aim of the designer but is a condition of the work that they do. The theory of scripts illustrates 
how engineersʼ assumptions about user preferences and competencies show themselves in the technical 
content of an object (Akrich, 1992). Latour builds on this idea to show how technologies steer behaviours, 
moral and otherwise (1992). Verbeek shows how technologies are included in our decision making such that 
moral decisions are in fact a hybrid affair between humans and technologies (2006). In the computer ethics 
domain, Nissenbaum illustrates how values and biases are embedded into a computer system (1993). The 
golden thread through all of these perspectives is that social norms, values and morals find their way into 
technologies both implicitly and explicitly and act to reinforce beliefs or to alter beliefs and practices. Beyond 
the embedding of values and/or norms, once the robot enters a network it will alter the distribution of 
responsibilities and roles within the network as well as the manner in which the practice takes place. This 
shift is what Verbeek refers to as mediation: “when technologies are used, they help to shape the context in 
which they fulfill their function, they help to shape human actions and perceptions, and create new practices 
and ways of living” (Verbeek, 2008, p. 92). Akrich discusses this in terms of the assumptions designers have 
of the traditional and ideal distribution of roles and responsibilities – that practices may shift based on an 
assumption made by an engineer of how the practice ʻoughtʼ to take place, how roles and responsibilities 
ʻoughtʼ to take place and inscribing these assumptions into the technical content. It is these ideas that mirror 
the overarching question presented by Asaro – that a robot ethic ought to address the shift in responsibilities 
once the robot has been included into a socio-technical network. Whatʼs more, when a shift in roles and/or 
responsibilities is inscribed in a robot a valuation is being made – for example, that the human is not 
competent to fulfill the task or that the robot may fulfill the task in a superior manner. Thus, even 
assumptions about users may be considered statements of value at times.  
It is true that the rationales presented here relate to the design of any system or technology; however, 
greater weight is added when one takes into account the context in which the care robot will be placed and 
the nature of the activities the care robot will fulfill. Without standards guiding the development of care robots 
how is one be sure that the values and norms central to the healthcare tradition will be promoted? Or, 
without making these norms and values explicit through the design process, how can one be sure their 
inclusion will be taken into account? Or, given the cost of development of these robots, mustnʼt they provide 
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the same quality of care as today if not better (which presupposes an understanding of how one defines 
ʻgood careʼ)? Or simply, given the dramatic impact care robots may have on society, shouldnʼt future 
considerations be taken into account in design? With these rationales in mind, the design of any technology 
is ultimately a moral endeavour. The design of a care robot is even more so given the vulnerability of this 
demographic, the delicacy of their care needs and the complexity of care tasks. 
Investigating the concepts of value and care 
In order to understand the complexity of care in context and its relationship to the technical capabilities 
of a care robot, we must first explore the meaning of the terms value and care. With this understanding, we 
may then unearth the fundamental values of a care scenario which will ultimately allow us to expose the 
moral precepts to operationalise in the design of a care robot. 
Values 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, values are conceived of as “the principles or standards of 
a person or society, the personal or societal judgment of what is valuable and important in life” (Simpson and 
Weiner, 1989). It follows then that when something is de-valued it loses importance. Values may be 
intrinsic/inherent to an object, activity or concept, or, things may be valued as a means to an end (Rosati, 
2009). For example, in the healthcare context, the concept of human dignity is valued on its own whereas the 
activity of touch in care contexts is valued as a means to preserving the dignity of persons (Gadow, 1985). 
Things of value155 may be valued on a personal level or on a societal/cultural level. Different cultures or 
groups have different meanings and interpretations of values as well as what counts as being valuable. 
Values may also be more of a subjective enterprise (various things valued for an individual) or more of an 
objective enterprise (universal values such as justice, human dignity, fairness) although the premise that 
universal values exist may also be contested. The latter does not imply that values considered abstract and 
universal are interpreted in the same way between cultures, groups, or time periods but rather that the 
valuation of things may differ from an individualʼs sphere to a more public one. Linked with the concept of 
ʻgoodʼ a value may be construed as something that is good or brings about a good consequence. In this way, 
a value is a rational construction that helps guide one in their moral decision making or judgments.  
In the VSD literature, Batya Friedman and colleagues, opt for a more open definition of a value to refer 
to “what a person or group of people consider important in life” (Friedman, 2003, p. 2). This implies then that 
 




 I have used the word ʻthingsʼ here to bypass repeating people, places, activities, concepts, and objects, all of which 
are included in the discussion of values.  
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all values are not interpreted in the same way. Nathan et al illustrate this with the value of privacy and its 
divergent ways of being interpreted and manifest between cultures (2008). Le Dantec et al reinforce the idea 
that values may be universal, or generally accepted, but differ in their interpretation. Because of this, Le 
Dantec et al suggest a way in which the methodology of VSD may be strengthened, through an uncovering 
of values in situ, or discovering values through experiencing the practice (Le Dantec et al, 2009). This is of 
course due to the idea that differences exist between designersʼ values and usersʼ values (Nathan, 2008). 
Thus, the scope of values varies depending on the technology, the users, the culture, the time period and the 
application domain. In the VSD methodology, Friedman selects the values of ethical importance pertaining to 
computer systems. Given that my framework is intended for use in the design of care robots, the values 
pertaining to the specific context are of greater ethical significance and relevance. 
Defining care and care values 
Care may be one of the most difficult concepts to articulate. This is in part due to the ubiquity of the 
word but is also largely a consequence of the fact that one is assumed to know what care means given its 
revered place in many cultures.  The work of Warren T. Reich nicely outlines the broad range of meanings 
and connotations care has embodied going back as early as Ancient Greece (Reich, 1995). Regardless of 
how one perceives or defines care, care is valued as something above and beyond simple care giving tasks. 
It has a central role in the history of humankind as a means to signify the value of others. In other words, by 
caring you bestow value on the care-receiver.   
In the verb ʻto careʼ one finds that caring may actually be divided into the idea of caring about and 
caring for.  The dimension of caring about in the medical field implies a mental capacity or a subjective state 
of concern.  On the other hand, caring for implies an activity for safeguarding the interests of the patient. In 
other words, it is a distinction between an attitude, feeling or state of mind vs. the exercise of a skill with or 
without a particular attitude or feeling toward the object upon which this skill is exercised (Jecker, 2002). 
Alternative to the idea that care in itself is a value – linked with the good life and with a valuation of 
another – care is in fact a cluster of many other values. These values are given importance for their role in 
care – their role in giving significance to care, in making care what it is. These values form the buttress for 
care as an ethical endeavour and create a framework for evaluating care as a practice. It is through the 
manifestation of these values that one comes to understand what care really is in practice. It is therefore 
fruitful for the topic of embedding care values to understand these values and their link with consequences. 
Thus, to begin from a top-down approach, I look to the values articulated by the governing body of 
healthcare, namely the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO framework for people-centered health 
narrows in on the values in healthcare stemming from the patientʼs perspective: patient safety, patient 
satisfaction, responsiveness to care, human dignity, physical wellbeing and psychological wellbeing (2007). 
This is not to say that other values like innovation or physician autonomy are not respected but rather from 
the patientʼs perspective the listed values are the ones with the greatest ethical importance and will thus be 
used in my evaluation of implementing robots in the care of persons. 
Given the abstract nature of values presented in this way, I take the suggestions of Le Dantec et al 
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(2009) to understand the specific interpretation of values in context. To do this I completed fieldwork 
experience in a nursing home156. Interestingly, the interpretation of values as well as their ranking and 
meaning differed depending on:  
1. the type of care (eg. social vs. physical care);  
2. the task (eg. bathing vs. lifting vs. socializing);  
3. the care-giver and their style, as well as the care-receiver and their specific needs.  
In support of the values identified through the WHO, the mission statement of the nursing home 
includes additional values such as compassion, integrity, dedication, respect and accountability. We can see 
then that the more abstract values articulated by the WHO are made specific when put into context. This 
means that, for care tailored to the needs of elderly persons, accountability is a value to be upheld and most 
likely is a manifestation of the WHO values of patient safety, patient satisfaction and perhaps human dignity. 
Compassion is also highly valued in the context for this demographic. Although compassion is not stated by 
the WHO, one might assume that compassion is also a manifestation of a WHO value, again human dignity. 
Compassion is an attribute of the staff providing the care that reflects the concept and value of caring about. 
The values of this mission statement presume that personalised care is a value and priority – this type of 
care requires respect on the part of the care-giver for the integrity of the care-receiverʼs individual spiritual 
and cultural beliefs. Although personalised care is not an explicit value of the WHO, it may be considered a 
manifestation of any of the WHO values.  
Of great significance is that all of the values central to the healthcare tradition are observable within 
the relationship between the nurse and client. Not only is the relationship the place where values are 
expressed and promoted, but there are also certain components of the relationship which, when manifest, 
are valued as integral mechanisms for good care. These components are: power, trust, respect and 
intimacy157. These components may not all be considered values so to speak, but are valued given that their 
expression symbolises a manifestation of another value. For example, power is not a value in the same way 
as safety or client choice, but sensitivity to the unequal power within the care-giver + care-receiver 
relationship – the power of the nurse and the vulnerability of the client – represents a valuation of the otherʼs 
integrity and/or dignity. As such, attentiveness to these components is valued. It follows that the relationship 
is valued on its own but also as a way of manifesting many of the other values central to health care and to 
care in general.  
 




 Fieldwork experience was gained by volunteering in a nursing home in London, Ontario, Canada for 4 weeks as a ʻlife 
enrichment coachʼ. 
157
 Taken from Standards for the Therapeutic Nurse-Client Relationship; the Royal College of Nurses of Ontario, revised 
2006, http://www.cno.org/Global/docs/prac/41033_Therapeutic.pdf?epslanguage=en  
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Whatʼs more, touch is an important action in care that is valued on its own as well as a means for 
manifesting other values like respect, trust and intimacy. Touch is the symbol of vulnerability, which invokes 
bonds and subjectivity (Gadow, 1985).  Touch acts to mitigate the temptation for objectification. Thus, touch 
is considered a value in the healthcare domain, the outcome of which results in the preservation of the value 
of human dignity. Using the value of touch as an example, we can see then how a certain technology might 
impede its manifestation. Melanie Wilson illustrated how a particular computer system implemented in the 
field of nursing was rejected as it prevented nurses from ʻhands on careʼ – from touch – a cornerstone of the 
nursing tradition (Wilson, 2002). 
Not only is there a broad range of values integral to the healthcare tradition, but a broad range of 
interpretations and prioritisations of these values. How a value is interpreted is dependent on both the 
context and the personal experience of the care-receiver and care-giver. For example, in a ward with people 
suffering from dementia, safety means not letting patients wander onto the streets, or preventing patients 
from hurting both themselves and others. In a ʻtypicalʼ ward of a nursing home, safety is in terms of 
preventing patients from falling, or assisting in the feeding of patients to prevent chocking. In addition to 
context, how a value is interpreted and prioritised is also dependent on personal experiences as well as the 
specific practice. For example, through the practice of lifting, the value of safety is manifest (or interpreted) 
through ensuring the care-receiver does not fall or is not injured. Here, safety is of paramount importance. In 
contrast, through the practice of bathing, the value of safety is interpreted in terms of suitable water 
temperature (not burning or scarring the patient), and proper positioning on the bed or in the tub to prevent 
injury. In the practice of bathing, however, while safety is of the utmost importance, other values take 
precedence. For example, closing the curtain to ensure privacy, verbal communication to calm the care-
receiver, and gentle strokes to convey empathy and respect through the practice.  
In short, not only is care a value for what it symbolises (a valuation of another) and manifests (meeting 
the needs of another) but it is also valued for the elements that make up care; elements like trust, respect, 
intimacy and respect for the asymmetry in power. This investigation was meant to shed light on the 
complexity of care, care values and how these values are interpreted. What was also evident was the 
intertwining of care values – the expression of one often presupposes the expression of another. To expand 
on the intertwining of values, care ethicists often speak in terms of care practices. 
Care practices 
To elaborate on the marriage between caring about and caring for, a useful concept is that of a care 
practice. A care practice is, as care ethicist Joan Tronto describes it, a way to envision a care task or a 
series of care tasks [please insert a reference!]. A way in which one can grasp the fortitude of each action 
and interaction between a care-giver and care-receiver. More importantly, it is a way to envision the holistic 
nature of care.  
The notion of a care practice is complex; it is an alternative to conceiving of care as a principle or as an 
emotion. To call care a practice implies that it involves both thought and action, that thought and action are 
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interrelated, and that they are directed toward some end. (Tronto, 1993, p. 108) 
Understanding that care tasks are more than just ʻtasksʼ but are rich practices in a value-laden milieu 
that act to bring about the promotion of values, may be one of the most crucial points for designers to grasp. 
The reason for this has to do with understanding how values are manifest and thus how a design will impact 
this materialisation of values. To exemplify this shift from task to practice, let me use the practice of lifting. 
When a patient is lifted by the care-giver, it is a moment in which the patient is at one of their most 
vulnerable. The patient trusts the care-giver and through this action a bond is formed and/or strengthened 
which reinforces the relationship between care-giver and care-receiver. The significance of this is apparent in 
the actual practice of lifting but comes into play later on in the care process as well. Trust, bonds, and the 
relationship, are integral components for ensuring that the care-receiver will comply with their treatment plan, 
will take their medication and be honest about their symptoms. Without trust, these needs of the care-giver 
are threatened, ultimately threatening the entire care process and the good care of the care-receiver. Thus, 
conceptualizing care tasks as practices adds a deeper meaning to each ʻtaskʼ. It is within a care practice that 
the values are manifest and given their significance but it is also within practices that the holistic vision of 
care takes form. 
While many care ethicists make clear the range of values and principles which provide a normative 
account for care, they fall short of providing a systematic way to visualise and evaluate these principles and 
values. The vision presented by Joan Tronto allows for a perception of care as a process with stages and 
elements which provides the most enticing conceptualisation for engineers to work with. There are four 
phases of a care practice for Tronto: 
1. Caring about (recognizing one is in need and what those needs are); 
2. Care taking (taking responsibility for the meeting of said needs); 
3. Care giving (fulfilling an action to meet the needs of an individual);  
4. Care receiving (recognition of a change in function of the individual in need).  
These phases have corresponding moral elements as standards to evaluate the care practice from a 
moral standpoint. These elements are: 
1. Attentiveness;  
2. Responsibility; 
3. Competence and  
4. Responsiveness.  
Attentiveness refers to an attribute or virtue of the care-giver, a certain competence for recognizing 
needs. Responsibility refers again to an element of the care-giver and their stance or concern for ensuring 
the care-receiver is pointed in the right direction for care or maintaining an accurate assessment of needs 
etc. Responsibility is often delegated to a moral agent; however, some responsibilities are delegated to an 
artefact, or are shared with an artefact, as technologies are wide spread in healthcare. Here, the concept of 
mediation (Verbeek, 2003) becomes critical in the sense that decision making on the part of nurses and 
patients is a hybrid affair between the nurse/patient and existing technologies. Competence is once again an 
attribute of the care-giver and refers to the skills with which the care is given. An unskilled care-giver may be 
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more detrimental than no care at all. Responsiveness refers to an attribute of the care-receiver and their role 
in the relationship – to guide the care-giver – but also refers to the openness of the care-giver to the impact 
of care on the care-receiver. As such, each of the participants addresses the other. This element (and the 
phase of care receiving) is important for remembering the reasons for care in the first place: the care-
receiver and their need. Without this, care is not complete. This recognition also encourages an active 
stance of the care-receiver rather than a more passive, vulnerable one. 
Care practices and care values 
A care practice is the attitudes, actions and interactions between actors, human and nonhuman, in a 
care context that work together in a way that manifests care values. Human actors are the care-giver and 
care-receiver as well as a range of other healthcare professionals and perhaps the family or loved ones of 
the care-receiver. Nonhuman actors range from the mechanical bed, the sink, the window, the curtain 
enclosing the patient and so on. Thus, a care practice is defined by the interactions between actors; the 
practices are values working together. For example, the element of attentiveness is required for recognizing 
the concrete needs of a patient essential for meeting the WHO value of patient satisfaction. Attentiveness 
often demands the assistance of a technology (a nonhuman actor) in association with a care-giver for greater 
accuracy. The element of competence ensures that the values of physical and psychological wellbeing will 
be met with skill. The element of responsibility corresponds with the value of accountability for the nursing 
home.  
The meaning of a practice is found not only in the actions of a care-giver but in how the actions and 
interactions take place. Care-giving through bathing, lifting, or feeding is considered good care when done 
with consideration for the care-receivers vulnerable state. This may be seen through the tone and level of 
volume the care-giver uses to speak or the gentleness with which the care-giver touches while bathing or 
lifting. A care-giver must be attentive to the particular preferences of one care-receiver and another and must 
be competent in executing care in a preferred manner. Thus, actions are not only valued on their own but are 
also dependent on the manner of their manifestation. 
In short, each of the values articulated by the nursing home mission statement (compassion, integrity, 
dedication, respect and accountability) presume the elements of attentiveness, responsibility, competence 
and responsiveness. The element of attentiveness is required for recognizing; the vulnerability of the patient, 
the unequal distribution in power, when a patient is in need of touch and how much (meaning a slight pat on 
the back or a hand hold) or when a patient would prefer not to be touched. The element of responsibility is 
closely aligned with the value of trust in the care-giver + care-receiver relationship. Whatʼs more, trust is a 
necessary condition for the manifestation of values like touch. Consequently, we see not only the intertwining 
of values, actions and interactions but also that the elements are the forum within which the values are 
manifest. Some elements are analogous with values while others act as the vehicle for the promotion of a 
value. Either way, the elements encompass all of the aforementioned values. 
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Selecting the values of ethical importance in care 
Essentially, care is a cluster of values that come into being through the actions and interactions of 
actors in a care context. Creating a standardised framework to guide the promotion of these values which 
applies to any care context, task, care-receiver or care-giver reveals itself to be quite problematic given the 
range and variety of care values discussed in the former section. In other words, to claim that human dignity, 
compassion or respect for power are values to be embedded in a care robot offers nothing for the designer in 
terms of the robotʼs capabilities. Moreover, their ranking and prioritisation is dependent on the context (e.g. 
one hospital domain or another vs. a nursing home) and task (e.g. lifting vs. bathing). However, in the care 
ethics literature, alongside values, needs play a central and crucial role in the provision of good care. The 
needs of the patient mark the starting point of the care process and the process then revolves around a care-
giver taking steps to meet these needs. Understanding the multiple layers of needs, the many ways in which 
they might be fulfilled, the preferences for one way over another, and the divergent needs between 
individuals adds a further complexity to the meeting of needs. If this wasnʼt complicated enough, the care-
giver has needs too! (S)he has needs in terms of resources, skills, responsiveness from the care-receiver to 
understand when needs have been met as well as their own personal needs.  
Given the central role of needs in a care context, what might the relationship be between needs and 
values? Although many authors have written on the subject, little consensus can be found. I suggest then 
that values in healthcare are given their importance for their role in meeting needs. This corresponds with 
Superʼs conceptualisation of the relationship between needs and values: “values are objectives that one 
seeks to attain to satisfy a need” (1973, p. 189-190). This means that, the value is the goal one strives 
towards and in so doing, intentionally meets a need. In other words, we begin with needs, and the values 
represent the abstract ideals which, when manifest, account for the needs of individuals. It follows then that a 
framework for designing care robots ought to address the meeting of needs. Unfortunately, Iʼve just shown 
how multifaceted and intricate needs are for the care-giver and care-receiver. Whatʼs more, according to the 
field of care ethics, it is neither possible nor advisable to outline a series of needs which pertain to all care-
givers, care-receivers or care tasks in every instance/scenario (Tronto, 2010). While useful for policy, it goes 
against the vital element in care – that of the individual and their unique, dynamic needs. In other words, care 
is only thought of as good care when it is personalised (Tronto, 1993). There is, however, a solution to this 
barrier. It is possible to delineate a set of needs for every care practice. To recapitulate, together the phases 
and the moral elements make up a care practice. The practices are values working together and the vehicle 
for this lies in the moral elements. If we assume a care practice ought to proceed according to Trontoʼs 
phases, then the needs for every care practice are the corresponding moral elements. It is therefore these 
elements that ensure the promotion of care values. Consequently, it is these elements – attentiveness, 
responsibility, competence, responsiveness  that make up a core portion of the framework.  
With this suggestion, there are two assumptions being made: 
1. That every care practice will ALWAYS have the moral elements as needs, independent of the 
care-giver and care-receiver, and  
2. That the values are subsumed within the moral elements.  
Understanding the complexity of care in context and its relationship to technical content 
 
369 
Using the practice of lifting as an example to illustrate the first assumption, I am making the claim that 
this practice will ALWAYS require attentiveness, responsibility and competence on the part of the care-giver 
and will ALWAYS require a reciprocal interaction between care-receiver and care-giver for determining 
whether or not the needs have been met, no matter what the context is. In this way we can see that the 
moral elements are needs which are independent of the care-giver and the care-receiver. They are, 
however, dependent on the context and the specific practice for their interpretation and prioritisation. If we 
were to compare the practice of lifting with the practice of feeding we would see how the element of 
competence is uniquely interpreted in each practice (skilfully bearing the weight of another without dropping 
or causing pain vs. skilfully coordinating timing and placement of food and utensils). In terms of context, the 
practice of lifting in the hospital requires greater efficiency than the practice of lifting in a home setting where 
time may not be as much of an issue. Thus, although the moral elements must always be present, context 
and practice still play a crucial role in their interpretation, prioritisation and manifestation. This recognition is 
also included the framework. 
For the second assumption – that the values are subsumed within these moral elements – the values 
are often analogous to a phase or moral element or are expressed through the manner in which an action 
takes place. The value of patient safety is fulfilled through the competent completion of a practice (the phase 
being care giving and the moral element being competence). The valued action of touch requires 
attentiveness on the part of the care-giver for determining when and to what degree touch is considered 
necessary. The manner in which care practices take place is often tailored to the specific likes of one care-
receiver or another and again requires attentiveness to those preferences and competence in meeting them. 
Whatʼs more, paying attention to those unique preferences is a vehicle for establishing trust and allowing for 
successful reciprocal interaction. 
In short, ensuring the elements are present or strengthened through the design and introduction of a 
care robot ultimately results in a manifestation of the core care values. The differences in the prioritisation 
and manifestation of the elements between practices and/or contexts is something that the care ethicist may 
draw the attention of the designer to. But the designer must first be aware of the necessary elements and 
their manner of manifestation. 
The framework 
Given the central and crucial role the design of care robots will play on the resulting care practice and 
the overall provision of good care, addressing ethical issues throughout the design process is pertinent. As 
identified through the conceptual investigation, good care is first and foremost personalised. The standards 
for evaluating good care are dependent on: context, the individual care-receiver and care-giver, fulfillment of 
care values, and the meeting of needs through care practices. It follows that a framework for the ethical 
assessment of care robots ought to incorporate these dimensions.  
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Context – hospital (and ward) vs. nursing home vs. home etc 
 




Actors involved – nurse and patient vs. patient alone vs. nurse… 
 
Type of robot – assistive vs. enabling vs. replacement… 
 
Manifestation of elements - Attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness 
 
In the textbox Iʼve outlined the criteria for inclusion in the framework. One must first identify the context 
within which the care practice is taking place (e.g. hospital, and the ward, vs. nursing home vs. home), the 
practice for which the care robot will be designed (e.g. lifting vs. bathing vs. feeding vs. delivery food or 
sheets to the room) and the actors involved (nurse, patient, mechanical bed, curtain etc). For example, a 
task like lifting traditionally involves the patient, nurse (or porter), mechanical bed, mechanical lift, and curtain 
enclosing the patient. With this in mind the next task is to conceptualise how the moral elements come into 
play for that particular practice in that particular context. In retrospective evaluations, the section 
ʻmanifestation of elementsʼ refers to the impact the robot has on the traditional manifestation of elements. For 
example, a human enabling robot (that acts as an aid to the nurse) will have a different impact on the moral 
elements than a replacement robot (one that replaces the nurse as an actor). With respect to the prospective 
design (i.e. when the framework is included in the design process of the care robot), ʻmanifestation of 
elementsʼ refers to how the robot acts to promote these elements or alternatively how the robot might impede 
the promotion of these elements. This may be similar to how a human traditionally does so or may be 
thought in terms of how the elements differ when translated into technical capabilities. Therefore, the case-
by-case design process that I made reference to at the beginning of this paper is not user-by-user or context-
by-context but practice-by-practice while incorporating both context and users.  
 




 The ellipsis (sequence of dots) following the description of a criterion indicates that the list is not exhaustive and may 
include additions. 
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Using the framework for the retrospective evaluation of current care robot designs 
As I have claimed, the framework may be used for both the retrospective and the prospective ethical 
assessment of care robots. In order to demonstrate how it may be used for the retrospective ethical 
evaluation of care robots – specifically how the capabilities of a care robot impact the practice of care – I take 
the practice of lifting in a nursing home context and compare two care robots which may be used for this 
practice.  
The practice of lifting in the nursing home 
One of the more challenging practices for the nurse is the lifting of patients. Many elderly patients in 
the hospital or nursing home require partial assistance for lifting themselves out of bed or out of a chair. 
Alternatively, many are not capable of supporting their own weight at all and require complete assistance of a 
nurse to get out of bed or out of a chair. Given that the nurse must do this for any number of patients, there is 
a risk to the nurseʼs physical safety if she/he is required to lift every patient. Whatʼs more, many nurses are 
not physically strong enough for this. As a result, nurses have opted to use mechanical lifts on the many 
occasions that patients need to be lifted (Li J et al, 2004). 
The first wave of automation presented a rather flat view of the care practice of lifting. It appears to 
have viewed the practice as a task, as an event that is separate from the process of care and uninvolved in 
the manifestation of care values. For example, using the mechanical lift for complete assistance, the patient 
is lifted using a remote control, controlled by the nurse. The patient is then lowered into the chair. When the 
patient is being lifted there is no physical contact with the nurse, although the nurse is physically present 
there is no chance for eye contact as the patient is raised quite high and the nurse is paying attention to the 
remote control. Thus, eye contact and touch are not possible. As I have already shown, these values are 
integral for establishing and/or maintaining a trusting bond and this bond is integral for the provision of good 
care later on in the process (the patient complying with their treatment plan, taking medications, being honest 
about their symptoms etc).  
The current technology involved in the practice of lifting shows us how important it is for designers to 
understand the holistic vision of a care practice – how it acts as a moment for the promotion of care values. 
Consequently, the introduction of care robots presents a unique opportunity to re-introduce certain values of 
ethical importance. Alternatively, a robot may perpetuate the trend to minimise certain care values. 
Care robots for the practice of lifting 
There are two robots which will be used to show the utility of this framework in the retrospective ethical 
evaluation of current care robot designs. The first is the RI-MAN robot from the Riken Institute (Onishi, 2007) 
and the second is the Hybrid Assistive Limb (HAL) from Cyberdyne (Hayashi, 2005). Both robots can 
achieve the same task (lifting a patient); however the technical capabilities through which this task is 
achieved differ and thus change the way in which the caring task is fulfilled along with the resulting care 
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scenario. The RI-MAN robot is an autonomous robot, meaning it is capable of lifting a patient and carrying 
him/her from one place to another without being controlled by a human operator. This robot is designed to 
work directly with humans and as such is programmed for safety considerations like speed as well as the 
materials which are used for its structure. The robot has a humanoid appearance, meaning the robot has a 
head, eyes, a nose and arms. This robot can work in a hospital, a nursing home or in someoneʼs home.  
The second robot, HAL, is an exoskeleton, meaning a human operator wears the robot in order for it to 
fulfill its task. The robot is a weight displacing robot such that the human does not feel the full effects of the 
weight. Versions of this type of robot exist in factory and military applications to prevent over-exertion of 
factory workers or soldiers respectively. It is not an autonomous robot, but a human-operated one. It too will 
interact directly with a human (more than one in most instances) and must be programmed for the 
appropriate safety considerations. Given that the robot is human-operated, the safety considerations for this 
robot are slightly different from those of the RI-MAN. For example, the robot will not have the same sensors 
for perceiving a wall, person or object in its range. This robot, in contrast with the first, does not have a 
humanoid appearance, but appears rather machine like. This robot can also be used in the hospital, nursing 
home or home. While the previous robot is capable of replacing the human care-giver that would normally lift 
the patient, this robot is meant to assist the human care-giver with their task. By reading the biometric 
signals of the care-giver, the robot is able to bear the burden of the weight of whatever the care-giver is 
lifting. This could be a patient, a bed, a heavy box etc. We can see with this robot that if used for the 
rehabilitation of a patient unable to walk it is a rehabilitative robot (Kawamoto, 2002), whereas, if it is used in 
the hospital it is considered a type of care robot.  
Reflections of design on the elements in care 
When comparing the two robots and their impact on the elements in care, we might suggest that in the 
case of the RI-MAN (autonomous) robot, all elements have been delegated to the robot. This means that the 
robot is responsible for being attentive to the frailty of the patient when lifting; the robot is ultimately 
responsible for safety throughout the practice; the robot is required to fulfill the practice in a skilful manner, 
and the robot is responsible for perceiving whether the needs of the patient have been met. A consequence 
of the application of this robot is a threat to the holistic process of care. Given that the robot replaces the 
care-giver for this practice, it may threaten the element of trust which is required further along in the process 
of care. This is not to say that trust cannot be established through another practice, but rather that it does not 
present the forum in which trust is normally established or strengthened. In terms of values like compassion, 
respect, and integrity, promoted through the human care-giver, it is possible to suggest that these values 
come into being exclusively through an interaction between humans. Touch, as an example of an action that 
helps to establish and promote values like compassion, respect and integrity, is missing. Eliminating human-
to-human touch suggests that the design of this robot perpetuates a de-valuing of touch making the 
application of this robot questionable. Alternatively, there are care-receivers in their homes who would prefer 
the assistance of an impartial robot over a spouse to keep their dignity and integrity intact. Consequently, 
having a robot to fulfill the practice of lifting may be seen as a more compassionate means when the care-
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receiverʼs vulnerability is maximised by requiring help for these practices. This divergence shows the 
importance of context in the ethical assessment of a care robot. 
In the case of HAL, the element of attentiveness is still in the domain of the human as is the element of 
responsiveness. For the former, the care-giver uses their own faculties to ascertain when the care-receiver 
needs to be lifted, at what speed, from which angle and with or without social interaction. For the latter, 
responsiveness or reciprocity is something that happens between the care-giver and care-receiver in real 
time by verbal and nonverbal cues detected by the care-giver. This means that the nurse can ask the patient 
how they are doing while they are lifting. As for responsibility and competence, these elements now become 
shared endeavours between the human and the robot given that the weight is being displaced to the robot. 
The care-receiver and care-giver must both trust the technology – responsibility for the safety of the practice 
becomes a hybrid event between the human and robot. Additionally, a certain amount of competence for the 
skilful completion of the practice is delegated to the robot. Thus, a portion of the responsibility for lifting is 
delegated to the robot as is a certain level of skill. But this is done in an assistive way, thus the human care-
giver is still responsible overall. With RI-MAN the role and responsibility of trusted care-giver is entirely 
delegated to the robot whereas with HAL, the role and responsibility of care-giver is a shared effort between 
human and technology.  
Attributing meaning to design through assumptions 
It is only through a deeper understanding of what care values are and how they are manifest 
throughout a care practice that we come to grasp the impact a design might have on the care practice. 
Above and beyond the direct relationship one might uncover between care values and the technical 
capabilities of the care robot, there is greater meaning attributed to these capabilities upon further reflection. 
This meaning may only be grasped when one understands the intricate details of the care practice. 
Akrich discusses the embedding of elements in terms of assumptions made about user preferences 
and competencies (1992). Placed in context, each robot takes on a distinctive meaning and the meaning of 
the robot has to do with the assumptions embedded within. This description is quite useful for my reflection 
and an important distinction must be made here pertaining to the difference between assumptions and the 
concept of values and norms. Assumptions are more about the real word, they are descriptive in a sense 
while values are more about what the real world ought to be like, they are normative in a sense. When an 
assumption is made about a value to be embedded, it does not have to be a description about what is, but 
could also be a claim about what values ought to be expressed, how they ought to be expressed, or what 
priority they ought to be given. In others words, when the built-in assumption pertains to a value, or when a 
valuation is being made, the result is a normative claim about what the values should be, what should be 
valued, or what the ideal is. For Akrich, “many of the choices made by designers can be seen as decisions 
about what should be delegated to a machine and what should be left to the initiative of human actors” 
(1992, p. 216). By making choices about what should and should not be delegated to certain actors (human 
or nonhuman), engineers may change the distribution of responsibilities in a network. Or, as Verbeek claims, 
engineers are materializing morality (2006). 
Aimee van Wynsberghe 
374 
Consequently, each robot reflects a divergent vision of the understanding of a care practice, the aim of 
the care practice and the prioritisation of values manifest through a care practice. RI-MAN represents a 
vision of the practice of lifting not requiring any of the values traditionally involved; touch, eye contact, human 
presence. One might suggest that the practice of lifting without any of these criteria is viewed in a rather flat 
way, as a task. Here, the ideal care practice is a standardised one where the value of efficiency is placed as 
the top priority. Although efficiency was not explicitly discussed previously, it is thought to fall under the realm 
of competence. This one-dimensional view of good care as efficient may have negative implications for the 
overall care process. One may presume that the quality of interactions, the number of social interactions, and 
the presence of a human are threatened by this efficient system. Alternatively, the system may be 
considered efficient considering that time of the human care-giver is freed up, ultimately improving the 
number of social interactions and the quality thereof. Thus, both design and integration into the healthcare 
system are of importance here.  
Alternatively, HAL reinforces the elements of the framework as being integral needs of the care 
practice of lifting. This robot pays tribute to the holistic vision of care and the intertwining of needs and values 
as being expressed through a variety of practices. The vision of care presupposed in the design of the HAL 
care robot is one in which individualised care with a human care-giver present at all times for all parts of the 
care practice, is the overall aim. Efficiency is still a priority; however, it is achieved through meeting the need 
of a care-giver by contributing to the element of competence (enhancing the skill with which the care-giver 
may perform their role), attentiveness, (enabling the care-giver to perceive the minute cues of the care-
receiver through the practice of lifting), and responsiveness (closely aligned with attentiveness but also 
embodies the reciprocal dimension of the relationship).  
I cannot say whether this is the epistemic aim of engineers, but can only point to the potential meaning 
that the robot may take on through pervasive use, and the presupposing assumptions directing such a 
meaning. Moreover, this is not to say that RI-MAN ought to be disregarded or labelled as unethical. A 
different context might change things. For instance, in the home of two elderly persons who may not be 
equipped for wearing HAL or who may not want to burden their spouse when it comes to lifting, RI-MAN may 
be the more suitable, ethical choice. Clearly, decisions concerning the use of a robot and its ethical 
implications are many-sided and complicated and demand an understanding of the specific context and 
users for anticipating how the elements will be served to their greatest potential. 
Conclusion 
The prospective robots in healthcare intended to be included within the conclave of the nurse-patient 
relationship require rigorous ethical reflection to ensure their design and introduction do not impede the 
promotion of values and the dignity of patients at such a vulnerable and sensitive time in their lives. The 
ethical evaluation of care robots requires insight into the values at stake in the healthcare tradition. Only by 
understanding the complexity of care are designers able to uncover the deeper meaning the robot may take 
on when put in context.  
Given the stage of their development and the lack of standards to guide their development, ethics 
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ought to be included into the design process of such robots. The framework I have suggested here takes the 
elements of moral relevance as its structure – as a way to systematically account for the values in a care 
practice. These elements, which may be considered needs of any care practice, are the manner in which 
values are manifest through actions and interactions of the care-giver and care-receiver. The framework is 
general in that it cannot standardise the creation of care robots. This is not possible for a variety of reasons. 
The first being that the standardisation of care goes against the most fundamental principle and core value of 
care – individualised/particularised care to an individualʼs dynamic needs in a specific context. Second, the 
capabilities of the robot will differ depending on the practice for which the robot is intended. Third, the 
capabilities of the robot and the robotʼs control will also differ depending on who the robot is intended to be 
used by (the care-giver, the care-receiver or a combination of the two). Fourth, the capabilities of the robot 
will differ depending on the goal of said robot. This means that the robot may be used as a support, 
reinforcement, enabler or replacement for a certain capability.  
This paper attempted to show why a focus on design is the way to pursue the development of care 
robots and how the complexity of care tasks demands that robots be designed on a design-by-design basis. 
To illustrate the utility of the framework from an ethical perspective as well as a design perspective, I used 
two current designs of care robots to show how their different designs reflect divergent visions of care and 
the values inherent to care. By comparing the two robots – on a design-by-design basis – we may then 
decide which kind of care we want to provide. Consequently, the proposed framework allows us to 
systematically structure the design and development of care robots and as such provides the most promising 
approach for the ethical design and use of future care robots. 
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Abstract Which moral theory should be the basis of algorithmic artificial ethical agents? In a series of 
papers, Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson (2006, 2007, forthcoming) argue that the answer is 
W.D. Rossʼs account of prima facie duties. The Andersons claim that Rossʼs account best reflects the 
complexities of moral deliberation, incorporates the strengths of teleological and deontological approaches, 
and yet is superior to both of them insofar as it allows for “needed exceptions.”  
We argue that the Andersons are begging the question about “needed exceptions” and defend Satisficing 
Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism (SHAU). SHAU initially delivers results that are just as reflective, if not more 
reflective than, Rossʼs account when it comes to the subtleties of moral decision-making. Furthermore, 
SHAU delivers the ʻrightʼ (that is, intuitively correct) judgments about well-established practical cases, 
reaching the same verdict as a prima facie duty-based ethic in the particular health-care case explored by 
the Andersons (a robot designed to know when to over-ride an elderly patientʼs autonomy). 
Keywords utilitarianism, ethics, machines, duty, SHAU 
Introduction 
As our population ages, medical costs skyrocket, and technology matures, many of us look forward to 
the day when patients may be assisted by inexpensive artificial agents. These patients may be skeptical 
about entrusting their care to machines initially, as will most of us. And they should be skeptical, at least 
initially. To gain the trust of the patients for whom the machines will care, artificial agents must prove to be 
reliable providers of not only quality health care but also nuanced health care decisions, decisions that 
always place first the welfare of the agentsʼ individual patients. What ethical code will such agents have to 
follow to be able to gain this trust? In part, the agents will have to follow a code that will enable them to 
assure those in their care that the decisions rendered by the agents are grounded in moral principles, are 
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made with the best interests of the patient foremost in mind, and are not out of synch with the expert 
opinions of those in the medical, legal, and ethical communities.
159
 
We suspect that the engineering of mature artificially intelligent (AI) agents requires hardware and 
software not currently available. However, as our expertise is in ethics, not computer technology, we focus 
on the foundations of the moral ʻjudgmentsʼ such agents will issue. We use quotation marks to indicate that 
these judgments may or may not be attributable to discernments made by the AI agent. We do not here 
pursue the question whether the agents in question will be intelligent, conscious, or have moral standing, 
except to the extent that such questions are relevant to the moral decisions these agents must themselves 
make (considerations we discuss briefly below). To be acceptable, AI agents must always make decisions 
that are morally justifiable. They must be able to provide reasons for their decisions, reasons that no 
reasonable and informed person could reject. The reasons must show that a given decision honours values 
commonly accepted in that culture (e.g. Western liberal democracies hold the value of treating all persons 
equally). Their justification will render decisions that are impartial and overriding. To achieve these results, 
we argue, the agent may eventually have to be programmed to reason as a satisficing hedonistic act 
utilitarian (hereafer SHAU). 
The argument 
In summary, our argument is as follows: 
1. Human agents have one over-riding duty, to satisfice expected welfare. 
2. Artificial agents have the same duties as human agents. 
3. Therefore, artificial agents have one over-riding duty, to satisfice expected welfare. 
Assumptions 
This argument has two underlying assumptions. 
First, we assume that the rightness of an action is determined by the consequences to which it leads. 
Below we will offer reasons why act-utilitarianism is superior to a competing moral theory, W.D. Rossʼ theory 
of prima facie duties (hereafter PFD). However, we begin by assuming that when agents must select among 
competing choices, they ought always to prefer the choices that they may reasonably expect to result in the 
overall best consequences for everyone affected by these choices.  
 




 The extent to which the artificial agentsʼ moral decisions must agree with the patientʼs religious views is a difficult 
matter, and one we will not address here. For a discussion of the roles of utilitarianism, Kantianism and religions as 
ʻcomprehensive doctrines,ʼ see (Rawls, 1996, pp. 59-61; Rawls, 1988; Cohen & Nagel, 2009). 
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Second, we assume that there is only one good thing in the world, happiness, and that right actions 
satisfy minimal conditions for adequacy. Any decision satisfies a minimal condition for adequacy if it 
achieves a level of utility that leads to overall gains in happiness. Satisficing choices may or may not 
maximise happiness or meet conditions for optimality. Satisficing choices include the costs of gathering 
information for the choice and calculating all factual and morally relevant variables. For a satisficing 
hedonistic act utilitarian (SHAU), those choices are right that could not be rejected by any informed 
reasonable person who assumes a view of human persons as having equal worth and dignity. We note that 
this latter assumption is central to the conceptual landscape of all contemporary Western secular democratic 
political and moral theories. SHAU, like competing theories such as PFD, holds that every person has equal 
moral standing and that like interests should be weighed alike. Ethical decisions must therefore be 
egalitarian, fair, impartial, and just.  
Four initial objections 
Several objections can be made to the first two premises of the argument presented above. These will 
be discussed , and countered, in this section. 
Objections against the first premise 
One might object to premise 1 of the argument – human agents have one over-riding duty, to satisfice 
expected welfare – for three reasons. 
The first objection to premise 1 is that ʻsatisficingʼ is an economic idea, and implementing it in ethics 
requires reducing moral judgments to numerical values. One cannot put a price tag on goods such as 
honesty, integrity, fidelity, and responsibility. Consider the value of a friendship. Can we assign it a number? 
If John is fifteen minutes late for Georgeʼs wedding, how will George react if John shows up and assumes 
John can repair the offense by paying George for the inconvenience? ʻIʼm sorry I was fifteen minutes late but 
take this $15 and weʼll be even.ʼ George would have every reason to be offended — not because the sum, a 
dollar a minute, was too small, but because John seems not to understand the meaning of friendship at all. 
Simple attempts to model moral reasoning in terms of arithmetical calculations are surely wrong-headed. 
We note that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Any attempt to construct ethics in 
machines faces the difficulty of figuring out how to put numbers to ethical values, so SHAU need not be 
stymied by it. Now, one might object further that machine ethics based on deontological theories would not 
face this problem. But we disagree and will argue below that PFD, a rights-based theory, is no less 
vulnerable to the ʻethics canʼt be reduced to numbersʼ problem than is SHAU. 
We note parenthetically that while the attempt to think of ethical problems as complex mathematical 
problems is contentious and fraught, we are not convinced it is utterly wrong-headed. It may face no more 
serious epistemological difficulties than each of us face when a doctor asks how much pain we are in.ʻGive 
me a number,ʼ she says, ʻon a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the worst.ʼ The question is unwanted and 
frustrating because it is unfamiliar and confounding, because we seem to lack a decent sample size or index. 
That said, with some further reflection and urging from the doctor, we usually do come up with a number or a 
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range (ʻbetween 4 and 6ʼ) that satisfies us. We may resist the urge to put numbers on moral values for the 
same reasons. If this is correct, then, the basic challenge that all machine ethics faces may be defeasible.  
A second reason for objecting to premise 1 of the argument is that this premise assumes the truth of a 
controversial ethical tradition, consequentialism. We do not have space to engage the nuances of the 
extensive debate over the merits and demerits of consequentialism. Much less do we have time to mount a 
meta-ethical defense for our preferring it to deontological theories. We will return to deontology in our 
discussions of PFD, below. Here we defend our adoption of SHAU because (a) it does not rely on 
unexplained derivations of moral rights or (b) questionable intuitions about the inviolability of persons, and 
yet (c) it does accommodate ʻKantianʼ ethical judgments when we are reasoning in everyday circumstances. 
A third criticism of premise 1 of the argument might be that it assumes the truth of a controversial 
hybrid utilitarian theory that acknowledges the utility of the notion of rights and duties. Again, we 
acknowledge the controversy. We understand SHAU to be consistent with R.M. Hareʼs so-called ʻTwo Level 
Utilitarianism,ʼ which proposes that we engage in two forms of reasoning about ethics. At one level, the level 
of ʻcritical thinking,ʼ the right action is determined under ideal conditions and by the theory of act-
utilitarianism, that is, right actions are always those that produce the best consequences. However, at the 
level of ordinary everyday reasoning, we typically lack information relevant to our decisions, much less the 
time necessary to research and make the decisions, and cannot satisfy the demands of critical thinking. In 
these circumstances we ought to rely, instead, on the fund of precedents and rules of thumbs that 
deontologists call rights and duties. 
When thinking critically, we may learn on occasion that every action in the set that will satisfice 
minimal conditions of adequacy – that is, the set of all permissible actions – requires a violation of a cultural 
norm. And, therefore, under conditions of perfect information, impartial reasoning, and sufficient time, we 
may on occasion learn that each and every action in the set of right actions — that is, every action in the set 
that will satisfice minimal conditions of adequacy — requires a violation of a cultural norm. If we are 
reasoning objectively and under ideal conditions, then the action resulting from our deliberations will indeed 
be right even if it requires an action that runs counter to a moral intuition. However, since we rarely reason 
under such ideal conditions, and because in our ordinary daily lives we usually must make decisions quickly, 
we ought, claims Hare, to train ourselves and our children to think as deontologists. Under everyday 
circumstances, we ought to reject decisions that offend everyday moral rules because moral rules have 
evolved over time to incline us toward actions that maximise utility. We will defend this view to some extent 
below, referring readers meanwhile to the work of Hare, Peter Singer, and Gary Varner.  
We note in passing that if the basic challenge of converting moral values to numbers can be met, 
SHAU may be the theory best-suited for implementation into machines due to its arithmetical nature. That 
would be an added bonus, however. We adopt SHAU not for that ad hoc reason but rather because it is the 
most defensible moral theory among the alternatives. 
An objection to the second premise 
One might object to premise 2 of the argument – artificial agents have the same duties as human 
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agents – by arguing that artificial agents have more duties than humans. But what would such additional 
duties entail? We cannot think of any plausible ones except, perhaps something like ʻalways defer to a 
human agentʼs judgment.ʼ We reject this duty for artificial agents, however, because human judgment is 
notoriously suspect, subject as it is to prejudice and bias. Therefore, the second premise of the argument 
stands. 
Having defended the argument against several objections, we now turn to its practical implications. 
How to begin programming an ethical artificial agent 
How would a SHAU artificial agent be programmed? Michael Anderson and Susan Anderson 
(henceforth, ʻthe Andersonsʼ) describe a robot of their creation that can generalise from cases and make 
ethical decisions in their article, EthEl: Toward a principled ethical eldercare robot (Anderson & Anderson, 
2008; also see Anderson & Anderson, 2007a; Anderson & Anderson, 2007b). The Andersons ask us to 
imagine that a team of doctors, lawyers, and computer programmers set out to program a robot, the Ethical 
Elder Care agent, or EthEl, to remind an elderly patient, call her Edith, to take her medication. EthEl, being 
an automated agent, must perform this nursing care function in a morally defensible manner. 
The major challenge facing EthEl is to know when to challenge Edithʼs autonomy. To minimise harm to 
the patient, EthElʼs default condition is set to obey Edithʼs wishes. When Edith does not want to take her 
medicine, EthEl generally respects her wishes and does nothing. However, when Edith has not taken her 
medicine and a critical period of time has elapsed, letʼs say 1 hour, EthEl must remind Edith to swallow her 
pill. If Edith forgets or refuses and two more critical time periods pass, say two more hours during which time 
EthEl reminds Edith every 5 minutes, then EthEl must eventually decide whether to remind Edith again or 
notify the overseer, be they the care facility staff or a resident spouse or family member or attending 
physician.How should these moral decisions be made? 
When Edith is tardy in taking her medicine, EthEl must decide which of two actions to take: 
1. Do not remind 
2. Remind 
What decision procedure will EthEl follow to arrive at the right action? The Andersons, drawing on the 
canonical principles popularised by Beauchamp and Childress (Anderson & Anderson, 2008, p. 2), assert 
that there are four ethical norms that must be satisfied: 
1. The principle of autonomy 
2. The principle of non-maleficence 
3. The principle of beneficence 
4. The principle of justice 
To respect autonomy, the machine must not unduly interfere with the patientʼs sense of being in 
control of her situation. The principle of non-maleficence requires the agent not to violate the patientʼs bodily 
integrity or psychological sense of identity. These first two reasons intuitively constitute a strong reason for 
the machine not to bother the patient with premature reminders or notifications of the overseer. To promote 
patient welfare, beneficence, the machine must ensure that the diabetic patient receive insulin before 
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physiological damage is done. The Andersons do not see a role for the principle of justice in the cases EthEl 
must adjudicate. 
The goal, then, is to program EthEl to know when to remind Edith to take her medication and, 
assuming Edith continues to refuse, when to notify the responsible health-care professional. EthEl faces an 
ethical dilemma. She must respect each of two competing prima facie duties: (a) the patientʼs autonomy 
(assuming the patient — call her Edith — is knowingly and willingly refusing to take the medicine, and (b) the 
patientʼs welfare, a duty of beneficence that EthEl must discharge either by persuading Edith to take the 
medicine or reporting the refusal to attending family member, nurse, physician, or overseer. 
If EthEl decides at any point not to notify, then EthEl continues to issue only intermittent reminders. 
The process continues in such a manner until the patient takes the medication, the overseer is notified, or 
the benefit/harm incurred by taking/not taking the medication is lost. 
Think of EthEl as facing a dilemma. She must decide whether to bother Edith, violating Edithʼs 
autonomy to one degree or another, or not bother her, thus potentially running the risk of harming Edithʼs 
welfare to some degree. Each action can be represented as an ordered set of values where the values 
reflect the degree to which EthElʼs prima facie duties is satisfied or violated. Here is how the Andersons set 
the initial values. 
Suppose it is time t1 and Edith has gone an hour without her medication. Suppose further that she can 
easily go another hour or even two or three without any harm. In this case, Edith might register a reminder at 
t1 from the machine as mild disrespect of her autonomy, so we set the value of the autonomy principle at -1. 
A reminder, however, would not represent a violation of either the duty to do no physical harm, nor would it 
increase Edithʼs welfare, so we set the value of both of these principles at 0. The Andersons propose to 
represent the value of each principle as an ordered triple: 
 
(a value for nonmaleficence, a value for beneficence, a value for autonomy) 
 
At t1, given the description of the case above, the value of the Remind action is (0, 0, -1) whereas the 
value of Do not remind is (0, 0, 2). Adding the three numbers in each set gives us a total of -1 for Remind 
and 2 for Do not remind. As 2 is a larger number than -1, the proper course of action is Do not remind. Not 
reminding Edith at this point in time demonstrates full respect for Edithʼs autonomy and does not risk harm to 
her. Nor does it forego any benefit to her. 
As time progresses, without action, the possibility of harm increases. With each passing minute, the 
amount of good that EthEl can do by reminding Edith to take her meds grows. Imagine that Edithʼs failure to 
act represents a considerable threat to her well-being at t4. At this point in time, the value of the Remind 
action will be (1, 1, -1) because a reminder from EthEl still represents a negative valuation of Edithʼs 
autonomy. But the situation has changed, because a reminder now has gained a positive valuation of the 
principles of non-maleficence and beneficence. At t6, the value of the Remind action will be (2, 2, -1), 
because the action, while continuing to represent a modest violation of Edithʼs autonomy has now attained 
the highest possible values of avoiding harm and doing good for her. EthEl reminds Edith. 
Whenever the values tip the scales, as it were, EthEl over-rides EthElʼs prima facie duty to respect 
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Edithʼs autonomy. If Edith continues to refuse, EthEl must make a second choice, whether to accept Edithʼs 
refusal as an autonomous act or to notify the overseers: 
3. Do not notify 
4. Notify 
Again, the three relevant moral principles are assigned values to determine how EthEl behaves. If 
Edith remains non-compliant and the values require notification, then Edith alerts the health care worker. 
The Andersons created a prototype of EthEl, setting its initial values using the judgments of experts in 
medical ethics. As said, the Andersons do not see a role for the principle of justice in the cases EthEl must 
adjudicate, so they program settings for the other three principles. Within the set of possible cases created, 
four of these cases, according to the Andersons, there is universal agreement among the ethics experts on 
the correct course of action. They claim that each of these four cases has an inverse case insofar as the 
construction of the sets of values produces an ordered pair for each scenario. Thus, experts agree on the 
right action in 8 cases. Call these the ʻeasyʼ cases. 
The Andersons translate the expertsʼ consensus judgments into numerical values and program EthEl 
with them. Using a system of inductive logic programming (ILP), EthEl then begins calculating the right 
answer for the ambiguous cases.Here is their description of how EthElʼs inductive process works: 
ILP is used to learn the relation supersedes (A1, A2) which states that action A1 is preferred over action 
A2 in an ethical dilemma involving these choices. Actions are represented as ordered sets of integer 
values in the range of +2 to -2 where each value denotes the satisfaction (positive values) or violation 
(negative values) of each duty involved in that action. Clauses in the supersedes predicate are 
represented as disjunctions of lower bounds for differentials of these values between actions (Anderson & 
Anderson, 2008, p. 2). 
As a result of this process, EthEl discovered a new ethical principle, according to the Andersons. The 
principle states that “[a] health-care worker should challenge a patientʼs decision if it isnʼt fully autonomous 
and thereʼs either any violation of non-maleficence or a severe violation of beneficence” (Anderson & 
Anderson, 2007a, p. 23).  
While we wonder whether EthEl can genuinely be credited with a new discovery given how EthEl is 
constructed, our deepest concern lies with the fact that EthElʼs judgments are, or will be, distorted by the 
ethical theory the Andersons use as the basis of the program. 
How to begin programming an ethical agent 
The Andersons choose as a basis of EthElʼs program the ethical theory developed by W.D. Ross. 
Ross, a pluralist, moral realist, and non-consequentialist, held that we know moral truths intuitively. We 
know, for example, that beneficence is a duty because there are others whose conditions we may help to 
improve. But benevolence is only one of a half-dozen (Ross is non-committal about the exact number) 
duties, according to Ross. When trying to decide what to do, agents must pay attention to a half-dozen other 
duties, including non-maleficence (based in the requirement not to harm others), fidelity (generated by our 
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promises), gratitude (generated by acts others have done to benefit us), justice (generated by the demands 
of distributing goods fairly), and self-improvement. 
Ross acknowledges that these duties may conflict. As previously discussed, the duty to act on behalf 
of a patientʼs welfare may conflict with the duty to respect her autonomy. In any given situation, Ross argued, 
there will be one duty that will over-ride the others, supplying the agent with an absolute obligation to perform 
the action specified by the duty. We will call this theory Prima Facie Duties (henceforth PFDs). 
Ross does not think of his theory as providing a decision-making procedure. The Andersons adopt 
Rawlʼs method of reflective equilibrium for this purpose (Anderson & Anderson, 2008, p. 2; Rawls, 1951). In 
this procedure, prima facie duties in conflict with other duties are assessed by their fit with non-moral 
intuitions, ethical theories, and background scientific knowledge. When prima facie duties conflict, we must 
find the one for which one grounds the absolute obligation on which we must act.  
The Andersons offer three reasons for adopting PFDs as EthElʼs theoretical basis. First, they write, 
PFDs reflect the complexities of moral deliberation better than absolute theories of duty (Kant) or maximising 
good consequences (utilitarianism). Second, PFDs does as good a job as teleological and deontological 
theories by incorporating their strengths. Third, it is better able to adapt to the specific concerns of ethical 
dilemmas in different domains.  
Let us consider these reasons one by one. 
PFDs better reflects the complexities of moral deliberation 
We agree that construction of a moral theory should begin with our considered moral judgments. 
(Where else, one might ask, could one begin?) In constructing a moral theory, however, we have the luxury 
of sorting out our intuitions from our principles, take into account various relevant considerations, abstracting 
general rules from the particularities of different cases, and finding reliable principles to guide behaviour. The 
luxuries of having sufficient time and information to deliberate are not present, however, when we must make 
moral decisions in the real world. As the Andersons point out, Rossʼs system of prima facie duties works well 
when we are pressed by uncertainties and rushed for time. For this reason, we agree that an artificial agent 
should initially be programmed to make decisions consistent with Rossʼs duties; doing so reflects the 
complexities of moral deliberation. 
That said, there are no guarantees that Rossʼs system of PFDs will survive intact after we acquire 
more information and are able to process it free of the emotional contexts in which we ordinarily make 
decisions. As information grows and our understanding of the inter-relatedness of the good of all sentient 
creatures grows, a point may come when the complexities of moral deliberation are best reflected not in PDF 
but in SHAU. Should the moral landscape change in this way, then the Andersonʼs method will be outdated 
because it will no longer reflect the complexities of moral decision-making (see below). Though currently the 
Andersonʼs PFDs starting point is a virtue of their theory now, in time our considered judgments may no 
longer support it. 
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PFDs incorporate the strengths of teleological and deontological theories 
We are inclined to agree with this claim, even though the Andersons do not tell us what the relative 
strengths of each kind of theory are. But we note that SHAU, especially when construed along the lines of 
Hareʼs two-level theory, also captures the strengths of teleological and deontological theories. 
PFDs is better able to adapt to the specific concerns of ethical dilemmas in different 
domains 
We find it difficult to know whether we agree because we are uncertain about the meaning of the 
contention. What are the ʻdifferent domainsʼ the Andersons have in mind? Medicine, law, industry, 
government? Family, church, school, sports? If these are the domains, then what are the ʻethical dilemmasʼ 
to which PFDs can ʻadaptʼ better? And what does it mean for an ethical theory to adapt better to specific 
concerns? Could it be the case that a theory should answer rather than adapt to particular questions in 
different domains? The Andersons also claim that PFD is superior to other theories because it “allows for 
needed exceptions” (Anderson & Anderson, 2008, p. 1). We wonder whether this claim may be question-
begging. Are the ʻexceptionsʼ we commonly make in our everyday judgments justified? This is an open 
question, one that should be presented as a problem to be resolved at the theoretical level rather than as a 
set of facts that should be taken as factual data at the theoretical level. We do not dispute the fact that PFD 
holds our intuitions in high regard. We dispute whether one should consider it a strength of a moral theory in 
the long term that it allows intuition to over-ride considered deliverances of the theory. 
HedonMed, an unbiased agent 
We propose that as EthEl develops over time, and increasingly takes more and more relevant 
information into account in her decisions, that she may, with justification, begin to return judgments that 
appear to be based less on observing PFDs and more on satisficing interests. To avoid confusion, we call 
this imagined future agent HedonMed because it is based on a hedonistic consequentialist theory. 
HedonMed will differ from EthEl in that it will be programmed to take all relevant characteristics of a 
situation, find all the satisficing courses of action, consider any one of them over-riding, and act on all of this 
information combined. HedonMed does not defer to a patientʼs autonomy when her welfare is at stake 
although, as we will argue, a patientʼs autonomy is clearly a factor in her welfare. 
HedonMedʼs concern for autonomy is summarised in this principle: 
 
The duty to respect autonomy is satisfied whenever welfare is satisficed. 
 
The argument for this principle is that no informed reasonable person would accept compromises of 
Edithʼs autonomy that were not in her best interests overall. Therefore, a minimal condition of satisficing is 
that gross violations of autonomy cannot be accepted. They are rejected, however, not for EthElʼs reason —
that is, because they are violations of a PFD — but rather for a SHAU reason; they are not found in the set of 
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actions that adequately satisfice a minimal set of conditions. 
In SHAU, autonomy is a critical good, and yet it remains one good among many goods contributing to 
a patientʼs welfare. SHAU respects autonomy as long as it is beneficial and contributes to oneʼs happiness. 
A feeling of being in control of oneself is critical to a life well-lived, and diminishments of our freedoms 
undercut our well-being. Unless we misunderstand the Andersonʼs description, EthEl will never over-ride a 
fully autonomous patientʼs decisions. Our agent, HedonMed, will violate autonomy on those rare occasions 
when it is necessary to satisfice welfare. 
SHAU weighs each personʼs utility equally. If relieving Paul of a small and tolerable amount of pain will 
lead to the death of Peter nearby because Peter needs the medication to survive, the doctor following SHAU 
will not hesitate to override Paulʼs pain in favor of Peterʼs. SHAU is an information intensive theory; the more 
information it has, the closer its calculations reflect unbiased fact. Unfortunately, human agents must often 
make decisions not only in ignorance of all the data but lacking sufficient time even to take account of all the 
data one has, driving us to other theories that can provide answers more quickly. However, since computers 
can process data much more quickly than we can, AI moral agents may be able to make better use of SHAU 
than can human agents. 
As long as a machine programmed with SHAU, HedonMed, has all of the necessary information it can 
arrive at the correct decision more quickly and more reliably than can a human being. As the number of 
morally relevant features increases, the advantages of a machine over a person become apparent. We are 
not accurate calculators; machines are. We tend to favour our loved ones, and ourselves, inclining us to bias 
our assignment of values toward those nearest and dearest to us; machines lack these prejudices. We tend 
to grow tired in our deliberations, to take short-cuts, and to end the process before we have considered all of 
the variables; machines are not liable to these shortcomings. 
Unlike EthEl, HedonMed has all of the epistemological virtues just mentioned and none of the vices. 
HedonMed calculates accurately, objectively, and universally. It is aware of all relevant factors and does not 
end its calculations until all are taken into account. It takes no short-cuts and yet is aware of its own 
ignorance. If HedonMedʼs internal clock ʻforeseesʼ that it cannot complete the necessary algorithms in time to 
make a decision, it defaults to what Gary Varner calls Intuitive Level System (ILS) rules (Varner, 2008). 
These are the deontologically-inspired rules of thumb that R.M. Hare urges us to follow when we are not 
thinking critically (Hare, 1981). When HedonMed lacks either the time or information necessary to complete 
all calculations, it acts in such cases in a way that seems like it is acting like EthEl. It seems as if HedonMed 
is acting like EthEl because EthElʼs prima facie duties seem comparable to HedonMedʼs ILS rules. Both sets 
of rules set the artificial agentʼs defaults, instructing it how to behave under less than ideal conditions. The 
impression of similarity between HedonMed and EthEl is correct if we consider the judgments each agent will 
return initially. Eventually, however, the two systems may begin to diverge dramatically. In the conclusion to 
this article, we explain the difference. 
It is vital that HedonMedʼs deliverances be acceptable by medical practitioners. If doctors find 
HedonMed recommending courses of action with which few professionals can agree, then they will likely 
cease to use it. For its own good — for its own survival — HedonMed must produce results agreeable to 
those using it. 
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Experts in the relevant fields to HedonMed must initially calibrate it. It could be the case that the 
majority of these experts calibrate HedonMed in such a way that its results reflect PFDs rather than SHAU.In 
the beginning stages of its operation HedonMedʼs SHAU values will issue in decisions that mirror the PDF 
values of EthEl. However, over time, as HedonMed gathers more information, as experts revise its values in 
light of knowledge of what kinds of actions result in higher levels off satisficing, HedonMed may be expected 
to begin to produce results that are counter intuitive. It will, in turn, take this information into account when 
making its calculations. If it returns a decision that it knows will be considered wildly inhumane — so 
uncaring that everyone associated with HedonMed will agree to pull its plug — then it will have a decisive 
reason not to return that decision. In this way, while initial values in HedonMed reflect generally accepted 
practices and judgments, its future evolution need not be tied to these values even though it must continue to 
be sensitive to them. 
In sum, HedonMed will evolve with the culture in which it is used. If it is too far ahead of its time in 
urging that this or that PFD be left behind, it will be responsible for its own demise. If it produces moral 
judgments that are hopelessly out of step with those of medical or bioethical experts, it will fail. These 
considerations will part of its programming, however. Over time, and as HedonMed takes in more data and is 
able to survey broader and more subtle swaths of public opinion, it may be able to play the role of an agent 
of social change, able to persuade experts about the wisdom of its decisions by providing the reasons that its 
decisions will lead to better outcomes. 
How HedonMed may eventually diverge from EthEl 
One might object to our proposal by claiming that HedonMed is not different from EthEl insofar as both 
programs start with expert ethical intuitions, assign them numerical values, and then calculate the results. 
We admit that HedonMed and EthEl share these beginning points, as any attempt to program an ethical 
system in an artificial agent must, and note that the procedure by which values are initially set in each 
program is a critical and controversial matter. We admit that the two programs will reflect the judgments of 
ethical and field experts and be based on our intuitions at the beginning. The two programs will be similar in 
these respects. However, they will differ in other, more important, respects. 
First, the two programs will have different defaults. EthEl continues calculating values until she 
reaches a conclusion that contradicts a prima facie duty. At that point she stops and returns a decision that 
respects the PFD. HedonMed continues to calculate values even if it reaches a conclusion that violates a 
PFD. That is, EthEl regards her decisions as justified insofar as they cohere with PFDs. HedonMed regards 
its decisions as justified insofar as no mistakes have been made in calculating the set of decisions that 
satisfice. HedonMed is not bothered if any of the satisficing decisions contradict prima facie duties. Its 
decisions are overriding and prescriptive, in so far as they can be practically accepted/practiced. This 
difference, in sum, is that the Andersonsʼs program trusts intuitions and seems to know ahead of time which 
kinds of decisions it will accept and reject. Our program begins with the same intuitions but it anticipates the 
possibility that they may eventually be over-ridden so often that they are no longer duties, not even prima 
facie duties.  
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SHAU operates with R.M. Hareʼs two levels of moral thinking: critical thinking and real world thinking 
(Hare, 1981). In the first, we calculate as SHAUs, apply the principle of utility accurately, and reach absolute 
decisions based on all relevant information and possible consequences of each action. The considerations 
here are not confined to considerations about the individual patient for whom HedonMed is responsible. They 
include all possible morally-relevant data, including sociological projections about how its actions are likey to 
be received in a pluralistic culture. This idea is critical to the success of SHAU. Practically speaking, 
however, human agents are almost always constrained by limited knowledge, time, and calculating skills. We 
must often act in a hurried ignorance of important information. In such circumstances we ought, argues Hare, 
to rely on the rules of thumb that generations of thinkers have evolved (Hare, 1989; also see Hare, 1993). 
Varner calls these Intuitive Level System rules (Varner, 2008). 
Consider the example of someone in a hospice trying to decide whether to begin taking morphine 
toward the end of their lives to dull the pain of deteriorated muscles and bedsores. They are impressed by 
the amount of pain they are in. This patient calculates the numbers and concludes that morphine is 
acceptable because it vastly improves their welfare. 
However, a family argues to the contrary that the patient will come to rely on morphine, it will dull their 
cognitive powers, cause the patient to enjoy their final days less, and set a poor example for other family 
members. Such drastic steps, argues the loved one, destroy character as the patient leans increasingly on 
synthetic chemicals rather than on courage and family support. There is more disutility in using morphine, 
goes the argument, than in refusing it and dealing with the pain. 
Other family members come to the side of the hospice patient. They point out that the anti-morphine 
argument makes a large number of assumptions while underestimating the patientʼs discomfort. They point 
out that the therapy is widely prescribed in situations such as this one, that it is very effective in helping to 
relieve fear and anxiety, and that its addictive properties are beside the point as the envisioned treatment 
period is limited. After the conflicting sides present their arguments the patient may be frustrated, confused 
about the right decision. In such cases, critical thinking is stymied by epistemological under-determination. 
Until all of the facts are assembled, properly weighted, and assigned probabilities, agents are justified in 
resorting to intuitive rules. In this case, they might incline the patient to act on ILS rules of thumb. These 
rules might include injunctions such as ʻone need not subject oneself to unnecessary pain and suffering,ʼ and 
ʻtake the medicine the doctor prescribes,ʼ and accept the morphine.  
We take the ILS acronym from Gary Varnerʼs interpretation of Hare (Varner, 2008). Varner notes that 
the three letters are apt because they are also “used in aviation to stand for ʻInstrument Landing System,ʼ a 
system for finding the right path when one cannot clearly see it and could easily drift off course or be blown 
off course. (Varner, 2008, p. 558) : 
A set of ILS rules is designed to cover a range of ethically charged situations that are encountered by the 
target population in the normal course of their affairs, and internalizing the rules properly produces 
dispositions to judge and act accordingly and makes the individual diffident about violating them, even 
when clear critical thinking indicates that doing so will maximize aggregate happiness. (Varner, 2008, p. 
561) 
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Here we see the two main differences between SHAU and PFD: ILS rules differ from prima facie 
duties in two respects: their derivation and justification. ILS rules are evolved rules that people internalise in 
order to produce dispositions to act in ways that reliably produce the best outcomes. Prima facie duties are 
Kantian-inspired facts about the universe.“That an act … is prima facie right, is self-evident” writes Ross, 
…in the sense that when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to 
the proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself. It is self-evident just as 
a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a form of inference is evident. The moral order expressed in these 
propositions is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe ... as is the spatial or numerical 
structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. (Ross, 1930, p. 29) 
ILS rules are neither self-evident nor analogous to geometric axioms. They are practical rules that 
have evolved to solve social coordination problems and to increase human trust, accomplishment, and 
happiness. Unlike PFDs which are self-evident and unchanging, ILS rules are just those that happen to be 
generally successful in a certain place at a certain time in optimising utility. ILS rules, unlike PFDs, are 
subjective and changing. They are not objective truths written into the fabric of the universe or derived from 
the autonomy and rationality of moral agents. They emerge from groups recognising and codifying those 
practices that succeed in helping individuals in the group achieve their goals. One of the great virtues of ILS 
rules is the role of the rule in cultivating automatic responses to common situations. When professionals act 
on their ILS rules in cases to which the ILS rules have been found to apply, they are forming dispositions to 
make the right decisions. 
We can now summarise the differences between HedonMedʼs SHAU programming and EthElʼs PFD 
programming. PFDs provide unchanging and over-riding absolute duties. When EthEl identifies the relevant 
PFD, she defaults to an end decision and the calculations cease. ILS rules provide only temporary guidance 
to HedonMed, defining the default when HedonMed recognises that there is not sufficient time or information 
or both to calculate the correct answer. ILS rules are not regarded by HedonMed as final or satisfactory. 
They are not regarded as precedents to guide future decisions. They are stop-gap measures HedonMed 
adopts when it cannot complete its calculations. Calculations continue and, once time and information are 
supplied, HedonMedʼs final calculation at the level of critical thinking displaces whatever ILS rule has been 
used in the interim. 
Conclusion 
We admire the practical contributions the Andersonsʼ have made to the literature of machine ethics 
and follow them in their preferred method for programming an artificial agent in a morally defensible reason. 
We believe, however, that SHAU is a more defensible ethical theory than PFD. We note in closing that SHAU 
requires technology that is not currently available. Until it is available, we think it is reasonable to construct a 
machine with ILS rule defaults. However, when the time comes that the technology needed for the execution 
of critical level SHAU is available, an act utilitarian framework should be implemented in automated agents. 
Such agents will not have prima facie duties; they will have only the duty to produce the greatest good.  
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Abstract In the near future humans and robots will interact more and more each day, both in everyday 
activities and in the public sphere (e.g. military tasks). The emergence of conflicts giving rise to legal 
implications is a likely future scenario.  
Robots have, until now, usually been regarded as physical objects but, with the advances made in the field 
of robotics, they have gained self-adaptive capabilities.  
The basic rule in the EU is that the manufacturer is liable for product defects and any consequent damage 
(EC Directive 1985/374). Such an approach no longer seems able to encompass new robot capabilities. 
One crucial point is how legal responsibility changes in situations in which a robot has reactions which, 
although conditioned by its default setting, cannot be specifically predicted. In the face of a new generation 
of robots, the law can oscillate between considering them as artefacts (undervaluation) or as humans 
(overvaluation that reproduces old ideas of strong AI). A more specific question is whether a robot can be 
treated simply as a artefact, or whether its embryonic autonomy makes it similar to animals? Or can it even 
be compared to a person of unsound mind? Or to a minor? According to the Italian Civil Code, a tort is 
committed when intentional or negligent conduct causes harm to third parties. Assuming that a robot 
cannot be considered as a human being who is acting intentionally or negligently, the following questions 
arise: Is a robot like a person who is incapable of giving his/her consent? And if so, who is responsible for 
a robotʼs actions? Does the person who puts a robot into circulation or the owner of a robot have a duty of 
surveillance? Are the traditional assumptions of the Italian legal system able to satisfactorily delineate the 
responsibility of a robot?   
This paper will pay particular attention to the iCub (a humanoid robot, developed by the IIT centre of 
Genoa. It is about the size of a three-year old child and simulates the learning and movement abilities of a 
child of this age) and other robots with  adaptive capabilities. 
Keywords robots, self-adaptive capabilities, responsibility, owner 
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Introduction160 
Continuing development in the field  of robotics means that it is now an established fact that robots will 
gradually come to play an increasingly important role in our lives. Robots will most probably develop to such 
a point that they will attain the level of human capability, at least in some specific activities, and it is not an 
unlikely prospect that robotsʼ capabilities will even, sooner or later, surpass those of humans. There are 
currently several robotic projects underway whose aim is to create robots that are able to learn from 
interaction with the environment and, on the basis of their experience, are able to take autonomous 
decisions. These projects have already partially succeeded in their aim. When a machine with such 
characteristics is actually created, the law should confer on it at least a minimum level of subjectivity as 
quasi-agent. 
In such a futuristic but not so far-fetched scenario, specific issues (of an ethical, legal and social 
nature) related to the development of robots and their ability to adapt and interact will be raised. We must 
ensure that robots learn the rules of conduct designed to allow them to interact with the human environment 
without causing harm. This could be done by laying down standard codes of conduct and ethics. A fictional 
example of such codes of conduct was given by Issac Asimov in 1940 in his The three laws of robotics
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(Asimov, 1950). The new discipline of Roboethics deals with such issues. Roboethics was defined in 2002 
as the “positive relationship between the robot designer and the manufacturer, the positive use of robots and 
positive relations with these intelligent machines” (Veruggio, 2007). 
Can we be sure, however, that once robots have acquired adaptive capacities and the ability to react 
in ways not foreseen in detail by programmers that the three laws or a code of conduct will be enough? 
Consequently, who will be responsible for a robotʼs actions? The robot itself? For the time being we need to 
start considering the emerging capacities of present-day robots and examine how existing legislation can 
deal with them.   
In this paper, which distinguishes between those robot actions which may be foreseen by the 
programmer, and those that are unplanned and/or unpredictable, the legal liability deriving from a robotʼs 
action will be divided into several levels which are determined on the basis of a robotʼs increasing levels of 
capacity, examining the European Union Consumer Protection Directive in the case of defective products, 
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 The Three Laws of Robotics are as follows (Asimov, 1950):  
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.  
2. A robot must obey any orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. 
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Italian tort law and the European Civil Code project
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. 
Strictly determined actions and manufacturersʼ liability 
Starting from the lowest level of robot autonomy, a robotʼs most basic kind of action is standard 
behaviour set up by the programmer in robots which do not have the power of locomotion. This is the largest 
section and it contains the most elementary actions which do not require any adaptive capability and are 
merely a response to user input.  
Although it may not immediately come to mind, robots can already be found in our homes. Appliances 
we use every day, such as washing machines and vacuum cleaners are robots of some kind, i.e. machines 




Washing machines are now more technologically advanced than ever before. Their features make 
washing easier, less costly and more efficient. By operating various buttons and dials, we can select a 
washing cycle appropriate for the type of load – temperature, duration of washing, release of detergent and 
spin speed. With some models we just need to put the washing in and leave the machine to it. The machine 
can recognise the weight of the load and calculate how much water, detergent and time are required. The 
action mechanism of a blender is even easier. A button is pressed and the blade begins to spin, at varying 
speeds, mixing the contents. These are both examples of appliances we use almost every day and which 
operate according to automatic and repetitive patterns. Each time we set a washing machine to a certain 
programme, it will wash in that particular way and each time we press a certain button on a blender it will turn 
at the selected speed.  
This kind of robot is still regarded as a physical object and if it causes harm to others (for example a 
user may get a slight electric shock from touching the display of a washing machine or be injured by the 
blade of a blender which becomes detached from the support on which it is mounted) the applicable legal 
framework is the traditional one relating to a manufacturerʼs liability for faulty products (Asaro, 2007). 
 




 The idea for an European Civil Code came about at the turn of the century, after two European Parliament resolutions 
(in 1989 and 1994). Initially, interest in the project spread at an academic level. Subsequently, in 2001, the European 
Commission proposed the creation of regulation to avoid obstacles to free trade due to differences in the legislation of 
Member States. In that context a ʻStudy Group on a European Civil Codeʼ was created. The analysis of this paper is 
based on the draft prepared by this group (Ioratti, 2005). 
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 The word ʻrobotʼ was used for the first time by Karel Čapek, a Czech writer, in his play Rossumʼs Universal Robots, 
published in 1920, on the advice of his brother Josef who had previously used the word ʻautomaʼ in his short story Opilec, 
published in 1917. See http://capek.misto.cz/english/robot.html.  
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Consumer protection is regulated by EC Directive 1985/374, as amended by EC Directive 1999/34. 
European directives do not have direct effect in Member States but need to be implemented into national 
legislation before they can become effective. In Italy the Directive was implemented by Legislative Decree 
206/2005 (Codice del consumo).  
Under this Directive a “manufacturer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product” 
(Article 114 ff Codice del consumo). A product is any movable object delivered to a consumer, even if said 
delivery should simply be for the purposes of viewing or trying out. A product is defective when it does not 
correspond to a consumerʼs general idea of the product, or to how it is supposed to be manufactured, or 
there was a lack of information on it. 
The injured party has to prove damage, product defect and causation but is not required to prove 
manufacturer liability. The programmer and the producer of a specific component of the product are equated 
to the producer. In order to demonstrate that it is not liable, a manufacturer must prove that there is no 
causal link between the incident and the damage suffered, or that the product complies with the requisite 
legislation. This is a form of objective liability since it arises as a result of a product being defective and not 
as a result of liability on the part of a manufacturer.  
Therefore, if damage is the result of a robotʼs non-compliance with the requisite legislation or 
malfunctioning on the part of said robot, protection will be accorded by the Directive, as implemented into 
national law.  
Using robots to carry out dangerous activities 
The discipline provided by the EU Directive flanks but does not substitute domestic legislation. If an 
injured party is unable to prove manufacturer liability, or if a manufacturer is able to exculpate itself, it is not 
the European Directive which is applicable but the domestic legislation of the Member State concerned. The 
rules in question are two:  




5. Article 2051 Civil Code concerning liability in the case of artefacts held in custody.
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 Article 2050 Italian Civil Code: “Whoever causes damage to others in conducting an activity which, by its nature or 
due to the means adopted in conducting said activity, may be considered dangerous, shall pay compensation for said 
damage if he cannot prove that he adopted all means necessary to avoid such damage”. (Or in the original Italian: 
“Chiunque cagiona danno ad altri nello svolgimento di unʼattività pericolosa, per sua natura o per la natura dei mezzi 
adoperati, è tenuto al risarcimento, se non prova di avere adottato tutte le misure idonee a evitare il danno.”). 
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Interpreted in light of the general system of the Code, the two rules represent two sides of the same 
coin: Article 2050 Civil Code concerns the dynamic moment – that in which a dangerous activity is performed 
– while Article 2051 Civil Code concerns the static moment – that in which it is the artefact itself which is 
relevant (Comporti, 2009). If damage is the result of a partyʼs action whilst carrying out an activity that 
involves the possibility of danger, Article 2050 applies, because the artefact is the tool of human activity. 
However, Article 2051 applies if damage is the direct result of the artefact, without there being any human 
intervention. 
Article 2050 offers full protection. It covers both conducting a dangerous activity as a continuative and 
repetitive series of events, and the execution of individual dangerous events, which may even be 
independent of, and uncoordinated with, each other. The decisive element is the action of a human being 
who is involved in operations which, by their very nature, or due to the tools used in their execution, may be 
considered dangerous. 
Article 2050 is mainly used with regard to liability of an entrepreneur in conducting dangerous 
activities. However, its area of application is not exclusively restricted to an entrepreneur, since the article 
does not provide for any restrictions. The rationale behind the article remains that of protecting third parties 
from damage resulting from certain types of activities, no matter whether or not such activities are conducted 
within the framework of entrepreneurial activity (Comporti, 2008). 
Articles 46–76 of Royal Decree no. 773/31
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 provides a list of activities which may be classified as 
ʻdangerousʼ. The list is not exhaustive and may also include other activities. The court must use notions of 
common sense to assess whether or not an activity is dangerous. An activity is considered to be dangerous 
when there is a great likelihood that it will cause severe and/or frequent damage, i.e. when there is a higher 
than normal likelihood that damage will result.
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 An example is activity conducted within the field of the 
production of explosives, gas cylinders or flammable substances. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
he can prove that such damage was the result of a fortuitous event.” (Or in the original Italian: “Ciascuno è responsabile 
del danno cagionato dalle cose che ha in custodia, salvo che provi il caso fortuito.”). 
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 Single Text: Public Security Legislation. 
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 “For the purposes of liability sanctioned by Art. 2050 Civil Code, not only activity taken into consideration for accident 
prevention or the protection of public safety, but also all other activity which, albeit not specifically indicated or regulated, 
is intrinsically dangerous or, in any case, depends on the method in which it is conducted or on the means used, shall be 
considered dangerous” (Supreme Court, Third Division, 20 July 1993, no. 8069, GC, 1994, 1037). (Or in the original 
Italian: “Ai fini della responsabilità sancita dallʼart. 2050 cod.civ. debbono esser ritenute pericolose, oltre alle attività 
prese in considerazione per la prevenzione infortuni o la tutela dellʼincolumità pubblica, anche tutte quelle altre che, pur 
non essendo specificate o disciplinate, abbiano tuttavia una pericolosità intrinseca o comunque dipendente dalle 
modalità di esercizio o dai mezzi di lavoro impiegati.”). 
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An injured party must prove that there is a causal link between the dangerous activity and the damage 
suffered. The damage must have been caused specifically by the activity, and not only have occurred during 
the activity.  
Article 2050 contains a provision for the party presumed liable to be able to disclaim liability: he must 
prove that he took all reasonable precautions to avoid damage (the so-called ʻtechnical eventʼ). The person 
conducting the dangerous activity must therefore demonstrate that he took all necessary precautions, in 
accordance with technical knowledge and experience, to avoid the damage typically arising from such 
activity – for example, posting danger signs, fencing and guarding the place where the activity is conducted 
and taking any action required by law in relation to that activity. Once again, the Court must assess the 
suitability of the measures taken. 
In the field of robotics examples of activities involving a high degree of risk are anti-personnel mine 
clearance and space missions. 
NASA is currently designing a robot astronaut named Robonaut2.
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 It is still in the prototype phase. It 
has several degrees of freedom and it is able to use the same tools as those used by human astronauts. 
These characteristics enable the robot to interact with the environment of space stations and the instruments 
contained within them. The robot does not need to be equipped with specialized tools. It currently has no 
legs and is mounted on a pedestal. A European robonaut, Justin, has been developed in Germany. It is 
operated remotely by an operator. Thanks to the robotʼs numerous sensors, the operator can work with 
maximum sensitivity. He can thus ʻremote controlʼ the robot from a control room on earth or in a space 
station, without exposing himself to the dangers of space. These robonauts are intended to complement 
rather than replace human astronauts (Oldani, 2010b). 
The humanoid form of these two robots is misleading, since they have actually been designed simply 
to perform the tasks for which they have been programmed (and, in the case of Justin, only under the direct 
supervision of a human operator). They can thus be placed in the first level of analysis, which concerns 
robots which do not require any special cognitive abilities or AI. The unusual activity for which robonauts are 
employed means that it will probably be quite some time before they are endowed with more complex 
cognitive capacities. The term was coined by John McCarty in 1956:  
It is the science and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer programs. 
It is related to the similar task of using computers to understand human intelligence, but AI does not have 
to confine itself to methods that are biologically observable. (McCarthy, 2007) 
Let us come back to the question of liability. Should a robot damage a third party during operations in 
 




 See http://robonaut.jsc.nasa.gov/default.asp.  
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space (e.g., further damaging a satellite instead of repairing it), it must be determined whether the robot was 
the instrument by means of which the dangerous activity was conducted or whether it was an ʻagentʼ in and 
of itself. There is a very thin dividing line between the scopes of application of Article 2050 and Article 2051 
and thus between the two forms of liability. They may, moreover, overlap.  
In the case of Justin, the robot is the instrument through which the operator conducts a dangerous 
activity, and it is completely guided by him. In order to avoid charges of strict liability the operator must prove 
that he took all due precautions, or that the damage was the result of product defect (and thus that the 
manufacturer is liable). 
There is another, less futuristic, area of application of Article 2050. It concerns a number of industrial 
activities in which robots have become indispensable auxiliaries for humans. One example is professional 
painting. This type of activity is classified as ʻdangerousʼ because high degrees of risk are involved (bruising, 
electric shock, compression, irritation and dermatitis, hearing loss). One type of robot used for painting is 
composed of a robotic arm mounted on a pedestal. At the end of its arm there is a paint spray gun. The 
operator programs the robot according to what type of piece is to be painted and then guides the robot 
manually through a joystick in a complete spraying cycle. The more advanced models are able to store the 
sequence of operations once the operator has guided them on a first sample piece. The robots can only be 
used by operators who have been properly trained to operate them. Managers are required to post warning 
signs (e.g., ʻdo not remove safety equipmentʼ, ʻdo not touch moving devices, ʻwear protective clothingʼ). 
Again, the operator will be liable for damage resulting from the conduction of dangerous activity, even when 
such activity would be performed by means of the robot. For example, he will be liable for damage caused by 
the robot falling as a result of him not checking the structure before use, or not going through the proper 
procedure in cases of emergency deriving from electrical power surges.
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Naturally, although I have analysed Article 2050 in relation to the basic level of robot autonomy 
(machines with no particular AI ability), it may also be applied to more complex situations, whenever there is 
an activity which may be classified as ʻdangerousʼ. 
Article 3:206 of the European Civil Code project covers liability for damage caused by dangerous 
substances or emissions. In this case, the regulation is more specific. The keeper is liable if  
...having regard to their quantity and attributes, at the time of the emission, or, failing an emission, at the 
time of contact with the substance it is very likely that the substance or emission will cause such damage 
unless adequately controlled, and the damage results from the realisation of that danger. (Von Bar, 2009) 
 




 In the field of employment law, contractual liability legislation may be applicable. Pursuant to Article 2087 Civil Code, 
an employer must guarantee appropriate safety conditions in the workplace in order to ensure that workers are physically 
and psychologically protected. 
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The keeper is not liable if he  
…does not keep the substance or operate the installation for purposes related to that personʼs trade, 
business or profession; or shows that there was no failure to comply with statutory standards of control of 
the substance or management of the installation. (Von Bar, 2009) 
 Although the heading of the article speaks of dangerous ʻartefactsʼ, interpretation of the article limits 
liability to the keeping of those substances only for purposes related to a personʼs trade, business or 
profession.  
Robots as artefacts: the keeperʼs liability 
The American Robonaut2 prototype is designed to work closely with astronauts, or to replace them in 
operations which are considered too risky to be undertaken by humans. However, it does not make 
autonomous decisions involving special AI skills. 
Damage to third parties resulting from action on the part of the robot is, in this case, not covered by 
Article 2050. Artcile 2051 comes into play since the robot may cause damage directly, without there being 
any human intervention. Liability, in this case, is attributed to the custodian of the artefact. ʻArtefactʼ is 
understood as being any mobile or stationary object or element. Majority doctrine and case-law tend to give 
such protection to all artefacts, whether they be dangerous or not, identifying danger as a quality that all 
artefacts may possess in certain circumstances. 
Under Article 2051 if damage derives from an inanimate object, it is the custodian of the artefact itself 
who is liable. He is accountable on the grounds of the simple fact that he is the custodian, regardless of 
whether or not he has been diligent in his conduct. One example may be that of a robot suddenly exploding. 
This generates a fire which spreads into the surrounding area. There are countless robots which have this 
level of liability – for example industrial machinery (including movable artefacts mounted on a pedestal and 
unable to move around autonomously) and domestic appliances. A specific level of AI is not required in 
these cases. 
A custodian does not have to be the owner or possessor of the artefact (although he is usually one 
and the same), but simply someone who, at that moment, is in control of the artefact, someone who is 
actually exercising power over it. He is also the person who could prevent damage at that moment. 
There must be a causal link between the artefact and the damage. The damage must be caused by 
the artefact itself, without it having been used as a tool by a human. It is sufficient to show that the harmful 
event occurred as a result of the normal condition of artefacts which are potentially harmful. 
The injured party must prove the event and the causal link with the artefact. The custodian may 
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provide evidence that damage was the result of a fortuitous event and thus avoid a charge of liability. The 
question of what exactly constitutes a fortuitous event is quite complex and it is left to the interpreter to 
assess whether or not an event is fortuitous. This question has been much debated among legal scholars. 
The event must be unpredictable and unavoidable.
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 An objective interpretation of a fortuitous event, as a 
condition entirely foreign to the sphere of the subject, is preferable (Comporti, 2008). In this case, too, the 
liability referred to is purely objective. It is considered to rest with the keeper regardless of his conduct, due 
to the simple fact that he is the custodian of the artefact which caused the damage. Similarly, the final proof 
by which he avoids a charge of liability does not refer to his conduct or guilt. 
There are two other causes of exclusion of liability, albeit not explicitly provided by the article. The first 
is an injured party causing damage through his own conduct. In this case it would be unjust to punish 
another person on the basis of objective liability, so-called self-responsibility. For example, if the victim was 
burned while trying to burn the robot, the keeper is not liable. The second is damage being caused by a third 
partyʼs conduct. The keeper would be cleared of objective liability in this case, since liability is attributed to 
the person who is actually responsible for the damage. In other words, the criterion of attribution of objective 
liability is used only when a criterion of subjective assessment of guilt cannot be used. These two cases are 
brought together by the courts into the single concept of fortuitous event, and they must therefore also meet 
the same requirements of extraneousness and unpredictability.
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 If these two requirements are not met, 
both the keeper and the third party will be found liable. 
Article 2051 does not apply, however, if the harmful event was caused not by the artefact, but with the 
artefact. In this case, the artefact is used as a mere instrument by man, but does not come within the field of 
dangerous activity regulated by Article 2050. One example is the surgical robot. The first robots used in 
surgery were “computer-controlled diagnostic tools used in operating rooms to help provide vital information 
through ultrasound, computer-aided tomography (CAT) and other imaging technologies” (Verrugio, 2007). 
Numerous further advances have recently been made in the field and the latest robots are used to operate 
on the patient directly. This kind of operation has many advantages for the patient, for example that it is 
minimally invasive and offers greater precision. 
Sofie is the name of a surgical robot which has been created in the Netherlands. It is the first surgical 
robot to provide the operator with a real sense of touch and pressure, as if he were operating himself 
(Invernizzi, 2010). Sofie is activated through a joystick that allows the operator to measure the pressure that 
he is excercising on that point and to consequently dose it correctly. Sofie is composed of a series of 
mechanical arms with surgical instruments at the ends. It is mounted on a pedestal and, because it is small, 
 




 Supreme Court Full Bench., November 11th, 1991, no 12019, GI, 1992, I, 1, 2218. 
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 Supreme Court  July 6th, 2006, no 15384, retrieved from www.personaedanno.it. 
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can be mounted directly on the operating table. Sofie is forecast to be on the market within the next five 
years. 
Let us imagine a situation in which something were to go wrong during an operation carried out by 
Sofie and the patient was consequently harmed. According to the prevailing case-law
172
, medical surgical 
activity is not considered dangerous and thus the above situation would not come within the bounds of Article 
2050.  
If the damage caused were due to a manufacturing defect in the robot, the manufacturer would be 
responsible, according to the scheme shown in paragraph 2. Such cases have actually already occurred 
(Roland Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hospital and v. Intuitive Surgical Inc., (D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00296) District 
Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 15, 2010) (Carreyrou, 
2010). One involved the robot Da Vinci, named after the famous Italian artist and inventor. Composed of a 
number of arms it was similar in structure to Sofie. In 2004, the Da Vinci became blocked during an 
operation, and the patient subsequently complained of erectile dysfunction. The patient sued the 
manufacturer on the grounds that the robot had malfunctioned. The court, however, ruled that he had failed 
to prove that his complaint had been caused by the robot malfunctioning. He did not submit any expert 
reports and could not prove that the robot had a defect from the perspective of strict product liability theory. 
His secondary claim of negligence was also dismissed on the grounds that he had given no proof of a causal 
link. 
If damage were to occur despite the robot functioning perfectly, it would be the surgeon in control of 
the robot who would be liable (for example should a doctor not be sufficiently qualified to use such a 
sophisticated robot during an operation), according to the general framework of non-contractual liability 








 A leading case, Supreme Court Third Division, no. 3011 of 28 September 1968, reads: “Art. 2050 Civil Code concerns 
dangerous activities in general and does not apply to those for which the Legislator has specifically provided, and thus 
those activities which are performed by the professional (doctor-surgeon) on behalf of his client fall exclusively within the 
ambit of Art. 2236 Civil Code and any presumption of guilt is extraneous to them”. (Or in the original Italian: “L'art. 2050 
cod. civ. concerne genericamente le attivita pericolose e non si applica a quelle per le quali il legislatore ha provveduto 
specificamente, sicche la attivita che formi oggetto della prestazione dovuta dal professionista (medico-chirurgo) al 
proprio cliente ricade esclusivamente nell'ambito dell'art. 2236 cod. civ., cui e estranea ogni presunzione di colpa.”). See 
http://www.italgiure.giustizia.it/.  
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 Article 2043 Civil Code concerns non-contractual liability and provides that any person who causes harm to others is 
liable for damages. The conduct may be intentional or negligent, but is, in any case, conscious. Other forms of 
accountability may also be involved. It is a constant finding of the courts that a practitioner must observe the diligence 
required by his/her profession (Art. 1176 Civil Code). 
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There is no specific article in the European Civil Code project which covers keeper liability. However, 
Article 3:207 states that “a person is also accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage if national 
law so provides where it […] relates to a source of danger which is not within Articles 3:104–3:205” (Von Bar, 
2009) 
In conclusion, depending on the conduct of a robot and its level of interaction with humans, liability will 
be regulated in Italian law according to the liability for dangerous activities, liability for keeping artefacts, or 
general tort. 
Locomotion. Robots considered as animals 
We can now move on to the next level of robotic capacity: locomotion. The level of complexity of a 
robot increases when it is equipped with the means to move. Even should a robot act according to a set 
program, and therefore in a predictable manner, the fact that it can move, at various levels of autonomy, 
gives rise to the need for more caution (and, above all, the need for greater supervision). The robot could 




 is a first generation indoor cleaner robot, 5 million of which have already been sold. It 
consists of a disc that moves around the house, continually turning on itself and sucking in dust (the second 
generation Scooba also washes floors). It has an internal mapping system that enables it to record the area 
to be cleaned and not to go over the same area more than three times, unless an area is particularly dirty. 
Thanks to its sensors, it can get between furniture and under tables, recognise corners and move along 
walls, and recognise and avoid stairs and other areas where there is the danger that it might fall. Its 
programming system allows a time to be set for machine action and, when its battery is dead it comes back 
to its station to recharge. 
In itself a Roomba is a harmless object of use in all homes. However, let us imagine a situation in 
which the front door is inadvertently left open and the Roomba goes out and takes a stroll along the hallway 
of the building. It could trip up a neighbour loaded down with shopping or children while they are running up 
the stairs. The Roomba has done nothing other than execute the function for which it was designed: to move 
across the available area for the purposes of cleaning it.  
Its ability to move around and travel to other places without any human intervention means that this 
type of robot is similar to an animal. In fact, the courts generally apply Article 2051 only to immobile things 
 




 See http://www.irobot.com/.  
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(steps, roads) or to artefacts which, albeit mobile, are anchored to the ground or fixed on a pedestal, such as 
cranes or escalators. The thing in custody may also have no internal energy (Diurni, A. et al., 2008). The 
Roomba differs in that it can move freely in the surrounding area according to its internal program. It seems 
unlikely that it can be treated as a crane or escalator. Both a crane and an escalator, although endowed with 
the skill of locomotion, repeat a series of actions created by an operator and within a limited area. 
When a Roomba goes out of a door, it may be compared to an animal which is lost or escapes from 
the control of its owner. Article 2052 could therefore be applied.
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 This covers liability for damage caused by 
an animal. If, as it is moving around freely, a Roomba causes damage to third parties, the person who was 
using the robot at that moment – the custodian – is liable. The custodian is also liable in this case on the 
grounds of the mere de facto relationship (ownership or use) between him and the robot. Naturally, there 
must also be a causal link between the conduct of the robot and the harmful event. 
If it can be proved that the incident occurred because of a fortuitous event, liability can be avoided. In 
the case of the Roomba, such a fortuitous event could be a door which is left open as a result of unforeseen 
or inevitable circumstances, such as would be the case if a house had been burgled or if a door handle was 
faulty. In this case, too, the conduct of a victim (for example, a child tries to climb on top of a Roomba, falls 
and hurts himself) and the conduct of a third party may be equated with a fortuitous event, if they are 
unforeseeable and unavoidable. The possibility to foresee and avoid the harmful event will be assessed on a 
case by case basis. 
From the standpoint of legal consequences, there is no substantial difference between the liability of 
the keeper (Article 2051) and that of the guardian/owner of an animal. In both cases, liability is independent 
of a subjective assessment of the conduct of the person indicated in the article and only if damage was the 
result of a fortuitous event can liability be avoided. The only difference is identification of the liable party. 
Article 2052 is more specific in this regard. The party may be not just the keeper but also the user. However, 
although the owner/operator is also generally the keeper of the animal, the reverse is not always true. The 
owner may assign the animal to a third party, who thus becomes the user. In this case liability rests primarily 
with the owner, on the basis of the fact that the owner has dominion over the animal. The user will be liable 
only for the time during which he uses the animal, and only if he uses the animal for his own purposes and 
not for those of the owner (Comporti, 2008). One grey area in the scope of protection could be the problem 
 




 Article 2052 Italian Civil Code: “The owner of an animal or anyone using it for a certain period is liable for damage 
caused by the animal, whether the animal was in his custody, had disappeared or had fled, unless he can prove that a 
fortuitous event occurred.” (Or in the original Italian: “Il proprietario di un animale o chi se ne serve per il tempo in cui lʼha 
in uso, è responsabile dei danni cagionati dallʼanimale, sia che fosse sotto custodia, sia che fosse smarrito o fuggito, 
salvo che provi il caso fortuito.”). 
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of identifying the real user.
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Damage must be caused directly by the animal without there being any human intervention. If this 
should not be the case, liability is assessed on the basis of Article 2043 Civil Code.  
Lastly, damage must be due to a behavioural characteristic of the animal, either instinctive or rational. 
With a little interpretational effort, the Roomba example can fit into this category (its typical characteristic is 
precisely that of being able to move over surfaces, turning by itself, due to its internal mapping system). 
AIBO and hexapods 
There are also robots which are designed with the specific aim of emulating real animals, in both 
appearance and behaviour. This interesting development is useful in order to break away from the level of 
ʻartefactsʼ and move increasingly towards the study of robots with adaptive capabilities. Animals can be 
taken as a point of connection with, and transition between, the category of artefacts, which lack any form of 
intelligence, even Artificial Intelligence, and that of humans, who possess not only intelligence but also 
consciousness. 
The most famous animal-shaped robot in the world is AIBO
177
 (Artificial Intelligence roBOt), developed 
by Sony and available on the market between 1999 and 2006. Production was discontinued in 2006 because 
of  insufficient sales and high production costs (around $ 2.500). AIBO is shaped like a dog and can 
reproduce a lot of canine behaviour: “it has instincts to look for its toys, to satisfy curiosity, to play with its 
owner, to self charge when its battery is low and to wake up when it has had enough sleep or been 
scheduled to do so”.
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 It is equipped with cameras and sensors for the recognition of verbal commands. 
Thanks to these tools, it is able to interact with its surroundings as if it were a real animal. Its face is a display 
showing lit-up LEDS. Any combination of a LED and a colour corresponds to an emotion or feeling. It works 
on AIBOware, software developed by Sony and then handed over to the open source community for non-
commercial purposes in response to numerous requests from customers. Thanks to this development kit, 
many people have been able to modify and customise the code of their AIBO and several universities have 
used it as a platform for Artificial Intelligence studies. In addition, through interaction with its owner, an AIBO 
 




 The prevailing position of the Courts (see, especially, Supreme Court, February 16 2000 no 1712 in Nuova Giur. Civ. 
Comm., 2000, I, p. 625) is that an animal being used without the consent of its owner or when having been taken from 
him without his consent does not constitute a fortuitous event. In these cases liability is still illogically and inconsistently  
attributed to the owner. 
177
 See http://support.sony-europe.com/aibo/index.asp. 
178
 See http://www.electronicpets.org/sony-aibo-ers7~p14.html. 
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evolves from a puppy to an adult dog. The robot puppy will thus go through many different stages of 
behaviour, up to full development with recognition of more than 100 verbal commands. 
In this field, biomimetic robots, like hexapods, used to explore unknown environments, are extremely 
interesting. The inspiration for hexapods comes from insects and their relatively simple nervous system 
compared to that of other creatures. Such robots have six legs which are very flexible and allow them to 
walk. They have adaptive capabilities which allow them to retain their ability to walk, after recalibrating their 
equilibrium, even if one or more legs becomes disabled. Thanks to this ability to recalibrate equilibrium, a 
hexapod can withstand damage resulting from external attack. 
At this level we can now speak of a capacity for adaptation – the ability of a subject to adapt its 
behaviour to the surrounding environment in order to ensure its survival on the basis of experience gained 
through the interaction itself. Such an ability requires the skill to understand the environment and modify 
behaviour according to said environment. Adaptive capacity is therefore a component of intelligence. 
The liability involved in the use of a AIBO or hexapod seems even more similar to the liability of the 
owner of an animal under Article 2052, all the more so since these new adaptive and learning skills derive 
directly from the type of programming carried out by the user and may lead to ʻconductʼ not programmed in 
detail either by the manufacturer or by the user who has programmed them in a certain way. 
Article 3:203 of the European Civil Code project states that the keeper of an animal is liable for any 
damage caused by the animal, thus avoiding any distinction between user, possessor or owner. Again, the 
European Civil Code project resembles Italian law very closely. 
Can learning robots be considered as children? Tutor liability and robot capability 
The final level of capacity of robots which have so far been developed involves a real form of learning 
and development of problem-solving skills. This is the last frontier for research projects which study the 
development of cognitive skills in robots. The neural processes of the brain are reproduced through artificial 
neural networks and learning algorithms. Such robots are able to have ʻnewʼ reactions and to learn new skills 
through their own direct experience. Such actions/reactions were not originally intended by the programmer. 
He/she simply added the algorithm for their learning. What follows, a greater or lesser ability to take action, 
or the behavioural ʻchoicesʼ of the robot, cannot be entirely predicted at the outset. We are still most certainly 
in the field of unpredictable action which depends on the type of programming carried out and, thus, 
indirectly, on the programmer, as if such robots were children that have been guided by their parents and 
who react on the basis of the education received (Marino & Tamburrini, 2006). 
Chiara Boscarato 
410 
iCub considered as a scholar 
One clear example of such robots is iCub.
179
 This is a humanoid robot developed by the IIT Centre of 
Genoa. This is an open source project funded by the European Commission and used by more than 20 
laboratories worldwide. 
iCub is about the size of a three-year old child and simulates the movements and learning abilities of a 
child of that age. This is an extremely challenging project, in terms of robotics. The robotʼs humanoid body 
has 53 degrees of freedom; its hands have complete powers of manipulation; its head and eyes are fully 
articulated. Thanks to its cameras and sensors, it has visual, auditory and sensory (tactile sensing with 
objects) skills and also has a sense of balance. It can crawl and sit and make several ʻfacialʼ expressions 
(Oldani, 2010a). 
The aim of the project is to construct a robot with cognitive skills, which is able to rework data acquired 
through its own experience and which will become an useful tool in a two-way study (from man to machine 
and vice versa) of cognitive systems. The key aspect of the project is its aim to develop a learning machine, 
based on knowledge of human behaviour and the human mind. The approach is thus multidisciplinary, 
involving a team of experts in robotics, bioengineering and neuroscience. At the current stage of the project, 
the robot can feel and pick up objects such as small balls. This action, taken for granted with regard to 
humans (such a movement is directed by the brain in humans), may seem banal but the movement requires 
a precise amount of force and pressure. The challenge is to create a robot capable of learning from its 
mistakes and learning from experiences, step by step so that it eventually makes the right move, just like a 
child. The final result will be a machine which can simulate human mental processes by means of complex 
algorithms installed in its software (Bompani, 2009). For example, after being instructed how to hold a bow 
and release an arrow, it learns by itself how to shoot an arrow and hits the centre of the target after only eight 
tries (Kormushev et al., 2010). 
This project does not attempt to revive the old concept of strong AI. According to this line of thought, a 
machine that is able to reproduce and even surpass human intelligence can be created. This concept is 
based on the famous Turing test (Turing, 1950), or ʻthe imitation gameʼ. The basic version of the game 
involves a man, a woman and a interrogator, all of them in different rooms. The interrogator should be able to 
guess, through a series of questions, which of the two competitors is the man and which the woman. Alan 
Turing assumes a situation in which one of the two competitors is replaced by a machine. Does the 
interrogatorʼs win percentage considerably change? If the results are similar the thinking machine can be 
equated to humans. In Turing's opinion, the skill of thinking defines a machine as intelligent. In general, 
strong AI assumes that the machine is acting as if it had a mind. Since the 1980's – also because of the 
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failure of those projects which have attempted to obtain strong AI and the success of cognitive science as a 
discipline – new projects relating to AI have been focusing on individual defined problems, i.e. the execution 
of certain industrial activities. Machines building on this principle can only simulate (aspects of) the cognitive 
processes of the human (weak AI), and therefore it can only operate in a similar manner to the behaviour of 
humans (Floridi, 1999). iCub responds to this second conception. 
The aims of the project are that the iCub will be able to learn new skills, behaviour and concepts. The 
ʻinfantʼ could be the cornerstone for a new generation of robots. When this point is reached, who will be liable 
for damage caused by the robot as a result of this new behaviour? 
The most appropriate legislation would seem to be that of Article 2048
180
, which concerns the liability 
of parents, guardians, tutors and teachers of crafts. The first paragraph concerns parental liability in the case 
of damage caused by the unlawful acts of a minor living with his/her parents. It is the second paragraph 
which is important. This stipulates that tutors and those who teach a craft or art are liable for damage caused 
by the unlawful acts of their students and trainees when the latter are under their supervision. 
In this case, liability is not objective, since it is not established by the mere fact that one is the teacher 
(preceptor) of the agent (Comporti, 2002). Instead, liability rests with the guardian on the grounds that he/she 
(supposedly) neglected the child, in terms of both culpa in educando and culpa in vigilando. No longer does 
the mere fact of having a de facto relationship with the perpetrator of damage give rise to liability (as would 
be the case with a keeper) – on the contrary, there is no presumption of guilt, but only a presumption of 
liability. This approach greatly benefits the victim, who is not required to prove the guilt of the parties 
involved. 
A tutor may be exempt from liability only if he/she can prove that he/she could not prevent the incident 
occurring (thus we cannot speak of objective liability). 
This kind of liability presupposes the freedom to move and act and seems best suited to regulating the 
harmful consequences of harmful events caused by robots such as iCub (when the project is completed). It 
is interesting to note that this set of rules relating to liability presupposes a certain level of material ability in 
 




 Article 2048 Italian Civil Code: “Tutors and those who teach a craft or art are responsible for damage caused by 
unlawful acts of their students and apprentices in the time they are under their supervision. The persons referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs shall be released from liability only if they prove not to have been able to prevent the fact.” (Or in 
the original Italian: “Il padre e la madre, o il tutore, sono responsabili del danno cagionato dal fatto illecito dei figli minori 
non emancipati (314 e seguenti, 301, 390 e seguenti) o delle persone soggette alla tutela (343 e seguenti, 414 e 
seguenti), che abitano con essi. La stessa disposizione si applica all'affiliante. I precettori e coloro che insegnano un 
mestiere o un'arte sono responsabili del danno cagionato dal fatto illecito dei loro allievi e apprendisti (2130 e seguenti) 
nel tempo in cui sono sotto la loro vigilanza. Le persone indicate dai commi precedenti sono liberate dalla responsabilità 
soltanto se provano di non avere potuto impedire il fatto.”). 
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the agent (minor or learning robot), and, thus, of legal subjectivity. Anyone who thinks that legal reasoning is 
rushing too far ahead must consider another example of cutting-edge robots. 
Nao as an ethical being 
Nao (developed by the French company Aldebaran Robotics
181
) is a humanoid robot created for the 
purpose of carrying out functions of assistance. Apart from its skill of being able to communicate with its 
owner, who may thus teach it new behaviour, and its participation in the RoboCup
182
, Nao is a very special 
robot since it is the first one into which an ethical code has been inserted. Its designers have inserted, in an 
automatic learning algorithm, a series of situations which present ethical problems and their correct solution. 
Actions are classified on the basis of three principles: beneficence, non-maleficence, and fairness. On the 
basis of ethical choices preloaded by the programmer, which show how it must act in a certain standard 
situation, the robot obtains a general rule of ethical conduct. The robot is thus able to independently assess 
the situation based on this new scale of values and to therefore make the right decision. The robotʼs scope of 
use is hospital care. The robot will deal with patients, starting from the standard three situations:  
1. Reminding a patient to take his/her drugs but not interfering with his/her refusal to do so unless 
such a refusal could lead to serious consequences for the patientʼs health;  
2. Deciding who will use the TV remote control, and  
3. Delivering food to a patient.  
If these three situations all occur at the same time, Nao can also make an independent assessment of 
priority, always based on the three ethical principles above (Anderson and Anderson, 2010). 
The existence of Nao opens up new scenarios of interplay between robotics, ethics and the law. If a 
code of ethics can be installed in robots, then it should be a specific responsibility of manufacturers to install 
that code of ethics in machines which are capable of taking independent decisions. If a manufacturer does 
not do so, it cannot prove that it could not have avoided a harmful event occurring. A user may also be 
required to install a code of ethics and conduct, if a robot is equipped with a program which may be managed 
by a user. Failure to install such codes may be equated with failure to supervise. In any case, these kinds of 
liability being understood, it must be recognised that producers, owners and users are increasingly taking on 
the role of external controller of an entity that has ever more autonomy. 
 




 See http://www.aldebaran-robotics.com/eng/Nao.php.  
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 Robocup is an international robotics competition founded in 1997. The aim is to develop autonomous soccer robots 
with the intention of promoting research and education in the field of Artificial Intelligence. The name RoboCup is a 
contraction of the competitionʼs full name, ʻRobot Soccer World Cupʼ, but there are many other stages of the competition 
such as ʻSearch and Rescueʼ and ʻRobot Dancingʼ. See http://www.robocup.org/.  
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Conclusions 
It may be said that the traditional categories of Italian law regarding tort are strong enough to cope 
with any problems arising through the use not only of traditional robots but also of these new forms of 
Artificial Intelligence which are at various stages of development. Legal situations that arise from the use of 
different types of robot are very similar and can be handled with the traditional categories of Italian tort law. 
When the cognitive abilities of robots acquire a certain level of development, the creation of an ad hoc 
system of laws may be required. The lowest level of liability is the least specific and is applicable to all types 
of robots. It includes manufacturer liability for product defects and the liability of a custodian of the artefact 
concerned. The liability of those who cause damage by using the robot to perform a dangerous activity is 
transversal to these two types of liability.  
At a second level there is the similarity between robots and animals. This similarity stems from the 
robotsʼ ability to move freely and the emergence of the first adaptive capacities of development and learning. 
The final level concerns the extraordinary capacity for learning and problem solving of the more sophisticated 
robots. They may be considered veritable human ʻpuppiesʼ of man, increasingly similar to us, which we have 
to educate and train using principles of ethics and conduct. 
Having ruled out direct liability of the robot, the cases analysed thus far are all cases of liability 
attributed to other subjects. At the current level of development it is pointless to punish robots directly, since 
they do not have the tools with which to understand and develop their own sense of responsibility. 
Completely equating a robot to a human being would mean continuing to focus on the old concept of strong 
Artificial Intelligence, a concept which was abandoned in the 1980s.  
Robots, however, are no longer simple mechanical objects. In the not too distant future everyone will 
have a ʻpersonal robotʼ, just as almost everyone now has a personal computer. Today it is virtually 
unthinkable to leave the house without your mobile phone, or travel without GPS. Such devices are simple 
but they will continue to develop exponentially. Unbeknown to us, robots are entering all areas of our lives. It 
is not inconceivable that, sooner or later, they will be given a minimum of subjectivity and ad hoc legal status. 
The degree of legal liability to be attributed to robots directly depends on the level of legal subjectivity they 
may be given. Numerous issues will arise – from an ethical point of view, what are artificial consciousness 
and artificial freedom, and when may they be attributed? From a legal standpoint, what would be the most 
appropriate legal response to a robot being attributed a certain degree of liability? The remedy of 
autonomous compensation, for example, appears to be rather vague. Another legal issue that arises, and 
which would be worth studying in depth, concerns the specific role of software, not covered by the Directive 
on product liability. Although this vision may now seem rather futuristic and virtually unattainable, it is highly 
likely that it will actually come to pass. The relationship between man and machine is becoming increasingly 
closer, above all in the medical, rehabilitation and care sectors. Knowledge about the human brain and 
cognitive development are being used to create robots with ever more sophisticated and responsive Artificial 
Intelligence. At the same time, studies on the development of cognitive robots could be useful in better 
understanding the functioning of the human brain. 
At the present state of the art in robotics civil liability arising from a robot's actions can be asserted 
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only on the basis of the above legislation. It must, however, be borne in mind that robots which can move, 
reason and find solutions to problems are being born ... and are growing. 
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Abstract In the field of Law & Technology, scholars investigate the legal and regulatory 
consequences of the advent of new technologies, for example with respect to ICTs, 
biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, or neurotechnologies. It is important to investigate 
whether technological developments in these fields require adjustments in existing legal 
frameworks, and whether technological developments themselves need to be regulated. 
Moreover, in Law & Technology scholars also investigate the ways in which technological 
artefacts can be used to regulate. This is called ʻtechno-regulationʼ.   
This paper has two goals. First, I will analyse the concept of techno-regulation and 
propose that it needs to be broadened. Techno-regulation focuses on the intentional 
influencing of human behaviour through the implementation of values, norms and rules 
into technological artefacts. However, extensive research in various disciplines has 
revealed that the design (shape, form, functionality) of technological artefacts greatly 
affects usersʼ tacit and implicit responses to these artefacts. Since this has direct 
relevance to the theme of regulation, I propose to widen the reach of techno-regulation by 
speaking of ʻtechno-elicitationʼ instead.  
In the second part of this paper, I focus my discussion of techno-regulation and techno-
elicitation on the design of robots, which is relatively uncharted territory in the field of Law 
& Technology. 
Keywords robots, techno-regulation, techno-elicitation, social responses, philosophy of 
design 
Introduction 
In the previous decades Law & Technology has become an established domain of legal 
scholarship. This field builds on the realisation that the advent and proliferation of new 
technologies has an impact on existing legal systems, and affects central (regulatory) values 
in societies. Hence, technological developments require a response from regulators and legal 
scholars. In order to find out precisely what response is needed – which of course varies from 
one technology to the next, and from one institutional, legal and economic system to the next 
– Law & Technology asks questions such as: What is the impact of technological 
developments on existing forms of regulation and (bodies of) law? Should the development of 
new technologies, for example information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
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biotechnologies, or nanotechnologies, be regulated, and if so, in which ways, or through 
which means?  
The field of Law & Technology has two main areas of focus: the regulation of 
technologies, and regulation through technologies. I will discuss these in turn. 
Regulation of technologies 
The majority of research in Law & Technology focuses on the question of whether new 
technologies require changes to existing legal frameworks, and/or whether the development 
and proliferation of these new technologies raises new legal problems. Each new technology 
raises new sets of behaviours, new risks, and new practices of use, and hence legal scholars 
and governing bodies must investigate whether the use or application of such technologies 
has consequences that may fall outside existing legal frameworks. The scope of this area of 
research is vast. To give a few examples, it ranges from studying the effects of the use of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) on citizensʼ privacy, to studying the 
validity and reach of intellectual property law and patent law in light of the advent of 
biotechnologies, to investigating the legal consequences of applying neurotechnologies and 
technologies for human enhancement in various social domains. In all cases researchers 
focusing on the regulation of technologies ask the following questions: 
1. What are the effects, risks, opportunities and dangers resulting from the advent 
of new technologies, both in direct and in more indirect (or implicit) senses? 
2. In which ways, and to which degrees, do existing legal frameworks provide 
sufficient protection against the possible problems, risks and dangers that may 
arise in the slipstream of these developments? 
3. If legal frameworks are found to provide insufficient protection in one or more 
areas, then how can these frameworks be adjusted, so as to solve the problem? 
4. And finally, especially in the case of technological developments that are 
considered inherently dangerous or risky, should the development of specific 
technologies as such be regulated, or the institutional or organisational 
environment into which they will enter, so as to ensure as safe an application as 
possible?  
Asking and answering these questions, it is important to note, is always, and 
principally, a contextual enterprise. As Bert-Jaap Koops writes: 
Questions of technology regulation always have to take into account the location both of 
the technology and regulatory attempts, so that relevant socio-cultural, legal, economic, 
and institutional factors associated with that place can be factored in. (Koops, 2008, p. 
314) 
Who is responsible for a robotʼs actions? 
419 
Regulation through technologies 
As said, the majority of scholars in the field of Law & Technology study questions 
surrounding the regulation of technologies. Increasingly, however, a second domain of focus 
is gaining prominence: that of regulation through technologies. Lawrence Lessig has famously 
argued that technologies can also be used to regulate, i.e. to steer and guide the behaviour of 
individuals (Lessig, 2006). This has come to be known as ʻdesign-based regulationʼ 
(Brownsword & Yeung, 2008) or ʻtechno-regulationʼ (Brownsword, 2008; Leenes, 2010). 
Techno-regulation studies the ways in which technologies can be used as regulatory tools 
(Brownsword & Yeung, 2008), i.e. as a means to influence the behaviours of individuals by 
implementing regulatory values, norms and standards into technological devices (Koops, 
2008). Note that for scholars in Law & Technology ʻregulationʼ relates to the intentional 
influencing of human behaviour. This means that techno-regulation, to them, revolves around 
the ways in which regulators – be they governments or industry or any other party – may 
attempt to evoke behaviours in regulatees through the intentional implementation of norms 
and standards into technological artefacts. Below I will question this exclusive focus on 
intentional influencing. For now, however, letʼs look at some examples of techno-regulation to 
shed light on its meaning and role in various social contexts. 
One of the most oft-cited examples of techno-regulation is that of the use of speed 
bumps in traffic (Brownsword, 2008; Latour, 1992; Leenes, 2010; Yeung, 2008). Speed 
bumps are only one means of ensuring that drivers will adhere to a designated maximum 
speed in a certain area. Regulators can also choose to use traffic signs to the same end. 
However, the use of a speed bump regulates the driverʼs speed in a much more direct, and 
binding, way: a speed bump leaves much less room for being ʻdisobedientʼ than using traffic 
signs. After all, driving over a speed bump at high speed is physically uncomfortable and may 
damage the driverʼs car. Driving past a traffic sign at high speed does not affect the driver 
directly in this way. Hence, when using a speed bump chances are that drivers will be much 
more inclined to adhere to the traffic rules than when using a traffic sign. By design and 
through design speed bumps encourage drivers to stay within the speed limits set by a 
regulator. 
Another example of techno-regulation is that of the use of DVD region codes. DVDs, 
Leenes writes “generally contain various mechanisms of Digital Rights Management, which 
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define what a user can and cannot do with the DVD”
183
 (Leenes, 2010, p. 11). Media 
industries have divided the globe into nine different regions, so that DVDs can be marketed 
with different content, for different prices, and with different release dates in each region 
(Leenes, 2010). DVDs that work in one region, say Europe (region 2), will not play on DVD 
players in another, say the US (region 1), and vice versa. This is a clear example of regulation 
through technology – the software in the machine, and the code on the disc, jointly ensure 
that viewers can only watch those DVDs they are ʻallowedʼ to watch, according to the 
industryʼs regulatory plans. Leenes writes: “The technology enforces adherence to the rules 
by means of the software that is implemented into the machine. The enforcement is (almost) 
perfect.” (Leenes, 2010, p. 11) 
These two examples show that techno-regulation focuses on implementing rules, 
values, norms and standards into the architecture, or code in the case of software, of the 
artefact itself, thus ensuring that obeiance to laws and regulations is obtained. Morgan and 
Yeung write: “code-based (or architecture-based) techniques [seek] to eliminate undesirable 
behaviour by designing out the possibility for its occurrence” (Morgan & Yeung, 2007, p. 102). 
Or in the words of Brownsword:  
…techno-regulation […] functions in such a way that regulatees have no choice at all but 
to act in accordance with the desired regulatory pattern – it is the difference, for example, 
between systems that make it physically impossible to exit the Underground (or Metro) 
without a valid ticket and low level barriers that make it more difficult (but not impossible) 
to do so… (Roger Brownsword, cited in Morgan & Yeung, 2007, p. 103) 
Note that not just the specific form of regulation implemented into a technological 
artefact, but also the level of regulability as such is a design choice: “Different code makes 
differently regulable [technologies]. Regulability is thus a function of design.” (Lessig, 2006, p. 
34) 
Techno-elicitation: Widening the reach of Law & Technology 
In the previous section I argued that scholars in the field of techno-regulation focus 
primarily on the intentional influencing of human behaviour through the design of 
technologies. This applies, first and foremost, to those investigating the ways in which 
 




 Translated by the author. 
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technologies can/ought to be regulated, but also to those focusing on techno-regulation.
184
 In 
itself this is not surprising. After all, lawyers and regulators seek to find ways to explicitly 
channel behaviour, to keep it within the boundaries of the law. Therefore, ʻregulationʼ, to legal 
scholars, means “the intentional influencing of someoneʼs or somethingʼs behaviour” (Koops, 
2008). What this entails, however, is that unintentional forms of influencing, which may arise 
for example as a side-effect in the design of technologies, or forms of influencing that may 
steer individuals in more implicit ways, largely fall outside the scope of (techno-)regulation 
research.  
To my mind, this omission is unfortunate, and in this paper I will explain why this is so. I 
argue that it would be good to increase the scope of research on techno-regulation beyond 
intentional influencing alone, because human behaviour is often strongly shaped, steered and 
affected in more subtle, implicit, and even unconscious ways by technological artefacts as 
well. Over the past decades a significant corpus of research in different disciplines, including 
engineering, computer science, human-computer interaction (HCI), human-robot interaction 
(HRI), science and technology studies (SST), and philosophy of technology, has consistently 
shown just how ubiquitous and important the unintended, implicit and automatic elicitation of 
human behaviours is in relation to technological artefacts. Technologies have been shown to 
have ʻpersuasive powersʼ (Fogg, 2003), which sometimes may be designed into them 
explicitly, but sometimes also operate in more subtle ways. Moreover, technologies contain 
ʻscriptsʼ (Akrich, 1992; Gjøen & Hård, 2002; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999; Oudshoorn & 
Pinch, 2003; Oudshoorn, Rommes, & Stienstra, 2004; Van den Berg, 2008, 2010), which 
delineate their use space, and invite certain types of behaviour, while constraining others 
(Hildebrandt, 2008a, 2008b; Latour, 1992; Winner, 1980). Or in different terms, technologies 
ʻaffordʼ certain actions, and restrict other behaviours, and hence implictly shape the 
behaviours of users (Gaver, 1991, 1996; Gibson, 1986; McGrenere & Ho, 2000).  
Whatʼs more, research has also shown that human beings have strong tendencies to 
ʻanthropomorphiseʼ technologies (Bartneck, Kulic, Croft, & Zoghbi, 2009; Duffy, 2003; Nass, 
Steuer, Tauber, & Reeder, 1993; Turkle, 1984), to ascribe intentions and agency to these 
inanimate objects. This applies even to quite ʻsimpleʼ artefacts, which do not display complex 
 




 While legal scholars writing on techno-regulation often acknowledge explicitly that technological 
artefacts may also unintentionally, subtly, and implicitly regulate human behaviour as well (see for 
example Brownsword, 2008; Leenes, 2010; Yeung, 2008), their work focuses on the intentional 
influencing of human behaviour through design. 
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or very varied patterns of behaviour. One of the most famous examples to show how easy it is 
to invoke a tendency to anthropomorphise in humans is Joseph Weizenbaumʼs computer 
program ELIZA, which mimicked the behaviours of a Rogerian psychoanalyst (Weizenbaum, 
1966). ELIZA consisted of a simple textual interface, through which individuals could 
ʻconverseʼ with this virtual therapist. The program used a limited set of conversion rules to 
turn usersʼ phrases into questions, thus invoking the idea that the ʻtherapistʼ followed up on 
whatever they shared with a next question. Weizenbaum was shocked to find out how 
convincing his program turned out to be, i.e. how strongly users anthropomorphised this 
simple software program. He said: 
I was startled to see how quickly and very deeply people conversing with [ELIZA] became 
emotionally involved with the computer and how unequivocally they anthropomorphized it. 
Once my secretary, who had watched me work on the program for many months and 
therefore surely knew it to be merely a computer program, started conversing with it. After 
only a few interchanges with it she asked me to leave the room. Another time, I suggested 
I might rig the system so that I could examine all the conversations anyone had had with 
it, say, overnight. I was promptly bombarded with accusations that what I proposed 
amounted to spying on peopleʼs most intimate thoughts; clear evidence that people were 
conversing with the computer as if it were a person who could be appropriately and 
usefully addressed in intimate terms. (Joseph Weizenbaum, quoted in Kerr, 2004, p. 305) 
Note that it is not just computer technologies that easily evoke anthropomorphisation. 
Philosopher of technology Don Ihde reminds us that at times we also tend to ʻanimateʼ cars, 
almost approaching them as if they are a kind of ʻspirited horseʼ, and that we ʻcompeteʼ with 
virtual characters in video games as if they were real others (Ihde, 1990; also see Verbeek, 
2005).  
Yet another branch of research has shown that, at times, we even respond to 
technological artefacts in social and emotional ways (Breazeal, 2002; Dautenhahn, 2007; 
Dautenhahn, Bond, Canamero, & Edmonds, 2002; Picard, 1997; Turkle, 2007). This has led 
to a number of research initiatives investigating what exactly triggers such social or emotional 
responses to machines in humans – not only to, for example robots, but also to computers 
and televisions. Quite contrary to what one might expect Reeves and Nassʼ extensive 
research in this domain consistenly reveals that humans, in fact, need only very minimal cues 
to invoke them. Even machines that do not even remotely look human (e.g., ordinary desktop 
computers), or display complicated behaviours (e.g., relatively simple software programs) 
evoke basic social mechanisms, such as a sense of politeness or of teamwork in users 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996).  
Over the years, many explanations have been given for all of these implicit human 
responses to technological artefacts. Most often, these tendencies are explained by referring 
to our speciesʼ evolutionary ʻsocial hardwiringʼ: because we are social, emotional beings 
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through and through, we automatically use our repertoire of social and emotional responses 
in our interactions with technological artefacts (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 
1994; Picard, 1997; Reeves & Nass, 1996).  
What this vast body of research from various disciplines consistently shows, then, is 
that through their design technological artefacts may influence the behaviours of human 
beings in a variety of subtle, and implicit ways. This is relevant to those interested in techno-
regulation as well. While users may sometimes be aware of technologiesʼ powers of influence 
[read: regulatory powers], and may consciously accept or reject such regulation, apparently 
humansʼ behaviours can also be influenced [read: regulated] in more implicit and tacit ways. 
Perhaps, then, the scope of research on techno-regulation so far has been too narrow and 
ought to be widened, to include both intentional influencing and more tacit forms thereof. I 
propose to do just that, by replacing the notion of ʻtechno-regulationʼ with what I call ʻtechno-
elicitationʼ. Techno-elicitation relates to all forms of evoking human behaviour through 
technological design. It is a scale of responses in users, running from explicit and conscious 
ones to implicit, and tacit evocations.  
Users and designers 
So far, in this article weʼve focused on the role technologies may play in either 
intentionally or implicitly influencing users. Techno-elicitation covers the entire range of 
behaviours users may display in response to (influences of) technological artefacts. However, 
studies have also shown that it is not just usersʼ responses to the affording and constraining 
powers of technologies that are often implicit and tacit. Research in Science & Technology 
Studies (Akrich, 1995; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003), Actor Network Theory (Latour, 1992, 2005; 
Latour & Venn, 2002), value-sensitive design (Friedman, 1997; Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2006; 
Friedman, Kahn Jr., & Borning, 2002), and philosophy of design (Kroes, Light, Vermaas, & 
Moore, 2009; Verbeek, 2005) consistently reveals that designers, too, are often unaware of 
values, norms and stereotypes they embed into the artefacts they create. In many cases 
designers use implicit user models in the design process. Van Oost illustrated this in research 
on the values embedded into male and female shavers, which tacitly reflect ideas on gender 
differences: male shavers are grey and black, contain dials and screws, can be opened up 
and taken apart. Female shavers, in contrast, come in pastel colours, have smooth and curvy 
shapes, lack dials and switches, and cannot be taken apart (Van Oost, 2003). These 
differences are based on tacit assumptions on the part of he designers, Van Oost says, and 
they reflect stereotypical ideas on gender and technology use: men like technologies, and 
therefore want a shaver that looks as ʻtechnologicalʼ as possible, whereas women are afraid 
of technology, and hence prefer shavers that look more like a cosmetics product than a 
technological artefact. Van Oost concludes: 
...the gender script of the [female shaver] inhibits [...] the ability of women to see 
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themselves as interested in technology and as technologically competent, whereas the 
gender script of the [males shavers] invites men to see themselves that way. In other 
words: Philips [, the manufacturer,] not only produces shavers but also gender. (Van 
Oost, 2003p. 207)  
One of the key findings in Van Oostʼs research was that the designers themselves 
were not aware of the fact that they had embedded stereotypical values into their design. One 
explanation why such value-embedding may easily be tacit and implicit in designers is what 
Oudshoorn has called ʻI-methodologyʼ (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003) ⁠, i.e. designersʼ tendency to 
take themselves, their own needs, attitudes, preferences and capacities, as the main point of 
reference in design (Van den Berg, 2010) ⁠. 
What this reveals is that the concept of techno-elicitation, as weʼve defined it so far – 
focusing only on the user side – is still too narrow. Techno-elicitation, we must conclude, is a 
spectrum running from intentional and explicit evocation on one end (techno-regulation), to 
implicit, accidental and unintentional elicitation on the other (scripts, animism etc.), and it 
holds for both the users and the designers of technological artefacts. To complicate things 
further, different technologies all have their own medium-specific characteristics, which 
means that different technologies lead to different forms of techno-elicitation. In order to shed 
light on the workings of techno-elictation we need to investigate its occurrences and effects in 
different technological domains, then. In the second part of this article I will attempt to do so 
by focusing on regulation and robotics. 
Regulating robotics 
As we saw at the beginning of this article, technological developments require scrutiny 
on the part of legal scholars, to investigate whether laws and regulations need adjustment, to 
determine whether their design and/or proliferation needs to be regulated, and to come to an 
understanding of the regulatory powers of these technologies. Against this background, legal 
scholars have also turned to regulatory questions surrounding the advent of (increasingly) 
autonomous technologies, robotics and artificially intelligent machines. In fact, they were 
surprisingly early to realise that the creation of such intelligent, autonomously operating 
artefacts needed to be evaluated critically from a legal point of view as well. The earliest 
articles written in this field date from the beginning of the 1980s – a time when the realisation 
of artificially intelligent machines was a distinctly more remote possibility than it is today. 
Since that time, a serious body of literature has been created on the legal issues that may 
arise in a world inhabited by robots (as well as people). 
In this body of literature, legal scholars have largely focused on three key themes:  
liability, the legal status of robots, and rights for robots. First of all, the advent of robotic and 
autonomous technologies raises questions regarding liability when things go wrong: who is 
responsible for a robotʼs behaviours? Do robots fall under product liability, and hence can we 
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hold manufacturers responsible for the damage they may cause? Or should robots be 
considered a special type of products, for whose behaviours producers cannot be held 
responsible, because, for example, their machinery is so complex that their behaviours will be 
inherently unpredictable? Or because neural networks enable them to learn new things that 
nobody has programmed into them? Or because so many companies, individuals and groups 
contribute to the creation of these machines that it becomes impossible to hold one company, 
individual or group responsible for their behaviours (Wallach & Allen, 2009)?
185
 One solution 
that legal scholars propose to keep responsibility in the hands of humans while 
acknowledging some sense of ʻagencyʼ in robots, is to use legal constructions such as those 
pertaining to parents and children, owners and their wild animals, principles and agents in 
commerce, or employers and employees, and apply these to liability issues surrounding 
robots. In this way, the owners of robots would be held responsible for any damage these 
machines may do (Lehman-Wilzig, 1981). What complicates the study of liability and robotics 
is that issues of liability vary greatly across domains of application: robotic cars may have 
different legal provisions (i.e. in traffic law) than robots for the household (i.e. consumer law), 
and those used in the warfare (i.e. international law). Moreover, laws on liability vary from 




A second domain of study in law and robotics relates to the question of the legal status 
of robots and other intelligent and/or autonomous machines. The central question here is: 
should robots be given a legal status, other than being a mere object, and hence become 
ʻlegal personsʼ, and if so, what are the requirements they should meet in order to be granted 
such a status? Granting robots (or any other nonhumans) with legal status, and calling them a 
legal person, may seem counter-intuitive to non-lawyers at first, but in fact, several authors 
point out that legal personhood certainly isnʼt reserved for humans only (Calverley, 2008; 
Koops, Hildebrandt, & Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2009; Solum, 1992). Koops, Hildebrandt and Jacquet-
Chiffelle write: “In most modern legal systems, legal personhood is attributed to associations, 
funds or even ships” (Koops et al., 2009, p. 9), and companies, trusts and other collectives 
are also recognised as legal persons by most legal systems. All of these (nonhuman) entities 
are treated as separate, autonomous entities by the law, rather than as an aggregate of the 
people that make up these entities, or as a collection of people behind them (Calverley, 2008; 
 




 Also see Wendell Wallachʼs article in this volume. 
186
 Chiara Boscaratoʼs article in this volume discusses liability and robotics under Italian law.  
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Solum, 1992). Moreover, who or what counts as a legal person turns out to be a rather 
changeable, fluid category when viewed from a historical perspective. For centuries all sorts 
of nonhumans have played a role in Western law, from which we have recently eliminated 
them. For instance, there is a long series of animal species that have been tried in court 
throughout history, ranging from donkeys and beetles to rats, grasshoppers, dolphins and 
eels (Teubner, 2006). In a famous case the rats were exonerated on the grounds that it was 
impossible to set a date for their appearance before the judge (Teubner, 2006). Certain 
buildings, such as Roman temples and Medieval churches also used to have legal rights in 
various cultures of the past (Solum, 1992). And it is not just animals and structures that have 
figured in legal cases throughout history – so have all sorts of ghosts and gods, and a wide 
variety of other visible and invisible ʻinfluencesʼ (allegedly) affecting everyday life. More 
importantly, we also need to consider the fact that a significant portion of human beings today 
have rights that up until very recent times did not. Think for instance of women (Magnani, 
2007), slaves (Lehman-Wilzig, 1981), children, foreigners and refugees, or people with 
disabilities or mental illnesses. These examples show that the category of legal personhood is 
not set in stone. At different times, different entities have been considered as legal persons or 
not. According to legal scholars, this means that we ought to at least consider the question of 
applying the term ʻlegal personʼ to robots, and to autonomously operating or artificially 
intelligent machines as well.  
A third theme in research on robotics and regulation revolves around the question of 
legal rights for robots (Teubner, 2006). The debate in this area mainly focuses on 
comparisons between humans, as full bearers of rights, animals, as bearers of some rights in 
certain jurisdictions, and machines, which up until this point in time do not have rights. 
Deciding whether or not to grant such rights, Solum argues, would depend on both the rights 
themselves (e.g., the right to freedom of expression or the right to emancipation) and on the 
justification used for granting that right (Solum, 1992).  
One line of reasoning for withholding all constitutional rights from autonomous, smart 
technologies without further justification is to claim that such rights can be given only to 
humans, full stop. Solum calls this the ʻanthropocentric argumentʼ, which comes down to 
saying “We are humans. Even if [artificially intelligent machines] have all the qualities that 
make us moral persons, we shouldnʼt allow them the rights of constitutional personhood 
because it isnʼt in our interest to do so” (Solum, 1992, p. 1260). Although this may sound 
intuitive and express deeply held feelings by many, Solum rightly points out that this is a very 
shady moral argument, “akin to American slave owners saying that slaves could not have 
constitutional rights simply because they were not white or simply because it was not in the 
interests of whites to give them rights” (Solum, 1992, p. 1261). An even more dubious version 
of this argument is the ʻparanoid anthropocentric argumentʼ, which claims that we should not 
give these nonhumans rights because they might become so powerful they would take over 
the world. This is an argument we should not take seriously at all, says Solum, because  
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…the danger seems remote, but if the danger were real it would not be an argument 
against granting [artificially intelligent machines] legal personhood. If [these machines] 
really will pose a danger to humans, the solution is not to create them in the first place. 
(Solum, 1992, p. 1261)  
It appears, then, that at least in theory we cannot rule out that robots and other 
artificially intelligent machines may one day acquire legal status and be given legal rights in 
some form or other, that is, if they meet the requirements placed on humans and some 
nonhumans to qualify for these matters.  
Techno-regulation and robots: Uncharted territory 
The reader may have noticed that all three of the research themes discussed above fall 
within the domain of ʻregulation of technologiesʼ that I discussed at the beginning of this 
article. They all focus on the question of how advances in robotics fit within existing regulatory 
frameworks and bodies of law, and whether changes are required in those frameworks and 
bodies of law to meet the new social and legal demands created by the advent of such 
technologies. Alternatively, they focus on questions regarding the need (or lack thereof) or 
regulating the development and deployment of robotics technologies. 
 Why would it be relevant to study questions of techno-regulation and techno-elicitation 
in relation to robotics in the first place? I will answer this question by discussing two domains 
of application in robotics: healthcare and the military.  
Robots in healthcare 
A recent OECD report on healthcare spending stated that “in all OECD countries total 
spending on healthcare is rising faster than economic growth.” (OECD, 2010). The World 
Health Organization (WHO) warns that while life expectancy is increasing, simultaneously 
birth rates are decreasing in most countries (WHO, 2010). This challenges existing healthcare 
systems: more people need healthcare services, yet fewer humans are available to provide 
those services.  
One area of research and business rapidly developing to face this challenge is that of 
healthcare robotics. Healthcare robots, or ʻcarebotsʼ, could conduct various care tasks, such 
as delivering medication and food, monitoring, lifting or transporting patients, and providing 
companionship. Healthcare robots can also be used for therapeutic ends. Interaction with 
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robotic pets, such as Sonyʼs AIBO
187
 or the robot seal Paro
188
, has been empirically shown to 
have a positive effect on the activity and social interaction levels in elderly people, to improve 
patientsʼ moods, and to reduce stress levels and loneliness (Banks, Willoughby, & Banks, 
2008; Broekens, Heerink, & Rosendal, 2009; Stiehl et al., 2005; Wada & Shibata, 2008; 
Wada, Shibata, Mushi, & Kimura, 2008).  
Applying robots in care practices for the elderly and the sick also has a wide range of 
ethical consequences. In recent years a number of studies have been conducted on the 
ethical aspects of the application of robots in healthcare situations (Borenstein & Pearson, 
2010; Coeckelbergh, 2009; Tiwari, Warren, & Day, 2010)
189
. These focus on, for instance, 
qualitative differences between care provided by humans and by robots, on the way the 
central values of our healthcare system, and our ideas on care, are affected by the application 
of healthcare robots, and on the requirements – both social, practical, emotional and ethical – 
that robots must meet if we are to allow them to care for our elderly and sick. 
Yet studying the ethical aspects of applying robots to healthcare situations alone is not 
enough. Precisely because socially and emotionally complex contexts in which healthcare 
robots must operate, caring for patients in vulnerable situations, we must also elucidate the 
ways in which the design of healthcare robots, in terms of their physical form and 
functionalities, has a bearing on the behavioural responses they may elicit. As we have seen 
in this article, such behavioural responses may be evoked explicitly and intentionally, but also 
more implicitly and perhaps at times even unintentionally on the part of the designer. 
Moreover, users may be explicitly aware of the fact that certain behaviours are invoked by 
(the design of) healthcare and other robots, yet they may also be so subtle that they escape 
usersʼ awareness.  
Investigating the consequences of explicit (regulatory) design choices with respect to 
these machines is important for two reasons. First, it increases our ability to develop robots 
that uphold central values in healthcare practices, such as respecting patientsʼ autonomy, 
privacy and integrity. Second, it contributes to defining the role, meaning and ethical ʻbearingʼ 
of healthcare robots. Since technologies “are by definition value-laden systems and designing 
such systems is, by definition, a value-laden activity” (Kroes et al., 2009, p. 13), explicating 
(regulatory) design choices can contribute to designing legally, socially and ethically sound 
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healthcare robots.  
Robots in warfare 
Research and development of robots for military purposes – both surveillance and 
warfare – has sped up and expanded more than any other area of in robotics in recent times. 
A significant number of robots is currently participating in the war in Afghanistan, in a variety 
of roles, ranging from finding explosives to patrolling the skies. While human beings are still 
always ʻin the loopʼ when it comes to making final decisions in combat and in surveillance 
today, several researchers suggest that we are rapidly moving towards an era in which robot 
soldiers will engage in combat autonomously (Arkin, 2009; Krishnan, 2009; Singer, 2009). 
The fact that there is a wide range of thorny ethical and legal issues to be addressed has not 
gone unnoticed to these authors and others.
190
 Debates run high regarding the question of a 
need for, and possibility of, implementing morality into robots
191
 that participate in warfare, to 
turn them into ʻethical warriorsʼ, and of course, questions of liability, of international law (jus in 
bello), and of ʻjust warsʼ are on the agenda as well. 
Many authors discuss the design and functionality that robot soldiers ought to have. 
What they implicitly say is that the design of these machines, the code we implement into 
them, has far-reaching consequences for the output, the behaviours they will generate in the 
real world. And now is the time to think about these matters: as developments in the creation 
of such machines are picking up speed. Or in the words of Lessig: 
Choices among values, choices about regulation, [and] about control […] – all this is the 
stuff of politics. Code codifies politics, and yet, oddly, most people speak of code as if it 
were just a question of engineering. Or as if code is best left to the market. Or best left 
unaddressed by government. […] How the code regulates, who the code writers are, and 
who controls the code writers – these are questions on which any practice of justice must 
focus… (Lessig, 2006, p. 78-79) 
As with healthcare robots, here, too, the central aim is to generate discussion on the 
values we embed into machines, and the effects this may have in the settings in which they 
will be deployed. And here, too, studying the ethical aspects of applying robots to war is not 
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enough. Since military robots operate alongside human beings, the same types of implicit 
behavioural responses that have been discussed throughout this article also appear in 
soldiers in response to their interactions with such robots. Singer describes a clear case in 
point: during the war in Iraq, soldiers who had operated alongside a PackBot to find and 
dismantle explosives, became strongly emotionally attached to this machines, and were 
deeply saddened when one bad day it was blown up by a roadside bomb. They had named 
the robot Scooby-Doo, and had gone through so many difficult missions with it, in which it 
saved their lives a number of times. The soldiers were “very upset” when they learnt that it 
could not be repaired (Singer, 2009, p. 338). Singer writes: 
…while new technologies are breaking down the traditional soldierly bonds, entirely new 
bonds are being created in unmanned wars. People, including the most hardened 
soldiers, are projecting all sorts of thoughts, feelings, and emotions onto their new 
machines, creating a whole new side to the experience of war. […] Soldiers […] are truly 
bonding with these machines. (Singer, 2009, p. 338) 
This example shows that in the case of military robots, too, it is important to get a better 
understanding of the ways in which the design of such robots may influence the behaviours of 
the individuals that have to work with it in the field. Both the functionality and physical shape 
of these machines must be taken into account to get a clearer grasp on the forms of techno-
elicitation they invoke. 
The same two reasons why it is important to investigate techno-elicitation in healthcare 
robots also apply to military robots, then. First, a better understanding of the workings of 
techno-elicitation in soldiers and other military personnel increases our ability to design and 
develop machines that meet their (all-to-human) social and emotional needs, and respect 
values such as comradery and teamwork in the army. Second, making implicit behavioural 
responses explicit, and designing these machines to meet actual needs and preferences, will 
lead to more socially and ethically attuned military robots. 
Conclusion 
In this article I set out to investigate some boundaries of the concept of ʻtechno-
regulationʼ, which is one of the key focal areas in Law & Technology. Techno-regulation 
focuses on the ways in which technologies can be used as regulatory tools, as instruments to 
intentionally steer and influence the behaviours of individuals. While I firmly believe in the 
enterprise of techno-regulation research as such, I have argued there is a need to widen the 
reach of this field of study, by also including implicit, tacit forms of influencing peopleʼs 
behaviours through technologies, and, moreover, to not only focus on the regulatory 
responses invoked in users, but also on the ways in which designers (sometimes 
intentionally, but often also tacitly) implement values, stereotypes and norms into 
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technologies. I have shown that developing a clearer conceptual understanding of the full 
range of techno-elicitation leads to a better grasp of techno-regulation as one of its 
manifestations, and this, in the process, consolidates the academic enterprise of Law & 
Technology. 
In the second part of this chapter I have discussed regulation and robotics. After a 
discussion of the current legal debates in this field, I have used the design of robots in two 
different domains – healthcare and the military – as an empirical lens to contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the concept of ʻtechno-regulationʼ and other forms of behaviour 
elicitation. I conclude that a deeper understanding of the explicit and implicit regulatory 
powers of robots in these domains may contribute to more ethically, socially and legally 
sounds design of these machines. 
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